Tweet
SOCHI OLYMPICS OFFER A LEVER ON RUSSIA AND RIGHTS
Kurt Volker
Washington Post
May 25 2010
With summer arriving, it might seem early to be thinking through the
politics of the 2014 Winter Olympics. But the next Winter Games are to
be held in Sochi, Russia, just a few miles from Abkhazia, a territory
Russia broke off from Georgia by military force in 2008. Simply put,
this will be tricky. Preparations need to begin as soon as possible.
Few are suggesting that the United States and Europe boycott the Sochi
Games, a la Moscow in 1980. But attending the 2014 Olympics under
today's circumstances would make all of us complicit in cementing
in practice Russia's changing European borders by force, even if we
reject those changes in principle.
Imagine the practicalities. Abkhazia is a part of sovereign Georgian
territory according to every country in the world except Russia,
Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru. Already, Olympic construction workers
are being housed in Abkhazia. By 2014, we could see housing for
tourists, regular border crossings between Russia and Abkhazia without
a hint of Georgian sovereignty, high-visibility symbols of Abkhaz
"statehood" such as flags and travel documents, and the presence of
the Abkhaz and South Ossetian "presidents" at Olympic ceremonies --
alongside U.S. and European leaders.
To avoid the unpalatable choices of boycott or complicity, the United
States and Europe should get to work on a third possibility: that the
Sochi Olympics could become a catalyst for resolving long-standing
conflicts, bringing the Caucasus region into the 21st century.
Russia's interest in a successful Olympics -- an interest that we
share -- should be a powerful incentive for consigning to history
Moscow's zero-sum, divide-and-rule approach to the Caucasus. This
would surely be the best outcome for the states and peoples in the
region, for Moscow, for the athletes and for the Olympics.
To get there, four steps come to mind:
First, we need to be clear that in today's Europe, the change of
borders by force will not be recognized. Diplomacy should begin now
so that at this autumn's NATO and U.S.-E.U. summit meetings, we can
agree on a formal non-recognition policy pertaining to Abkhazia and
Georgia's other breakaway province, South Ossetia.
Although details can be fine-tuned, such a policy could encompass:
non-recognition of statehood; non-acceptance of travel documents issued
by the two territories; no official travel to these areas unless the
access is from Georgian territory; no investment in, or trade with,
business entities based in these territories; and no U.S.
or E.U. visas for officials of the breakaway governments, unless it
is on terms the United States and Europe decide upon. But it should
be equally clear that the West is prepared to lift these policies
quickly should there be agreement with Georgia on internationally
supervised autonomy.
Second, in parallel with a non-recognition policy, the United States
and Europe should give a renewed push to the Geneva process of
negotiations over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. First launched after
the E.U.-brokered cease-fire in 2008, the talks are foundering. The
United States hit the reset button in early 2009; it is time for
Russia to reset as well.
Third, efforts should be reenergized to resolve the region's other
major conflict: the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, which is disputed by
Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is an issue on which Russia, the United
States and Europe have been working together well for years, and the
outlines of a possible settlement have long been on the table. An
Azeri-Armenian settlement could spur travel, trade, investment
and economic prosperity in the region. A ministerial meeting of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Minsk
group, led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov, should be convened to renew pressure toward
a settlement.
Fourth, the OSCE, the European Union and the United States should
put far greater resources into strengthening democratic institutions,
supporting nongovernmental organizations, monitoring conflict zones,
fighting corruption and building trade and investment throughout
the Caucasus. The next elections in Georgia -- where democratic
institutions are strongest, though still fragile -- should be heavily
monitored to make them as clean as possible. We should step up calls
for genuine democratic processes in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Washington
should increase Freedom Support Act funding and team up with the E.U.
Eastern Partnership initiative. Healthy political and economic
development will increase incentives for resolving conflicts and
serve as a magnet for breakaway territories to seek closer integration.
If the United States and Europe do nothing, we will surely face an
untenable situation in 2014. But by acting now, we can stake out a
position based on democratic values and increase the prospects for
reaching long-term solutions well before the Sochi Games.
Kurt Volker, U.S. ambassador to NATO from July 2008 to May 2009, is
managing director of the Center on Transatlantic Relations at Johns
Hopkins University and a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council of
the United States.
From: A. Papazian
Kurt Volker
Washington Post
May 25 2010
With summer arriving, it might seem early to be thinking through the
politics of the 2014 Winter Olympics. But the next Winter Games are to
be held in Sochi, Russia, just a few miles from Abkhazia, a territory
Russia broke off from Georgia by military force in 2008. Simply put,
this will be tricky. Preparations need to begin as soon as possible.
Few are suggesting that the United States and Europe boycott the Sochi
Games, a la Moscow in 1980. But attending the 2014 Olympics under
today's circumstances would make all of us complicit in cementing
in practice Russia's changing European borders by force, even if we
reject those changes in principle.
Imagine the practicalities. Abkhazia is a part of sovereign Georgian
territory according to every country in the world except Russia,
Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru. Already, Olympic construction workers
are being housed in Abkhazia. By 2014, we could see housing for
tourists, regular border crossings between Russia and Abkhazia without
a hint of Georgian sovereignty, high-visibility symbols of Abkhaz
"statehood" such as flags and travel documents, and the presence of
the Abkhaz and South Ossetian "presidents" at Olympic ceremonies --
alongside U.S. and European leaders.
To avoid the unpalatable choices of boycott or complicity, the United
States and Europe should get to work on a third possibility: that the
Sochi Olympics could become a catalyst for resolving long-standing
conflicts, bringing the Caucasus region into the 21st century.
Russia's interest in a successful Olympics -- an interest that we
share -- should be a powerful incentive for consigning to history
Moscow's zero-sum, divide-and-rule approach to the Caucasus. This
would surely be the best outcome for the states and peoples in the
region, for Moscow, for the athletes and for the Olympics.
To get there, four steps come to mind:
First, we need to be clear that in today's Europe, the change of
borders by force will not be recognized. Diplomacy should begin now
so that at this autumn's NATO and U.S.-E.U. summit meetings, we can
agree on a formal non-recognition policy pertaining to Abkhazia and
Georgia's other breakaway province, South Ossetia.
Although details can be fine-tuned, such a policy could encompass:
non-recognition of statehood; non-acceptance of travel documents issued
by the two territories; no official travel to these areas unless the
access is from Georgian territory; no investment in, or trade with,
business entities based in these territories; and no U.S.
or E.U. visas for officials of the breakaway governments, unless it
is on terms the United States and Europe decide upon. But it should
be equally clear that the West is prepared to lift these policies
quickly should there be agreement with Georgia on internationally
supervised autonomy.
Second, in parallel with a non-recognition policy, the United States
and Europe should give a renewed push to the Geneva process of
negotiations over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. First launched after
the E.U.-brokered cease-fire in 2008, the talks are foundering. The
United States hit the reset button in early 2009; it is time for
Russia to reset as well.
Third, efforts should be reenergized to resolve the region's other
major conflict: the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, which is disputed by
Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is an issue on which Russia, the United
States and Europe have been working together well for years, and the
outlines of a possible settlement have long been on the table. An
Azeri-Armenian settlement could spur travel, trade, investment
and economic prosperity in the region. A ministerial meeting of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Minsk
group, led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov, should be convened to renew pressure toward
a settlement.
Fourth, the OSCE, the European Union and the United States should
put far greater resources into strengthening democratic institutions,
supporting nongovernmental organizations, monitoring conflict zones,
fighting corruption and building trade and investment throughout
the Caucasus. The next elections in Georgia -- where democratic
institutions are strongest, though still fragile -- should be heavily
monitored to make them as clean as possible. We should step up calls
for genuine democratic processes in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Washington
should increase Freedom Support Act funding and team up with the E.U.
Eastern Partnership initiative. Healthy political and economic
development will increase incentives for resolving conflicts and
serve as a magnet for breakaway territories to seek closer integration.
If the United States and Europe do nothing, we will surely face an
untenable situation in 2014. But by acting now, we can stake out a
position based on democratic values and increase the prospects for
reaching long-term solutions well before the Sochi Games.
Kurt Volker, U.S. ambassador to NATO from July 2008 to May 2009, is
managing director of the Center on Transatlantic Relations at Johns
Hopkins University and a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council of
the United States.
From: A. Papazian