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SARGSYAN'S DECISION WAS RECEIVED RELATIVELY POSITIVELY IN TURKEY - ANALYST
news.az
May 25 2010
Azerbaijan
Nigar Goksel News.Az interviews Nigar Goksel, senior analyst at the
European Stability Initiative (ESI) and Editor in Chief of Turkish
Policy Quarterly.
Do you expect improvements in the U.S.-Turkish relations after
Obama's statement on April 24-th, which didn't recognize 1915 events
as genocide?
Once again, President Obama may not have pronounced the word
"genocide", but ultimately he defined genocide with the description
of the events in his message on April 24th. Had he used the G-word,
a harsh reaction was expected in Turkey.
The reaction among Turkish decision makers and opinion leaders to the
passage of the resolution in the House Foreign Relations Committee on
March 4th had already offered a glimpse of how dramatic the response
might be: American Congressmen who voted in favor of the resolution
were labeled "reckless" by Turkish decision makers, and the occasion
was described as an 'American comedy.' It was predicted by Turkish
commentators that "internal politics and foreign policy balances
would turn upside down" if the resolution were to be adopted by the
US Congress. The "opportunity" was also used in self-serving ways:
Hardliner supporters of the AKP government blamed the Jewish lobby
for not supporting Turkey against this vote. Some analysts blamed
Azerbaijan for not working hard enough against the resolution in the
House Committee, and consequentially questioned why Turkey should
make sacrifices for Azerbaijan.
Eventually, the fact that President Obama did not use the G-word
did not necessarily boost relations - it only prevented a severe
deterioration.
That Turkey ventured down the path of normalization of relations with
Armenia with various miscalculations is a common assessment by now.
But the United States also miscalculated by creating the impression
that the US threatened to recognize genocide unless Turkey ratified
the protocols. Ultimately, the US would not have benefitted from the
fallout of Washington's genocide recognition, nor from a premature
Turkey-Armenia "breakthrough" that appeared to be US-imposed.
Even though Obama did not use the word "genocide", unfortunately, we
left April 2010 behind with increased tension between involved actors -
including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and the US. After about a month
of keeping the issue relatively low-profile to cool the tensions, the
issue of rapprochement with Armenia has started to be discussed again
in Turkey. Hopefully this time the management of the complex dimensions
- also involving the US and Azerbaijan - will be more smooth.
How would you comment on Armenian decision to stop Turkish-Armenian
approaching process?
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan's decision - announced with a
powerful speech - was understandable given the circumstances. The
normalization process was already deadlocked and at the eve of April
24th, Sargsyan was under domestic (and diaspora) pressure not to allow
Turkey to benefit from the mere appearance of ongoing normalization.
Before the President of Armenia's announcement that the process was
stalled, Ankara tried to keep up the appearance of the normalization
process being on track even though public debate and political messages
from both countries had revealed insurmountable differences.
Unable to deliver results to appease its skeptics, Yerevan had
already hardened its rhetoric. The Armenian leadership was repeating
the Armenian nations' red lines as often as the Turkish leadership
voiced its diametrically opposed expectations. The situation was
not sustainable.
Sargsyan's decision was received relatively positively in Turkey.
Because, if instead, Yerevan had decided to go ahead and ratify the
protocols in its own Parliament, this would have put Turkey in a more
awkward position, highlighting the Turkish resistance to following
suit. In the current situation, the process can be regenerated when
Turkey is ready or when the circumstances Ankara expects are ripe.
What could the Turkish side do after this decision and what will be
the future of the two protocols ratification?
There are steps which do not require an open border ( thus do not
compromise geostrategic balances), that Turkey can take to build
trust and communicate sincerity about wanting to reconcile with the
Armenian nation. These steps will also help prepare the ground for
eventual Armenian-Turkish diplomatic rapprochement.
In this sense Turkish intellectuals and civil society have come a long
way - albeit with baby steps- in breaking stereotypes and changing
paradigms both at home and among Armenians. Hope for real change in
the region is vested - in the long term- in these developments.
Allowing such initiatives to be pursued freely, effectively
implementing the new laws that pertain to minorities- including the
Armenian minority in Turkey, putting more effort into attributing the
Armenian cultural heritage to their civilization, and investing more
political will into restoration efforts would substantiate the claim
of Turkey wishing to overcome the deep running problems between Turks
and Armenians.
On the diplomatic and strategic level there is a deadlock currently.
There is hope in Turkey that a compromise can be reached in the form
of Armenia withdrawing from a few districts surrounding Karabagh
and Turkey in parallel moving the protocol process forward. However
that such a formula will be welcomed by either the Armenian or the
Azerbaijani people is questionable. Given the mutually exclusive
expectations from the societies, it seems that this time, an effort
will be made not to announce the parameters of the processes to the
publics. This can prove to be problematic though, because speculation
will continue to abound, and of course eventually the challenge of
getting the people on board will have to be faced.
From: A. Papazian
news.az
May 25 2010
Azerbaijan
Nigar Goksel News.Az interviews Nigar Goksel, senior analyst at the
European Stability Initiative (ESI) and Editor in Chief of Turkish
Policy Quarterly.
Do you expect improvements in the U.S.-Turkish relations after
Obama's statement on April 24-th, which didn't recognize 1915 events
as genocide?
Once again, President Obama may not have pronounced the word
"genocide", but ultimately he defined genocide with the description
of the events in his message on April 24th. Had he used the G-word,
a harsh reaction was expected in Turkey.
The reaction among Turkish decision makers and opinion leaders to the
passage of the resolution in the House Foreign Relations Committee on
March 4th had already offered a glimpse of how dramatic the response
might be: American Congressmen who voted in favor of the resolution
were labeled "reckless" by Turkish decision makers, and the occasion
was described as an 'American comedy.' It was predicted by Turkish
commentators that "internal politics and foreign policy balances
would turn upside down" if the resolution were to be adopted by the
US Congress. The "opportunity" was also used in self-serving ways:
Hardliner supporters of the AKP government blamed the Jewish lobby
for not supporting Turkey against this vote. Some analysts blamed
Azerbaijan for not working hard enough against the resolution in the
House Committee, and consequentially questioned why Turkey should
make sacrifices for Azerbaijan.
Eventually, the fact that President Obama did not use the G-word
did not necessarily boost relations - it only prevented a severe
deterioration.
That Turkey ventured down the path of normalization of relations with
Armenia with various miscalculations is a common assessment by now.
But the United States also miscalculated by creating the impression
that the US threatened to recognize genocide unless Turkey ratified
the protocols. Ultimately, the US would not have benefitted from the
fallout of Washington's genocide recognition, nor from a premature
Turkey-Armenia "breakthrough" that appeared to be US-imposed.
Even though Obama did not use the word "genocide", unfortunately, we
left April 2010 behind with increased tension between involved actors -
including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and the US. After about a month
of keeping the issue relatively low-profile to cool the tensions, the
issue of rapprochement with Armenia has started to be discussed again
in Turkey. Hopefully this time the management of the complex dimensions
- also involving the US and Azerbaijan - will be more smooth.
How would you comment on Armenian decision to stop Turkish-Armenian
approaching process?
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan's decision - announced with a
powerful speech - was understandable given the circumstances. The
normalization process was already deadlocked and at the eve of April
24th, Sargsyan was under domestic (and diaspora) pressure not to allow
Turkey to benefit from the mere appearance of ongoing normalization.
Before the President of Armenia's announcement that the process was
stalled, Ankara tried to keep up the appearance of the normalization
process being on track even though public debate and political messages
from both countries had revealed insurmountable differences.
Unable to deliver results to appease its skeptics, Yerevan had
already hardened its rhetoric. The Armenian leadership was repeating
the Armenian nations' red lines as often as the Turkish leadership
voiced its diametrically opposed expectations. The situation was
not sustainable.
Sargsyan's decision was received relatively positively in Turkey.
Because, if instead, Yerevan had decided to go ahead and ratify the
protocols in its own Parliament, this would have put Turkey in a more
awkward position, highlighting the Turkish resistance to following
suit. In the current situation, the process can be regenerated when
Turkey is ready or when the circumstances Ankara expects are ripe.
What could the Turkish side do after this decision and what will be
the future of the two protocols ratification?
There are steps which do not require an open border ( thus do not
compromise geostrategic balances), that Turkey can take to build
trust and communicate sincerity about wanting to reconcile with the
Armenian nation. These steps will also help prepare the ground for
eventual Armenian-Turkish diplomatic rapprochement.
In this sense Turkish intellectuals and civil society have come a long
way - albeit with baby steps- in breaking stereotypes and changing
paradigms both at home and among Armenians. Hope for real change in
the region is vested - in the long term- in these developments.
Allowing such initiatives to be pursued freely, effectively
implementing the new laws that pertain to minorities- including the
Armenian minority in Turkey, putting more effort into attributing the
Armenian cultural heritage to their civilization, and investing more
political will into restoration efforts would substantiate the claim
of Turkey wishing to overcome the deep running problems between Turks
and Armenians.
On the diplomatic and strategic level there is a deadlock currently.
There is hope in Turkey that a compromise can be reached in the form
of Armenia withdrawing from a few districts surrounding Karabagh
and Turkey in parallel moving the protocol process forward. However
that such a formula will be welcomed by either the Armenian or the
Azerbaijani people is questionable. Given the mutually exclusive
expectations from the societies, it seems that this time, an effort
will be made not to announce the parameters of the processes to the
publics. This can prove to be problematic though, because speculation
will continue to abound, and of course eventually the challenge of
getting the people on board will have to be faced.
From: A. Papazian