DID SAAKASHVILI PINCH RUSSIA ON THE NORTH CAUCASUS ISSUE?
Zaza Jgharkava
Georgia Today
Oct 22 2010
Georgia
After President Saakashvili's announcement last week that the visa
regime for citizens of countries of the North Caucasus would be
abolished, the battle for the region has entered a new phase. The
Kremlin perhaps has found a new competitor in the struggle for the
Caucasus - is the prospect of a unified region once more on the table?
The most recent attempt at such a feat began in the 1990s when the
first president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia together with the
then president of Chechnya, Jokhar Dudaev announced the opening of
a common Caucasian House.
Nothing however came out of initiative: Three months after the plan was
first announced, President Gamsakhurdia's government was overthrown;
Gamsakhurdia himself found shelter in Chechnya dying two years later
in uncertain conditions. The same year Chechnya's President Jokhar
Dudaev shared Gamsakhurdia's tragic fate and talks of a unified
Caucasus were silenced.
Parallel to that, in Sokhumi, Tskhinvali and Stepanakert, pro-Russian
separatists came to power. The Kremlin's 'three-legged chair' policy
proved successful and at minimal cost, it ensured control over the
Caucasus. To date, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh were
the lynchpins of this policy, in August 2008 an attempt was made to
change the balance, but it fell flat.
It seems that the method has been changed now. Passports may now
change more than bombs and coups ever could.
Under an official decree by President Saakashvili, from October 15, any
Russian citizen registered in Daghestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North
Ossetia, Kabardo-Balkarya, Karachai-Cherkezya and Adighe have been
given the right to cross the Georgian border and stay in the country
for 90 days without a visa. This order for the most part concerns
people seeking to enter Georgia from the Northern Russia-Georgia
border via the Georgian military highway.
The visa intrigue is compounded by the fact that when negotiations
on the reopening of the Zemo Larsi border checkpoint were underway,
Russia demanded in the strongest possible terms that Georgian visas
were not to be issued at the border checkpoint. With the logic that
vistors to Tbilisi could only go through Moscow; this is how the
checkpoint has worked since May 2010. However, Saakashvili has now
turned everything upside down for the Kremlin.
What purpose does the Saakashvili's initiative serve?
Articles with titles such as "Saakashvili pinches Russia on an issue
of the North Caucasus" have already appeared in the Russian media.
According to their authors, Tbilisi's initiative will lead to the
formation of guerilla groups that will further ferment unrest in the
North Caucasus. The idea is wrong right from the beginning: firstly
armed groups cannot move through the controlled border checkpoint;
secondly, support for terrorism, no matter what purpose it serves is
unacceptable to anyone, especially the allies of officials in Tbilisi.
Moscow has responded to the order by the Georgian president with
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stating that his ministry had not
received any notice about such an action, with Moscow learning about
the decision Tbilisi from the mass media.
"In terms of relations between civilized partners it is only acceptable
to discuss the issue bilaterally," said Lavrov in a statement to
Ria Novosti on October 12, "The way they are going about this is
reminiscent of a propagandistic maneuver."
Following the war of August 2008, talks about 'partnership' between
Russia and Georgia are ridiculous, leaving many in Georgia wondering
what partnership Russia's Foreign Minister was talking about. It looks
like Saakashvili's 'pinch' has already been followed with results
as a diplomat of such a high level as Lavrov has now started talking
about international law and partnership norms.
The Kremlin's nervous reaction suggests that Russian border guards
will not allow North Caucasians to cross the border without visas,
leading to a single-sided blockage of the border forcing a reaction
from Tbilisi. In response, Tbilisi may close the Larsi border to
Armenian citizens and the situation will return to 2006, a situation
unacceptable both for Moscow and for Yerevan.
In order to avoid such an outcome Russia will probably have to accept
the rules of Saakashvili's game and play on his terms.
It is another issue as to whether this step is purely propaganda -
time will tell. Until then, the president of Georgia will be guided
by one thing - presenting a positive image of Georgia to the eyes of
the North Caucasians. The idea behind this initiative is that for
the North Caucasus elites, Tbilisi should be seen as on a par with
Moscow and St. Petersburg as centers of culture and education.
As Saakashvili said at a recent UN General Assembly meeting, "He is
not going to change the borders, but the borders cannot change the
cultural unity of the Caucasian peoples."
The October 12 order points once again to the Rose Revolution's promise
that Georgia should become an alternative model for state development,
defeating corruption, rapidly modernizing and transforming into an
attractive country for investment and tourism.
The future will show how well Georgia has managed to accomplish
this goal.
From: A. Papazian
Zaza Jgharkava
Georgia Today
Oct 22 2010
Georgia
After President Saakashvili's announcement last week that the visa
regime for citizens of countries of the North Caucasus would be
abolished, the battle for the region has entered a new phase. The
Kremlin perhaps has found a new competitor in the struggle for the
Caucasus - is the prospect of a unified region once more on the table?
The most recent attempt at such a feat began in the 1990s when the
first president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia together with the
then president of Chechnya, Jokhar Dudaev announced the opening of
a common Caucasian House.
Nothing however came out of initiative: Three months after the plan was
first announced, President Gamsakhurdia's government was overthrown;
Gamsakhurdia himself found shelter in Chechnya dying two years later
in uncertain conditions. The same year Chechnya's President Jokhar
Dudaev shared Gamsakhurdia's tragic fate and talks of a unified
Caucasus were silenced.
Parallel to that, in Sokhumi, Tskhinvali and Stepanakert, pro-Russian
separatists came to power. The Kremlin's 'three-legged chair' policy
proved successful and at minimal cost, it ensured control over the
Caucasus. To date, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh were
the lynchpins of this policy, in August 2008 an attempt was made to
change the balance, but it fell flat.
It seems that the method has been changed now. Passports may now
change more than bombs and coups ever could.
Under an official decree by President Saakashvili, from October 15, any
Russian citizen registered in Daghestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North
Ossetia, Kabardo-Balkarya, Karachai-Cherkezya and Adighe have been
given the right to cross the Georgian border and stay in the country
for 90 days without a visa. This order for the most part concerns
people seeking to enter Georgia from the Northern Russia-Georgia
border via the Georgian military highway.
The visa intrigue is compounded by the fact that when negotiations
on the reopening of the Zemo Larsi border checkpoint were underway,
Russia demanded in the strongest possible terms that Georgian visas
were not to be issued at the border checkpoint. With the logic that
vistors to Tbilisi could only go through Moscow; this is how the
checkpoint has worked since May 2010. However, Saakashvili has now
turned everything upside down for the Kremlin.
What purpose does the Saakashvili's initiative serve?
Articles with titles such as "Saakashvili pinches Russia on an issue
of the North Caucasus" have already appeared in the Russian media.
According to their authors, Tbilisi's initiative will lead to the
formation of guerilla groups that will further ferment unrest in the
North Caucasus. The idea is wrong right from the beginning: firstly
armed groups cannot move through the controlled border checkpoint;
secondly, support for terrorism, no matter what purpose it serves is
unacceptable to anyone, especially the allies of officials in Tbilisi.
Moscow has responded to the order by the Georgian president with
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stating that his ministry had not
received any notice about such an action, with Moscow learning about
the decision Tbilisi from the mass media.
"In terms of relations between civilized partners it is only acceptable
to discuss the issue bilaterally," said Lavrov in a statement to
Ria Novosti on October 12, "The way they are going about this is
reminiscent of a propagandistic maneuver."
Following the war of August 2008, talks about 'partnership' between
Russia and Georgia are ridiculous, leaving many in Georgia wondering
what partnership Russia's Foreign Minister was talking about. It looks
like Saakashvili's 'pinch' has already been followed with results
as a diplomat of such a high level as Lavrov has now started talking
about international law and partnership norms.
The Kremlin's nervous reaction suggests that Russian border guards
will not allow North Caucasians to cross the border without visas,
leading to a single-sided blockage of the border forcing a reaction
from Tbilisi. In response, Tbilisi may close the Larsi border to
Armenian citizens and the situation will return to 2006, a situation
unacceptable both for Moscow and for Yerevan.
In order to avoid such an outcome Russia will probably have to accept
the rules of Saakashvili's game and play on his terms.
It is another issue as to whether this step is purely propaganda -
time will tell. Until then, the president of Georgia will be guided
by one thing - presenting a positive image of Georgia to the eyes of
the North Caucasians. The idea behind this initiative is that for
the North Caucasus elites, Tbilisi should be seen as on a par with
Moscow and St. Petersburg as centers of culture and education.
As Saakashvili said at a recent UN General Assembly meeting, "He is
not going to change the borders, but the borders cannot change the
cultural unity of the Caucasian peoples."
The October 12 order points once again to the Rose Revolution's promise
that Georgia should become an alternative model for state development,
defeating corruption, rapidly modernizing and transforming into an
attractive country for investment and tourism.
The future will show how well Georgia has managed to accomplish
this goal.
From: A. Papazian