Tweet
PROSPECTS FOR TURKISH - U.S. TIES NOT THE BEST
SEMIH IDIZ
Turkish Press
http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=358948
Oct 15 2010
HURRIYET DAILY NEWS - It is hardly a secret that Turkish-US relations
are going through one of their most turbulent periods in recent
history. Indications are that things may get worse before they
get better. At least this is the feeling I got from talking to US
diplomats, researchers and journalists over the past three days
in Bodrum.
The occasion of our discussions was a brainstorming roundtable session
organized by the Turkish Center for Economics and Political Studies
(EDAM) and the Center for European Reform. Because of the Chatham
House rules in force, I cannot quote any of the participants or go
into the details of our discussions.
It is nevertheless possible to reflect some of the ideas and opinions
floated on the sidelines of the roundtable and in private discussions.
>From these, it is clear that there are three elemental issues that
have to be resolved somehow if ties between Ankara and Washington
are to be normalized again: Turkish-Israeli relations, the question
of Iran, and Turkish-Armenian ties.
If we look at Turkish-Israeli relations first, these have become a
kind of litmus test for Turkish-US relations as well. As long as the
dispute between Turkey and Israel remains unresolved, it is clear that
Washington will veer towards Israel on issues like the investigation
into the Mavi Marmara incident, which in turn will feed the already
widespread anti-Americanism among Turks.
This is a fact that the Recep Tayyip Erdogan government, which has
shown serious populist tendencies to date, cannot afford to overlook,
especially as we move closer to next year's general elections and
the campaign atmosphere.
>From Israel's perspective, on the other hand, there appears little
hope that the Netanyahu government will provide an apology, let alone
compensation, over the killing of nine Turkish activists on the Mavi
Marmara by Israeli soldiers.
The short of it is that getting an apology and compensation from Israel
has become a matter of honor and public credibility for Prime Minister
Erdogan's government. The opposite side of the coin, on the other
hand, is that not providing an apology, let alone compensation, has
also become a matter of national honor for the Netanyahu government.
Because of this, no early rapprochement should be expected between
Turkey and Israel, and this situation will of course continue
to cast a shadow over Ankara's ties with Washington. Even if the
Obama administration wants to normalize ties with Turkey despite this
problem, it seems the US Congress, where the Jewish lobby is paramount,
will ensure that this does not happen.
The question of Iran, on the other hand, continues to be a festering
wound between Turkey and Washington, where the two governments don't
see eye to eye at all. There seems little possibility, however, that
Ankara will change tack on its growing ties with Tehran for the sake
of improving relations with the US.
Doing so would represent a great loss of face for the ruling Justice
and Development Party (AK Party), and that is a touchy possibility
given the populist nature of the government.
It seems that we may also be facing further potential sore points
between the two countries, in addition to the fact that Turkey voted
against UN sanctions against Iran at the Security Council. Washington
continues to remain keen on a missile defense system that has one leg
in Turkey and which many analysts say will be primarily aimed at Iran.
The dilemma for Ankara, when the issue is on the table in earnest,
is how to manage this problem without falling out with its key NATO
ally, namely the US, while at the same time not antagonizing Iran.
The decision is a hard one, and Turkish diplomats are exhorting their
American counterparts that even if the missile defense system is
put in place in the end, its mission definition should not name any
country in particular, 'because this would create automatic enemies
for NATO.' What this means in plain language is that Ankara doesn't
want any document about the mission of the proposed missile defense
system to name Iran.
Turkey's dilemma is, however, that Iran has already been named in
this context, and even if it's not mentioned in any document, the
whole world knows who the initial target of this system is. It's
not clear at this stage how Turkey will extricate itself from this
problem if indeed the proposed missile defense system goes ahead.
The third thorn in the side of Turkish-US ties is the stalled
Turkish-Armenian normalization process and the fate of the Zurich
protocols signed last year, which were supposed to have paved the
way for a breakthrough between these two deeply estranged neighbors.
It seems from the discussions we held in Bodrum that the general
belief in Washington, and particularly in the US Congress, is that
Turkey negotiated the Zurich Protocols with Armenia in bad faith,
not to actually move ahead in terms of Turkish-Armenian ties, but to
prevent President Barack Obama from using the 'G word' ['genocide']
in his annual April 24 message earlier this year.
One person in Bodrum said the mood in Congress on Turkey is 'ugly'
because of this, and that the Armenian lobby is mobilizing with all
its strength to use the downturn in Turkish-US ties in order to try
and push through an Armenian genocide resolution in the House and
the Senate.
Whether it will be successful this time remains to be seen. But if
it is, this will likely lead to a 'train crash' in Turkish-US ties,
which some are already predicting somewhat pessimistically as being
somewhere down the line anyway, if the present mood in bilateral ties
remains sour.
Even this somewhat cursory list of problem areas in Turkish-US ties
appears to indeed suggest that things will probably get worse before
they get better. In addition to these problems, there are also Ankara's
overtures to Russia and China, which we are told are causing some
consternation in Washington.
The lines of the sides involved in all above three issues are so firmly
drawn that it appears almost to be stating the obvious to say that the
prospects for Turkish-US ties in the coming months don't look the best.
From: A. Papazian
SEMIH IDIZ
Turkish Press
http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=358948
Oct 15 2010
HURRIYET DAILY NEWS - It is hardly a secret that Turkish-US relations
are going through one of their most turbulent periods in recent
history. Indications are that things may get worse before they
get better. At least this is the feeling I got from talking to US
diplomats, researchers and journalists over the past three days
in Bodrum.
The occasion of our discussions was a brainstorming roundtable session
organized by the Turkish Center for Economics and Political Studies
(EDAM) and the Center for European Reform. Because of the Chatham
House rules in force, I cannot quote any of the participants or go
into the details of our discussions.
It is nevertheless possible to reflect some of the ideas and opinions
floated on the sidelines of the roundtable and in private discussions.
>From these, it is clear that there are three elemental issues that
have to be resolved somehow if ties between Ankara and Washington
are to be normalized again: Turkish-Israeli relations, the question
of Iran, and Turkish-Armenian ties.
If we look at Turkish-Israeli relations first, these have become a
kind of litmus test for Turkish-US relations as well. As long as the
dispute between Turkey and Israel remains unresolved, it is clear that
Washington will veer towards Israel on issues like the investigation
into the Mavi Marmara incident, which in turn will feed the already
widespread anti-Americanism among Turks.
This is a fact that the Recep Tayyip Erdogan government, which has
shown serious populist tendencies to date, cannot afford to overlook,
especially as we move closer to next year's general elections and
the campaign atmosphere.
>From Israel's perspective, on the other hand, there appears little
hope that the Netanyahu government will provide an apology, let alone
compensation, over the killing of nine Turkish activists on the Mavi
Marmara by Israeli soldiers.
The short of it is that getting an apology and compensation from Israel
has become a matter of honor and public credibility for Prime Minister
Erdogan's government. The opposite side of the coin, on the other
hand, is that not providing an apology, let alone compensation, has
also become a matter of national honor for the Netanyahu government.
Because of this, no early rapprochement should be expected between
Turkey and Israel, and this situation will of course continue
to cast a shadow over Ankara's ties with Washington. Even if the
Obama administration wants to normalize ties with Turkey despite this
problem, it seems the US Congress, where the Jewish lobby is paramount,
will ensure that this does not happen.
The question of Iran, on the other hand, continues to be a festering
wound between Turkey and Washington, where the two governments don't
see eye to eye at all. There seems little possibility, however, that
Ankara will change tack on its growing ties with Tehran for the sake
of improving relations with the US.
Doing so would represent a great loss of face for the ruling Justice
and Development Party (AK Party), and that is a touchy possibility
given the populist nature of the government.
It seems that we may also be facing further potential sore points
between the two countries, in addition to the fact that Turkey voted
against UN sanctions against Iran at the Security Council. Washington
continues to remain keen on a missile defense system that has one leg
in Turkey and which many analysts say will be primarily aimed at Iran.
The dilemma for Ankara, when the issue is on the table in earnest,
is how to manage this problem without falling out with its key NATO
ally, namely the US, while at the same time not antagonizing Iran.
The decision is a hard one, and Turkish diplomats are exhorting their
American counterparts that even if the missile defense system is
put in place in the end, its mission definition should not name any
country in particular, 'because this would create automatic enemies
for NATO.' What this means in plain language is that Ankara doesn't
want any document about the mission of the proposed missile defense
system to name Iran.
Turkey's dilemma is, however, that Iran has already been named in
this context, and even if it's not mentioned in any document, the
whole world knows who the initial target of this system is. It's
not clear at this stage how Turkey will extricate itself from this
problem if indeed the proposed missile defense system goes ahead.
The third thorn in the side of Turkish-US ties is the stalled
Turkish-Armenian normalization process and the fate of the Zurich
protocols signed last year, which were supposed to have paved the
way for a breakthrough between these two deeply estranged neighbors.
It seems from the discussions we held in Bodrum that the general
belief in Washington, and particularly in the US Congress, is that
Turkey negotiated the Zurich Protocols with Armenia in bad faith,
not to actually move ahead in terms of Turkish-Armenian ties, but to
prevent President Barack Obama from using the 'G word' ['genocide']
in his annual April 24 message earlier this year.
One person in Bodrum said the mood in Congress on Turkey is 'ugly'
because of this, and that the Armenian lobby is mobilizing with all
its strength to use the downturn in Turkish-US ties in order to try
and push through an Armenian genocide resolution in the House and
the Senate.
Whether it will be successful this time remains to be seen. But if
it is, this will likely lead to a 'train crash' in Turkish-US ties,
which some are already predicting somewhat pessimistically as being
somewhere down the line anyway, if the present mood in bilateral ties
remains sour.
Even this somewhat cursory list of problem areas in Turkish-US ties
appears to indeed suggest that things will probably get worse before
they get better. In addition to these problems, there are also Ankara's
overtures to Russia and China, which we are told are causing some
consternation in Washington.
The lines of the sides involved in all above three issues are so firmly
drawn that it appears almost to be stating the obvious to say that the
prospects for Turkish-US ties in the coming months don't look the best.
From: A. Papazian