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news.az, Azerbaijan
Nov 11 2010
Karabakh peace process 'needs its own Camp David'
Thu 11 November 2010 09:28 GMT | 11:28 Local Time
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Taleh Ziyadov News.Az interviews Taleh Ziyadov, a doctoral fellow at
the University of Cambridge (UK).
Could you comment on the recent meeting between the presidents of
Azerbaijan and Armenia in Astrakhan, mediated by Russian President
Dmitriy Medvedev?
This was yet another attempt to find ways to break the deadlock in the
current peace process that is bound to collapse if a way out is not
found. The OSCE Minsk Group has a revised proposal on the table that
outlines a feasible plan to achieve long term peace in the South
Caucasus. Mind you, this proposal was drafted taking into account the
concerns and suggestions of both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Baku declared
that the proposal is not perfect but it could be used as a basis for
drafting a final agreement on the so-called Basic Principles - which
is to say, it agreed in principle. Yerevan, on the other hand, did not
officially denounce the proposal (though a series of disapproving and
contradictory statements have been circulated in the Armenian press),
nor did it accept it. Instead, Yerevan started pointing to the more
recent trilateral discussions between the presidents of Azerbaijan,
Armenia and Russia in St Petersburg in June. While the content of the
St Petersburg meeting of the three presidents was not made public, it
seems that the discussions among the parties were not limited to the
OSCE Minsk Group proposal and may have gone beyond it. Azerbaijan
interpreted this as an attempt by Armenia to disrupt the peace process
and distract attention away from the current OSCE Minsk Group
proposal, which Baku considers a workable option. Therefore, the
following meetings facilitated by the Russian Federation, including
the one in Astrakhan, should be viewed in the light of the odd St
Petersburg meeting. I think the current OSCE Minsk Group proposal has
the best framework that could lead to a workable agreement on Basic
Principles. The focus should be placed on establishing common ground
for a possible agreement.
What do you think about the agreement on the immediate exchange of
prisoners and human remains by Azerbaijan and Armenia? Will this
agreement have a positive impact on the Karabakh peace process in
general?
The exchange of prisoners and dead soldiers between Azerbaijan and
Armenia is indeed a positive development. This is especially so,
considering that there had been numerous attempts to do this exchange
earlier. As you know, all the previous attempts, including the appeal
from Russia's Orthodox Patriarch Kirill I to repatriate the body of
the dead Azeri soldier, Mubariz Ibrahimov, from Armenia, failed.
Hence, this was an important tangible outcome of the trilateral
meeting. But it is unfortunate that this exchange has been delayed for
so long.
The `real outcome' for the Karabakh peace process, however, would be
reaching an agreement on the OSCE Minsk Group proposal. If the
initiative by President Medvedev helps reach this goal, it will be
applauded. But whether this is the intention or a possible outcome of
these trilateral meetings is yet to be seen. One thing is clear and
that is that Moscow has an undeniable influence over Armenia and it's
probably the only regional power that could affect Yerevan's
decisions.
Considering the increased number of meetings between President Aliyev
and President Sargsyan in recent months with the mediation of the
Russian Federation, has Russia de facto `squeezed out' the other two
OSCE Minsk Group mediators, namely the United States and France?
I wouldn't characterize these efforts as `squeezing out' other
players, though Moscow undoubtedly makes sure its interests are taken
into account. Russia has always dominated the Karabakh peace process.
In addition to multilateral and bilateral meetings, there have been a
number of trilateral meetings of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia
and Russia. The meeting in Astrakhan was the third in 2010 and the
seventh since 2008. I don't recall any trilateral meetings of the
presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and France or the United States
during this time. Compared to active Washington in the early 1990s
(when James Baker had worked out the so-called `Baker Rules') and 2000
(when Colin Powell led the Key West talks), today the US is rather
inactive and the Obama administration has no clear strategy towards
the region. The same applies to Europe (i.e. the European Commission)
whose involvement in the Karabakh peace process does not go beyond
statements and reports. If Moscow is more active today, it does not
mean it is holding the United States or France/the European Union back
from doing the same. Rather, the Karabakh conflict is not a priority
in Washington, Paris or Brussels. For Moscow, on the other hand,
resolving the major conflict between two neighbours and states, which
Russia considers its strategic partners in the South Caucasus, could
be more important. After all, Moscow still perceives this matter as a
regional "duty".
Moreover, the common belief that the status quo in the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict serves Moscow is bound to fail. The South
Caucasus region is a relatively small region and its further
integration is only a matter of time. The integration of the economies
of its neighbouring states will help this process and make the
regional states more interdependent. Therefore, building strategies
based on `freezing' conflicts is counterproductive and will not bring
long-term peace to the region and may result in another war.
How would you judge the mediation efforts of the Russian Federation?
Are these efforts credible and do they have potential? Are these
efforts in line with the national interests of Azerbaijan?
The mediation efforts are judged by their outcomes. While small
results have been achieved in the negotiations, the more tangible and
final outcome - the signing of a peace deal between Azerbaijan and
Armenia - is yet to be attained. Hence, it would be premature to make
a judgment on the credibility of the mediation efforts. As for the
potential of Russia's mediation efforts, this depends on how Moscow
views its role as a mediator. In other words, if a mediator has
leverage over the negotiating parties, but refuses to use this
leverage in view of impartiality, this mediation effort is likely to
be ineffective and a breakthrough should not be expected. Russian
officials, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, have made a number
of statements in the past noting that the final decision on resolution
of the Karabakh conflict should be left to the leadership of Armenia
and Azerbaijan. This means that Moscow has so far been unwilling to
use its leverage to achieve a breakthrough, which Baku and Yerevan
won't reach on their own.
Carrots and inducements are an inseparable part of the mediation and
negotiation process and it does not always run against the
impartiality principle. It is no secret that Russia has significant
influence in Armenia. Yerevan's insecurity could be addressed by
Moscow's guarantees and other measures could be introduced to make
sure that any signed peace deal will be sustainable and implemented by
all parties. If extra effort is not made, the current process will be
dead soon and the so-called Madrid principles will follow the fate of
the 1997 Lisbon principles. The mediation efforts should focus on
sealing a deal on the current OSCE Minsk Group proposal, as doing
otherwise would nullify several years of work.
As far as Baku's position in the negotiations is concerned, it is
based on the principles of international law, and territorial
integrity constitutes the key component of this framework.
International mediators, including Russia, act within the framework of
international law and their mediation efforts are guided by
international law. Though bias among various mediating parties will
always exist.
What do you expect from the meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan
and Armenia on the sidelines of the OSCE Summit in Astana in December?
This would most probably be another round of talks between the two
heads of states. So no surprises there!
To make a serious breakthrough, the Karabakh peace process needs its
own Camp David. The parties have agreed to most of the outstanding
issues and require a final push. It's extremely difficult to seal a
comprehensive deal through sporadic meetings that take place once
every two or three months. Realistically, what one should expect from
the negotiations at the current stage is a possible agreement on a
step-by-step `road map' to a final solution. This is feasible. For
this reason, a dedicated high level peace accord should be organized
(be it in Russia, Europe or the US) with the attendance of the two
presidents and other influential global leaders. Such a retreat would
show serious intent and create an opportunity for intensive and
continuous mediated discussions between President Aliyev and President
Sargsyan, reinforced by additional incentives from other leaders,
which could hopefully break the deadlock.
Taleh Ziyadov is a doctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge
(UK). He specializes in energy security, transportation and
geopolitical issues in Central Eurasia. His article analysing the
phases of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process from 1994 until
2009 was published in the journal of International Negotiation (Volume
15, Number 1, 2010).
Aliyah Fridman
News.Az
From: A. Papazian
Nov 11 2010
Karabakh peace process 'needs its own Camp David'
Thu 11 November 2010 09:28 GMT | 11:28 Local Time
Text size:
Taleh Ziyadov News.Az interviews Taleh Ziyadov, a doctoral fellow at
the University of Cambridge (UK).
Could you comment on the recent meeting between the presidents of
Azerbaijan and Armenia in Astrakhan, mediated by Russian President
Dmitriy Medvedev?
This was yet another attempt to find ways to break the deadlock in the
current peace process that is bound to collapse if a way out is not
found. The OSCE Minsk Group has a revised proposal on the table that
outlines a feasible plan to achieve long term peace in the South
Caucasus. Mind you, this proposal was drafted taking into account the
concerns and suggestions of both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Baku declared
that the proposal is not perfect but it could be used as a basis for
drafting a final agreement on the so-called Basic Principles - which
is to say, it agreed in principle. Yerevan, on the other hand, did not
officially denounce the proposal (though a series of disapproving and
contradictory statements have been circulated in the Armenian press),
nor did it accept it. Instead, Yerevan started pointing to the more
recent trilateral discussions between the presidents of Azerbaijan,
Armenia and Russia in St Petersburg in June. While the content of the
St Petersburg meeting of the three presidents was not made public, it
seems that the discussions among the parties were not limited to the
OSCE Minsk Group proposal and may have gone beyond it. Azerbaijan
interpreted this as an attempt by Armenia to disrupt the peace process
and distract attention away from the current OSCE Minsk Group
proposal, which Baku considers a workable option. Therefore, the
following meetings facilitated by the Russian Federation, including
the one in Astrakhan, should be viewed in the light of the odd St
Petersburg meeting. I think the current OSCE Minsk Group proposal has
the best framework that could lead to a workable agreement on Basic
Principles. The focus should be placed on establishing common ground
for a possible agreement.
What do you think about the agreement on the immediate exchange of
prisoners and human remains by Azerbaijan and Armenia? Will this
agreement have a positive impact on the Karabakh peace process in
general?
The exchange of prisoners and dead soldiers between Azerbaijan and
Armenia is indeed a positive development. This is especially so,
considering that there had been numerous attempts to do this exchange
earlier. As you know, all the previous attempts, including the appeal
from Russia's Orthodox Patriarch Kirill I to repatriate the body of
the dead Azeri soldier, Mubariz Ibrahimov, from Armenia, failed.
Hence, this was an important tangible outcome of the trilateral
meeting. But it is unfortunate that this exchange has been delayed for
so long.
The `real outcome' for the Karabakh peace process, however, would be
reaching an agreement on the OSCE Minsk Group proposal. If the
initiative by President Medvedev helps reach this goal, it will be
applauded. But whether this is the intention or a possible outcome of
these trilateral meetings is yet to be seen. One thing is clear and
that is that Moscow has an undeniable influence over Armenia and it's
probably the only regional power that could affect Yerevan's
decisions.
Considering the increased number of meetings between President Aliyev
and President Sargsyan in recent months with the mediation of the
Russian Federation, has Russia de facto `squeezed out' the other two
OSCE Minsk Group mediators, namely the United States and France?
I wouldn't characterize these efforts as `squeezing out' other
players, though Moscow undoubtedly makes sure its interests are taken
into account. Russia has always dominated the Karabakh peace process.
In addition to multilateral and bilateral meetings, there have been a
number of trilateral meetings of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia
and Russia. The meeting in Astrakhan was the third in 2010 and the
seventh since 2008. I don't recall any trilateral meetings of the
presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and France or the United States
during this time. Compared to active Washington in the early 1990s
(when James Baker had worked out the so-called `Baker Rules') and 2000
(when Colin Powell led the Key West talks), today the US is rather
inactive and the Obama administration has no clear strategy towards
the region. The same applies to Europe (i.e. the European Commission)
whose involvement in the Karabakh peace process does not go beyond
statements and reports. If Moscow is more active today, it does not
mean it is holding the United States or France/the European Union back
from doing the same. Rather, the Karabakh conflict is not a priority
in Washington, Paris or Brussels. For Moscow, on the other hand,
resolving the major conflict between two neighbours and states, which
Russia considers its strategic partners in the South Caucasus, could
be more important. After all, Moscow still perceives this matter as a
regional "duty".
Moreover, the common belief that the status quo in the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict serves Moscow is bound to fail. The South
Caucasus region is a relatively small region and its further
integration is only a matter of time. The integration of the economies
of its neighbouring states will help this process and make the
regional states more interdependent. Therefore, building strategies
based on `freezing' conflicts is counterproductive and will not bring
long-term peace to the region and may result in another war.
How would you judge the mediation efforts of the Russian Federation?
Are these efforts credible and do they have potential? Are these
efforts in line with the national interests of Azerbaijan?
The mediation efforts are judged by their outcomes. While small
results have been achieved in the negotiations, the more tangible and
final outcome - the signing of a peace deal between Azerbaijan and
Armenia - is yet to be attained. Hence, it would be premature to make
a judgment on the credibility of the mediation efforts. As for the
potential of Russia's mediation efforts, this depends on how Moscow
views its role as a mediator. In other words, if a mediator has
leverage over the negotiating parties, but refuses to use this
leverage in view of impartiality, this mediation effort is likely to
be ineffective and a breakthrough should not be expected. Russian
officials, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, have made a number
of statements in the past noting that the final decision on resolution
of the Karabakh conflict should be left to the leadership of Armenia
and Azerbaijan. This means that Moscow has so far been unwilling to
use its leverage to achieve a breakthrough, which Baku and Yerevan
won't reach on their own.
Carrots and inducements are an inseparable part of the mediation and
negotiation process and it does not always run against the
impartiality principle. It is no secret that Russia has significant
influence in Armenia. Yerevan's insecurity could be addressed by
Moscow's guarantees and other measures could be introduced to make
sure that any signed peace deal will be sustainable and implemented by
all parties. If extra effort is not made, the current process will be
dead soon and the so-called Madrid principles will follow the fate of
the 1997 Lisbon principles. The mediation efforts should focus on
sealing a deal on the current OSCE Minsk Group proposal, as doing
otherwise would nullify several years of work.
As far as Baku's position in the negotiations is concerned, it is
based on the principles of international law, and territorial
integrity constitutes the key component of this framework.
International mediators, including Russia, act within the framework of
international law and their mediation efforts are guided by
international law. Though bias among various mediating parties will
always exist.
What do you expect from the meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan
and Armenia on the sidelines of the OSCE Summit in Astana in December?
This would most probably be another round of talks between the two
heads of states. So no surprises there!
To make a serious breakthrough, the Karabakh peace process needs its
own Camp David. The parties have agreed to most of the outstanding
issues and require a final push. It's extremely difficult to seal a
comprehensive deal through sporadic meetings that take place once
every two or three months. Realistically, what one should expect from
the negotiations at the current stage is a possible agreement on a
step-by-step `road map' to a final solution. This is feasible. For
this reason, a dedicated high level peace accord should be organized
(be it in Russia, Europe or the US) with the attendance of the two
presidents and other influential global leaders. Such a retreat would
show serious intent and create an opportunity for intensive and
continuous mediated discussions between President Aliyev and President
Sargsyan, reinforced by additional incentives from other leaders,
which could hopefully break the deadlock.
Taleh Ziyadov is a doctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge
(UK). He specializes in energy security, transportation and
geopolitical issues in Central Eurasia. His article analysing the
phases of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process from 1994 until
2009 was published in the journal of International Negotiation (Volume
15, Number 1, 2010).
Aliyah Fridman
News.Az
From: A. Papazian