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The Jamestown Foundation
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
Tuesday, September 28, 2010-Volume 7, Issue 174
AMBASSADORIAL VACANCY DISABLES US POLICY IN AZERBAIJAN AND BEYOND
by Vladimir Socor
Washington's failure to send an ambassador to Azerbaijan for well over
a year---and now the hold on the ambassador's confirmation---must look
like a case of systemic malfunction from the perspective of Azerbaijan
as the affected party, Turkey as a keenly interested observer, and
Russia as a potential beneficiary of any damage to the US-Azerbaijan
strategic partnership.
US Ambassador Anne Derse had completed her tour of duty and left Baku
in July 2009. By that time, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Matthew Bryza, was rumored to be in line for nomination as ambassador
to Azerbaijan. However, the State Department waited until May 2010 to
announce the nomination; an Armenian advocacy group then launched a
campaign to block the nomination in the US Senate; and two Senators
(out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's 19 members) placed a
hold on the nomination on September 21.
The hold seems opportunistically linked to the November mid-term
elections. However, one of these two Senators has had a track record
of blocking nominations including that of the US ambassador-designate
to Armenia from 2006 to 2008, asking that nominee and the
Administration to recognize an Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey
(`US Policy in South Caucasus - The Real Target of US Ambassador's
Opponents,' EDM, September 28).
Candidate Barack Obama had pledged to deliver the genocide recognition
if elected, but could not deliver it as president without antagonizing
the crucial partner Turkey. In lieu of this, the administration
proposed to deliver a unilateral opening of the Turkish-Armenian
border, at Azerbaijan's expense. This move would have eliminated the
main positive inducement for a peacefully negotiated withdrawal of
Armenian troops from Azerbaijani districts.
With the ambassadorial post in Baku vacant, Washington urged Turkey to
open the Turkey-Armenia border, no longer conditioning this on
progress toward resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.
Washington's policy shift also risked undermining the package solution
proposed by the US-Russia-France trio of mediators. That package
envisages (inter alia) the opening of both Turkey's and Azerbaijan's
borders with Armenia, conditionally linked with the withdrawal of
Armenian troops from certain inner districts of Azerbaijan. The Obama
administration, however, sought quite a different trade-off through
the Turkey-Armenia October 2009 Zurich Protocols. In return for
re-opening Turkey's border with Armenia, Washington expected Yerevan
(along with mainstream US Armenian groups) to help remove the genocide
recognition campaign from the US political arena. Ultimately,
however, Turkey refused to break ranks with Azerbaijan, while the
Armenian government proved unwilling or unable to desist from genocide
recognition efforts. Even after this, the administration failed to
invite Azerbaijan to the Washington nuclear-safety summit.
At least some of those missteps were soon acknowledged as such in
Washington. The administration seems no longer to press for an
unconditional opening of the Turkey-Armenia border. It announced the
Bryza ambassadorial nomination in May, then dispatched Defense
Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for
brief separate visits to Azerbaijan in July (as part of a region-wide,
get-acquainted tour in Clinton's case). Whether those visits were mere
box-checking exercises or intended to spur a US policy review, remains
unclear.
President Obama's September 24 meeting with Azerbaijan's President,
Ilham Aliyev, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in
New York does not seem to have answered that question. The hold on the
ambassador's confirmation has added an element of uncertainty,
although the administration does stand by its nominee (VOA, September
24).
Baku is watching these developments in Washington with concern over
the fate of the US-Azerbaijan strategic partnership. Azerbaijani
officials are characteristically restrained in their public
comments. Meanwhile, an analysis signed by Zaur Shiriyev from
Azerbaijan's Center for Strategic Studies under the country's
Presidency, published in the Turkish press, may offer a rare insight
into Baku's concerns (Hurriyet, September 23).
Thus, from Baku's vantage point, the long delay in the ambassadorial
nomination looks like `US disrespect and disinterest in the
development of bilateral relations...or dysfunction in the US
political system, or both. As a result, conclusions are being drawn in
Baku about the US capacity for leadership in the region. Following
the push to open the Turkey-Armenia border at any cost, the Obama
administration not only failed to develop, but even decreased the
importance of the US-Azerbaijan strategic partnership...On one hand,
Azerbaijan needs US assistance for resolution of the Karabakh conflict
and balancing regional actors like Russia and Iran. On the other hand,
a strong partnership with Azerbaijan answers to the consolidation of
the US presence in the South Caucasus-Caspian region' (Hurriyet,
September 23).
If any policy review is quietly underway in the US administration it
must, first, stop viewing the policy through the prism of US domestic
politics, instead of strategic interests. Second, the US should
proactively advance the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict,
as part of a region-wide US policy in the South Caucasus. Thirdly,
that policy operates at its best as an extension of US-Europe
relations, with focus on energy security as a common trans-Atlantic
concern. Fourthly, any US policy review ought to stipulate proactive
steps for reversing the perception of an incremental, undeclared US
disengagement from the South Caucasus. That widely perceived
disengagement adds to the region's deficit of security.
-- Vladimir Socor
From: A. Papazian
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
Tuesday, September 28, 2010-Volume 7, Issue 174
AMBASSADORIAL VACANCY DISABLES US POLICY IN AZERBAIJAN AND BEYOND
by Vladimir Socor
Washington's failure to send an ambassador to Azerbaijan for well over
a year---and now the hold on the ambassador's confirmation---must look
like a case of systemic malfunction from the perspective of Azerbaijan
as the affected party, Turkey as a keenly interested observer, and
Russia as a potential beneficiary of any damage to the US-Azerbaijan
strategic partnership.
US Ambassador Anne Derse had completed her tour of duty and left Baku
in July 2009. By that time, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Matthew Bryza, was rumored to be in line for nomination as ambassador
to Azerbaijan. However, the State Department waited until May 2010 to
announce the nomination; an Armenian advocacy group then launched a
campaign to block the nomination in the US Senate; and two Senators
(out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's 19 members) placed a
hold on the nomination on September 21.
The hold seems opportunistically linked to the November mid-term
elections. However, one of these two Senators has had a track record
of blocking nominations including that of the US ambassador-designate
to Armenia from 2006 to 2008, asking that nominee and the
Administration to recognize an Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey
(`US Policy in South Caucasus - The Real Target of US Ambassador's
Opponents,' EDM, September 28).
Candidate Barack Obama had pledged to deliver the genocide recognition
if elected, but could not deliver it as president without antagonizing
the crucial partner Turkey. In lieu of this, the administration
proposed to deliver a unilateral opening of the Turkish-Armenian
border, at Azerbaijan's expense. This move would have eliminated the
main positive inducement for a peacefully negotiated withdrawal of
Armenian troops from Azerbaijani districts.
With the ambassadorial post in Baku vacant, Washington urged Turkey to
open the Turkey-Armenia border, no longer conditioning this on
progress toward resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.
Washington's policy shift also risked undermining the package solution
proposed by the US-Russia-France trio of mediators. That package
envisages (inter alia) the opening of both Turkey's and Azerbaijan's
borders with Armenia, conditionally linked with the withdrawal of
Armenian troops from certain inner districts of Azerbaijan. The Obama
administration, however, sought quite a different trade-off through
the Turkey-Armenia October 2009 Zurich Protocols. In return for
re-opening Turkey's border with Armenia, Washington expected Yerevan
(along with mainstream US Armenian groups) to help remove the genocide
recognition campaign from the US political arena. Ultimately,
however, Turkey refused to break ranks with Azerbaijan, while the
Armenian government proved unwilling or unable to desist from genocide
recognition efforts. Even after this, the administration failed to
invite Azerbaijan to the Washington nuclear-safety summit.
At least some of those missteps were soon acknowledged as such in
Washington. The administration seems no longer to press for an
unconditional opening of the Turkey-Armenia border. It announced the
Bryza ambassadorial nomination in May, then dispatched Defense
Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for
brief separate visits to Azerbaijan in July (as part of a region-wide,
get-acquainted tour in Clinton's case). Whether those visits were mere
box-checking exercises or intended to spur a US policy review, remains
unclear.
President Obama's September 24 meeting with Azerbaijan's President,
Ilham Aliyev, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in
New York does not seem to have answered that question. The hold on the
ambassador's confirmation has added an element of uncertainty,
although the administration does stand by its nominee (VOA, September
24).
Baku is watching these developments in Washington with concern over
the fate of the US-Azerbaijan strategic partnership. Azerbaijani
officials are characteristically restrained in their public
comments. Meanwhile, an analysis signed by Zaur Shiriyev from
Azerbaijan's Center for Strategic Studies under the country's
Presidency, published in the Turkish press, may offer a rare insight
into Baku's concerns (Hurriyet, September 23).
Thus, from Baku's vantage point, the long delay in the ambassadorial
nomination looks like `US disrespect and disinterest in the
development of bilateral relations...or dysfunction in the US
political system, or both. As a result, conclusions are being drawn in
Baku about the US capacity for leadership in the region. Following
the push to open the Turkey-Armenia border at any cost, the Obama
administration not only failed to develop, but even decreased the
importance of the US-Azerbaijan strategic partnership...On one hand,
Azerbaijan needs US assistance for resolution of the Karabakh conflict
and balancing regional actors like Russia and Iran. On the other hand,
a strong partnership with Azerbaijan answers to the consolidation of
the US presence in the South Caucasus-Caspian region' (Hurriyet,
September 23).
If any policy review is quietly underway in the US administration it
must, first, stop viewing the policy through the prism of US domestic
politics, instead of strategic interests. Second, the US should
proactively advance the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict,
as part of a region-wide US policy in the South Caucasus. Thirdly,
that policy operates at its best as an extension of US-Europe
relations, with focus on energy security as a common trans-Atlantic
concern. Fourthly, any US policy review ought to stipulate proactive
steps for reversing the perception of an incremental, undeclared US
disengagement from the South Caucasus. That widely perceived
disengagement adds to the region's deficit of security.
-- Vladimir Socor
From: A. Papazian