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DIFFICULT SEARCH FOR THE PEACE FORMULA; IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SOLVE THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PROBLEM BY A MILITARY BLOW
by Sergei Markedonov
WPS Agency
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
March 24, 2010 Wednesday
Russia
THE REASON FOR MILITARY RHETORIC OF AZERBAIJAN IS ABSENCE OF PROGRESS
AT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH REGULATION?; At first
glance, the process of Nagorno-Karabakh regulation did not undergo
any significant transformations in 2010. All possible options for
resolving of the conflict have been already proposed and have been
discussed many times. It seems that it is impossible to hope for birth
of a salvation peace formula in the short term and even in the medium
term. More detailed consideration of the dynamic of the peace process
in Nagorno-Karabakh enables observers to say that the current stage
of regulation has a number of important differences.
At first glance, the process of Nagorno-Karabakh regulation did not
undergo any significant transformations in 2010. All possible options
for resolving of the conflict have been already proposed and have
been discussed many times. It seems that it is impossible to hope for
birth of a salvation peace formula in the short term and even in the
medium term.
Undermining of the status quo
More detailed consideration of the dynamic of the peace process in
Nagorno-Karabakh enables observers to say that the current stage of
regulation has a number of important differences.
For a long time Nagorno-Karabakh regulation was developing in
conditions of the first status quo formed in the South Caucasus after
1991. This time was characterized by "freezing" of the conflicts and
establishment of republics with disputable status.
The "winds of change" started blowing from Georgia. The team of Mikhail
Saakashvili started shaking all political and legal formats of peace
regulation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia methodically.
It provoked a war against the rebellious South Ossetian autonomy
(August of 2004) and there was the first restarting of hostilities in
the zone of the "frozen" conflict after 1992. In July of 2006, Georgia
breached the basic Moscow agreement on ceasefire and separation of
the forces inserted army units into the upper part of the Kodori Gorge.
What did Armenia and Azerbaijan learn from this? August of 2008
brought understanding to Baku that the West was too far. The Big
Caucasus is important for it but, unlike the Balkans, this region
is not a territory of "vital interests" for the European Union and
moreover so for the US. It was not accidental that after the "five-day"
war Azerbaijan did not have any militarist propaganda for a few months.
Yerevan got to understand the bad fact: the defeat of Georgia by
Russia created many new problems for Armenia (bearing in mind that
all logistic between the two allies in the Collective Security Treaty
Organization was done through Georgia). Understanding of the fact that
the "factor of the West" should not be overestimated force Yerevan
to seek for the ways to achieve compromises with neighboring Turkey.
Turkish factor
Thus, formation of the new status quo in the Caucasus is not limited by
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, termination of diplomatic
relations between Russia and Georgia, growth of the role of Ankara in
the region and beginning of the Armenian-Turkish dialog. The latter
became a serious factor of influence on the process of Nagorno-Karabakh
regulation.
There is an obvious geopolitical paradox. The absolute majority of
supporters of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations has spoken
(and keeps speaking) about the need to divide the two problems: the
peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh and the reconciliation between
Yerevan and Ankara. However, these two processes were combined in
reality. With assistance of multilateral pressure (especially on the
part of the US) Turkey was persuaded of the need to sign two protocols
on normalization of relations with Armenia without mentioning of
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict at all. In
any case, without ratification by the parliament they will remain an
ordinary sheet of paper.
Meanwhile, this procedure turned out to be not very simple. This
resulted in stagnation of the rapidly started Armenian-Turkish
normalization.
The reason for belligerence
It is necessary to recognize efficiency of the Azerbaijani President
who has managed not to let the Nagorno-Karabakh problem to finally
digress from the Armenian-Turkish normalization.
Ilham Aliyev nearly threatened to start hostilities in case of
drawing up of negotiations. In his interview to television channel
Euronews in early February of 2010 he unequivocally announced that
his country had a right for regaining of its occupied territories. In
a conversation with the French Ambassador in Baku on February 27
Aliyev spoke in a more certain way, "Now it is the turn of war and
this threat is gradually approaching. If aggressive Armenia does not
liberate our territories, beginning of a big war in the South Caucasus
is inevitable."
Of course, big belligerence of official Baku is explained not by
the natural inclination of authorities and citizens of Azerbaijan
to war as a universal tool for solving of all problems. Many other
pressing problems appeared inside of Azerbaijan on the ethnic grounds
besides Nagorno-Karabakh during the post-Soviet period. However,
they were solved peacefully and constructively in general, although
not without excesses.
However, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven districts that surround
it is really a national trauma for Azerbaijan and many thousands of
refugees do not let it forget about it. Along with this, we could
not miss the fact that in the 1990s official Baku did not use all
resources available to it for peaceful resolving of the conflict.
All this makes Azerbaijan harsher and more intolerable, whereas Armenia
(together with the Armenian community of unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic) can afford a defensive position because the war has ended
favorably for it in 1993.
A non-idle question
In any case, is it possible to keep the militarist rhetoric within
strictly measured framework? Azerbaijani belligerence appeared on the
ground of disbelief in progress in peaceful resolving of the conflict.
Meanwhile, the quantity of rounds of negotiations is growing. Besides
the format of the Minsk group there also appeared the trilateral
presidential format (Russia-Azerbaijan-Armenia). In any case, all
this did not lead at least to a minimum success yet. Absence of even
small positive aspects in the process of conflict resolving creates
a solid basis for attempts to achieve revenge in a unilateral way.
Such scenario does not promise anything good to those who is
the first to start breaking the status quo. Quick solving of the
"Nagorno-Karabakh problem" by force is possible only in conditions
of blitzkrieg but chances for it are poor. The division line is well
fortified on the two sides and an attempt to change it will lead to
a drawn-out positional war and inevitable interference of external
forces. Unlike in the Balkan conflict, there will be unilateral
support of only one participant of the armed conflict there.
The Nagorno-Karabakh also differs seriously from the Georgian-Abkhaz
and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. Two de facto states supported
by Moscow fought against Georgia. In this situation the interest
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their striving for independence
were either simply ignored by the US and EU, or viewed as miserably
small values.
In Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan not only combats extremism but also
counteracts to Armenia, a recognized state that has a powerful support
in the West.
Azerbaijan will not be perceived as an outpost of the West unlike
Georgia. For Baku Moscow is an indirect opponent and Yerevan is a
strategic enemy. Hence, there will be no "bipolar model" there in
case of "unfreezing."
The fact that Armenia and Azerbaijan have an armament race against
each other is not favorable for transformation of military rhetoric
into hostilities. Although it may seem paradoxical, this "competition
between Baku and Yerevan may play a stabilizing role.
How long will this stability last? The question does not have a
definite answer yet. So far, the parties involved into the conflict
master the new realities and try to benefit (and, on the contrary,
to reduce the drawbacks) from the current situation.
Source: Voenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer, No. 10, March 17-23, 2010, p. 3
by Sergei Markedonov
WPS Agency
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
March 24, 2010 Wednesday
Russia
THE REASON FOR MILITARY RHETORIC OF AZERBAIJAN IS ABSENCE OF PROGRESS
AT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH REGULATION?; At first
glance, the process of Nagorno-Karabakh regulation did not undergo
any significant transformations in 2010. All possible options for
resolving of the conflict have been already proposed and have been
discussed many times. It seems that it is impossible to hope for birth
of a salvation peace formula in the short term and even in the medium
term. More detailed consideration of the dynamic of the peace process
in Nagorno-Karabakh enables observers to say that the current stage
of regulation has a number of important differences.
At first glance, the process of Nagorno-Karabakh regulation did not
undergo any significant transformations in 2010. All possible options
for resolving of the conflict have been already proposed and have
been discussed many times. It seems that it is impossible to hope for
birth of a salvation peace formula in the short term and even in the
medium term.
Undermining of the status quo
More detailed consideration of the dynamic of the peace process in
Nagorno-Karabakh enables observers to say that the current stage of
regulation has a number of important differences.
For a long time Nagorno-Karabakh regulation was developing in
conditions of the first status quo formed in the South Caucasus after
1991. This time was characterized by "freezing" of the conflicts and
establishment of republics with disputable status.
The "winds of change" started blowing from Georgia. The team of Mikhail
Saakashvili started shaking all political and legal formats of peace
regulation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia methodically.
It provoked a war against the rebellious South Ossetian autonomy
(August of 2004) and there was the first restarting of hostilities in
the zone of the "frozen" conflict after 1992. In July of 2006, Georgia
breached the basic Moscow agreement on ceasefire and separation of
the forces inserted army units into the upper part of the Kodori Gorge.
What did Armenia and Azerbaijan learn from this? August of 2008
brought understanding to Baku that the West was too far. The Big
Caucasus is important for it but, unlike the Balkans, this region
is not a territory of "vital interests" for the European Union and
moreover so for the US. It was not accidental that after the "five-day"
war Azerbaijan did not have any militarist propaganda for a few months.
Yerevan got to understand the bad fact: the defeat of Georgia by
Russia created many new problems for Armenia (bearing in mind that
all logistic between the two allies in the Collective Security Treaty
Organization was done through Georgia). Understanding of the fact that
the "factor of the West" should not be overestimated force Yerevan
to seek for the ways to achieve compromises with neighboring Turkey.
Turkish factor
Thus, formation of the new status quo in the Caucasus is not limited by
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, termination of diplomatic
relations between Russia and Georgia, growth of the role of Ankara in
the region and beginning of the Armenian-Turkish dialog. The latter
became a serious factor of influence on the process of Nagorno-Karabakh
regulation.
There is an obvious geopolitical paradox. The absolute majority of
supporters of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations has spoken
(and keeps speaking) about the need to divide the two problems: the
peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh and the reconciliation between
Yerevan and Ankara. However, these two processes were combined in
reality. With assistance of multilateral pressure (especially on the
part of the US) Turkey was persuaded of the need to sign two protocols
on normalization of relations with Armenia without mentioning of
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict at all. In
any case, without ratification by the parliament they will remain an
ordinary sheet of paper.
Meanwhile, this procedure turned out to be not very simple. This
resulted in stagnation of the rapidly started Armenian-Turkish
normalization.
The reason for belligerence
It is necessary to recognize efficiency of the Azerbaijani President
who has managed not to let the Nagorno-Karabakh problem to finally
digress from the Armenian-Turkish normalization.
Ilham Aliyev nearly threatened to start hostilities in case of
drawing up of negotiations. In his interview to television channel
Euronews in early February of 2010 he unequivocally announced that
his country had a right for regaining of its occupied territories. In
a conversation with the French Ambassador in Baku on February 27
Aliyev spoke in a more certain way, "Now it is the turn of war and
this threat is gradually approaching. If aggressive Armenia does not
liberate our territories, beginning of a big war in the South Caucasus
is inevitable."
Of course, big belligerence of official Baku is explained not by
the natural inclination of authorities and citizens of Azerbaijan
to war as a universal tool for solving of all problems. Many other
pressing problems appeared inside of Azerbaijan on the ethnic grounds
besides Nagorno-Karabakh during the post-Soviet period. However,
they were solved peacefully and constructively in general, although
not without excesses.
However, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven districts that surround
it is really a national trauma for Azerbaijan and many thousands of
refugees do not let it forget about it. Along with this, we could
not miss the fact that in the 1990s official Baku did not use all
resources available to it for peaceful resolving of the conflict.
All this makes Azerbaijan harsher and more intolerable, whereas Armenia
(together with the Armenian community of unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic) can afford a defensive position because the war has ended
favorably for it in 1993.
A non-idle question
In any case, is it possible to keep the militarist rhetoric within
strictly measured framework? Azerbaijani belligerence appeared on the
ground of disbelief in progress in peaceful resolving of the conflict.
Meanwhile, the quantity of rounds of negotiations is growing. Besides
the format of the Minsk group there also appeared the trilateral
presidential format (Russia-Azerbaijan-Armenia). In any case, all
this did not lead at least to a minimum success yet. Absence of even
small positive aspects in the process of conflict resolving creates
a solid basis for attempts to achieve revenge in a unilateral way.
Such scenario does not promise anything good to those who is
the first to start breaking the status quo. Quick solving of the
"Nagorno-Karabakh problem" by force is possible only in conditions
of blitzkrieg but chances for it are poor. The division line is well
fortified on the two sides and an attempt to change it will lead to
a drawn-out positional war and inevitable interference of external
forces. Unlike in the Balkan conflict, there will be unilateral
support of only one participant of the armed conflict there.
The Nagorno-Karabakh also differs seriously from the Georgian-Abkhaz
and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. Two de facto states supported
by Moscow fought against Georgia. In this situation the interest
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their striving for independence
were either simply ignored by the US and EU, or viewed as miserably
small values.
In Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan not only combats extremism but also
counteracts to Armenia, a recognized state that has a powerful support
in the West.
Azerbaijan will not be perceived as an outpost of the West unlike
Georgia. For Baku Moscow is an indirect opponent and Yerevan is a
strategic enemy. Hence, there will be no "bipolar model" there in
case of "unfreezing."
The fact that Armenia and Azerbaijan have an armament race against
each other is not favorable for transformation of military rhetoric
into hostilities. Although it may seem paradoxical, this "competition
between Baku and Yerevan may play a stabilizing role.
How long will this stability last? The question does not have a
definite answer yet. So far, the parties involved into the conflict
master the new realities and try to benefit (and, on the contrary,
to reduce the drawbacks) from the current situation.
Source: Voenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer, No. 10, March 17-23, 2010, p. 3