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MEDVEDEV'S VISIT TO TURKEY AND THE KARABAKH ISSUE
Hurriyet
May 9 2010
Turkey
If in the 1990s someone was to suggest that Turkish-Russian relations
could one day reach a level of strategic partnership it would have
likely induced uproarious laughter to listeners. Psychological
constraints revolving around misperceptions were a kind of Sword
of Damocles in bilateral relations while the persistent lack of
understanding, prevalent among the ruling elite on both sides, was
the main source of mutual mistrust.
This problem was more acute among the Russian decision makers. In
the post-Soviet period, the anti-Turkey lobby in Russia consisted
mainly of security elites and, to a lesser extent, communist and
ultra-nationalist deputies of the Duma who considered Turkey a proxy
of Russia's arch-military adversaries, namely the U.S. and NATO. Due to
ambitions they advanced with regard to the Russian sphere of influence,
or the so-called "near abroad," their perception of Turkey appeared
to have been that of a rival and traditional enemy.
As an expert on ex-Soviet geography, however, I always believed that,
in time, the unique geopolitics of both countries, having left profound
marks on their historical progress and bilateral relations alike,
would inevitably force them to adopt a more constructive attitude. I
was certain that they would eventually realize their interests overlap
rather than clash. Time has proven me right.
The primary drive behind this astonishing process has come from
Russia itself. The current Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin,
since coming to power in 2000, has prioritized economic interests in
his foreign policy conduct while geopolitical ambitions have been
replaced by geo-economical aspirations. Trying to make the most of
Russia's few assets, Putin has increasingly relied on the export of
energy resources. Under his leadership, the creation of an energy
dependence on Russia among its neighbors in particular has become
Moscow's primary foreign policy goal. The reason Turkey has been
elevated to the top of Russia's foreign policy agenda is closely
related to Putin's strategic expectations in that regard.
In the meantime, Turkey was also undergoing a change in its foreign
policy understanding, the main motto of which was "A Turkish world
from the Adriatic to China." Having first been uttered in a speech
made by Henry Kissinger in a session of the World Economic Forum held
in Istanbul in 1992, this idea dominated the Turkish understanding
of the nation's foreign policy drive toward ex-Soviet geography in
the post-communist period. However, it was the late Ä°smail Cem, the
Turkish foreign minister between 1997 and 2002, who realized that it
was this understanding which was raising Russian hackles. According to
Cem, Turkey's foreign policy could be best described as being bereft of
a historical dimension. He argued it lacked depth with respect to time
and breadth with respect to space. At this time, Turkey needed to set
a new policy course that acknowledged the role of Russia as pivotal.
The Action Plan on Cooperation with Eurasia, signed in 2001, became
the eventual manifestation of the political rapprochement between
the two countries. As someone who contributed academically to it, I
very clearly recall that Cem, first and foremost, wanted both sides
to speak openly, no matter whether they agreed or disagreed. Thus,
the calls for consultation, as well as confidence-building measures,
which are envisaged in the agreement, have undeniably led to talks
of a strategic partnership today.
The Justice and Development Party government, under the theoretical
guidance of Ahmet Davutoglu, has taken one step further. There is
no doubt that at present, Ankara is paying special attention to the
Russia factor in its foreign policy conduct. There are, nevertheless,
expectations. With the earlier mentioned agreement, both capitals
finally acknowledged bilateral cooperation in the vast Eurasian area
as a basic prerequisite for regional stability. This is particularly
valid for the Caucasus, where the main problem is the resolution of
the Karabakh knot. It is in this regard that Moscow should approach
Prime Minister Recep T. Erdogan's persistent calls for a regional
Caucasian stability pact in a more concrete manner.
One of the basic issues to be discussed during Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev's official visit to Turkey will therefore be the Karabakh
problem. Circles close to Erdogan say that the prime minister, during
his last visits to Russia, frankly highlighted Turkey's expectations
of the Russian government and there have been promising signs that
these calls have not gone unheard. During my visit to Baku last
February, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov, for instance,
described Russia's stance as having become "more constructive than
ever." Apparently it was the Sochi meeting held between Medvedev,
Azerbaijani President Ä°lham Aliyev and Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan that had increased his optimism.
In any strategic partnership, a common strategic vision is an
essential prerequisite. What matters is whether respective parties
are seeing the world, as well as the problems before them, through
the same lenses. For the Turkish-Russian partnership the acid test
will ultimately be the Karabakh issue.
Hurriyet
May 9 2010
Turkey
If in the 1990s someone was to suggest that Turkish-Russian relations
could one day reach a level of strategic partnership it would have
likely induced uproarious laughter to listeners. Psychological
constraints revolving around misperceptions were a kind of Sword
of Damocles in bilateral relations while the persistent lack of
understanding, prevalent among the ruling elite on both sides, was
the main source of mutual mistrust.
This problem was more acute among the Russian decision makers. In
the post-Soviet period, the anti-Turkey lobby in Russia consisted
mainly of security elites and, to a lesser extent, communist and
ultra-nationalist deputies of the Duma who considered Turkey a proxy
of Russia's arch-military adversaries, namely the U.S. and NATO. Due to
ambitions they advanced with regard to the Russian sphere of influence,
or the so-called "near abroad," their perception of Turkey appeared
to have been that of a rival and traditional enemy.
As an expert on ex-Soviet geography, however, I always believed that,
in time, the unique geopolitics of both countries, having left profound
marks on their historical progress and bilateral relations alike,
would inevitably force them to adopt a more constructive attitude. I
was certain that they would eventually realize their interests overlap
rather than clash. Time has proven me right.
The primary drive behind this astonishing process has come from
Russia itself. The current Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin,
since coming to power in 2000, has prioritized economic interests in
his foreign policy conduct while geopolitical ambitions have been
replaced by geo-economical aspirations. Trying to make the most of
Russia's few assets, Putin has increasingly relied on the export of
energy resources. Under his leadership, the creation of an energy
dependence on Russia among its neighbors in particular has become
Moscow's primary foreign policy goal. The reason Turkey has been
elevated to the top of Russia's foreign policy agenda is closely
related to Putin's strategic expectations in that regard.
In the meantime, Turkey was also undergoing a change in its foreign
policy understanding, the main motto of which was "A Turkish world
from the Adriatic to China." Having first been uttered in a speech
made by Henry Kissinger in a session of the World Economic Forum held
in Istanbul in 1992, this idea dominated the Turkish understanding
of the nation's foreign policy drive toward ex-Soviet geography in
the post-communist period. However, it was the late Ä°smail Cem, the
Turkish foreign minister between 1997 and 2002, who realized that it
was this understanding which was raising Russian hackles. According to
Cem, Turkey's foreign policy could be best described as being bereft of
a historical dimension. He argued it lacked depth with respect to time
and breadth with respect to space. At this time, Turkey needed to set
a new policy course that acknowledged the role of Russia as pivotal.
The Action Plan on Cooperation with Eurasia, signed in 2001, became
the eventual manifestation of the political rapprochement between
the two countries. As someone who contributed academically to it, I
very clearly recall that Cem, first and foremost, wanted both sides
to speak openly, no matter whether they agreed or disagreed. Thus,
the calls for consultation, as well as confidence-building measures,
which are envisaged in the agreement, have undeniably led to talks
of a strategic partnership today.
The Justice and Development Party government, under the theoretical
guidance of Ahmet Davutoglu, has taken one step further. There is
no doubt that at present, Ankara is paying special attention to the
Russia factor in its foreign policy conduct. There are, nevertheless,
expectations. With the earlier mentioned agreement, both capitals
finally acknowledged bilateral cooperation in the vast Eurasian area
as a basic prerequisite for regional stability. This is particularly
valid for the Caucasus, where the main problem is the resolution of
the Karabakh knot. It is in this regard that Moscow should approach
Prime Minister Recep T. Erdogan's persistent calls for a regional
Caucasian stability pact in a more concrete manner.
One of the basic issues to be discussed during Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev's official visit to Turkey will therefore be the Karabakh
problem. Circles close to Erdogan say that the prime minister, during
his last visits to Russia, frankly highlighted Turkey's expectations
of the Russian government and there have been promising signs that
these calls have not gone unheard. During my visit to Baku last
February, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov, for instance,
described Russia's stance as having become "more constructive than
ever." Apparently it was the Sochi meeting held between Medvedev,
Azerbaijani President Ä°lham Aliyev and Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan that had increased his optimism.
In any strategic partnership, a common strategic vision is an
essential prerequisite. What matters is whether respective parties
are seeing the world, as well as the problems before them, through
the same lenses. For the Turkish-Russian partnership the acid test
will ultimately be the Karabakh issue.