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NO FOREIGN ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE SOLUTION, US PROFESSOR
news.az
May 11 2010
Azerbaijan
Paul du Quenoy News.Az interviews Paul du Quenoy, Professor of the
American University of Beirut.
The role of U.S. in the South Caucasus has become more passive. Do
you agree with this, and if yes, does it mean that US accepted the
regional domination of Russia?
I disagree. At best Russia only achieved its pre-2008 status quo in
the South Caucasus, and then at considerable cost to its international
standing and foreign investment. Most Georgians, I believe at least,
would join me in strongly disagreeing that Russia enjoys some kind
of "regional domination" over them. If the US involvement appears
more "passive," this is probably only because of the change in
administrations and the simple fact that Russian policy since the
August 2008 conflict with Georgia has been relatively weaker and less
intrusive than it was before, thus not eliciting any kind of active
response from the U.S. Russia faces major domestic challenges -- a
faltering economy, renewed terrorist attacks, a military that badly
needs technological upgrades, and so on, that do not allow it broad
latitude even in its near-abroad on the same scale is enjoyed up to
2008. Indeed, its general policy toward the US - especially since
Obama became president -- appears to favor rapprochement. Witness the
corny meeting to "reset" relations and the recent and far-reaching arms
control agreement. At the same time it is clear that the South Caucasus
is and will remain a vital zone of US foreign policy interests. The
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, major aspects of international energy
policy, and the problems of Iran and the Middle East generally all
depend in part on favorable relations with the regional governments
of the South Caucasus.
The US it seems have already lost Georgia, Kirgiziya and Ukraine.
Which of the post-soviet republics may be the next?
I can't agree that Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, or any other former
Soviet republic was ever the U.S.'s to "lose," as though they were
chess pieces in some kind of renewed Cold War. If you pose the question
in terms of relative U.S. influence compared with that of Russia,
however, Georgia is still firmly pro-U.S. Russia's strategy in the
August 2008 conflict failed to meet most of its declared goals.
The Russian government wanted President Mikheil Saakashvili removed
from power, it wanted the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline disrupted, it wanted
the West out of the Caucasus, and it wanted broad diplomatic support
from most former Soviet republics and China. Almost two years later,
Saakashvili is still in power, the pipeline still flows, the West
continues to play major diplomatic and economic roles in the Caucasus,
and the former Soviet leaders in the republics and the Chinese refused
to support Russian policy in favor of the French-sponsored cease-fire.
All th Russians did was reestablish control of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia (i.e. the status quo ante) and lose about $500 billion in
direct foreign investment in their economy in less than five weeks,
and that was before the global economic crisis. In Kyrgyzstan recently
overthrown President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was by no means a firm U.S. ally
- indeed, it was he who only last year ordered the U.S. to close its
air base at Manas after accepting a $2 billion investment offer from
Russia. He then reversed the decision when Russia could not pay because
of the economic crisis, and because the U.S. offered to pay a higher
rent on the facility. It is unclear what the new Kyrgyz government
will do. Its temporary leader, Roza Otunbayeva, was a high-level
participant in the same Tulip Revolution that toppled former and
decidedly pro-Russian president Askar Akayev in 2005. She is rumored
to have links to Moscow, but she has said nothing about the U.S. air
base, promises to relinquish power in a democratic election in the near
future, and has renounced the use of force in domestic politics. It
is unclear how any future Kyrgyz government will orient itself, but
it will most likely continue to pursue Kyrgyz national interests,
whether they be pro-U.S., pro-Russian, or neutral. Ukraine is more
complicated. The new president, Viktor Yanukovych, is pro-Russian,
but he won office in what appeared to be a fair and democratic election
over a heavily divided pro-U.S. opposition.
Still, all of Ukraine's recent leaders have attempted to play a
balancing act between Washington and Moscow, a necessity determined by
their delicate domestic concerns, and it is unclear that Russia will
receive any definitive advantage from the Yanukovych presidency. The
contentious renewal of Russia's lease on the naval base at Sevastopol
merely affirmed a long-standing feature of the status quo, and it
is unclear that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's plan to
broker a merger between Gazprom and Naftogaz will either work out
in practice or have major strategic implications if it does. Apart
from these tentatives signs that Russia might play an enhanced role
in Ukrainian politics, I can see no other axis of Russian gains and
U.S. losses in the former Soviet republics.
Russians see no prospects for Georgia and Ukraine to be a NATO member
states. And what is your opinion?
Georgia has a strong possibility of NATO membership if its government
continues to address the institutional standards that NATO requires of
aspiring members. In Ukraine public opinion has swayed against NATO
membership because the prospect of taking either a strong pro-US or
pro-Russian orientation invites civil conflict and the unattractive
possibility of becoming the front line of any conflict between Russia
and NATO. We saw these fears clearly expressed in the near-riot that
broke out in the Ukrainian parliament over the recent close vote
on extending the Russian lease on the naval base at Sevastopol. And
this vote merely preserved an element of the status quo! To take a
demonstrative step closer toward either the U.S. or Russia could
precipiate civic unrest that Ukraine's leaders and people alike
would prefer to avoid. Remaining in a neutral position between
the U.S. and Russia, on the other hand, offers the possibility of
soliciting advantages from both countries as they try to woo Ukraine
to develop closer relations. It is striking how both sides of the
Ukrainian political divide realized this in the years since the
Orange Revolution.
Azerbaijan is displeased by Washington's attitude to the Karabagh
problem, saying that U.S. is rather support Armenia than try to assist
to solve the conflict. Does it mean that activity of Armenian diaspora
really influence the U.S. foreign policy?
Like many ethnic groups, the Armenian diaspora community has a
voice in U.S. political discourse. It lobbied heavily after 1991 to
prevent Azerbaijan from receiving U.S. economic aid, for example,
and Azerbaijan was the only former Soviet republic not to receive
such aid. But more recently the Armenian lobby does not appear to
have had a decisive impact. In 2007, for example, its influence failed
to even to bring to a vote a U.S. Congressional resolution declaring
the events of 1915 a genocide, a declaration that was long the major
goal of the Armenian diaspora community in the U.S. Indeed, both the
Bush and Obama administrations have opposed the resolution, as has
former president Jimmy Carter, his still influential national security
advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and no fewer than eight former U.S.
Secretaries of State. U.S. politicians did not wish to risk favorable
relations with Turkey -- or with Azerbaijan -- to make a pro-Armenian
political statement about history. Casting the aspersion that the
U.S. is more pro-Armenian simply because of the Karabakh ignores the
desirability to U.S. of generally good relations with Turkey, the
central role of international energy policy in U.S. decision making
in the region, and the on-going question of Iraq, where U.S.-led
efforts are affected by relations with all regional governments.
Azerbaijani authorities said that they may restrict cooperation with
US if it won't change its approaches to the Karabagh problem. Do you
expect further worsening of the Azeri-American relations?
No. Losing US investment, bilateral security relations, and US
assistance in the profitable operation of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline are,
in my opinion, far more important to Azerbaijan's strategic interests
than perceptions of U.S. policy toward the Karabakh problem.
It would be unwise to jeopardize those real advantages simply to
posture more insistently in a long-term ethnic conflict that has
little prospect of finding a definitive solution.
Do you see the Karabakh problem resolved in the near future and what
it depends on?
Like many ethnic conflicts, the Karabakh problem is an old and
difficult one. I don't believe it will be solved any time soon,
and foreign attempts to mediate a solution do not appear to have
resulted in a durable peace. Any resolution will ultimately depend
on Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the ethnic communities in the Karabakh
finding common interests that supersede the problem. That is not as
quixotic as it may sound. One can point to any number of economic
reasons to promote a settlement, as well as to the obvious political
advantages of eliminating a cause of violence that could invite
unwelcome foreign intervention.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
news.az
May 11 2010
Azerbaijan
Paul du Quenoy News.Az interviews Paul du Quenoy, Professor of the
American University of Beirut.
The role of U.S. in the South Caucasus has become more passive. Do
you agree with this, and if yes, does it mean that US accepted the
regional domination of Russia?
I disagree. At best Russia only achieved its pre-2008 status quo in
the South Caucasus, and then at considerable cost to its international
standing and foreign investment. Most Georgians, I believe at least,
would join me in strongly disagreeing that Russia enjoys some kind
of "regional domination" over them. If the US involvement appears
more "passive," this is probably only because of the change in
administrations and the simple fact that Russian policy since the
August 2008 conflict with Georgia has been relatively weaker and less
intrusive than it was before, thus not eliciting any kind of active
response from the U.S. Russia faces major domestic challenges -- a
faltering economy, renewed terrorist attacks, a military that badly
needs technological upgrades, and so on, that do not allow it broad
latitude even in its near-abroad on the same scale is enjoyed up to
2008. Indeed, its general policy toward the US - especially since
Obama became president -- appears to favor rapprochement. Witness the
corny meeting to "reset" relations and the recent and far-reaching arms
control agreement. At the same time it is clear that the South Caucasus
is and will remain a vital zone of US foreign policy interests. The
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, major aspects of international energy
policy, and the problems of Iran and the Middle East generally all
depend in part on favorable relations with the regional governments
of the South Caucasus.
The US it seems have already lost Georgia, Kirgiziya and Ukraine.
Which of the post-soviet republics may be the next?
I can't agree that Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, or any other former
Soviet republic was ever the U.S.'s to "lose," as though they were
chess pieces in some kind of renewed Cold War. If you pose the question
in terms of relative U.S. influence compared with that of Russia,
however, Georgia is still firmly pro-U.S. Russia's strategy in the
August 2008 conflict failed to meet most of its declared goals.
The Russian government wanted President Mikheil Saakashvili removed
from power, it wanted the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline disrupted, it wanted
the West out of the Caucasus, and it wanted broad diplomatic support
from most former Soviet republics and China. Almost two years later,
Saakashvili is still in power, the pipeline still flows, the West
continues to play major diplomatic and economic roles in the Caucasus,
and the former Soviet leaders in the republics and the Chinese refused
to support Russian policy in favor of the French-sponsored cease-fire.
All th Russians did was reestablish control of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia (i.e. the status quo ante) and lose about $500 billion in
direct foreign investment in their economy in less than five weeks,
and that was before the global economic crisis. In Kyrgyzstan recently
overthrown President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was by no means a firm U.S. ally
- indeed, it was he who only last year ordered the U.S. to close its
air base at Manas after accepting a $2 billion investment offer from
Russia. He then reversed the decision when Russia could not pay because
of the economic crisis, and because the U.S. offered to pay a higher
rent on the facility. It is unclear what the new Kyrgyz government
will do. Its temporary leader, Roza Otunbayeva, was a high-level
participant in the same Tulip Revolution that toppled former and
decidedly pro-Russian president Askar Akayev in 2005. She is rumored
to have links to Moscow, but she has said nothing about the U.S. air
base, promises to relinquish power in a democratic election in the near
future, and has renounced the use of force in domestic politics. It
is unclear how any future Kyrgyz government will orient itself, but
it will most likely continue to pursue Kyrgyz national interests,
whether they be pro-U.S., pro-Russian, or neutral. Ukraine is more
complicated. The new president, Viktor Yanukovych, is pro-Russian,
but he won office in what appeared to be a fair and democratic election
over a heavily divided pro-U.S. opposition.
Still, all of Ukraine's recent leaders have attempted to play a
balancing act between Washington and Moscow, a necessity determined by
their delicate domestic concerns, and it is unclear that Russia will
receive any definitive advantage from the Yanukovych presidency. The
contentious renewal of Russia's lease on the naval base at Sevastopol
merely affirmed a long-standing feature of the status quo, and it
is unclear that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's plan to
broker a merger between Gazprom and Naftogaz will either work out
in practice or have major strategic implications if it does. Apart
from these tentatives signs that Russia might play an enhanced role
in Ukrainian politics, I can see no other axis of Russian gains and
U.S. losses in the former Soviet republics.
Russians see no prospects for Georgia and Ukraine to be a NATO member
states. And what is your opinion?
Georgia has a strong possibility of NATO membership if its government
continues to address the institutional standards that NATO requires of
aspiring members. In Ukraine public opinion has swayed against NATO
membership because the prospect of taking either a strong pro-US or
pro-Russian orientation invites civil conflict and the unattractive
possibility of becoming the front line of any conflict between Russia
and NATO. We saw these fears clearly expressed in the near-riot that
broke out in the Ukrainian parliament over the recent close vote
on extending the Russian lease on the naval base at Sevastopol. And
this vote merely preserved an element of the status quo! To take a
demonstrative step closer toward either the U.S. or Russia could
precipiate civic unrest that Ukraine's leaders and people alike
would prefer to avoid. Remaining in a neutral position between
the U.S. and Russia, on the other hand, offers the possibility of
soliciting advantages from both countries as they try to woo Ukraine
to develop closer relations. It is striking how both sides of the
Ukrainian political divide realized this in the years since the
Orange Revolution.
Azerbaijan is displeased by Washington's attitude to the Karabagh
problem, saying that U.S. is rather support Armenia than try to assist
to solve the conflict. Does it mean that activity of Armenian diaspora
really influence the U.S. foreign policy?
Like many ethnic groups, the Armenian diaspora community has a
voice in U.S. political discourse. It lobbied heavily after 1991 to
prevent Azerbaijan from receiving U.S. economic aid, for example,
and Azerbaijan was the only former Soviet republic not to receive
such aid. But more recently the Armenian lobby does not appear to
have had a decisive impact. In 2007, for example, its influence failed
to even to bring to a vote a U.S. Congressional resolution declaring
the events of 1915 a genocide, a declaration that was long the major
goal of the Armenian diaspora community in the U.S. Indeed, both the
Bush and Obama administrations have opposed the resolution, as has
former president Jimmy Carter, his still influential national security
advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and no fewer than eight former U.S.
Secretaries of State. U.S. politicians did not wish to risk favorable
relations with Turkey -- or with Azerbaijan -- to make a pro-Armenian
political statement about history. Casting the aspersion that the
U.S. is more pro-Armenian simply because of the Karabakh ignores the
desirability to U.S. of generally good relations with Turkey, the
central role of international energy policy in U.S. decision making
in the region, and the on-going question of Iraq, where U.S.-led
efforts are affected by relations with all regional governments.
Azerbaijani authorities said that they may restrict cooperation with
US if it won't change its approaches to the Karabagh problem. Do you
expect further worsening of the Azeri-American relations?
No. Losing US investment, bilateral security relations, and US
assistance in the profitable operation of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline are,
in my opinion, far more important to Azerbaijan's strategic interests
than perceptions of U.S. policy toward the Karabakh problem.
It would be unwise to jeopardize those real advantages simply to
posture more insistently in a long-term ethnic conflict that has
little prospect of finding a definitive solution.
Do you see the Karabakh problem resolved in the near future and what
it depends on?
Like many ethnic conflicts, the Karabakh problem is an old and
difficult one. I don't believe it will be solved any time soon,
and foreign attempts to mediate a solution do not appear to have
resulted in a durable peace. Any resolution will ultimately depend
on Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the ethnic communities in the Karabakh
finding common interests that supersede the problem. That is not as
quixotic as it may sound. One can point to any number of economic
reasons to promote a settlement, as well as to the obvious political
advantages of eliminating a cause of violence that could invite
unwelcome foreign intervention.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress