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'POLITICAL FIRESTORM' IF GENOCIDE RECOGNIZED
Armenian Weekly
Mon, Nov 29 2010
ANKARA, Turkey
In a letter leaked by Wikileaks, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James
Jeffrey summarizes the "few key issues" that a U.S.
diplomat visiting Turkey should raise. Talking about the Caucasus,
Jeffrey says that Turkish officials constantly threaten of an imminent
"political firestorm" if the U.S. recognizes the Armenian Genocide.
"Turkey consistently warns that any U.S. determination of the events
of 1915 as 'genocide' would set off a political firestorm in Turkey,
and the devastating effect on our bilateral relationship-including
political, military, and commercial aspects-would be unavoidable,"
writes Jeffrey.
.
For hourly updates on released WikiLeaks documents, "Like" the Armenian
Weekly's Facebook group at http://www.facebook.com/ArmenianWeekly.
Full text of the letter
Viewing cable 09ANKARA1472, SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY If you
are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of
a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: ~UThe
top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom
it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.~UThe
middle box contains the header information that is associated with
the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a
general subject.~UThe bottom box presents the body of the cable. The
opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables
(browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed
by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific
topics and a comment section.To understand the justification used for
the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article
as reference.
Discussing cables If you find meaningful or important information in a
cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to
a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying
the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please
mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the
hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g.
#09ANKARA1472.
Help us extend and defend this work Reference ID Date Classification
Origin 09ANKARA1472 2009-10-13 08:08 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #1472/01 2860830 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 130830Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY
ANKARA TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW
PRIORITY 0267 RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE
WASHDC PRIORITY 0936S E C R E T ANKARA 001472
NOFORN SIPDIS
OSD FOR ASD VERSHBOW FROM AMBASSADOR JEFFREY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM PTER TU SUBJECT:
SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Sandy, Glad you'll be able to visit Turkey at this key
time. Your short visit will give you an opportunity to engage
with key Turkish leaders on, first and foremost in their minds,
missile defense. The Turks are keen to learn more about U.S. plans,
in particular what role the U.S.
wants/expects Turkey and others in Europe to play. The Turkish General
Staff (TGS) will be interested in our ideas for HLDG reform, even if
they may be slow to accept them.
¶2. (S) You know how broad our agenda is with Turkey. As you will
have a short time in country, I suggest you focus on a few key issues.
Be sure to raise: ------------------ - Missile Defense, with emphasis
on how the U.S. will look to several Allies - not just Turkey - for
help (para 3) - Repeat our commitment to our intel and other support
for strikes against the PKK (para 5-6) - Appreciation for Turkey's
efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan (para 13) - Float the idea of HLDG
reform and ensure Guner knows we expect him in Washington (para 4)
- Press for a realistic assessment of Turkey's view of the threat
assessment from Iran (para 10)
Watch Out For: --------------- - Pressure for direct U.S. milops
against the PKK (paras 11-12) - Conflation of Turkey's exploration
of air defense capabilities with our Missile Defense needs (para 3)
Missile Defense ----------------
¶3. (S) The Turks will appreciate your update on U.S. missile defense
plans and in particular will expect you to have specific ideas on
how Turkey would contribute to the PAA.
While the top-level bureaucrats with whom you will meet will understand
the rationale for the PAA and will be ready to explore ways Turkey
can help, the political environment for a request to base assets in
Turkey is mixed, and Turkey's perception of the Iranian threat to
its territory differs from ours. The GOT continues to tread a fine
line in managing its strong relationship with the U.S. and its ties
with both the Islamic world and Russia. The government must be able
to demonstrate that any missile defense program is not specifically
anti-Iran, nor blatantly pro-Israel.
¶4. (S) Likewise, it will want to ensure that Russia is not opposed
to Turkey's role. Also important will be clarity on the degree
to which this system is a NATO one, under NATO Command and Control
(C2). The PAA would presumably complement Turkey's effort to establish
a domestic missile defense capability that would protect Turkey's major
population centers. The PAC-3 has been offered in response to Turkey's
air defense tender and you should highlight the system's ability to
be interoperable with any future NATO command and control architecture.
HLDG -----
¶5. (C) You will need to outline U.S. views to streamline and alter the
current HLDG format to make it into a more substantive discussion. The
Turks are shy to stray from the status quo; you should emphasize
why we feel this change is necessary while underscoring that it is
vitally important the DCHOD Guner attend the upcoming HLDG in December,
when decisions about future dialogues will be agreed upon. (We have
learned that the new position of TGS number three, a four-star slot
held by General Balanli (with a focus on hardware), might get the
nod for the HLDG representative.
We've told Guner it should be his.) You should also be prepared for
the Turkish General Staff to raise the Shared Defense Vision document,
as they await a response to their latest proposed text.
PKK ----
¶6. (C) Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK
have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond military
action alone. Although the government's Democratic (i.e., Kurdish)
Initiative is not yet fully developed, the government has increased
social and economic support to ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey,
has dramatically broadened the rights of Kurds to use their own
language, and increased educational opportunities as well. It is our
view that the TGS military success against the PKK, supported by our
intelligence--sharing operation, has given the civilians the political
space to explore this "opening." Turkish military operations against
the PKK continue, however, and on October 6 Parliament extended the
government's mandate to conduct cross-border operations against the
PKK in Iraq for another year.
¶7. (C) Our 2007 decision to share operational intelligence was a
turning point for the bilateral relationship, and President Obama's
declaration before the Turkish Parliament of our continuing commitment
to support Turkey's fight against the PKK was warmly welcomed. This
cooperation has helped to improve our bilateral relationship across
the board. Turkey's military leaders value this intelligence and the
advice our military leaders give them. Our work has made it difficult
for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq as a safe haven. Turkish
causalities are still occurring, however, and an increasing proportion
are from IEDs. Due to pressure on Chief of Staff General Basbug and
the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to "finish off" the PKK this year,
the government wants and has requested direct U.S. kinetic action
against the PKK; we have refused this request to date due to our own
rules of engagement. The GOT has also requested the sale of armed
MQ-9/Reaper UAVs, which will be a challenge to fulfill (see para 10).
Northern Iraq --------------
¶8. (C) Turkey will not consider any alternative to the political
unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has become more flexible
on how it engages "the local authorities of northern Iraq" (how Turkey
refers officially to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)). Turkey's
policy remains focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach
to the KRG is expanding. This outreach is reinforced by the continued
dominance of Turkish products and investments in the KRG's healthy
economy. It is also tied to turkey's new opening to its own Kurds, by
far the biggest and most controversial domestic political issue here.
¶9. (S) The U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Tripartite Security talks continue
regularly and a new Tripartite operational office in Erbil,
established to share counter-PKK intelligence was established over the
summer. The Turks remain shy to share data; they are not convinced
that they can trust Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information
concerning operations secret. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right
direction. Turkish military officials have become more strident in
their calls for KRG officials to take action against the PKK.
U.S. Drawdown through Turkey -----------------------------
¶10. (S) Habur Gate and the Incirlik Cargo Hub -- vital to our
sustainment operations -- could be helpful in our drawdown if other
options prove too difficult. Minister of National Defense Vedci
Gonul suggested to Secretary Gates in June that Turkey was ready to
agree to the increased use of Incirlik for this purpose. Using the
surface route from Habur Gate to Mediterranean ports (Iskenderun,
Mersin) is also worth exploring, and we may be able to involve
Turkish commercial shippers in support of the Northern Distribution
Network. We caution that the rough terrain, security environment,
and the cantankerous nature of the Turkish government bureaucracy
will challenge any U.S. operation. Nevertheless, we are evaluating
these options in cooperation with CENTCOM and EUCOM partners.
Iran ------
¶11. (C) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and international
concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but is hesitant to use
harsh language in public statements, in part due to its dependence
on Iran as an energy supplier and as a trade route to Central Asian
markets. PM Erdogan himself is a particularly vocal skeptic of the
U.S. position. Turkey believes international pressure against Iran
only helps to strengthen Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. However,
it continues to press Iran quietly to accept the P5 plus 1 offer. The
GOT is a strong partner in our non-proliferation efforts, with several
significant results. Politically, Turkey will try to position itself
on Iran between wherever we are and where Russia is. In a pinch or
if pressed, the Turks will slant to us.
UAVs and Attack Helicopters ----------------------------
¶12. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own UAV
capability. The administration has made clear at high levels that we
support this goal, and Turkey has pending request to acquire armed
Reaper UAVs. Ultimate approval for armed Reapers is complicated
due to MTCR obligations and Hill concerns. However, even if those
could be overcome, the delivery pipeline for these systems is long,
and Turkey's leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull
our intelligence support until they can replace it. We have not made
this commitment to date.
¶13. (C) Additionally, bad procurement decisions led Turkey to a
severe shortage of attack helicopters, desperately needed for its
fight against the PKK Turkey has looked to us to help them bridge
the capability gap, asking to purchase additional AH-1W Super Cobra
aircraft. These aircraft are in short supply in our own inventory,
but Secretary Gates and VCJCS Cartwright have promised to try to
support with request within a few years (four each in 2011, 2012,
and 2013). The Turks took this as an affirmative, and recently started
pressing for delivery in 2010 instead of 2011.
Afghanistan/Pakistan ----------------------
¶14. (C) Turkey has commanded ISAF twice since its inception and will
take command of RC-Capital this November. Turkey leads PRT Wardak
and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan in early 2010. Turkey
has sponsored the "Ankara Process" dialogue, one of several
efforts to encourage constructive communications between Kabul and
Islamabad and is a leading participant in the Friends of Democratic
Pakistan. Turkey pledged significant aid to both countries: USD 200
million to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to Pakistan. Because of
its culture, history and religious orientation, as well as Foreign
Minister Davutoglu's strategic ambition, Turkey is well disposed to act
as an agent of the international community's goals in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Constraining Turkey's potential is a lack of resources. Our
conversations with Turkish interlocutors have helped us identify
several areas in which Turkey can be of particular help: education and
health, military training and support, economics, counter-narcotics,
and trilateral engagement. (Note: Turkey will not support any CT
operations in Afghanistan. They do not believe there is a NATO/ISAF
mandate to engage in these operations, and they additionally have
national caveats preventing them from participating in NATO/ISAF CT
operations. The GOT also believes that ISAF should not/not be engaged
in the counter-narcotics fight, believing that foreign fighters who
engage in this fight just produces antipathy against foreign forces
in the local population. I do, however, believe the GOT are willing
to engage the training of Afghan security forces.)
Caucasus --------
¶15. (C) Turkey seeks to develop itself as a regional power and
recognizes that the Caucasus region, stymied in its growth by frozen
conflicts, could turn to Turkey for develop.
The signing of the Protocol document in Zurich on October 10 was
a landmark for the region, and should serve as a starting point
for establishing bilateral relations and, ultimately, the opening
of its closed border. Nevertheless, future relations will still be
heavily linked to the 1915 "genocide" issue and the resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey
consistently warns that any U.S. determination of the events of
1915 as "genocide" would set off a political firestorm in Turkey,
and the devastating effect on our bilateral relationship -- including
political, military, and commercial aspects -- would be unavoidable.
Political Environment ----------------------
¶16. (C) PM Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development
(AK) Party is squarely in the driver's seat, but fears an
erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist
parties. Civilian-military relations remain complex. Chief of Staff
General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with PM Erdogan, but
the long-running struggle between Turkey's secularists (with the
Army as its champion) and Islamists (represented by the government)
naturally puts them at odds.
Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug has
seemingly learned to live. Alleged past military involvement in coup
contingency planning or even deliberate generation of internal chaos
remains political theme number one and preoccupies both Erdogan and
Basbug and their respective underlings.
Israel -------
¶17. (C) While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General Staff
agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship is essential
for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to shore up his domestic
right political flank at the expense of this relationship. His outburst
at Davos was the first in a series of events the results of which we
and his staff have sought to contain. The latest of these was Exercise
Anatolian Eagle. Erdogan canceled Israel's participation hours before
the exercise was to begin. With an Israeli strike - across Turkish
airspace - against targets in Iran a possibility, Erdogan decided he
could not afford the political risk of being accused of training the
forces which would carry out such a raid. Through some remarkable
work with Allies and with the inter-agency, we engineered a public
"postponement" of the international portion of the exercise, but the
relationship has begun to sour.
JEFFREY
"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"
From: A. Papazian
Armenian Weekly
Mon, Nov 29 2010
ANKARA, Turkey
In a letter leaked by Wikileaks, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James
Jeffrey summarizes the "few key issues" that a U.S.
diplomat visiting Turkey should raise. Talking about the Caucasus,
Jeffrey says that Turkish officials constantly threaten of an imminent
"political firestorm" if the U.S. recognizes the Armenian Genocide.
"Turkey consistently warns that any U.S. determination of the events
of 1915 as 'genocide' would set off a political firestorm in Turkey,
and the devastating effect on our bilateral relationship-including
political, military, and commercial aspects-would be unavoidable,"
writes Jeffrey.
.
For hourly updates on released WikiLeaks documents, "Like" the Armenian
Weekly's Facebook group at http://www.facebook.com/ArmenianWeekly.
Full text of the letter
Viewing cable 09ANKARA1472, SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY If you
are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of
a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: ~UThe
top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom
it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.~UThe
middle box contains the header information that is associated with
the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a
general subject.~UThe bottom box presents the body of the cable. The
opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables
(browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed
by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific
topics and a comment section.To understand the justification used for
the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article
as reference.
Discussing cables If you find meaningful or important information in a
cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to
a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying
the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please
mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the
hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g.
#09ANKARA1472.
Help us extend and defend this work Reference ID Date Classification
Origin 09ANKARA1472 2009-10-13 08:08 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #1472/01 2860830 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 130830Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY
ANKARA TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW
PRIORITY 0267 RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE
WASHDC PRIORITY 0936S E C R E T ANKARA 001472
NOFORN SIPDIS
OSD FOR ASD VERSHBOW FROM AMBASSADOR JEFFREY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM PTER TU SUBJECT:
SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Sandy, Glad you'll be able to visit Turkey at this key
time. Your short visit will give you an opportunity to engage
with key Turkish leaders on, first and foremost in their minds,
missile defense. The Turks are keen to learn more about U.S. plans,
in particular what role the U.S.
wants/expects Turkey and others in Europe to play. The Turkish General
Staff (TGS) will be interested in our ideas for HLDG reform, even if
they may be slow to accept them.
¶2. (S) You know how broad our agenda is with Turkey. As you will
have a short time in country, I suggest you focus on a few key issues.
Be sure to raise: ------------------ - Missile Defense, with emphasis
on how the U.S. will look to several Allies - not just Turkey - for
help (para 3) - Repeat our commitment to our intel and other support
for strikes against the PKK (para 5-6) - Appreciation for Turkey's
efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan (para 13) - Float the idea of HLDG
reform and ensure Guner knows we expect him in Washington (para 4)
- Press for a realistic assessment of Turkey's view of the threat
assessment from Iran (para 10)
Watch Out For: --------------- - Pressure for direct U.S. milops
against the PKK (paras 11-12) - Conflation of Turkey's exploration
of air defense capabilities with our Missile Defense needs (para 3)
Missile Defense ----------------
¶3. (S) The Turks will appreciate your update on U.S. missile defense
plans and in particular will expect you to have specific ideas on
how Turkey would contribute to the PAA.
While the top-level bureaucrats with whom you will meet will understand
the rationale for the PAA and will be ready to explore ways Turkey
can help, the political environment for a request to base assets in
Turkey is mixed, and Turkey's perception of the Iranian threat to
its territory differs from ours. The GOT continues to tread a fine
line in managing its strong relationship with the U.S. and its ties
with both the Islamic world and Russia. The government must be able
to demonstrate that any missile defense program is not specifically
anti-Iran, nor blatantly pro-Israel.
¶4. (S) Likewise, it will want to ensure that Russia is not opposed
to Turkey's role. Also important will be clarity on the degree
to which this system is a NATO one, under NATO Command and Control
(C2). The PAA would presumably complement Turkey's effort to establish
a domestic missile defense capability that would protect Turkey's major
population centers. The PAC-3 has been offered in response to Turkey's
air defense tender and you should highlight the system's ability to
be interoperable with any future NATO command and control architecture.
HLDG -----
¶5. (C) You will need to outline U.S. views to streamline and alter the
current HLDG format to make it into a more substantive discussion. The
Turks are shy to stray from the status quo; you should emphasize
why we feel this change is necessary while underscoring that it is
vitally important the DCHOD Guner attend the upcoming HLDG in December,
when decisions about future dialogues will be agreed upon. (We have
learned that the new position of TGS number three, a four-star slot
held by General Balanli (with a focus on hardware), might get the
nod for the HLDG representative.
We've told Guner it should be his.) You should also be prepared for
the Turkish General Staff to raise the Shared Defense Vision document,
as they await a response to their latest proposed text.
PKK ----
¶6. (C) Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK
have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond military
action alone. Although the government's Democratic (i.e., Kurdish)
Initiative is not yet fully developed, the government has increased
social and economic support to ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey,
has dramatically broadened the rights of Kurds to use their own
language, and increased educational opportunities as well. It is our
view that the TGS military success against the PKK, supported by our
intelligence--sharing operation, has given the civilians the political
space to explore this "opening." Turkish military operations against
the PKK continue, however, and on October 6 Parliament extended the
government's mandate to conduct cross-border operations against the
PKK in Iraq for another year.
¶7. (C) Our 2007 decision to share operational intelligence was a
turning point for the bilateral relationship, and President Obama's
declaration before the Turkish Parliament of our continuing commitment
to support Turkey's fight against the PKK was warmly welcomed. This
cooperation has helped to improve our bilateral relationship across
the board. Turkey's military leaders value this intelligence and the
advice our military leaders give them. Our work has made it difficult
for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq as a safe haven. Turkish
causalities are still occurring, however, and an increasing proportion
are from IEDs. Due to pressure on Chief of Staff General Basbug and
the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to "finish off" the PKK this year,
the government wants and has requested direct U.S. kinetic action
against the PKK; we have refused this request to date due to our own
rules of engagement. The GOT has also requested the sale of armed
MQ-9/Reaper UAVs, which will be a challenge to fulfill (see para 10).
Northern Iraq --------------
¶8. (C) Turkey will not consider any alternative to the political
unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has become more flexible
on how it engages "the local authorities of northern Iraq" (how Turkey
refers officially to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)). Turkey's
policy remains focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach
to the KRG is expanding. This outreach is reinforced by the continued
dominance of Turkish products and investments in the KRG's healthy
economy. It is also tied to turkey's new opening to its own Kurds, by
far the biggest and most controversial domestic political issue here.
¶9. (S) The U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Tripartite Security talks continue
regularly and a new Tripartite operational office in Erbil,
established to share counter-PKK intelligence was established over the
summer. The Turks remain shy to share data; they are not convinced
that they can trust Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information
concerning operations secret. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right
direction. Turkish military officials have become more strident in
their calls for KRG officials to take action against the PKK.
U.S. Drawdown through Turkey -----------------------------
¶10. (S) Habur Gate and the Incirlik Cargo Hub -- vital to our
sustainment operations -- could be helpful in our drawdown if other
options prove too difficult. Minister of National Defense Vedci
Gonul suggested to Secretary Gates in June that Turkey was ready to
agree to the increased use of Incirlik for this purpose. Using the
surface route from Habur Gate to Mediterranean ports (Iskenderun,
Mersin) is also worth exploring, and we may be able to involve
Turkish commercial shippers in support of the Northern Distribution
Network. We caution that the rough terrain, security environment,
and the cantankerous nature of the Turkish government bureaucracy
will challenge any U.S. operation. Nevertheless, we are evaluating
these options in cooperation with CENTCOM and EUCOM partners.
Iran ------
¶11. (C) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and international
concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but is hesitant to use
harsh language in public statements, in part due to its dependence
on Iran as an energy supplier and as a trade route to Central Asian
markets. PM Erdogan himself is a particularly vocal skeptic of the
U.S. position. Turkey believes international pressure against Iran
only helps to strengthen Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. However,
it continues to press Iran quietly to accept the P5 plus 1 offer. The
GOT is a strong partner in our non-proliferation efforts, with several
significant results. Politically, Turkey will try to position itself
on Iran between wherever we are and where Russia is. In a pinch or
if pressed, the Turks will slant to us.
UAVs and Attack Helicopters ----------------------------
¶12. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own UAV
capability. The administration has made clear at high levels that we
support this goal, and Turkey has pending request to acquire armed
Reaper UAVs. Ultimate approval for armed Reapers is complicated
due to MTCR obligations and Hill concerns. However, even if those
could be overcome, the delivery pipeline for these systems is long,
and Turkey's leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull
our intelligence support until they can replace it. We have not made
this commitment to date.
¶13. (C) Additionally, bad procurement decisions led Turkey to a
severe shortage of attack helicopters, desperately needed for its
fight against the PKK Turkey has looked to us to help them bridge
the capability gap, asking to purchase additional AH-1W Super Cobra
aircraft. These aircraft are in short supply in our own inventory,
but Secretary Gates and VCJCS Cartwright have promised to try to
support with request within a few years (four each in 2011, 2012,
and 2013). The Turks took this as an affirmative, and recently started
pressing for delivery in 2010 instead of 2011.
Afghanistan/Pakistan ----------------------
¶14. (C) Turkey has commanded ISAF twice since its inception and will
take command of RC-Capital this November. Turkey leads PRT Wardak
and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan in early 2010. Turkey
has sponsored the "Ankara Process" dialogue, one of several
efforts to encourage constructive communications between Kabul and
Islamabad and is a leading participant in the Friends of Democratic
Pakistan. Turkey pledged significant aid to both countries: USD 200
million to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to Pakistan. Because of
its culture, history and religious orientation, as well as Foreign
Minister Davutoglu's strategic ambition, Turkey is well disposed to act
as an agent of the international community's goals in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Constraining Turkey's potential is a lack of resources. Our
conversations with Turkish interlocutors have helped us identify
several areas in which Turkey can be of particular help: education and
health, military training and support, economics, counter-narcotics,
and trilateral engagement. (Note: Turkey will not support any CT
operations in Afghanistan. They do not believe there is a NATO/ISAF
mandate to engage in these operations, and they additionally have
national caveats preventing them from participating in NATO/ISAF CT
operations. The GOT also believes that ISAF should not/not be engaged
in the counter-narcotics fight, believing that foreign fighters who
engage in this fight just produces antipathy against foreign forces
in the local population. I do, however, believe the GOT are willing
to engage the training of Afghan security forces.)
Caucasus --------
¶15. (C) Turkey seeks to develop itself as a regional power and
recognizes that the Caucasus region, stymied in its growth by frozen
conflicts, could turn to Turkey for develop.
The signing of the Protocol document in Zurich on October 10 was
a landmark for the region, and should serve as a starting point
for establishing bilateral relations and, ultimately, the opening
of its closed border. Nevertheless, future relations will still be
heavily linked to the 1915 "genocide" issue and the resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey
consistently warns that any U.S. determination of the events of
1915 as "genocide" would set off a political firestorm in Turkey,
and the devastating effect on our bilateral relationship -- including
political, military, and commercial aspects -- would be unavoidable.
Political Environment ----------------------
¶16. (C) PM Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development
(AK) Party is squarely in the driver's seat, but fears an
erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist
parties. Civilian-military relations remain complex. Chief of Staff
General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with PM Erdogan, but
the long-running struggle between Turkey's secularists (with the
Army as its champion) and Islamists (represented by the government)
naturally puts them at odds.
Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug has
seemingly learned to live. Alleged past military involvement in coup
contingency planning or even deliberate generation of internal chaos
remains political theme number one and preoccupies both Erdogan and
Basbug and their respective underlings.
Israel -------
¶17. (C) While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General Staff
agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship is essential
for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to shore up his domestic
right political flank at the expense of this relationship. His outburst
at Davos was the first in a series of events the results of which we
and his staff have sought to contain. The latest of these was Exercise
Anatolian Eagle. Erdogan canceled Israel's participation hours before
the exercise was to begin. With an Israeli strike - across Turkish
airspace - against targets in Iran a possibility, Erdogan decided he
could not afford the political risk of being accused of training the
forces which would carry out such a raid. Through some remarkable
work with Allies and with the inter-agency, we engineered a public
"postponement" of the international portion of the exercise, but the
relationship has begun to sour.
JEFFREY
"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"
From: A. Papazian