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DASHED HOPES FOR TURKISH-ARMENIAN RAPPROCHEMENT
AZG DAILY #220
30-11-2010
The International Institute for Strategic Studies
More than a year after the signature by Turkey and Armenia of protocols
aimed at normalising bilateral relations, the agreements have yet
to be ratified and the border between the two countries is still
closed. Despite the efforts of the United States, Russia and the
European Union, the short-term prospects for ratification are bleak.
Key stumbling blocks include Turkey's promise to Azerbaijan not to
reopen the border until Armenia gives up control over the areas around
Nagorno-Karabakh - the disputed enclave in Azerbaijan 'occupied'
by Armenia since a 1992-94 conflict - and the campaign for the
1915 massacre of Armenians by Ottoman forces to be recognised as
'genocide'. The success of any diplomatic rapprochement will also
require a shift in popular opinion on both sides of the border.
Roots of the deadlock
A central failing on the part of all the key participants in the
normalisation process, and particularly Turkey, is the degree to
which they underestimated the importance of Azerbaijan, which was not
included in the process leading up to the signature of the protocols
in October 2009. Excluded, Azerbaijan used its historic and cultural
links with Turkey, as well as its grievances over Armenia's occupation
of a large area of its territory, to mount a campaign of opposition to
the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process from within Turkey itself.
This served to strengthen Turkish public opposition to the ratification
of the protocols unless there was progress on Nagorno-Karabakh.
Armenia may appear to be the party with the most to gain from
normalisation, because the closure of its border with Turkey in
1993 has impeded its economic development. However, the move is
not universally popular among Armenians. President Serzh Sargsyan's
decision to sign the protocols was, therefore, a gamble. Armenian
reservations - articulated mostly by its diaspora as well as domestic
political forces associated with Armenians abroad, such as the Heritage
Party, and by nationalist Dashnaks - are rooted in the perception that
the normalisation process will disrupt the campaign for international
recognition of the 1915 massacre as 'genocide'.
Sargsyan was already under pressure after having agreed to establish
a sub-commission on the massacre, which was perceived by the diaspora
and affiliated parties as a concession to Turkey and as a means of
disputing the established facts. This left him with little political
capital with which to make a compromise on Nagorno-Karabakh.
In what could, therefore, be seen as a diplomatic victory for
Armenia, the protocols do not include any explicit reference to
Nagorno-Karabakh, even though the border closure was initially imposed
by Turkey in response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenia's
occupation of Azerbaijani territory. Yet Armenia's refusal to address
Nagorno-Karabakh has contributed to the failure of the protocols. It
quickly became apparent that Nagorno-Karabakh and the normalisation
process were politically entwined, regardless of whether they were
linked in the documents or not.
Within Turkey, the normalisation process has become a hot political
issue. It has highlighted tensions between President Abdullah Gul -
who first travelled to Armenia in September 2008 to attend a World Cup
football match between the two countries, and who wanted to normalise
relations without any preconditions - and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan who took a more hardline stance from the outset. Erdogan
demanded concessions from Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh as a
precondition, and thus used the issue to strengthen his own support
base in Turkey and within the ruling Justice and Development Party.
Erdogan travelled to Baku during the summer of 2009 and delivered an
emotional speech at the Azerbaijani parliament, vowing not to open
the border with Armenia unless it made concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh
and withdrew from other occupied territories.
Russia's position on the normalisation process has not been
straightforward. Given that most Armenian-Turkish trade today travels
through Georgian territory, Moscow initially supported the opening
of the border as a way to further isolate Georgia, which is already
subject to Russian economic sanctions, and to weaken its economy. Yet
as the signing of the protocols approached, Moscow began to fear being
unseated as the key mediator and power broker in the South Caucasus.
It was not ready to cede this role to the US, which was actively
promoting normalisation. Moreover, it was alarmed by Turkey's growing
activism in the region, which served as a reminder of Ottoman-era
rivalries. Hence for Moscow the status quo, where the protocols
have been signed but not ratified, is preferable. In the past year,
Moscow has taken the opportunity to strengthen its influence over
both Armenia and Azerbaijan through expanded military ties.Meanwhile,
neither the US nor the EU has offered significant rewards to Armenia
and Azerbaijan to promote progress on Nagorno-Karabakh. And now that
Turkey's accession efforts have stalled, the EU has found its power
to influence Ankara on the issue has also diminished.
Consequences of stalled normalisation
A successful Turkish-Armenian rapprochement had the potential to
improve the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, and to promote cooperation
in the divided South Caucasus. Its failure has instead resulted in
a dangerous backlash.
Most importantly, with Azerbaijan excluded from the talks while
feeling increasingly assertive due to its oil wealth and Armenia less
able to offer compromises, there is a danger of escalation in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There has been a dramatic increase in the
number of ceasefire violations along the 175km Line of Contact. In
spite of growing international concern and much-improved cooperation
between the three co-chairs of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Minsk Group - Russia, the US and
France - little progress has been made in negotiations and Baku has
been stepping up its rhetoric, vowing to pursue a military solution
if no tangible results are achieved soon.
The delay in ratifying the protocols has also raised questions about
the viability of Turkey's new 'zero problems' foreign policy, and
its desire for a regional and global role. Despite its ambitions,
Ankara has yet to prove that it has the capacity to successfully
navigate such a complex web of politically sensitive relations.
The failure so far of the normalisation process, coupled with growing
tensions along the ceasefire line with Azerbaijan, have left Armenia
increasingly dependent on Russia's security guarantees. During a
visit to Yerevan by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in August 2010,
Armenia agreed to extend Russia's lease on its Gyumri military base
until 2044, without any compensation from Moscow.
In tandem with the normalisation process, regional development has
also stalled.Closed borders and divisions are making it harder for
states to overcome the consequences of the global financial crisis
and to rebuild their economies.
Drivers for change
Although the short-term prospects for the successful completion of
the normalisation process are bleak, the outlook for its completion
over the next two to three years may be brighter.
The most important factor working in its favour is that despite the
deadlock at government level, the protocols have stimulated a new
level of Turkish public interest in their country's historic relations
with the Armenians. In contrast to just a few years ago when even
mentioning the G-word would guarantee imprisonment or even death -
as in the 2007 assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant
Dink - today discussions of historical legacies are much more open
and no longer suppressed by the authorities. In April 2010, hundreds
of Turks were permitted for the first time to gather in Istanbul
and in Ankara to mark the anniversary of the Armenian massacre. As a
reflection of this new level of openness, there is now a larger media
debate about the fate of Turkey's Armenian community and the need for
reconciliation. Meanwhile, there are a growing number of direct flights
between Armenia and Turkey. In September, hundreds of Armenian tourists
were permitted to attend the first service in Akhtamar's Armenian
church for 95 years; it had previously been relegated to serving as
a museum. In the long term, such public reconciliation could provide
the basis for a more sustainable political reconciliation.
Another key factor is the growing evidence that Azerbaijan, which was
adamantly opposed to normalisation, might be reviewing its position,
amid suggestions that Baku has overplayed its hand and is now worse
off for having thwarted the normalisation process. It has been under
pressure from Turkey not to let the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict escalate
and, though it has sharply increased its defence budget since 2000,
few in Azerbaijan believe that Baku can fulfil its threat to retake
Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories by force.
Having witnessed the escalation of the Georgian-South Ossetian
conflict in 2008, major powers are anxious to prevent any new violent
confrontation over Nagorno-Karabakh, which has the potential to be
more devastating and to draw in Russia, Turkey and other regional
players. The Minsk Group co-chairs are sending strong messages to
both Baku and Yerevan to this effect, while Medvedev has met both
Sargsyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for extensive talks
three times in the last six months. There has been little progress in
these talks except for an agreement to hand over the bodies of those
recently killed along the ceasefire line, which remains unprotected by
any external forces or is only monitored intermittently by a handful
of OSCE officials.
The OSCE is holding its first summit in over ten years in December
in Astana, Kazakhstan, and it is hoped that it will deliver some
progress on Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar
Mammadyarov has expressed hopes that a 'road map' for the resolution
of the conflict could be adopted at the summit, but Armenians have
expressed scepticism and unwillingness to compromise at this stage. If
some progress is achieved, however symbolic, the summit could help
to unlock the stalled Turkish-Armenian normalisation process. But if
there is none, not only will the OSCE's credibility be tested again,
but the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will also continue to escalate and
may even reach a new level of danger.
Even if the dynamics surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh do improve, Turkish
domestic politics could then get in the way of any rapprochement.
Erdogan's victory in the September 2010 referendum on constitutional
reform has strengthened his domestic power base, meaning that he does
not need to use populist rhetoric with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh
and Armenia in his domestic political battles. However, the prospect
of presidential elections in 2012 - in which Erdogan is widely
expected to run - will most certainly limit his room for manoeuvre
with regard to the ratification of the protocols, which he has so
publicly opposed. Moreover, with the current overload of issues on
Turkey's foreign and domestic agenda, it will be hard to put the
normalisation process back on the list of priorities once it has
fallen from the agenda all together. Yet the Turks cannot ignore the
issue indefinitely.
If no further progress on the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process
has been achieved by 2015, which will mark the 100th anniversary of
the mass killings of Armenians, Turkey risks international humiliation
as more countries, possibly even the US, move to call the killings
'genocide'. In March, 2010, a non-binding resolution was narrowly
approved by the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs in favour of
the term - despite last-minute pleas from the White House to abandon
the vote. Moreover, given the recent deterioration of Israeli-Turkish
relations, the powerful pro-Israel lobby in the US, which used to
block efforts to persuade Washington to recognise the massacre as
'genocide', has signalled a possible change of stance. However,
if some progress towards a diplomatic rapprochement is achieved,
accompanied by a popular reconciliation, the 100th anniversary could
provide an opportunity for both Turkey and Armenia to finally resolve
the most difficult issues in their history and foreign policy.
From: A. Papazian
AZG DAILY #220
30-11-2010
The International Institute for Strategic Studies
More than a year after the signature by Turkey and Armenia of protocols
aimed at normalising bilateral relations, the agreements have yet
to be ratified and the border between the two countries is still
closed. Despite the efforts of the United States, Russia and the
European Union, the short-term prospects for ratification are bleak.
Key stumbling blocks include Turkey's promise to Azerbaijan not to
reopen the border until Armenia gives up control over the areas around
Nagorno-Karabakh - the disputed enclave in Azerbaijan 'occupied'
by Armenia since a 1992-94 conflict - and the campaign for the
1915 massacre of Armenians by Ottoman forces to be recognised as
'genocide'. The success of any diplomatic rapprochement will also
require a shift in popular opinion on both sides of the border.
Roots of the deadlock
A central failing on the part of all the key participants in the
normalisation process, and particularly Turkey, is the degree to
which they underestimated the importance of Azerbaijan, which was not
included in the process leading up to the signature of the protocols
in October 2009. Excluded, Azerbaijan used its historic and cultural
links with Turkey, as well as its grievances over Armenia's occupation
of a large area of its territory, to mount a campaign of opposition to
the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process from within Turkey itself.
This served to strengthen Turkish public opposition to the ratification
of the protocols unless there was progress on Nagorno-Karabakh.
Armenia may appear to be the party with the most to gain from
normalisation, because the closure of its border with Turkey in
1993 has impeded its economic development. However, the move is
not universally popular among Armenians. President Serzh Sargsyan's
decision to sign the protocols was, therefore, a gamble. Armenian
reservations - articulated mostly by its diaspora as well as domestic
political forces associated with Armenians abroad, such as the Heritage
Party, and by nationalist Dashnaks - are rooted in the perception that
the normalisation process will disrupt the campaign for international
recognition of the 1915 massacre as 'genocide'.
Sargsyan was already under pressure after having agreed to establish
a sub-commission on the massacre, which was perceived by the diaspora
and affiliated parties as a concession to Turkey and as a means of
disputing the established facts. This left him with little political
capital with which to make a compromise on Nagorno-Karabakh.
In what could, therefore, be seen as a diplomatic victory for
Armenia, the protocols do not include any explicit reference to
Nagorno-Karabakh, even though the border closure was initially imposed
by Turkey in response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenia's
occupation of Azerbaijani territory. Yet Armenia's refusal to address
Nagorno-Karabakh has contributed to the failure of the protocols. It
quickly became apparent that Nagorno-Karabakh and the normalisation
process were politically entwined, regardless of whether they were
linked in the documents or not.
Within Turkey, the normalisation process has become a hot political
issue. It has highlighted tensions between President Abdullah Gul -
who first travelled to Armenia in September 2008 to attend a World Cup
football match between the two countries, and who wanted to normalise
relations without any preconditions - and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan who took a more hardline stance from the outset. Erdogan
demanded concessions from Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh as a
precondition, and thus used the issue to strengthen his own support
base in Turkey and within the ruling Justice and Development Party.
Erdogan travelled to Baku during the summer of 2009 and delivered an
emotional speech at the Azerbaijani parliament, vowing not to open
the border with Armenia unless it made concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh
and withdrew from other occupied territories.
Russia's position on the normalisation process has not been
straightforward. Given that most Armenian-Turkish trade today travels
through Georgian territory, Moscow initially supported the opening
of the border as a way to further isolate Georgia, which is already
subject to Russian economic sanctions, and to weaken its economy. Yet
as the signing of the protocols approached, Moscow began to fear being
unseated as the key mediator and power broker in the South Caucasus.
It was not ready to cede this role to the US, which was actively
promoting normalisation. Moreover, it was alarmed by Turkey's growing
activism in the region, which served as a reminder of Ottoman-era
rivalries. Hence for Moscow the status quo, where the protocols
have been signed but not ratified, is preferable. In the past year,
Moscow has taken the opportunity to strengthen its influence over
both Armenia and Azerbaijan through expanded military ties.Meanwhile,
neither the US nor the EU has offered significant rewards to Armenia
and Azerbaijan to promote progress on Nagorno-Karabakh. And now that
Turkey's accession efforts have stalled, the EU has found its power
to influence Ankara on the issue has also diminished.
Consequences of stalled normalisation
A successful Turkish-Armenian rapprochement had the potential to
improve the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, and to promote cooperation
in the divided South Caucasus. Its failure has instead resulted in
a dangerous backlash.
Most importantly, with Azerbaijan excluded from the talks while
feeling increasingly assertive due to its oil wealth and Armenia less
able to offer compromises, there is a danger of escalation in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There has been a dramatic increase in the
number of ceasefire violations along the 175km Line of Contact. In
spite of growing international concern and much-improved cooperation
between the three co-chairs of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Minsk Group - Russia, the US and
France - little progress has been made in negotiations and Baku has
been stepping up its rhetoric, vowing to pursue a military solution
if no tangible results are achieved soon.
The delay in ratifying the protocols has also raised questions about
the viability of Turkey's new 'zero problems' foreign policy, and
its desire for a regional and global role. Despite its ambitions,
Ankara has yet to prove that it has the capacity to successfully
navigate such a complex web of politically sensitive relations.
The failure so far of the normalisation process, coupled with growing
tensions along the ceasefire line with Azerbaijan, have left Armenia
increasingly dependent on Russia's security guarantees. During a
visit to Yerevan by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in August 2010,
Armenia agreed to extend Russia's lease on its Gyumri military base
until 2044, without any compensation from Moscow.
In tandem with the normalisation process, regional development has
also stalled.Closed borders and divisions are making it harder for
states to overcome the consequences of the global financial crisis
and to rebuild their economies.
Drivers for change
Although the short-term prospects for the successful completion of
the normalisation process are bleak, the outlook for its completion
over the next two to three years may be brighter.
The most important factor working in its favour is that despite the
deadlock at government level, the protocols have stimulated a new
level of Turkish public interest in their country's historic relations
with the Armenians. In contrast to just a few years ago when even
mentioning the G-word would guarantee imprisonment or even death -
as in the 2007 assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant
Dink - today discussions of historical legacies are much more open
and no longer suppressed by the authorities. In April 2010, hundreds
of Turks were permitted for the first time to gather in Istanbul
and in Ankara to mark the anniversary of the Armenian massacre. As a
reflection of this new level of openness, there is now a larger media
debate about the fate of Turkey's Armenian community and the need for
reconciliation. Meanwhile, there are a growing number of direct flights
between Armenia and Turkey. In September, hundreds of Armenian tourists
were permitted to attend the first service in Akhtamar's Armenian
church for 95 years; it had previously been relegated to serving as
a museum. In the long term, such public reconciliation could provide
the basis for a more sustainable political reconciliation.
Another key factor is the growing evidence that Azerbaijan, which was
adamantly opposed to normalisation, might be reviewing its position,
amid suggestions that Baku has overplayed its hand and is now worse
off for having thwarted the normalisation process. It has been under
pressure from Turkey not to let the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict escalate
and, though it has sharply increased its defence budget since 2000,
few in Azerbaijan believe that Baku can fulfil its threat to retake
Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories by force.
Having witnessed the escalation of the Georgian-South Ossetian
conflict in 2008, major powers are anxious to prevent any new violent
confrontation over Nagorno-Karabakh, which has the potential to be
more devastating and to draw in Russia, Turkey and other regional
players. The Minsk Group co-chairs are sending strong messages to
both Baku and Yerevan to this effect, while Medvedev has met both
Sargsyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for extensive talks
three times in the last six months. There has been little progress in
these talks except for an agreement to hand over the bodies of those
recently killed along the ceasefire line, which remains unprotected by
any external forces or is only monitored intermittently by a handful
of OSCE officials.
The OSCE is holding its first summit in over ten years in December
in Astana, Kazakhstan, and it is hoped that it will deliver some
progress on Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar
Mammadyarov has expressed hopes that a 'road map' for the resolution
of the conflict could be adopted at the summit, but Armenians have
expressed scepticism and unwillingness to compromise at this stage. If
some progress is achieved, however symbolic, the summit could help
to unlock the stalled Turkish-Armenian normalisation process. But if
there is none, not only will the OSCE's credibility be tested again,
but the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will also continue to escalate and
may even reach a new level of danger.
Even if the dynamics surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh do improve, Turkish
domestic politics could then get in the way of any rapprochement.
Erdogan's victory in the September 2010 referendum on constitutional
reform has strengthened his domestic power base, meaning that he does
not need to use populist rhetoric with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh
and Armenia in his domestic political battles. However, the prospect
of presidential elections in 2012 - in which Erdogan is widely
expected to run - will most certainly limit his room for manoeuvre
with regard to the ratification of the protocols, which he has so
publicly opposed. Moreover, with the current overload of issues on
Turkey's foreign and domestic agenda, it will be hard to put the
normalisation process back on the list of priorities once it has
fallen from the agenda all together. Yet the Turks cannot ignore the
issue indefinitely.
If no further progress on the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process
has been achieved by 2015, which will mark the 100th anniversary of
the mass killings of Armenians, Turkey risks international humiliation
as more countries, possibly even the US, move to call the killings
'genocide'. In March, 2010, a non-binding resolution was narrowly
approved by the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs in favour of
the term - despite last-minute pleas from the White House to abandon
the vote. Moreover, given the recent deterioration of Israeli-Turkish
relations, the powerful pro-Israel lobby in the US, which used to
block efforts to persuade Washington to recognise the massacre as
'genocide', has signalled a possible change of stance. However,
if some progress towards a diplomatic rapprochement is achieved,
accompanied by a popular reconciliation, the 100th anniversary could
provide an opportunity for both Turkey and Armenia to finally resolve
the most difficult issues in their history and foreign policy.
From: A. Papazian