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TURKEY AND RUSSIA ASSEMBLE AN 'AXIS OF OUTSIDERS'
www.worldbulletin.net
May 7 2010
Turkey
It was one of the most memorable parliamentary brawls of recent times.
Members of Ukraine's Supreme Council threw punches, eggs and smoke
bombs, while the speaker was shielded with an umbrella.
Last week's turmoil erupted when lawmakers were considering whether
to endorse an agreement that would, over the next 10 years, decrease
the price that Ukraine pays for Russian gas in exchange for a 25-year
extension of Moscow's lease on the Crimean port of Sevastopol, home
to Russia's Black Sea fleet.
On one level, these tensions are just the latest episode in a
century-long struggle between Ukraine's Russian-speaking east and
south on the one hand, and the country's centre and west on the other.
The former looks to Moscow; the latter considers itself part of the
West. Coming less than three months after a divisive presidential
election narrowly won by the pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovych,
the deal marks the end of Ukraine's flirtation with Nato and seals
its return into Russia's orbit.
More importantly, it signals a wider realignment in the Middle East
and Central Eurasia that heralds the return of former outsiders like
Russia, Ukraine and Turkey to the forefront. Disillusioned with the
EU's bureaucratic diktat and fed up with what they view as arbitrary
US interference in their Central Asian and Kurdish backyard, leaders
such as the Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin and his Turkish
counterpart Recep Erdogan are forging close ties. Traditional rivals
are becoming partners.
With the EU conspicuous by its absence and the US struggling to
make progress in Afghanistan or on Israel-Palestine, Russo-Turkish
co-operation is filling a growing void in the Caucasus and in the
strategic corridor that links the Gulf to Afghanistan and Central
Asia. In the process, Moscow and Ankara are reshaping the geopolitics
of the Middle East and Eurasia.
Many in the US and the EU will dismiss this rapprochement as little
more than a desperate move by two deeply disgruntled, post-imperial
powers in search of a role in a changing world. But there can be
little doubt that Russia and Turkey are building an "axis of outsiders"
that is challenging US hegemony and the EU's complacent indifference
regarding its own periphery.
Mutual geopolitical and economic interests are at the heart of this new
axis. Geopolitically, Moscow and Ankara have a stake in stabilising the
wider Caucasus and other parts of their shared neighbourhood. That's
why both have mediated in the ongoing conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Moreover, Turkey - a long-standing member of Nato - created the
Caucasus Security and Stability Platform after the 2008 war between
Georgia and Russia. Aimed at all countries in the region (including
Armenia and Iran) and granting Russia special status, this platform
was initiated independently from Turkey's traditional western allies.
Crucially, it marks a neo-Ottoman concern for the wider Caucasus
and underscores an imperial recognition that great power conflicts
threaten the collective security of entire regions.
This recognition also applies to the wider Middle East, where Ankara
and Moscow show their deep mistrust in Israel by maintaining links
to Hamas and other Palestinian groups. Even though any peace deal
depends on US brokerage, enhanced involvement from Turkey and Russia
can help prepare the ground for new negotiations.
Turkey and Russia have identified shared interests that go beyond
tourism and trade in cheap consumer goods. Both are engaged in the
geopolitics of energy security.
In the past, they seemed to be on opposing sides. Turkey was part
of the Nabucco pipeline project, delivering gas from Turkmenistan
via the Caspian Sea to Europe, thus bypassing Russia. Meanwhile, the
Kremlin championed the South Stream project, with a pipeline running
under the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria, thus bypassing Turkey.
Despite long-standing pricing and volume disputes, both have been
profoundly frustrated by a lack of investment and political support
from the EU and the US. In response, Moscow and Ankara are now
envisaging a second Blue Stream gas pipeline. The first such pipeline
was inaugurated in 2003 and currently transports 10 billion cubic
metres of gas yearly. Alternatively, Ankara could take up Moscow's
offer to join the South Stream project, using Turkey's exclusive
economic zone in the Black Sea. Either way, this would transform the
Turkish Republic into Europe's real energy hub, with possible gas
deliveries to Israel and links to Iran's vast energy reserves.
Moreover, Russia and Turkey have shared interests in Iran and
Afghanistan. As the tensions over Iran's nuclear ambitions escalate
and the Afghan security situation deteriorates, expect more joint
initiatives from the "axis of outsiders".
Despite the "Obama effect", the US and Nato remain deeply discredited
in the Middle East and Afghanistan, which opens the way for other
actors. The EU suffers from both integration and enlargement fatigue
and it lacks a substantive vision for relations with its neighbours,
thereby exacerbating the frustration and disillusionment of countries
on Europe's periphery.
Instead of simply opposing US domination or looking to the EU for
meaningless "strategic partnerships", Russia and regional powers
such as Turkey and Ukraine are forging close ties with each other
and intervening in their shared spheres of influence. Issues such as
future US troop withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan or a new wave of
sanctions on Iran won't be solved without their involvement or support.
In the wake of the global economic crisis, the centre of geopolitical
and geoeconomic power is shifting from the developed countries of the
West to the emerging markets in the Gulf region, eastern Asia and
the southern hemisphere. As part of this shift, there are a number
of realignments in the wider Middle East and Central Eurasia that
presage the return of former outsiders to the centre of global affairs.
www.worldbulletin.net
May 7 2010
Turkey
It was one of the most memorable parliamentary brawls of recent times.
Members of Ukraine's Supreme Council threw punches, eggs and smoke
bombs, while the speaker was shielded with an umbrella.
Last week's turmoil erupted when lawmakers were considering whether
to endorse an agreement that would, over the next 10 years, decrease
the price that Ukraine pays for Russian gas in exchange for a 25-year
extension of Moscow's lease on the Crimean port of Sevastopol, home
to Russia's Black Sea fleet.
On one level, these tensions are just the latest episode in a
century-long struggle between Ukraine's Russian-speaking east and
south on the one hand, and the country's centre and west on the other.
The former looks to Moscow; the latter considers itself part of the
West. Coming less than three months after a divisive presidential
election narrowly won by the pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovych,
the deal marks the end of Ukraine's flirtation with Nato and seals
its return into Russia's orbit.
More importantly, it signals a wider realignment in the Middle East
and Central Eurasia that heralds the return of former outsiders like
Russia, Ukraine and Turkey to the forefront. Disillusioned with the
EU's bureaucratic diktat and fed up with what they view as arbitrary
US interference in their Central Asian and Kurdish backyard, leaders
such as the Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin and his Turkish
counterpart Recep Erdogan are forging close ties. Traditional rivals
are becoming partners.
With the EU conspicuous by its absence and the US struggling to
make progress in Afghanistan or on Israel-Palestine, Russo-Turkish
co-operation is filling a growing void in the Caucasus and in the
strategic corridor that links the Gulf to Afghanistan and Central
Asia. In the process, Moscow and Ankara are reshaping the geopolitics
of the Middle East and Eurasia.
Many in the US and the EU will dismiss this rapprochement as little
more than a desperate move by two deeply disgruntled, post-imperial
powers in search of a role in a changing world. But there can be
little doubt that Russia and Turkey are building an "axis of outsiders"
that is challenging US hegemony and the EU's complacent indifference
regarding its own periphery.
Mutual geopolitical and economic interests are at the heart of this new
axis. Geopolitically, Moscow and Ankara have a stake in stabilising the
wider Caucasus and other parts of their shared neighbourhood. That's
why both have mediated in the ongoing conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Moreover, Turkey - a long-standing member of Nato - created the
Caucasus Security and Stability Platform after the 2008 war between
Georgia and Russia. Aimed at all countries in the region (including
Armenia and Iran) and granting Russia special status, this platform
was initiated independently from Turkey's traditional western allies.
Crucially, it marks a neo-Ottoman concern for the wider Caucasus
and underscores an imperial recognition that great power conflicts
threaten the collective security of entire regions.
This recognition also applies to the wider Middle East, where Ankara
and Moscow show their deep mistrust in Israel by maintaining links
to Hamas and other Palestinian groups. Even though any peace deal
depends on US brokerage, enhanced involvement from Turkey and Russia
can help prepare the ground for new negotiations.
Turkey and Russia have identified shared interests that go beyond
tourism and trade in cheap consumer goods. Both are engaged in the
geopolitics of energy security.
In the past, they seemed to be on opposing sides. Turkey was part
of the Nabucco pipeline project, delivering gas from Turkmenistan
via the Caspian Sea to Europe, thus bypassing Russia. Meanwhile, the
Kremlin championed the South Stream project, with a pipeline running
under the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria, thus bypassing Turkey.
Despite long-standing pricing and volume disputes, both have been
profoundly frustrated by a lack of investment and political support
from the EU and the US. In response, Moscow and Ankara are now
envisaging a second Blue Stream gas pipeline. The first such pipeline
was inaugurated in 2003 and currently transports 10 billion cubic
metres of gas yearly. Alternatively, Ankara could take up Moscow's
offer to join the South Stream project, using Turkey's exclusive
economic zone in the Black Sea. Either way, this would transform the
Turkish Republic into Europe's real energy hub, with possible gas
deliveries to Israel and links to Iran's vast energy reserves.
Moreover, Russia and Turkey have shared interests in Iran and
Afghanistan. As the tensions over Iran's nuclear ambitions escalate
and the Afghan security situation deteriorates, expect more joint
initiatives from the "axis of outsiders".
Despite the "Obama effect", the US and Nato remain deeply discredited
in the Middle East and Afghanistan, which opens the way for other
actors. The EU suffers from both integration and enlargement fatigue
and it lacks a substantive vision for relations with its neighbours,
thereby exacerbating the frustration and disillusionment of countries
on Europe's periphery.
Instead of simply opposing US domination or looking to the EU for
meaningless "strategic partnerships", Russia and regional powers
such as Turkey and Ukraine are forging close ties with each other
and intervening in their shared spheres of influence. Issues such as
future US troop withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan or a new wave of
sanctions on Iran won't be solved without their involvement or support.
In the wake of the global economic crisis, the centre of geopolitical
and geoeconomic power is shifting from the developed countries of the
West to the emerging markets in the Gulf region, eastern Asia and
the southern hemisphere. As part of this shift, there are a number
of realignments in the wider Middle East and Central Eurasia that
presage the return of former outsiders to the centre of global affairs.