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INSIDE THE TURKISH-RUSSIAN COOPERATION PACT
Sandy Smith
HULIQ.com
May 13 2010
SC
Turkey and Russia yesterday signed 17 agreements to cooperate on a
number of energy projects, including an oil pipeline from the Black
Sea to the Mediterranean and Turkey's first nuclear power plant. The
deal is the latest move in a multidimensional international chess
game involving not only Russia and Turkey, but Europe, the larger
Caucusus region, and even American interests.
The New York Times reported yesterday that the deal is the latest in a
series of agreements between Turkey and Russia that ensure continued
Russian control of vital energy transport routes between Asia and
Europe. Since Vladimir Putin's rise to power, Russia has used its
control of both vast supplies of oil and natural gas and the means
of getting those supplies to energy-hungry Europeans as a political
weapon, seeking to obtain policies favorable to Russian interests
from countries receiving energy from it by threatening cutoffs for
displeasing the Kremlin.
While some Turkish sources cited by the Times argue that the energy
pacts will benefit Russia more than Turkey, and others fret that the
deals will make Turkey overreliant on Russia, Turkey -- like Russia,
a country with one foot in Europe and the other in Asia -- has its own
reasons for seeking Russian partnerships. One possible reason is the
stalled status of Turkey's application for membership in the European
Union. Some EU members, most notably Austria and France, have raised
objections to Turkey's accession into the EU, and a number of policy
and diplomatic obstacles, including Turkey's continued support of
the breakaway Turkish government on Cyprus established a few years
after Turkey invaded the island in 1974, have made Turkish entry
into the EU highly unlikely by the previously announced 2013 target
date. Cooperation with Russia could give Turkey some leverage to move
further integration into Europe forward on terms it prefers if this
theory is accurate.
Another is the joint interest both countries have in the Caucusus. Both
Turkey and Russia have a keen interest in the political situation
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, in particular the dispute over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region, a majority Armenian area within Azerbaijan's
borders. Tensions between the two countries remain high, and while
Armenia would prefer a peaceful settlement to the dispute, some
policy analysts have stated that the prospect of rapprochement between
Turkey and Armenia -- an outcome public sentiment in both countries
appears to favor increasingly -- might drive Azerbaijan to declare
war. Increased cooperation between Turkey and Russia may well only
increase that sentiment within Azerbaijan.
Sandy Smith
HULIQ.com
May 13 2010
SC
Turkey and Russia yesterday signed 17 agreements to cooperate on a
number of energy projects, including an oil pipeline from the Black
Sea to the Mediterranean and Turkey's first nuclear power plant. The
deal is the latest move in a multidimensional international chess
game involving not only Russia and Turkey, but Europe, the larger
Caucusus region, and even American interests.
The New York Times reported yesterday that the deal is the latest in a
series of agreements between Turkey and Russia that ensure continued
Russian control of vital energy transport routes between Asia and
Europe. Since Vladimir Putin's rise to power, Russia has used its
control of both vast supplies of oil and natural gas and the means
of getting those supplies to energy-hungry Europeans as a political
weapon, seeking to obtain policies favorable to Russian interests
from countries receiving energy from it by threatening cutoffs for
displeasing the Kremlin.
While some Turkish sources cited by the Times argue that the energy
pacts will benefit Russia more than Turkey, and others fret that the
deals will make Turkey overreliant on Russia, Turkey -- like Russia,
a country with one foot in Europe and the other in Asia -- has its own
reasons for seeking Russian partnerships. One possible reason is the
stalled status of Turkey's application for membership in the European
Union. Some EU members, most notably Austria and France, have raised
objections to Turkey's accession into the EU, and a number of policy
and diplomatic obstacles, including Turkey's continued support of
the breakaway Turkish government on Cyprus established a few years
after Turkey invaded the island in 1974, have made Turkish entry
into the EU highly unlikely by the previously announced 2013 target
date. Cooperation with Russia could give Turkey some leverage to move
further integration into Europe forward on terms it prefers if this
theory is accurate.
Another is the joint interest both countries have in the Caucusus. Both
Turkey and Russia have a keen interest in the political situation
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, in particular the dispute over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region, a majority Armenian area within Azerbaijan's
borders. Tensions between the two countries remain high, and while
Armenia would prefer a peaceful settlement to the dispute, some
policy analysts have stated that the prospect of rapprochement between
Turkey and Armenia -- an outcome public sentiment in both countries
appears to favor increasingly -- might drive Azerbaijan to declare
war. Increased cooperation between Turkey and Russia may well only
increase that sentiment within Azerbaijan.