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Times.am, Armenia
Nov 20 2010
Baku declares its readiness to fight for Karabakh
By Times.am at 19 November, 2010, 5:34 pm
by Sergey Markedonov, visiting fellow at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, D.C
Azerbaijan is resorting to militarist rhetoric on the Karabakh theme
with strictly rational objectives: both to assuage public opinion
within the country and to exert diplomatic pressure on the interested
states - Turkey, Russia, and the United States.
Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev once again declared that the
conflict over Nagorno Karabakh may be resolved by military means. On
the one hand, the president of the republic on the Caspian did not
reveal anything new. His appeals (as well as the harsh statements of
the Azerbaijani ministers, notably Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev)
are heard regularly. I want to qualify that statement right off. The
explanation for the extensive militancy of the Azerbaijani side is
not, of course, the natural inclination of its leadership and citizens
for war as a universal means for resolving all problems. In addition
to the `Armenian problem,' a considerable number of acute problems on
ethnic grounds have emerged inside Azerbaijan during the post-Soviet
period. They include both the problem of `divided peoples' (Lezgins
and Avars) and the `Talysh [an Iranian ethnic group] question.'
However, unlike Nagornyy Karabakh, they were resolved peacefully and
constructively, although not without excesses either.
Baku has traditionally taken a tough and intolerant position towards
anti-Semitism. The problem of the loss of Karabakh and the seven
rayons surrounding it is a different matter. For post-Soviet
Azerbaijan it has become a real national trauma that the thousands of
refugees do not permit it to forget. At the same time, one cannot fail
to see that in the 1990s official Baku did not utilize all the
resources it had for a peaceful solution to the conflict with the
Armenian community of Karabakh and with official Yerevan.
All this makes Azerbaijan tougher and more intolerant, while Armenia
(together with the Armenian community of the unrecognized Nagorno
Karabakh Republic [NKR]) can afford a defensive posture, since
the war in 1994 ended in its favour. And then in November 2010, Ilham
Aliyev once again fell back on militant rhetoric at the ceremonial
farewell for two Azeri soldiers Mubariz Ibragimov and Farid Akhmedov
[names as transliterated], who died during the combat clashes on the
cease-fire line in Karabakh (which Azerbaijani and Armenian
politicians have been calling the `front line' for a long time now) on
18 June and 4 September of this year, respectively. As we can see, the
supposedly `frozen conflict' is shooting and killing in the direct
sense of the words even today.
In the meantime, Aliyev's November statement should be considered not
only as a surge of emotion of the president and the supreme commander
in chief in connection with the loss of his fellow citizens and
soldiers. Generally speaking, each of Baku's militarist statements, if
we look at it carefully, is a deeply rational and well thought-out
action. To illustrate, last year when the process of normalization of
Armenian-Turkish relations was on the upswing, Azerbaijani politicians
were truly worried that the reconciliation of Yerevan and Ankara would
create many new difficulties for Baku.
In the end there was the sharply stepped-up militant rhetoric that
became an effective diplomatic instrument of pressure not only on the
leadership of the Turkish Republic, but also on Moscow and Washington,
which began to spur on the Karabakh process parallel with the
Armenian-Turkish one. What does it come down to? In the first place,
the signing by the three presidents in July of last year of the
so-called `Basic Principles' of a Karabakh settlement, overall a rough
draft but one that largely reflects a configuration advantageous to
Baku.
It acknowledges the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the need
for demilitarization and de occupation of the rayons surrounding
Nagorno Karabakh. As for the status of the disputed territory, the
&quo the basic document' gives only a general sketch of the idea that
a referendum will decide its fate (however, it is not clear whether
this will be a legally binding vote or a merely a recommendation).
Secondly, the stagnation of the Armenian-Turkish process. This must
not be attributed altogether to Azerbaijan's policy, of course, but
Baku has made its large contribution to this matter. According to the
justifiable comment of Mitat Chelikpal [name as transliterated], a
professor at Istanbul's Kadir Has University, `Azerbaijan's position
is very important to Ankara. So without any positive change that would
satisfy Azerbaijan, any change in bilateral Armenian-Turkish relations
seems unrealistic.'
In November 2010 Ilham Aliyev, recalling the `last argument of kings,'
is also trying to accomplish several important rational political
tasks. By that we mean, needless to say, not the desire for a
diplomatic breakthrough, but to ensure a domestic and foreign
political configuration advantageous to him. Above all to a certain
extent he needs to be `rehabilitated' inside the republic itself. In
Azerbaijan (and in Armenia too, by the way), the state and society in
their attitude towards the conflict influence one another in an
intricate manner.
On the one hand, the conflict itself was long ago instrumentalized by
the government and used to strengthen its legitimacy. But on the
other, society (including NPOs [nongovernmental organizations] and
human rights structures) is a part of the conflict and considers any
trivial concession by the authorities to be all but treason.
On the eve of the new upsurge in militarist rhetoric, a meeting (the
sixth one) was held on 27 October among the presidents of the Russian
Federation, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in Astrakhan where the parties in
the conflict agreed to conduct an exchange of prisoners of war and
bodies of the people killed.
By the way, the ceremonial farewell to the two soldiers occurred after
this humanitarian initiative began to be realized. It would seem that
from the standpoint of the development of the settlement process, the
first steps to accommodate one another in the humanitarian sphere
should only be welcomed, since they create trust among the parties and
a backlog for the future (for solving status and political questions).
But it seems that way only at first glance. Firmly seated within the
conflicting societies is the maximalist goal built on the `victory -
defeat' principle whereby your opponent should not get anything.
Pursuant to that goal, rationalization of the settlement and removal
of its ritual element is dangerous. And so any concessions must be
alternated with militant calls.
The Armenian side, without making harsh war-like statements, for
example, from time to time declares the current importance of the
problem of the recognition of the NKR. Why? The government is giving a
signal to society that it remains devoted to the unwavering `patriotic
positions' and that it is ready to reach the highest bar (even if in
reality it cannot surmount the bar). As a result it is an endless
circle. The state fails to move society forward by supporting in it
expectations that are too high and unjustified, while society does not
offer the authorities an alternative solution to the conflict. To be
more specific, what is being offered certainly cannot be called an
alternative. Since there are even more radical formulas for resolving
the confrontation that has lasted many years.
The second consideration that Baku has is related to foreign policy
positioning. The midterm elections for the US Congress were held on 2
November (the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate
were elected). During this campaign representatives of the Republican
Party strengthened their positions, and among them were many unhappy
with President Obama's policy specifically in the Caucasus area. Here
is the evaluation of this course that Ariel Cohen, an influential
expert of the Heritage Foundation (a conservative think-tank close to
the Republicans), gave on the eve of the elections: `...President Obama
has managed to somewhat spoil relations with yet another important
country in the region - Azerbaijan... President Obama's Administration
ignores the fact that Azerbaijan is a secular Muslim state whose elite
are devoted to Western values; and to have such a partner bordering
Iran, Turkey, and Russia is important to the United States. Moreover,
Azerbaijan (together with Kazakhstan) is a crucial oil-and
gas-producing and transit state of the Caspian. Taking into account
the fact that the US rating in the Islamic world is quite low, the
existence of an ally that is an Islamic country that has access to the
Caspian and through it to Central Asia is an important trump card for
Washington.' And today among those who `gave a shellacking' to the
Democrats (an expression that Obama himself used to evaluate the
elections), there are a considerable number who are willing to share
the basic idea of the Heritage Foundation analyst.
We can most likely agree with the opinion of another American expert,
from the Council on Near East Policy, Mark Katz, who justifiably says
that the reduced number of Congressmen and Senators inclined to be
pro-Armenia does not mean that Congress will become unequivocally
pro-Azerbaijan. But the fact that Baku will try to use this alignment
within America for its own interests is obvious.
And the militarist rhetoric may become a certain help to the president
of Azerbaijan. Using it he can try to exert pressure on Washington and
try to get it in turn to be tougher in its approaches to Armenia and
to Russian policy in the South Caucasus.
At the same time, official Baku also has another trump card (it is
especially important in talking about delicate topics of democracy
inside Azerbaijan): the official government is still not the most
radical force in the republic on the Caspian, and so cooperation with
the current president is the optimal option for US foreign policy. In
that way raising the stakes in the game increases the geopolitical
significance of the country and preserves the possibility of avoiding
concessions, saving face within Azerbaijan as well as preserving the
image of the `patriot' and `defender of the unity and integrity' of
the state.
But any rational action in the military-political context has its
limits. One of the heroes of a Hollywood film about World War II
justifiably noted that everything does not always go as planned in
military preparations. The constant rocking of the rickety little
vessel of the negotiation process threatens to topple it and bury
under it not only all the hopes for a peaceful solution, but also the
very participants in the negotiations (in the political sense above
all). A rapid solution to the `Karabakh question' is possible only in
conditions of a political blitzkrieg.
But there is little chance of that. On the other hand, an alternative
to the blitzkrieg is protracted trench warfare of attrition. Not only
physically but in the information and psychological sense as well. And
in fact in the event of victory, there can certainly be no guarantee
that after it the conflict would not continue in the form of a
terrorist struggle or protracted guerilla warfare. And naturally in
that case the intervention of outside players would be inevitable.
Only unlike in Georgia, there will be no black and white picture here.
Opinions differ not only between the United States and the Russian
Federation, but also within these countries (let us recall at least
the very recent history involving the midterm elections to Congress),
and among the members of the European Union, and between the
pragmatists and the `hawks' in Ankara and in Tehran. But the most
important thing is that the benefits from this will be either
negligible or altogether unachievable. And hence, understanding all
the preconditions and reasons for `rational militarism,' we should
recognize the limited nature of this approach itself. In the end
rational thinking and abandonment of chimeras in the peace-keeping
process are necessary and called for more than ever before.
Translated by Katia Peltekyan
/Times.am-Armenian news/
From: A. Papazian
Nov 20 2010
Baku declares its readiness to fight for Karabakh
By Times.am at 19 November, 2010, 5:34 pm
by Sergey Markedonov, visiting fellow at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, D.C
Azerbaijan is resorting to militarist rhetoric on the Karabakh theme
with strictly rational objectives: both to assuage public opinion
within the country and to exert diplomatic pressure on the interested
states - Turkey, Russia, and the United States.
Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev once again declared that the
conflict over Nagorno Karabakh may be resolved by military means. On
the one hand, the president of the republic on the Caspian did not
reveal anything new. His appeals (as well as the harsh statements of
the Azerbaijani ministers, notably Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev)
are heard regularly. I want to qualify that statement right off. The
explanation for the extensive militancy of the Azerbaijani side is
not, of course, the natural inclination of its leadership and citizens
for war as a universal means for resolving all problems. In addition
to the `Armenian problem,' a considerable number of acute problems on
ethnic grounds have emerged inside Azerbaijan during the post-Soviet
period. They include both the problem of `divided peoples' (Lezgins
and Avars) and the `Talysh [an Iranian ethnic group] question.'
However, unlike Nagornyy Karabakh, they were resolved peacefully and
constructively, although not without excesses either.
Baku has traditionally taken a tough and intolerant position towards
anti-Semitism. The problem of the loss of Karabakh and the seven
rayons surrounding it is a different matter. For post-Soviet
Azerbaijan it has become a real national trauma that the thousands of
refugees do not permit it to forget. At the same time, one cannot fail
to see that in the 1990s official Baku did not utilize all the
resources it had for a peaceful solution to the conflict with the
Armenian community of Karabakh and with official Yerevan.
All this makes Azerbaijan tougher and more intolerant, while Armenia
(together with the Armenian community of the unrecognized Nagorno
Karabakh Republic [NKR]) can afford a defensive posture, since
the war in 1994 ended in its favour. And then in November 2010, Ilham
Aliyev once again fell back on militant rhetoric at the ceremonial
farewell for two Azeri soldiers Mubariz Ibragimov and Farid Akhmedov
[names as transliterated], who died during the combat clashes on the
cease-fire line in Karabakh (which Azerbaijani and Armenian
politicians have been calling the `front line' for a long time now) on
18 June and 4 September of this year, respectively. As we can see, the
supposedly `frozen conflict' is shooting and killing in the direct
sense of the words even today.
In the meantime, Aliyev's November statement should be considered not
only as a surge of emotion of the president and the supreme commander
in chief in connection with the loss of his fellow citizens and
soldiers. Generally speaking, each of Baku's militarist statements, if
we look at it carefully, is a deeply rational and well thought-out
action. To illustrate, last year when the process of normalization of
Armenian-Turkish relations was on the upswing, Azerbaijani politicians
were truly worried that the reconciliation of Yerevan and Ankara would
create many new difficulties for Baku.
In the end there was the sharply stepped-up militant rhetoric that
became an effective diplomatic instrument of pressure not only on the
leadership of the Turkish Republic, but also on Moscow and Washington,
which began to spur on the Karabakh process parallel with the
Armenian-Turkish one. What does it come down to? In the first place,
the signing by the three presidents in July of last year of the
so-called `Basic Principles' of a Karabakh settlement, overall a rough
draft but one that largely reflects a configuration advantageous to
Baku.
It acknowledges the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the need
for demilitarization and de occupation of the rayons surrounding
Nagorno Karabakh. As for the status of the disputed territory, the
&quo the basic document' gives only a general sketch of the idea that
a referendum will decide its fate (however, it is not clear whether
this will be a legally binding vote or a merely a recommendation).
Secondly, the stagnation of the Armenian-Turkish process. This must
not be attributed altogether to Azerbaijan's policy, of course, but
Baku has made its large contribution to this matter. According to the
justifiable comment of Mitat Chelikpal [name as transliterated], a
professor at Istanbul's Kadir Has University, `Azerbaijan's position
is very important to Ankara. So without any positive change that would
satisfy Azerbaijan, any change in bilateral Armenian-Turkish relations
seems unrealistic.'
In November 2010 Ilham Aliyev, recalling the `last argument of kings,'
is also trying to accomplish several important rational political
tasks. By that we mean, needless to say, not the desire for a
diplomatic breakthrough, but to ensure a domestic and foreign
political configuration advantageous to him. Above all to a certain
extent he needs to be `rehabilitated' inside the republic itself. In
Azerbaijan (and in Armenia too, by the way), the state and society in
their attitude towards the conflict influence one another in an
intricate manner.
On the one hand, the conflict itself was long ago instrumentalized by
the government and used to strengthen its legitimacy. But on the
other, society (including NPOs [nongovernmental organizations] and
human rights structures) is a part of the conflict and considers any
trivial concession by the authorities to be all but treason.
On the eve of the new upsurge in militarist rhetoric, a meeting (the
sixth one) was held on 27 October among the presidents of the Russian
Federation, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in Astrakhan where the parties in
the conflict agreed to conduct an exchange of prisoners of war and
bodies of the people killed.
By the way, the ceremonial farewell to the two soldiers occurred after
this humanitarian initiative began to be realized. It would seem that
from the standpoint of the development of the settlement process, the
first steps to accommodate one another in the humanitarian sphere
should only be welcomed, since they create trust among the parties and
a backlog for the future (for solving status and political questions).
But it seems that way only at first glance. Firmly seated within the
conflicting societies is the maximalist goal built on the `victory -
defeat' principle whereby your opponent should not get anything.
Pursuant to that goal, rationalization of the settlement and removal
of its ritual element is dangerous. And so any concessions must be
alternated with militant calls.
The Armenian side, without making harsh war-like statements, for
example, from time to time declares the current importance of the
problem of the recognition of the NKR. Why? The government is giving a
signal to society that it remains devoted to the unwavering `patriotic
positions' and that it is ready to reach the highest bar (even if in
reality it cannot surmount the bar). As a result it is an endless
circle. The state fails to move society forward by supporting in it
expectations that are too high and unjustified, while society does not
offer the authorities an alternative solution to the conflict. To be
more specific, what is being offered certainly cannot be called an
alternative. Since there are even more radical formulas for resolving
the confrontation that has lasted many years.
The second consideration that Baku has is related to foreign policy
positioning. The midterm elections for the US Congress were held on 2
November (the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate
were elected). During this campaign representatives of the Republican
Party strengthened their positions, and among them were many unhappy
with President Obama's policy specifically in the Caucasus area. Here
is the evaluation of this course that Ariel Cohen, an influential
expert of the Heritage Foundation (a conservative think-tank close to
the Republicans), gave on the eve of the elections: `...President Obama
has managed to somewhat spoil relations with yet another important
country in the region - Azerbaijan... President Obama's Administration
ignores the fact that Azerbaijan is a secular Muslim state whose elite
are devoted to Western values; and to have such a partner bordering
Iran, Turkey, and Russia is important to the United States. Moreover,
Azerbaijan (together with Kazakhstan) is a crucial oil-and
gas-producing and transit state of the Caspian. Taking into account
the fact that the US rating in the Islamic world is quite low, the
existence of an ally that is an Islamic country that has access to the
Caspian and through it to Central Asia is an important trump card for
Washington.' And today among those who `gave a shellacking' to the
Democrats (an expression that Obama himself used to evaluate the
elections), there are a considerable number who are willing to share
the basic idea of the Heritage Foundation analyst.
We can most likely agree with the opinion of another American expert,
from the Council on Near East Policy, Mark Katz, who justifiably says
that the reduced number of Congressmen and Senators inclined to be
pro-Armenia does not mean that Congress will become unequivocally
pro-Azerbaijan. But the fact that Baku will try to use this alignment
within America for its own interests is obvious.
And the militarist rhetoric may become a certain help to the president
of Azerbaijan. Using it he can try to exert pressure on Washington and
try to get it in turn to be tougher in its approaches to Armenia and
to Russian policy in the South Caucasus.
At the same time, official Baku also has another trump card (it is
especially important in talking about delicate topics of democracy
inside Azerbaijan): the official government is still not the most
radical force in the republic on the Caspian, and so cooperation with
the current president is the optimal option for US foreign policy. In
that way raising the stakes in the game increases the geopolitical
significance of the country and preserves the possibility of avoiding
concessions, saving face within Azerbaijan as well as preserving the
image of the `patriot' and `defender of the unity and integrity' of
the state.
But any rational action in the military-political context has its
limits. One of the heroes of a Hollywood film about World War II
justifiably noted that everything does not always go as planned in
military preparations. The constant rocking of the rickety little
vessel of the negotiation process threatens to topple it and bury
under it not only all the hopes for a peaceful solution, but also the
very participants in the negotiations (in the political sense above
all). A rapid solution to the `Karabakh question' is possible only in
conditions of a political blitzkrieg.
But there is little chance of that. On the other hand, an alternative
to the blitzkrieg is protracted trench warfare of attrition. Not only
physically but in the information and psychological sense as well. And
in fact in the event of victory, there can certainly be no guarantee
that after it the conflict would not continue in the form of a
terrorist struggle or protracted guerilla warfare. And naturally in
that case the intervention of outside players would be inevitable.
Only unlike in Georgia, there will be no black and white picture here.
Opinions differ not only between the United States and the Russian
Federation, but also within these countries (let us recall at least
the very recent history involving the midterm elections to Congress),
and among the members of the European Union, and between the
pragmatists and the `hawks' in Ankara and in Tehran. But the most
important thing is that the benefits from this will be either
negligible or altogether unachievable. And hence, understanding all
the preconditions and reasons for `rational militarism,' we should
recognize the limited nature of this approach itself. In the end
rational thinking and abandonment of chimeras in the peace-keeping
process are necessary and called for more than ever before.
Translated by Katia Peltekyan
/Times.am-Armenian news/
From: A. Papazian