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Sunday's Zaman, Turkey
March 28 2010
Peace in Karabakh -- increasingly difficult?
by AMANDA PAUL
At the end of last week I moderated a roundtable discussion on the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and prospects for a solution. I started off
feeling somewhat unoptimistic and ended up feeling totally depressed.
It would seem that the much talked about window of opportunity that
had apparently opened up in the aftermath of the Georgia-Russia war,
with both Azerbaijan and Armenia and the international community
having a greater understanding of the need not to allow these
so-called `frozen conflicts' to fester, has almost been slammed shut,
which is very unfortunate.
The Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders are currently negotiating a set
of `basic principles' within the framework of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mink Group, and while it
would seem that over the past 18 months there has been some good
progress, this all seems to have been put into jeopardy due to recent
developments in the region. The Armenian speaker made it very clear
that Turkey's decision to link the process of Turkey's rapprochement
with Armenia to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem has
seriously affected progress on the negotiations between Azerbaijan and
Armenia and that there is an urgent need to delink the two processes.
If this is not done, not only will the ongoing Karabakh talks continue
to flounder, but it could additionally result in a total failure of
the rapprochement, which is currently going off the tracks.
The Azerbaijanis, not surprisingly, have a different outlook. They
believe, as they have right from the start, that it is inconceivable
for Turkey to open its border with Armenia as long as Armenia
continues to occupy the seven districts that surround
Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey decided -- without pressure from Baku -- to
close the border following the occupation of the Azerbaijani province
of Kelbajar, and as far as Azerbaijan is concerned, it is therefore
only logical and right that Turkey only reopens the border once
Kelbajar has been liberated. This is clearly not going to happen any
time soon -- particularly as the return of Kelbajar is not
straightforward. Even in the context of the `basic principles' which
has as a first step the immediate return of five of the occupied
Azerbaijani provinces, Kelbajar is not foreseen to be returned at that
point. However, it is very unlikely that Turkey will delink the two
processes at this point. Even though many in Ankara now regret the
decision to link them. With elections on the horizon in 2011, Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an will put his own popularity before the
reconciliation process. While Turkey will lose some credibility from
the international community, Ankara views itself as too important a
regional player these days -- particularly vis-a-vis the US, to be
overly concerned with this.
Furthermore, while both Azerbaijanis and Armenians see confidence
building measures (CBM) as being crucial to regaining trust between
the two countries and their peoples, the concept of what sort of CBMs
is very different for each side. Again, Azerbaijan cites that the
return of the occupied territories should be considered as such a CBM,
while Armenia says this is impossible as the return of these provinces
is one of the four key issues in the resolution of the conflict and
therefore cannot be seen as a CBM. Rather, Armenia suggests CBMs to
focus on sharing water or environmental concerns. Azerbaijan will not
agree to look at any other type of CBM until its provinces have been
liberated.
The Russian representative present said that Russia continued to
support a solution to Nagorno-Karabakh, citing that Russia's main
interest was in increased regional stability. However, until now
Russia has been something of a `status quo' actor in this conflict and
others in the former soviet space, so the Kremlin is not going to be
pressuring either side to any great extent. Russians wants to be seen
as though they are playing a constructive role, in comparison to the
role they have played in South Ossetia and Abkhazia but at the same
time they could do far more if they really wanted to.
Overall, the picture looks very bleak unless some courageous decisions
are taken, and taken soon. If all three countries (Turkey, Armenia and
Azerbaijan) continue to stick to their positions, it seems very
unlikely that anything will change but, rather, the situation in the
region may deteriorate further and another war should not be totally
ruled out. Can any one of these three countries step up to the bar and
lead the way? Let's hope so.
http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/yazarDetay .do?haberno5606
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
March 28 2010
Peace in Karabakh -- increasingly difficult?
by AMANDA PAUL
At the end of last week I moderated a roundtable discussion on the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and prospects for a solution. I started off
feeling somewhat unoptimistic and ended up feeling totally depressed.
It would seem that the much talked about window of opportunity that
had apparently opened up in the aftermath of the Georgia-Russia war,
with both Azerbaijan and Armenia and the international community
having a greater understanding of the need not to allow these
so-called `frozen conflicts' to fester, has almost been slammed shut,
which is very unfortunate.
The Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders are currently negotiating a set
of `basic principles' within the framework of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mink Group, and while it
would seem that over the past 18 months there has been some good
progress, this all seems to have been put into jeopardy due to recent
developments in the region. The Armenian speaker made it very clear
that Turkey's decision to link the process of Turkey's rapprochement
with Armenia to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem has
seriously affected progress on the negotiations between Azerbaijan and
Armenia and that there is an urgent need to delink the two processes.
If this is not done, not only will the ongoing Karabakh talks continue
to flounder, but it could additionally result in a total failure of
the rapprochement, which is currently going off the tracks.
The Azerbaijanis, not surprisingly, have a different outlook. They
believe, as they have right from the start, that it is inconceivable
for Turkey to open its border with Armenia as long as Armenia
continues to occupy the seven districts that surround
Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey decided -- without pressure from Baku -- to
close the border following the occupation of the Azerbaijani province
of Kelbajar, and as far as Azerbaijan is concerned, it is therefore
only logical and right that Turkey only reopens the border once
Kelbajar has been liberated. This is clearly not going to happen any
time soon -- particularly as the return of Kelbajar is not
straightforward. Even in the context of the `basic principles' which
has as a first step the immediate return of five of the occupied
Azerbaijani provinces, Kelbajar is not foreseen to be returned at that
point. However, it is very unlikely that Turkey will delink the two
processes at this point. Even though many in Ankara now regret the
decision to link them. With elections on the horizon in 2011, Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an will put his own popularity before the
reconciliation process. While Turkey will lose some credibility from
the international community, Ankara views itself as too important a
regional player these days -- particularly vis-a-vis the US, to be
overly concerned with this.
Furthermore, while both Azerbaijanis and Armenians see confidence
building measures (CBM) as being crucial to regaining trust between
the two countries and their peoples, the concept of what sort of CBMs
is very different for each side. Again, Azerbaijan cites that the
return of the occupied territories should be considered as such a CBM,
while Armenia says this is impossible as the return of these provinces
is one of the four key issues in the resolution of the conflict and
therefore cannot be seen as a CBM. Rather, Armenia suggests CBMs to
focus on sharing water or environmental concerns. Azerbaijan will not
agree to look at any other type of CBM until its provinces have been
liberated.
The Russian representative present said that Russia continued to
support a solution to Nagorno-Karabakh, citing that Russia's main
interest was in increased regional stability. However, until now
Russia has been something of a `status quo' actor in this conflict and
others in the former soviet space, so the Kremlin is not going to be
pressuring either side to any great extent. Russians wants to be seen
as though they are playing a constructive role, in comparison to the
role they have played in South Ossetia and Abkhazia but at the same
time they could do far more if they really wanted to.
Overall, the picture looks very bleak unless some courageous decisions
are taken, and taken soon. If all three countries (Turkey, Armenia and
Azerbaijan) continue to stick to their positions, it seems very
unlikely that anything will change but, rather, the situation in the
region may deteriorate further and another war should not be totally
ruled out. Can any one of these three countries step up to the bar and
lead the way? Let's hope so.
http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/yazarDetay .do?haberno5606
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress