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MOSCOW IN THE MIDDLE
By Justin Lyle
RussiaProfile.org
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=International&articleid=a128923912 2
Nov 8 2010
Is Moscow's Involvement in Mediating the Escalating Conflict Between
Armenia and Azerbaijan Helping or Hurting the Peace-Building Process?
The conflict over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is
populated by ethnic Armenians and, although located within Azerbaijan,
has been beyond Baku's control for two decades, shows no signs of
abating. On the contrary, recent months have seen an intensification
of both skirmishes along the ceasefire line and bellicose rhetoric
from Baku and Yerevan. The intransigence of the two adversaries is
making finding a solution difficult, while the strategic calculations
of both sides and the modalities of the abortive peace process are
increasingly influenced by Russia's growing predominance in this
strategic area of the post-Soviet space.
In a joint declaration issued by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev
and his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan at Russian-mediated talks
in Astrakhan on October 27, the parties agreed to begin exchanging
prisoners and repatriating the dead from the Karabakh conflict. This
small public step is intended to alleviate the heightening tension,
which is threatening to break the fragile peace that has held since
the 1994 ceasefire agreement. The full-scale war that broke out in
this former autonomous region of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in
the death of over 20,000 people and the displacement of more than a
million. It has remained an open wound in relations between Armenia
and Azerbaijan ever since.
Moscow's success in drawing this limited and largely symbolic
humanitarian concession from the two sides marks a contrast to the
conspicuous failure of recent OSCE negotiations. Importantly, the
stalled talks overseen by the OSCE's Minsk Group, which Russia also
co-chairs alongside the United States and France, have not elicited
commitment from the parties to a 2007 Basic Principles document. The
principles call for the return of Armenian-occupied territories
surrounding Karabakh to Azerbaijan, in exchange for provisional
self-governance guarantees for the breakaway region. They also
foresee the return of refugees and internally displaced persons,
the introduction of an international peacekeeping force and the final
resolution of the dispute through a legally binding status vote.
Far from engaging in a substantive structured dialogue, Baku
and Yerevan seem increasingly caught up in a spiraling exchange
of provocations, which has onlookers fearful of a new outbreak of
conflict in the region. Small-scale incidents in the ceasefire zone are
on the rise: of the more than 20 soldiers reported killed this year,
roughly half have died in the last two months. Yerevan has stated that
recognition of Karabakh's independence is the only possibility for a
peaceful resolution of the conflict, and Baku is clearly dissatisfied
with the continuation of the status quo. The current situation plays
in favor of the Armenians, as the passing of time only cements their
hold on the occupied territories.
The recent escalation centers on Baku's decision to double its military
spending in 2011, fulfilling president Aliyev's 2007 prediction that
the latter would soon outstrip the entire Armenian state budget. The
military budget approved by Parliament on October 22 amounts to
$3.12 billion, a sum made possible by Azerbaijan's great oil and gas
wealth. Armenia, by contrast, does not boast similar energy resources
and relies chiefly on Russia for security guarantees.
Yerevan has responded to Baku's provocative move by stating its
willingness to bomb energy pipelines in Azerbaijan in the event of war.
This belligerent rhetoric and the possibility of rash action on either
side have alerted some observers to the risk of a new war, similar
to the conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008, which likewise
followed a cycle of provocations. "The current dynamic is worrying
because it could lead to major powers getting drawn into a conflict,"
cautioned Lawrence Sheets of International Crisis Group. As a fellow
CSTO member, Armenia enjoys a security guarantee from Russia, which
might force Moscow to intervene in the case of conflict even against
its better judgement.
While these aggressive developments are driven by the staunch
attitudes and frustrations of the countries' leaders, Moscow's steps to
advance its own interests in the region have done little to ease the
tension. On August 20 Russian and Armenian defense ministers signed
a protocol extending Russia's lease on the military base at Gyumri,
120 kilometers north of Yerevan, until 2044. To assuage Baku's concerns
about a possible shift in the strategic balance toward Armenia, Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev visited Aliyev two weeks later. Shortly
thereafter, Gazprom - Russia's majority state-owned gas supplier -
signed a deal doubling its purchases from Azerbaijan starting in 2011,
which will bring Baku a useful $5 billion per year.
In securing these sought-after geopolitical advantages, Moscow has
thus also provided the means for the escalation of the conflict.
But even if Russia is in this sense supporting the armament of
both sides, this does not necessarily make large-scale conflict
more likely. Crucially, war would be disastrous to Baku's hopes of
diversifying its energy partnerships through the EU's proposed Nabucco
pipeline project. Aware of the international community's desire to
avoid another South Caucasus war, Aliyev may be issuing international
onlookers a firm signal of his dissatisfaction with the present
situation. Reminding major players such as the United States and the EU
of the imminent potential for full-scale war could stimulate supportive
responses for Baku. Azerbaijan has been particularly irritated by
its traditional ally Turkey's recent steps toward rapprochement with
Armenia, which have conspicuously sidestepped the Karabakh issue. The
decisive factor, however, is likely to be Moscow's engagement.
Medvedev's recent activities have proved Moscow's influence on the
countries' military capacities. As Archil Gegeshidze, a senior analyst
at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies,
suggests, Russia's geopolitical aims in what it considers its "sphere
of privileged interests" are best served by a continued stalemate.
"Armenia is hostage to the Karabakh issue, as it relies on Russia for
its hard security guarantees. Russia is not sure that Armenia would
remain pro-Russian without competition over Karabakh," he noted.
As the Astrakhan meeting demonstrated, an important difference between
the current stand-off and the build-up to the 2008 South Ossetia war
lies in the positioning of major powers around the conflict. Russia's
success in bringing the leaders together for even that limited
gesture of cooperation illustrated Moscow's centrality not only
to the strategic calculus of the parties, but also to mediation of
the negotiations themselves. In the absence of similar achievements
through the stalled OSCE talks, Moscow seems to have the developments
in its grasp.
The ongoing struggle over questions of responsibility and entitlement
in this contested corridor of the post-Soviet space thus seems to
be playing out in Russia's favor. In light of recent rhetoric and
the long-standing centrality of Karabakh in the neighbors' fraught
relations, however, Moscow must take care not to underestimate the
possibility of spontaneous conflict between these staunch rivals. If
the Kremlin fails to do so, it could find itself in the eye of
the storm.
From: A. Papazian
By Justin Lyle
RussiaProfile.org
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=International&articleid=a128923912 2
Nov 8 2010
Is Moscow's Involvement in Mediating the Escalating Conflict Between
Armenia and Azerbaijan Helping or Hurting the Peace-Building Process?
The conflict over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is
populated by ethnic Armenians and, although located within Azerbaijan,
has been beyond Baku's control for two decades, shows no signs of
abating. On the contrary, recent months have seen an intensification
of both skirmishes along the ceasefire line and bellicose rhetoric
from Baku and Yerevan. The intransigence of the two adversaries is
making finding a solution difficult, while the strategic calculations
of both sides and the modalities of the abortive peace process are
increasingly influenced by Russia's growing predominance in this
strategic area of the post-Soviet space.
In a joint declaration issued by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev
and his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan at Russian-mediated talks
in Astrakhan on October 27, the parties agreed to begin exchanging
prisoners and repatriating the dead from the Karabakh conflict. This
small public step is intended to alleviate the heightening tension,
which is threatening to break the fragile peace that has held since
the 1994 ceasefire agreement. The full-scale war that broke out in
this former autonomous region of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in
the death of over 20,000 people and the displacement of more than a
million. It has remained an open wound in relations between Armenia
and Azerbaijan ever since.
Moscow's success in drawing this limited and largely symbolic
humanitarian concession from the two sides marks a contrast to the
conspicuous failure of recent OSCE negotiations. Importantly, the
stalled talks overseen by the OSCE's Minsk Group, which Russia also
co-chairs alongside the United States and France, have not elicited
commitment from the parties to a 2007 Basic Principles document. The
principles call for the return of Armenian-occupied territories
surrounding Karabakh to Azerbaijan, in exchange for provisional
self-governance guarantees for the breakaway region. They also
foresee the return of refugees and internally displaced persons,
the introduction of an international peacekeeping force and the final
resolution of the dispute through a legally binding status vote.
Far from engaging in a substantive structured dialogue, Baku
and Yerevan seem increasingly caught up in a spiraling exchange
of provocations, which has onlookers fearful of a new outbreak of
conflict in the region. Small-scale incidents in the ceasefire zone are
on the rise: of the more than 20 soldiers reported killed this year,
roughly half have died in the last two months. Yerevan has stated that
recognition of Karabakh's independence is the only possibility for a
peaceful resolution of the conflict, and Baku is clearly dissatisfied
with the continuation of the status quo. The current situation plays
in favor of the Armenians, as the passing of time only cements their
hold on the occupied territories.
The recent escalation centers on Baku's decision to double its military
spending in 2011, fulfilling president Aliyev's 2007 prediction that
the latter would soon outstrip the entire Armenian state budget. The
military budget approved by Parliament on October 22 amounts to
$3.12 billion, a sum made possible by Azerbaijan's great oil and gas
wealth. Armenia, by contrast, does not boast similar energy resources
and relies chiefly on Russia for security guarantees.
Yerevan has responded to Baku's provocative move by stating its
willingness to bomb energy pipelines in Azerbaijan in the event of war.
This belligerent rhetoric and the possibility of rash action on either
side have alerted some observers to the risk of a new war, similar
to the conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008, which likewise
followed a cycle of provocations. "The current dynamic is worrying
because it could lead to major powers getting drawn into a conflict,"
cautioned Lawrence Sheets of International Crisis Group. As a fellow
CSTO member, Armenia enjoys a security guarantee from Russia, which
might force Moscow to intervene in the case of conflict even against
its better judgement.
While these aggressive developments are driven by the staunch
attitudes and frustrations of the countries' leaders, Moscow's steps to
advance its own interests in the region have done little to ease the
tension. On August 20 Russian and Armenian defense ministers signed
a protocol extending Russia's lease on the military base at Gyumri,
120 kilometers north of Yerevan, until 2044. To assuage Baku's concerns
about a possible shift in the strategic balance toward Armenia, Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev visited Aliyev two weeks later. Shortly
thereafter, Gazprom - Russia's majority state-owned gas supplier -
signed a deal doubling its purchases from Azerbaijan starting in 2011,
which will bring Baku a useful $5 billion per year.
In securing these sought-after geopolitical advantages, Moscow has
thus also provided the means for the escalation of the conflict.
But even if Russia is in this sense supporting the armament of
both sides, this does not necessarily make large-scale conflict
more likely. Crucially, war would be disastrous to Baku's hopes of
diversifying its energy partnerships through the EU's proposed Nabucco
pipeline project. Aware of the international community's desire to
avoid another South Caucasus war, Aliyev may be issuing international
onlookers a firm signal of his dissatisfaction with the present
situation. Reminding major players such as the United States and the EU
of the imminent potential for full-scale war could stimulate supportive
responses for Baku. Azerbaijan has been particularly irritated by
its traditional ally Turkey's recent steps toward rapprochement with
Armenia, which have conspicuously sidestepped the Karabakh issue. The
decisive factor, however, is likely to be Moscow's engagement.
Medvedev's recent activities have proved Moscow's influence on the
countries' military capacities. As Archil Gegeshidze, a senior analyst
at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies,
suggests, Russia's geopolitical aims in what it considers its "sphere
of privileged interests" are best served by a continued stalemate.
"Armenia is hostage to the Karabakh issue, as it relies on Russia for
its hard security guarantees. Russia is not sure that Armenia would
remain pro-Russian without competition over Karabakh," he noted.
As the Astrakhan meeting demonstrated, an important difference between
the current stand-off and the build-up to the 2008 South Ossetia war
lies in the positioning of major powers around the conflict. Russia's
success in bringing the leaders together for even that limited
gesture of cooperation illustrated Moscow's centrality not only
to the strategic calculus of the parties, but also to mediation of
the negotiations themselves. In the absence of similar achievements
through the stalled OSCE talks, Moscow seems to have the developments
in its grasp.
The ongoing struggle over questions of responsibility and entitlement
in this contested corridor of the post-Soviet space thus seems to
be playing out in Russia's favor. In light of recent rhetoric and
the long-standing centrality of Karabakh in the neighbors' fraught
relations, however, Moscow must take care not to underestimate the
possibility of spontaneous conflict between these staunch rivals. If
the Kremlin fails to do so, it could find itself in the eye of
the storm.
From: A. Papazian