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MENSOIAN: KARABAGH AND THE CREDIBILITY OF 'HAI TAHD'
By: Michael Mensoian
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2010/11/17/mensoian-karabagh-and-the-credibility-of-hai-tahd/
Wed, Nov 17 2010
Karabagh occupies a very small piece of the earth's surface, but it
represents the sum and substance of Hai Tahd (Armenian Cause) and
the political fortunes of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF).
Some may view this as hyperbole, but Karabagh does represent a defining
moment in the history of the ARF. Not only were ARF members part of the
Karabagh government that declared its independence from Azerbaijan,
but ARF combat units were effective participants in the war for
liberation. And it was an ARF unit in a well-coordinated surprise
attack on May 8, 1992 that defeated the Azeri forces entrenched in
the historic mountain fortress city of Shushi that marked the turning
point in the war for liberation.
The 1994 ceasefire agreement "establishing" the de facto independence
of the Nagorno Karabagh Republic (NKR) represented a major victory
for the Armenian nation and the ARF in particular. However, much
needs to be done before Karabagh and the liberated lands of Artsakh
are recognized as a free and independent state. Achieving de jure
independence would give credence to Hai Tahd, a Dashnaktsutiun
manifesto, and would affirm to the Armenian people that the injustices
rooted in the genocide, in the Treaty of Sevres, and the Bolshevik's
territorial dismemberment of Armenia can be overcome.
Failure, for whatever reason and from whichever quarter, will
have a deleterious effect on the ARF and Hai Tahd. Unfortunately,
the present reactive policy of both Yerevan and the ARF will be more
likely to guarantee failure than success for Karabagh. If Yerevan feels
constrained for obvious or less obvious reasons, then the burden falls
more heavily upon the ARF. At stake is Hai Tahd and the creditability
of the ARF whose 120 year history identifies it as a force dedicated
to the welfare of the Armenian nation. Within this context, success
is more vital for the Dashnaktsutiun than it is for Yerevan.
Since the loss of Karabagh (historic Armenian Artsakh), Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev has engaged in a repetitious harangue that
threatens military action if negotiations (which exclude Karabagh as
a participant) fail. As part of this ongoing attempt to undermine
the resolve of the Karabagh Armenians and strain relations between
Stepanakert and Yerevan, statements are routinely released alluding to
agreements and understandings with Armenia or the Minsk Group mediators
(France, Russia, and the United States) that have no basis in fact.
As part of this psychological attack, Azerbaijan recently announced
that its 2010-11 military procurement budget will be about $3.4
billion. This is over 800 percent greater than the combined military
budget for Armenia and Karabagh. Since 2002, Azerbaijan has earmarked
approximately $10 billion for its military establishment. Yet, given
this unprecedented military expansion, neither NATO nor the Minsk Group
seems overly concerned. While ignoring the destabilizing effect this
has on the south Caucasus and possibly beyond, the Minsk mediators
continue to press Armenia and Karabagh that the first step toward a
peaceful resolution of the conflict requires the withdrawal of all
Armenian and Karabagh military units from the so-called "occupied"
territories. Nothing is said about Azerbaijan withdrawing military
units from occupied Shahumian and the eastern margins of Martakert
and Martuni.
This is a lose-lose situation for Karabagh and Armenia. This
unacceptable demand would leave Karabagh as an exclave, unprotected
and indefensible, the Lachin Corridor road notwithstanding. And the
Armenians would be no less vulnerable at the negotiation table. This
proposal by the Minsk mediators is based solely on the principle of
(Azerbaijan's) territorial inviolability and completely ignores the
principles of self-determination and remedial secession compatible
with the objectives of the Karabagh Armenians (see "Artsakh and ICJ's
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo," The Armenian Weekly, Aug. 21, 2010).
There is an ominous component to this determination by the Azeris to
undermine the will of the Karabagh Armenians. During the past several
months, six Karabagh Defense Force personnel have been killed along
the Line of Contact (LoC). This is the number released to the public by
Armenia. The latest killing was the result of sniper fire-an absolutely
unprovoked and unwarranted death. It may seem a fine distinction,
but it is a significant one. Whereas probing actions may or may not
result in deaths, Azeri snipers have orders to shoot to kill any
target of opportunity (obviously an Armenian soldier), but it could
just as well be an Armenian civilian living near the border.
With spotting scope and the proper gauge weapon for the task, it takes
one round to kill someone without any danger to the sniper. Their
use along the LoC, given the ceasefire agreement, cannot be tolerated.
Eldar Sabiroglu, the Azeri Defense Ministry spokesperson, proudly
stated that Armenia "...does not have a power capable of neutralizing
the Azerbaijani snipers." Given the rigorous technical training and
emotional and physical conditioning required of snipers, Sabiroglu's
confidence suggests that Azeri snipers may be trained by the United
States and most definitely by Turkey. Armenia has offered to withdraw
its snipers from the LoC-in line with the suggestion by United
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon that all snipers should be
withdrawn from the LoC. Azerbaijan refuses. One has to assume that
these killings will continue as Azerbaijan seeks to undermine the
morale of the Defense Force personnel and Karabagh civilians.
The Minsk mediators have taken no substantive action against Azerbaijan
nor have they issued any serious condemnation with respect to these
LoC violations. For that fact, neither Armenia nor Karabagh seem
willing or deem it necessary to mount any measured response.
There are numerous strategic objectives that would send a clear
message to Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), represented by the Minsk Group,
that Armenia and Karabagh are prepared to resist any military action
by Azerbaijan. Equally important is the subtext of this message that
Karabagh's independence and the lands governed by Stepanakert will
not be negotiated away. If the hard-fought gains in Karabagh cannot
be protected, does it seem likely that the other injustices Hai Tahd
represents can be successfully served?
Any further deterioration along the LoC could suggest to the Karabagh
Armenians and their diasporan supporters that the situation is becoming
precarious. Funds from the diaspora (if they continued to flow given
this perception) can never override the need for a proactive policy
that unequivocally indicates the determination of Yerevan and the
ARF in keeping Artsakh (Karabagh and the surrounding territories)
independent. Absent such a policy could encourage an out-migration
of Armenians from Karabagh, a development that would be welcomed
by Azerbaijan.
As it is, the population of Karabagh has shown no significant growth
since 1994. The resettlement program envisioned by Stepanakert
never materialized due primarily to a shortage of funds. In
fact, the inability by Yerevan or the ARF to have a comprehensive
resettlement program in place that would encourage the thousands of
families necessary to strengthen Armenian claims to historic Artsakh
represents a serious weakness. There is no shortage of potential
in-migrants. How they view the long-term viability of Artsakh
influences their decision to migrate. Any uncertainties or fears
that affect the Karabagh Armenians will affect them as well. Such a
malaise cannot be allowed to take hold.
Having said that, the question we must ask is what configuration
the future independent state will have. Will it be the former Soviet
autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabagh (the present-day Nagorno Karabagh
Republic minus Shahumian) or will it encompass all of the liberated
lands (historic Armenian Artsakh) governed by Stepanakert?
This begs the question as to the fate of Shahumian and the
Azeri-occupied eastern borderlands of Martakert and Martuni. This
configuration has yet to be definitively expressed allowing some
latitude for minor territorial adjustments. The present nomenclature
defining the region offers no help. We have allowed the Minsk
moderators (and ourselves) to divide the liberated territories into
two distinct parts: the Nagorno Karabagh Republic and the "occupied
territories" or "security zone." The recent Minsk mission referred
to the territory surrounding Karabagh as "occupied." They went so
far as to refer to the capital city of Stepanakert by its Azeri name
(Khankendi) as well.
Place-names do have geopolitical significance which explains why
Georgia has eliminated Javakhk from its maps. Georgian Foreign Minister
Grigol Vashadze recently claimed that he didn't "...know what Javakhk
is" and that "[t]here is no Javakhk on the map." Obviously not; his
government simply eliminated its use. The erasure and replacement
of place-names has been the official policy of Turkey and Azerbaijan
as well and is usually accompanied by the destruction of evidentiary
physical cultural artifacts attesting to its Armenian antecedents. It
might do well to refer to all of the liberated territory as Artsakh
to indicate the intent of Armenia and Karabagh.
This would be a bold move and sure to give Aliyev an apoplectic event.
It should not be difficult to see the connection between success in
Karabagh and the beneficial impact it would have on Hai Tahd and the
ARF. Maintaining the credibility of the ARF is important because its
work is just now beginning with respect to Hai Tahd. This includes
issues such as the state-imposed problems facing the Javakhkahayer
(Javakhk Armenians) and the forgotten Armenians of the genocide who
populate the lands of historic western Armenia. How would the concept
of "a united Armenia, free, and independent, for all Armenians" be
implemented? And then there are the issues of genocide recognition,
restitution, indemnification, and reparations. These are significant
issues that may or may not need to be addressed concurrently.
Within Armenia, the ARF must continue to serve as the catalyst to
effect the changes necessary to create a system that will provide
social and economic justice and opportunity within a democratic
structure for the worker and his family. There is nothing new here.
Historically the agenda of the ARF has encompassed many causes
simultaneously. Present conditions now suggest a restructuring that
will allow for an efficient and effective response by the ARF to
the various issues facing the Armenian nation-a nation that it has
successfully served for the past 120 years. How effective the ARF will
be as it moves into the second decade of this century depends in very
large measure on how the Armenian people assess its role in Artsakh,
whether or not that assessment is justified.
From: A. Papazian
By: Michael Mensoian
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2010/11/17/mensoian-karabagh-and-the-credibility-of-hai-tahd/
Wed, Nov 17 2010
Karabagh occupies a very small piece of the earth's surface, but it
represents the sum and substance of Hai Tahd (Armenian Cause) and
the political fortunes of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF).
Some may view this as hyperbole, but Karabagh does represent a defining
moment in the history of the ARF. Not only were ARF members part of the
Karabagh government that declared its independence from Azerbaijan,
but ARF combat units were effective participants in the war for
liberation. And it was an ARF unit in a well-coordinated surprise
attack on May 8, 1992 that defeated the Azeri forces entrenched in
the historic mountain fortress city of Shushi that marked the turning
point in the war for liberation.
The 1994 ceasefire agreement "establishing" the de facto independence
of the Nagorno Karabagh Republic (NKR) represented a major victory
for the Armenian nation and the ARF in particular. However, much
needs to be done before Karabagh and the liberated lands of Artsakh
are recognized as a free and independent state. Achieving de jure
independence would give credence to Hai Tahd, a Dashnaktsutiun
manifesto, and would affirm to the Armenian people that the injustices
rooted in the genocide, in the Treaty of Sevres, and the Bolshevik's
territorial dismemberment of Armenia can be overcome.
Failure, for whatever reason and from whichever quarter, will
have a deleterious effect on the ARF and Hai Tahd. Unfortunately,
the present reactive policy of both Yerevan and the ARF will be more
likely to guarantee failure than success for Karabagh. If Yerevan feels
constrained for obvious or less obvious reasons, then the burden falls
more heavily upon the ARF. At stake is Hai Tahd and the creditability
of the ARF whose 120 year history identifies it as a force dedicated
to the welfare of the Armenian nation. Within this context, success
is more vital for the Dashnaktsutiun than it is for Yerevan.
Since the loss of Karabagh (historic Armenian Artsakh), Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev has engaged in a repetitious harangue that
threatens military action if negotiations (which exclude Karabagh as
a participant) fail. As part of this ongoing attempt to undermine
the resolve of the Karabagh Armenians and strain relations between
Stepanakert and Yerevan, statements are routinely released alluding to
agreements and understandings with Armenia or the Minsk Group mediators
(France, Russia, and the United States) that have no basis in fact.
As part of this psychological attack, Azerbaijan recently announced
that its 2010-11 military procurement budget will be about $3.4
billion. This is over 800 percent greater than the combined military
budget for Armenia and Karabagh. Since 2002, Azerbaijan has earmarked
approximately $10 billion for its military establishment. Yet, given
this unprecedented military expansion, neither NATO nor the Minsk Group
seems overly concerned. While ignoring the destabilizing effect this
has on the south Caucasus and possibly beyond, the Minsk mediators
continue to press Armenia and Karabagh that the first step toward a
peaceful resolution of the conflict requires the withdrawal of all
Armenian and Karabagh military units from the so-called "occupied"
territories. Nothing is said about Azerbaijan withdrawing military
units from occupied Shahumian and the eastern margins of Martakert
and Martuni.
This is a lose-lose situation for Karabagh and Armenia. This
unacceptable demand would leave Karabagh as an exclave, unprotected
and indefensible, the Lachin Corridor road notwithstanding. And the
Armenians would be no less vulnerable at the negotiation table. This
proposal by the Minsk mediators is based solely on the principle of
(Azerbaijan's) territorial inviolability and completely ignores the
principles of self-determination and remedial secession compatible
with the objectives of the Karabagh Armenians (see "Artsakh and ICJ's
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo," The Armenian Weekly, Aug. 21, 2010).
There is an ominous component to this determination by the Azeris to
undermine the will of the Karabagh Armenians. During the past several
months, six Karabagh Defense Force personnel have been killed along
the Line of Contact (LoC). This is the number released to the public by
Armenia. The latest killing was the result of sniper fire-an absolutely
unprovoked and unwarranted death. It may seem a fine distinction,
but it is a significant one. Whereas probing actions may or may not
result in deaths, Azeri snipers have orders to shoot to kill any
target of opportunity (obviously an Armenian soldier), but it could
just as well be an Armenian civilian living near the border.
With spotting scope and the proper gauge weapon for the task, it takes
one round to kill someone without any danger to the sniper. Their
use along the LoC, given the ceasefire agreement, cannot be tolerated.
Eldar Sabiroglu, the Azeri Defense Ministry spokesperson, proudly
stated that Armenia "...does not have a power capable of neutralizing
the Azerbaijani snipers." Given the rigorous technical training and
emotional and physical conditioning required of snipers, Sabiroglu's
confidence suggests that Azeri snipers may be trained by the United
States and most definitely by Turkey. Armenia has offered to withdraw
its snipers from the LoC-in line with the suggestion by United
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon that all snipers should be
withdrawn from the LoC. Azerbaijan refuses. One has to assume that
these killings will continue as Azerbaijan seeks to undermine the
morale of the Defense Force personnel and Karabagh civilians.
The Minsk mediators have taken no substantive action against Azerbaijan
nor have they issued any serious condemnation with respect to these
LoC violations. For that fact, neither Armenia nor Karabagh seem
willing or deem it necessary to mount any measured response.
There are numerous strategic objectives that would send a clear
message to Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), represented by the Minsk Group,
that Armenia and Karabagh are prepared to resist any military action
by Azerbaijan. Equally important is the subtext of this message that
Karabagh's independence and the lands governed by Stepanakert will
not be negotiated away. If the hard-fought gains in Karabagh cannot
be protected, does it seem likely that the other injustices Hai Tahd
represents can be successfully served?
Any further deterioration along the LoC could suggest to the Karabagh
Armenians and their diasporan supporters that the situation is becoming
precarious. Funds from the diaspora (if they continued to flow given
this perception) can never override the need for a proactive policy
that unequivocally indicates the determination of Yerevan and the
ARF in keeping Artsakh (Karabagh and the surrounding territories)
independent. Absent such a policy could encourage an out-migration
of Armenians from Karabagh, a development that would be welcomed
by Azerbaijan.
As it is, the population of Karabagh has shown no significant growth
since 1994. The resettlement program envisioned by Stepanakert
never materialized due primarily to a shortage of funds. In
fact, the inability by Yerevan or the ARF to have a comprehensive
resettlement program in place that would encourage the thousands of
families necessary to strengthen Armenian claims to historic Artsakh
represents a serious weakness. There is no shortage of potential
in-migrants. How they view the long-term viability of Artsakh
influences their decision to migrate. Any uncertainties or fears
that affect the Karabagh Armenians will affect them as well. Such a
malaise cannot be allowed to take hold.
Having said that, the question we must ask is what configuration
the future independent state will have. Will it be the former Soviet
autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabagh (the present-day Nagorno Karabagh
Republic minus Shahumian) or will it encompass all of the liberated
lands (historic Armenian Artsakh) governed by Stepanakert?
This begs the question as to the fate of Shahumian and the
Azeri-occupied eastern borderlands of Martakert and Martuni. This
configuration has yet to be definitively expressed allowing some
latitude for minor territorial adjustments. The present nomenclature
defining the region offers no help. We have allowed the Minsk
moderators (and ourselves) to divide the liberated territories into
two distinct parts: the Nagorno Karabagh Republic and the "occupied
territories" or "security zone." The recent Minsk mission referred
to the territory surrounding Karabagh as "occupied." They went so
far as to refer to the capital city of Stepanakert by its Azeri name
(Khankendi) as well.
Place-names do have geopolitical significance which explains why
Georgia has eliminated Javakhk from its maps. Georgian Foreign Minister
Grigol Vashadze recently claimed that he didn't "...know what Javakhk
is" and that "[t]here is no Javakhk on the map." Obviously not; his
government simply eliminated its use. The erasure and replacement
of place-names has been the official policy of Turkey and Azerbaijan
as well and is usually accompanied by the destruction of evidentiary
physical cultural artifacts attesting to its Armenian antecedents. It
might do well to refer to all of the liberated territory as Artsakh
to indicate the intent of Armenia and Karabagh.
This would be a bold move and sure to give Aliyev an apoplectic event.
It should not be difficult to see the connection between success in
Karabagh and the beneficial impact it would have on Hai Tahd and the
ARF. Maintaining the credibility of the ARF is important because its
work is just now beginning with respect to Hai Tahd. This includes
issues such as the state-imposed problems facing the Javakhkahayer
(Javakhk Armenians) and the forgotten Armenians of the genocide who
populate the lands of historic western Armenia. How would the concept
of "a united Armenia, free, and independent, for all Armenians" be
implemented? And then there are the issues of genocide recognition,
restitution, indemnification, and reparations. These are significant
issues that may or may not need to be addressed concurrently.
Within Armenia, the ARF must continue to serve as the catalyst to
effect the changes necessary to create a system that will provide
social and economic justice and opportunity within a democratic
structure for the worker and his family. There is nothing new here.
Historically the agenda of the ARF has encompassed many causes
simultaneously. Present conditions now suggest a restructuring that
will allow for an efficient and effective response by the ARF to
the various issues facing the Armenian nation-a nation that it has
successfully served for the past 120 years. How effective the ARF will
be as it moves into the second decade of this century depends in very
large measure on how the Armenian people assess its role in Artsakh,
whether or not that assessment is justified.
From: A. Papazian