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MAMIGONIAN: 'DIVIDE ET IMPERA': THE TURKISH-ARMENIAN PROTOCOLS
By: Marc Mamigonian
The Armenian Weekly
April 2010 Magazine
Mon, May 10 2010
In the discussions surrounding the Turkish-Armenian protocols that have
taken place throughout the last year, there has been a disappointing,
yet hardly unforeseeable, tendency to oversimplify matters and draw
a clear-cut picture with "practical," pro-protocols Armenians on one
side, and "hawkish" diaspora "fanatics" who are dead-set against the
protocols and any normalization with Turkey on the other side. We can
see this as a minor refinement of the well-worn discourse of the Bad
Armenians and the Good Armenians that we have come to know and some
have come to love, or at least to make good use of.
As the Turkish scholar Taner Akcam has aptly described this discourse:
According to the defensive strategies developed by our intellectuals,
the 'bad' Armenians aren't the ones in Turkey or the ones in
neighboring Armenia. The 'bad' Armenians are the ones in the diaspora
because the ones who keep 'insisting on recognition of the genocide'
are actually they. In other words, instead of directly stating that
the problem has to do with defining Armenians as 'the bogeyman' and
'bad,' they accepted those definitions but changed the object of those
definitions; instead of saying Armenians are 'bad,' they stated that
the diaspora is 'bad.' In conclusion, the mentality that predominates
in Turkey continued unabated in our intellectuals and continues to
do so.1
In recent discussions, it is the critics of the protocols who have
become the "bad" Armenians, then, and interestingly enough, some
Armenians who had previously been lumped into the "bad" category
because of their emphasis on genocide recognition as such now find
themselves, due to their support of the protocols, transformed
(perhaps only temporarily) into "good" Armenians.
This leads us to Kerem Oktem's article "The Armenia-Turkey process:
don't stop now" on OpenDemocracy, which was in turn a response to
articles by Vicken Cheterian and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian.2
It is interesting to note that while Oktem rightly decries a
reductionist understanding of "the highly cosmopolitan Armenian
diaspora" as a univocal entity when, in fact, there is on the
protocols, as on other issues, a wide array of opinions (both pro-
and con- as well as within the pro- and con- "camps"), he seems to
fall into the hardly less reductionist trap of equating those who
oppose the protocols with those who oppose any normalization, of
presenting those who oppose the protocols as a nationalists and those
who support them as humanists. In other words, we have not really
moved beyond the categories of Bad Armenians and Good Armenians-we
have just done some rebranding.
In the former category, clearly, Oktem has placed the political
party the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), which has been
vocally opposed to the protocols. Oktem writes of the ARF that "it
has become trapped in the cage of an old-fashioned, if virulent
nationalism: retribution, compensation, and transfer of land to
Armenia are central to its vocabulary." He contrasts this with the
"humanist organizations" the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU),
the dioceses of the Armenian Churches of America, and the Armenian
Assembly of America (AAA)-groups that support "normalization" even
though genocide recognition "might be the first casualty." He does
not define what he means by a "humanist" organization.
What is at issue here is not these organizations per se or the merits
of their respective approaches to the protocols as such (or to other
issues), but rather how they are being depicted and deployed to suit
a version of the Good Armenian/Bad Armenian discourse. The Armenian
Assembly, in particular, is regularly grouped with the Bad Armenians
due to its long record of working for genocide recognition and lobbying
for the U.S. to pass resolutions affirming the genocide-work that it
shows no signs of abandoning and that has long been the sine qua non
of the Bad Armenian.
It is true that to support the protocols is to support "normalization,"
at least as it is defined by the protocols. But it does not follow
that to oppose the protocols is necessarily to oppose any sort of
normalization, unless one believes that the protocols represent the
only possible route to normalization. Oktem also appears to lump
together all critics of the protocols as virulent nationalists-which
is barely an improvement on lumping together the entire diaspora
as Bad Armenians. It is no wonder, then, that he cannot reconcile
the fact that "serious observers such as Juan Gabriel Tokatlian and
Vicken Cheterian" also take a stance against the protocols. It seems
he simply cannot imagine any "serious" critique of the protocols,
any critique that is not rooted in "virulent nationalism."
But there is an obvious solution to his confusion: Just as there
are people and organizations who support the protocols more or less
uncritically and those who support them with serious reservations,
so, too, are there people and organizations who are in favor of
normalization but who oppose the protocols either in whole or in
part for one or more of a variety of reasons-that is to say, it may
be that their concerns about this or that aspect of the protocols are
so strong that they cannot support them. Is it so inconceivable that a
"serious observer" might hold such a view?
Furthermore, it is fair to say that one "political persuasion" (read:
Dashnak) is more uniformly critical of the protocols, but it does not
follow that all who are critical are of the same political persuasion;
some, in fact, have close connections with organizations that have
publicly stated their support for the protocols, and many (most?) have
no political or organizational ties or loyalties whatsoever. Some
critics, as should be obvious, are not Armenian.
Nonetheless, Oktem crafts a sharp distinction between the "nationalist"
Armenians who oppose the protocols mainly because they hamper genocide
recognition and the "humanist" Armenians who support the protocols
even though it means sacrificing genocide recognition.
Yet the ABGU and the other organizations that issued a joint public
statement said clearly that they do not support the protocols at
the expense of genocide recognition-declaring that there "should be
no question that we also continue to stand firmly with the Nagorno
Karabakh Republic to ensure its freedom and security as well as with
all those working for universal affirmation of the Armenian Genocide."3
Oktem concludes that opposition to the protocols is motivated by
fear among those who "have long used the genocide to scare critical
minds into conformity, to rule over their flocks as they pleased,
and to claim the right to speak in their name" that they will lose
their power. He does not seem to consider other things that would
cause reasonable people not to support the protocols. For example, as
he himself says, "The joint historical commission, which the second
protocol proposes, is indeed a bad compromise, if not a complete
sell-out." Would it not be a reasonable or "serious" stance to advocate
normalization without such a "bad compromise"? For some, clearly,
the proposed commission is too high a price to pay, for reasons that
have been well expressed by Roger Smith among others.4 Is such a
stance incomprehensible and incompatible with "serious" thinking?
It is striking how similar some of Oktem's points are to those in a
column by Cengiz Aktar in Hurriyet entitled "The Armenian Initiative
and the Hrant Dink Case," in which he nearly proclaims the end of
nationalism in Turkey.5 Aktar, one of the initiators of the 2008
"apology campaign," also observes that "[o]wing to the protocols,
differences have surfaced within the diaspora-clear evidence that it
never was a monolithic entity." Evidently, if nothing else, we have
the protocols to thank for this breakthrough in perception. However,
"Within the diaspora, there are a limited number of people who are
making a lot of noise. They do not care about the future of the
Armenian Republic, make unrealistic demands and claim that it sold
out the diaspora." It is self-evident, apparently, that anyone who is
critical of the protocols must "not care about the future of Armenia."
Aktar, too, contrasts the "unrealistic," "uncaring" noisemakers with "a
silent majority that is calm and sober enough to grasp the importance
of the protocols," which he identifies with the AGBU. He does not,
of course, say how he knows it is a silent majority.
Aktar then gives a short quote from the statement from the AGBU Central
Board of Directors: "[The protocols] mark a significant moment in
the history of relations between the Armenian and Turkish peoples.
It presents major ramifications for both the government of the newly
independent Republic of Armenia and the Armenian nation worldwide."
There is nothing controversial in these words. They state the obvious:
The protocols are "significant" and present "major ramifications."
Such language could derive from either a declaration in favor of the
protocols or one against them. There is no dispute over whether the
protocols are "significant" or present "major ramifications." The
dispute is over what the significance is and what the ramifications
are.
It is revealing to read the entire AGBU statement in the context of the
sharp "nationalist" vs. "humanist" distinction that has been drawn (see
the AGBU statement here: www.agbu.org/pressoffice/article.asp?ID=626).
For example, after favorably noting the "pragmatic policy [of the
Armenian government] in its negotiations with Turkey," it goes on to
state: "However, as practical as such a policy may be, it should not
be implemented at the expense of the inalienable rights of the Armenian
people. We believe the authorities in Armenia, as administrators of the
state, must be guided by the same pan-national goals and aspirations
in making these difficult and far-reaching decisions. The documents
establishing diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey touch
directly or indirectly upon the Armenian Genocide and our territorial
demands. While we understand the importance for the Republic
of Armenia to have normal diplomatic relations with neighboring
countries, including Turkey, we believe that the inviolable Armenian
Case in its broadest sense and the international recognition of the
Armenian Genocide should transcend any diplomatic consideration"
(emphasis mine).
And then towards the end: "AGBU unwaveringly adheres to its national
policy of supporting the homeland and safeguarding the inviolable
rights of the Armenian nation, and its historical, material and
cultural legacy" (emphasis mine).
If such language as appears in bold above were used in a statement
against the protocols, would the "humanist" tag be stripped away and
replaced with the label "old-fashioned, if virulent nationalism"? Or
should one assume that Aktar and Oktem are fully in support of these
aspects of the statement?
It is interesting to see how organizations that have hitherto mostly
been lumped together as part of the powerful, nationalistic Armenian
Diaspora lobbying machine are now being distinguished among. Noisy
nationalists over here! Sober humanists over there! Oktem asks the
rhetorical question, "Is it possible that the highly cosmopolitan
Armenian diaspora, in 2009, can or would speak with a single voice?"
He answers with a resounding "No!" But the more complete inferred
answer from both his and Aktar's commentaries appears to be "No! It
speaks with two voices!" An optimist might view that as an improvement
of 100 percent!
It appears that, within the current revised Good Armenian/Bad Armenian
schematic, if you support the protocols and talk about "the inalienable
rights of the Armenian people" you are a "humanist." But if you do
not support them and talk about "the inalienable rights of the entire
Armenian Nation" you are a "nationalist."6
You are a "humanist" if you support the protocols and say "we
understand the importance for the Republic of Armenia to have normal
diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, including Turkey,
we believe that the inviolable Armenian Case in its broadest sense
and the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide should
transcend any diplomatic consideration." But you are a "nationalist"
if you do not support the protocols and say, "As neighboring states,
Armenia and Turkey are bound to take steps to normalize relations [but]
neighborly relations can be established between the two countries
only when Turkey recognizes the Armenian Genocide and reestablishes
the rights of the Armenian people."7
If you support the protocols, it is "humanistic" to refer to
"the inviolable rights of the Armenian nation." But it if you do
not support the protocols, it is "nationalistic" to refer to "the
unwavering rights of the Armenian people."8
And there is "humanism" in "our territorial demands" if you support the
protocols, but "nationalism" if you oppose the protocols and mention
"the dispossession of Western Armenia."9
Again, this is not about the AGBU, ARF, AAA, Armenian National
Committee, etc. The point to be made is not that the so-called
"nationalists" are really "humanists," or the so-called "humanists"
are really "nationalists."
The point to be made is about how problematic it is to divide up
Armenians along such lines. It is about recognizing a trap that is
part of the legacy of imperialism. The Romans had a name for it:
Divide et impera.
***
Endnotes
1. Taner Akcam, "Armenia, diaspora, and facing history,"
The Armenian Reporter, posted Nov. 28, 2008 on
www.reporter.am/go/article/2008-11-28-armenia-d iaspora-and-facing-history.
2. Kerem Oktem, "The Armenia-Turkey process:
don't stop now," posted Oct. 14, 2009 on
www.opendemocracy.net/article/armenia/the-armen ia-turkey-process-don-t-stop-now.
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Armenia and Turkey:
forgetting genocide," posted Oct. 12, 2009 on
www.opendemocracy.net/article/armenia/armenia-a nd-turkey-forgetting-genocide.
Vicken Cheterian, "Armenia-Turkey: genocide,
blockade, diplomacy," posted Oct. 13, 2009 on
www.opendemocracy.net/article/armenia/armenia-t urkey-genocide-blockade-diplomacy.
3. "Joint statement of major Armenian-American institutions welcoming
the president of the Republic of Armenia," posted Oct. 1, 2009 on
www.aaainc.org/index.php?id=755.
4. Roger Smith, "The Politics of Genocide and the Turkey-Armenia
Protocols," The Armenian Weekly, posted Oct. 24, 2009 on
www.armenianweekly.com/2009/10/24/smith-the-pol itics-of-genocide-and-the-turkey-armenia-protocols /.
5. Posted Oct. 16, 2009 on
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=initiative-to wards-armenia-and-the-hrant-dink-murder-case-2009- 10-16.
6. "ARF-ER Issues Statement After Meeting with
Sarkisian in New York," Asbarez, posted Oct. 4, 2009 on
www.asbarez.com/71458/arf-er-issues-statement-a fter-meeting-with-sarkisian-in-new-york/.
7. "ARF Bureau Issues Announcement on Protocols,"
The Armenian Weekly, posted Sept. 2, 2009 on
www.armenianweekly.com/2009/09/02/arf-bureau-is sues-announcement-on-protocols/.
8. Ibid.
9. "ARF-ER Issues Statement After Meeting with Sarkisian in New York,"
Asbarez, posted Oct. 4, 2009.
By: Marc Mamigonian
The Armenian Weekly
April 2010 Magazine
Mon, May 10 2010
In the discussions surrounding the Turkish-Armenian protocols that have
taken place throughout the last year, there has been a disappointing,
yet hardly unforeseeable, tendency to oversimplify matters and draw
a clear-cut picture with "practical," pro-protocols Armenians on one
side, and "hawkish" diaspora "fanatics" who are dead-set against the
protocols and any normalization with Turkey on the other side. We can
see this as a minor refinement of the well-worn discourse of the Bad
Armenians and the Good Armenians that we have come to know and some
have come to love, or at least to make good use of.
As the Turkish scholar Taner Akcam has aptly described this discourse:
According to the defensive strategies developed by our intellectuals,
the 'bad' Armenians aren't the ones in Turkey or the ones in
neighboring Armenia. The 'bad' Armenians are the ones in the diaspora
because the ones who keep 'insisting on recognition of the genocide'
are actually they. In other words, instead of directly stating that
the problem has to do with defining Armenians as 'the bogeyman' and
'bad,' they accepted those definitions but changed the object of those
definitions; instead of saying Armenians are 'bad,' they stated that
the diaspora is 'bad.' In conclusion, the mentality that predominates
in Turkey continued unabated in our intellectuals and continues to
do so.1
In recent discussions, it is the critics of the protocols who have
become the "bad" Armenians, then, and interestingly enough, some
Armenians who had previously been lumped into the "bad" category
because of their emphasis on genocide recognition as such now find
themselves, due to their support of the protocols, transformed
(perhaps only temporarily) into "good" Armenians.
This leads us to Kerem Oktem's article "The Armenia-Turkey process:
don't stop now" on OpenDemocracy, which was in turn a response to
articles by Vicken Cheterian and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian.2
It is interesting to note that while Oktem rightly decries a
reductionist understanding of "the highly cosmopolitan Armenian
diaspora" as a univocal entity when, in fact, there is on the
protocols, as on other issues, a wide array of opinions (both pro-
and con- as well as within the pro- and con- "camps"), he seems to
fall into the hardly less reductionist trap of equating those who
oppose the protocols with those who oppose any normalization, of
presenting those who oppose the protocols as a nationalists and those
who support them as humanists. In other words, we have not really
moved beyond the categories of Bad Armenians and Good Armenians-we
have just done some rebranding.
In the former category, clearly, Oktem has placed the political
party the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), which has been
vocally opposed to the protocols. Oktem writes of the ARF that "it
has become trapped in the cage of an old-fashioned, if virulent
nationalism: retribution, compensation, and transfer of land to
Armenia are central to its vocabulary." He contrasts this with the
"humanist organizations" the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU),
the dioceses of the Armenian Churches of America, and the Armenian
Assembly of America (AAA)-groups that support "normalization" even
though genocide recognition "might be the first casualty." He does
not define what he means by a "humanist" organization.
What is at issue here is not these organizations per se or the merits
of their respective approaches to the protocols as such (or to other
issues), but rather how they are being depicted and deployed to suit
a version of the Good Armenian/Bad Armenian discourse. The Armenian
Assembly, in particular, is regularly grouped with the Bad Armenians
due to its long record of working for genocide recognition and lobbying
for the U.S. to pass resolutions affirming the genocide-work that it
shows no signs of abandoning and that has long been the sine qua non
of the Bad Armenian.
It is true that to support the protocols is to support "normalization,"
at least as it is defined by the protocols. But it does not follow
that to oppose the protocols is necessarily to oppose any sort of
normalization, unless one believes that the protocols represent the
only possible route to normalization. Oktem also appears to lump
together all critics of the protocols as virulent nationalists-which
is barely an improvement on lumping together the entire diaspora
as Bad Armenians. It is no wonder, then, that he cannot reconcile
the fact that "serious observers such as Juan Gabriel Tokatlian and
Vicken Cheterian" also take a stance against the protocols. It seems
he simply cannot imagine any "serious" critique of the protocols,
any critique that is not rooted in "virulent nationalism."
But there is an obvious solution to his confusion: Just as there
are people and organizations who support the protocols more or less
uncritically and those who support them with serious reservations,
so, too, are there people and organizations who are in favor of
normalization but who oppose the protocols either in whole or in
part for one or more of a variety of reasons-that is to say, it may
be that their concerns about this or that aspect of the protocols are
so strong that they cannot support them. Is it so inconceivable that a
"serious observer" might hold such a view?
Furthermore, it is fair to say that one "political persuasion" (read:
Dashnak) is more uniformly critical of the protocols, but it does not
follow that all who are critical are of the same political persuasion;
some, in fact, have close connections with organizations that have
publicly stated their support for the protocols, and many (most?) have
no political or organizational ties or loyalties whatsoever. Some
critics, as should be obvious, are not Armenian.
Nonetheless, Oktem crafts a sharp distinction between the "nationalist"
Armenians who oppose the protocols mainly because they hamper genocide
recognition and the "humanist" Armenians who support the protocols
even though it means sacrificing genocide recognition.
Yet the ABGU and the other organizations that issued a joint public
statement said clearly that they do not support the protocols at
the expense of genocide recognition-declaring that there "should be
no question that we also continue to stand firmly with the Nagorno
Karabakh Republic to ensure its freedom and security as well as with
all those working for universal affirmation of the Armenian Genocide."3
Oktem concludes that opposition to the protocols is motivated by
fear among those who "have long used the genocide to scare critical
minds into conformity, to rule over their flocks as they pleased,
and to claim the right to speak in their name" that they will lose
their power. He does not seem to consider other things that would
cause reasonable people not to support the protocols. For example, as
he himself says, "The joint historical commission, which the second
protocol proposes, is indeed a bad compromise, if not a complete
sell-out." Would it not be a reasonable or "serious" stance to advocate
normalization without such a "bad compromise"? For some, clearly,
the proposed commission is too high a price to pay, for reasons that
have been well expressed by Roger Smith among others.4 Is such a
stance incomprehensible and incompatible with "serious" thinking?
It is striking how similar some of Oktem's points are to those in a
column by Cengiz Aktar in Hurriyet entitled "The Armenian Initiative
and the Hrant Dink Case," in which he nearly proclaims the end of
nationalism in Turkey.5 Aktar, one of the initiators of the 2008
"apology campaign," also observes that "[o]wing to the protocols,
differences have surfaced within the diaspora-clear evidence that it
never was a monolithic entity." Evidently, if nothing else, we have
the protocols to thank for this breakthrough in perception. However,
"Within the diaspora, there are a limited number of people who are
making a lot of noise. They do not care about the future of the
Armenian Republic, make unrealistic demands and claim that it sold
out the diaspora." It is self-evident, apparently, that anyone who is
critical of the protocols must "not care about the future of Armenia."
Aktar, too, contrasts the "unrealistic," "uncaring" noisemakers with "a
silent majority that is calm and sober enough to grasp the importance
of the protocols," which he identifies with the AGBU. He does not,
of course, say how he knows it is a silent majority.
Aktar then gives a short quote from the statement from the AGBU Central
Board of Directors: "[The protocols] mark a significant moment in
the history of relations between the Armenian and Turkish peoples.
It presents major ramifications for both the government of the newly
independent Republic of Armenia and the Armenian nation worldwide."
There is nothing controversial in these words. They state the obvious:
The protocols are "significant" and present "major ramifications."
Such language could derive from either a declaration in favor of the
protocols or one against them. There is no dispute over whether the
protocols are "significant" or present "major ramifications." The
dispute is over what the significance is and what the ramifications
are.
It is revealing to read the entire AGBU statement in the context of the
sharp "nationalist" vs. "humanist" distinction that has been drawn (see
the AGBU statement here: www.agbu.org/pressoffice/article.asp?ID=626).
For example, after favorably noting the "pragmatic policy [of the
Armenian government] in its negotiations with Turkey," it goes on to
state: "However, as practical as such a policy may be, it should not
be implemented at the expense of the inalienable rights of the Armenian
people. We believe the authorities in Armenia, as administrators of the
state, must be guided by the same pan-national goals and aspirations
in making these difficult and far-reaching decisions. The documents
establishing diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey touch
directly or indirectly upon the Armenian Genocide and our territorial
demands. While we understand the importance for the Republic
of Armenia to have normal diplomatic relations with neighboring
countries, including Turkey, we believe that the inviolable Armenian
Case in its broadest sense and the international recognition of the
Armenian Genocide should transcend any diplomatic consideration"
(emphasis mine).
And then towards the end: "AGBU unwaveringly adheres to its national
policy of supporting the homeland and safeguarding the inviolable
rights of the Armenian nation, and its historical, material and
cultural legacy" (emphasis mine).
If such language as appears in bold above were used in a statement
against the protocols, would the "humanist" tag be stripped away and
replaced with the label "old-fashioned, if virulent nationalism"? Or
should one assume that Aktar and Oktem are fully in support of these
aspects of the statement?
It is interesting to see how organizations that have hitherto mostly
been lumped together as part of the powerful, nationalistic Armenian
Diaspora lobbying machine are now being distinguished among. Noisy
nationalists over here! Sober humanists over there! Oktem asks the
rhetorical question, "Is it possible that the highly cosmopolitan
Armenian diaspora, in 2009, can or would speak with a single voice?"
He answers with a resounding "No!" But the more complete inferred
answer from both his and Aktar's commentaries appears to be "No! It
speaks with two voices!" An optimist might view that as an improvement
of 100 percent!
It appears that, within the current revised Good Armenian/Bad Armenian
schematic, if you support the protocols and talk about "the inalienable
rights of the Armenian people" you are a "humanist." But if you do
not support them and talk about "the inalienable rights of the entire
Armenian Nation" you are a "nationalist."6
You are a "humanist" if you support the protocols and say "we
understand the importance for the Republic of Armenia to have normal
diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, including Turkey,
we believe that the inviolable Armenian Case in its broadest sense
and the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide should
transcend any diplomatic consideration." But you are a "nationalist"
if you do not support the protocols and say, "As neighboring states,
Armenia and Turkey are bound to take steps to normalize relations [but]
neighborly relations can be established between the two countries
only when Turkey recognizes the Armenian Genocide and reestablishes
the rights of the Armenian people."7
If you support the protocols, it is "humanistic" to refer to
"the inviolable rights of the Armenian nation." But it if you do
not support the protocols, it is "nationalistic" to refer to "the
unwavering rights of the Armenian people."8
And there is "humanism" in "our territorial demands" if you support the
protocols, but "nationalism" if you oppose the protocols and mention
"the dispossession of Western Armenia."9
Again, this is not about the AGBU, ARF, AAA, Armenian National
Committee, etc. The point to be made is not that the so-called
"nationalists" are really "humanists," or the so-called "humanists"
are really "nationalists."
The point to be made is about how problematic it is to divide up
Armenians along such lines. It is about recognizing a trap that is
part of the legacy of imperialism. The Romans had a name for it:
Divide et impera.
***
Endnotes
1. Taner Akcam, "Armenia, diaspora, and facing history,"
The Armenian Reporter, posted Nov. 28, 2008 on
www.reporter.am/go/article/2008-11-28-armenia-d iaspora-and-facing-history.
2. Kerem Oktem, "The Armenia-Turkey process:
don't stop now," posted Oct. 14, 2009 on
www.opendemocracy.net/article/armenia/the-armen ia-turkey-process-don-t-stop-now.
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Armenia and Turkey:
forgetting genocide," posted Oct. 12, 2009 on
www.opendemocracy.net/article/armenia/armenia-a nd-turkey-forgetting-genocide.
Vicken Cheterian, "Armenia-Turkey: genocide,
blockade, diplomacy," posted Oct. 13, 2009 on
www.opendemocracy.net/article/armenia/armenia-t urkey-genocide-blockade-diplomacy.
3. "Joint statement of major Armenian-American institutions welcoming
the president of the Republic of Armenia," posted Oct. 1, 2009 on
www.aaainc.org/index.php?id=755.
4. Roger Smith, "The Politics of Genocide and the Turkey-Armenia
Protocols," The Armenian Weekly, posted Oct. 24, 2009 on
www.armenianweekly.com/2009/10/24/smith-the-pol itics-of-genocide-and-the-turkey-armenia-protocols /.
5. Posted Oct. 16, 2009 on
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=initiative-to wards-armenia-and-the-hrant-dink-murder-case-2009- 10-16.
6. "ARF-ER Issues Statement After Meeting with
Sarkisian in New York," Asbarez, posted Oct. 4, 2009 on
www.asbarez.com/71458/arf-er-issues-statement-a fter-meeting-with-sarkisian-in-new-york/.
7. "ARF Bureau Issues Announcement on Protocols,"
The Armenian Weekly, posted Sept. 2, 2009 on
www.armenianweekly.com/2009/09/02/arf-bureau-is sues-announcement-on-protocols/.
8. Ibid.
9. "ARF-ER Issues Statement After Meeting with Sarkisian in New York,"
Asbarez, posted Oct. 4, 2009.