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'MINSK GROUP NEGOTIATIONS ARE DEADLOCKED AT THE MOMENT:' THOMAS DE WALL
Tert.am
16:09 07.05.10
The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group met on May 6 in a closed meeting
to discuss the current state of negotiations between Armenia and
Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In an e-mail interview
to World Politic Review, Thomas de Waal, senior associate of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explains where negotiations
stand today.
WPR: What are the principle issues that still need to be resolved in
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
De Waal: The fundamental unresolved issue in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict is the same one that triggered the conflict back in Soviet
times in the Gorbachev era in February 1988: the status of the disputed
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. The Karabakh Armenians -- who
have been in full control of the territory and surrounding regions
since fighting ended between the two sides in 1994 -- insist that
Karabakh be recognized either as independent or unified with Armenia,
while the Azerbaijani authorities demand that it is a de jure part
of Azerbaijan and must be reaffirmed as such. The document on the
table attempts to resolve this issue with creative ambiguity about
postponing the issue of status, but the two sides still have polarized
positions and will not move until they get greater clarity supporting
their own stance.
WPR: How is that conflict impacting Turkey-Armenia normalization?
De Waal: The non-resolution of the Karabakh conflict is the principle
reason why the Armenia-Turkey normalization process came to a halt
in April when Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian suspended Armenian
official participation in the process. Turkey was insisting on making
a linkage between Armenia-Turkey normalization and the Karabakh
conflict that was not in the protocols the two sides signed in October
2009. That is not because Turkey cares deeply about the Karabakh issue
as such, but it does care about its relations with its Turkic ally,
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan did enough to lobby in the Turkish parliament
and to threaten Turkey with higher gas prices to dissuade the Turkish
government from pursuing the normalization policy. Now, unless there
is progress on the Karabakh conflict, it is highly unlikely that the
Armenia-Turkey process will move forward again.
WPR: Recent reports suggested progress has been made in the Minsk
Group negotiations. What's the likelihood for a breakthrough?
De Waal: Unfortunately the Minsk Group negotiations are deadlocked
at the moment. This time it is the Armenian side that does not want
to engage properly with the latest version of the so-called "Madrid
Principles" under discussion. On previous occasions, Azerbaijan has
pulled back. But there are deeper problems with the negotiations: It is
far too narrow a process to get the kind of traction needed to resolve
a major conflict. There is almost no Track Two process involving the
two societies and few international resources are being expended to
support the U.S., French and Russian mediators. Observers of the peace
talks have the perception that the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents
actually prefer the narrowly based desultory peace process, which
preserves the status quo and produces no results, to a more dynamic
process that would force them to take hard decisions and make public
compromises to the enemy.
Tert.am
16:09 07.05.10
The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group met on May 6 in a closed meeting
to discuss the current state of negotiations between Armenia and
Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In an e-mail interview
to World Politic Review, Thomas de Waal, senior associate of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explains where negotiations
stand today.
WPR: What are the principle issues that still need to be resolved in
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
De Waal: The fundamental unresolved issue in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict is the same one that triggered the conflict back in Soviet
times in the Gorbachev era in February 1988: the status of the disputed
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. The Karabakh Armenians -- who
have been in full control of the territory and surrounding regions
since fighting ended between the two sides in 1994 -- insist that
Karabakh be recognized either as independent or unified with Armenia,
while the Azerbaijani authorities demand that it is a de jure part
of Azerbaijan and must be reaffirmed as such. The document on the
table attempts to resolve this issue with creative ambiguity about
postponing the issue of status, but the two sides still have polarized
positions and will not move until they get greater clarity supporting
their own stance.
WPR: How is that conflict impacting Turkey-Armenia normalization?
De Waal: The non-resolution of the Karabakh conflict is the principle
reason why the Armenia-Turkey normalization process came to a halt
in April when Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian suspended Armenian
official participation in the process. Turkey was insisting on making
a linkage between Armenia-Turkey normalization and the Karabakh
conflict that was not in the protocols the two sides signed in October
2009. That is not because Turkey cares deeply about the Karabakh issue
as such, but it does care about its relations with its Turkic ally,
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan did enough to lobby in the Turkish parliament
and to threaten Turkey with higher gas prices to dissuade the Turkish
government from pursuing the normalization policy. Now, unless there
is progress on the Karabakh conflict, it is highly unlikely that the
Armenia-Turkey process will move forward again.
WPR: Recent reports suggested progress has been made in the Minsk
Group negotiations. What's the likelihood for a breakthrough?
De Waal: Unfortunately the Minsk Group negotiations are deadlocked
at the moment. This time it is the Armenian side that does not want
to engage properly with the latest version of the so-called "Madrid
Principles" under discussion. On previous occasions, Azerbaijan has
pulled back. But there are deeper problems with the negotiations: It is
far too narrow a process to get the kind of traction needed to resolve
a major conflict. There is almost no Track Two process involving the
two societies and few international resources are being expended to
support the U.S., French and Russian mediators. Observers of the peace
talks have the perception that the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents
actually prefer the narrowly based desultory peace process, which
preserves the status quo and produces no results, to a more dynamic
process that would force them to take hard decisions and make public
compromises to the enemy.