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IRAN'S GROWING INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA
Dario Cristiani
World Politics Review
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6369/irans-growing-interests-and-influence-in-central-asia
Sept 10 2010
In early August, at the fourth trilateral summit between Iran,
Afghanistan and Tajikistan held in Tehran, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad urged the leaders of the other two countries to join in
an alliance to counterbalance NATO's growing presence in Central Asia.
Though any such formal alliance is unlikely, the declaration reflects
Tehran's desire to play a larger role in Central Asia's regional
dynamics.
If Iran has always been geographically part of the regional context
of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Tehran's geopolitical orientation
has historically been focused southward, on the Persian Gulf. For more
than a century, Iranian interests in the area were limited to dealing
with Russia's -- and later the Soviet Union's -- expansionism. The
end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union opened new
opportunities on Iran's northern borders, even if Iran remained more
preoccupied with the need for domestic reconstruction following the
war with Iraq.
In the past 15 years, however, Tehran has been particularly active in
trying to create a deep net of institutional and economic links in the
region, in part to counter the increasing reach of Turkey, perceived
as an American proxy, and of Pakistan, historically an enemy of Iran.
Such an approach has been characterized by the "pragmatism" typical
of Iran's post-revolutionary leadership. Eschewing the idea of
exporting revolution, Iran has instead tried to improve ties with all
the countries of the region, focusing on those with which it shares
cultural and historical links. This explains the strong attention paid
by Tehran to Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which represent cornerstones
of the Iranian strategy in the region. At the same time, a clear
example of Iran's pragmatism is the close relationship it has forged
with Armenia, cemented by the common interest of containing Azerbaijan.
Iran's ultimate goal is to become a technological and economic power
in the region, and to this end, Tehran is supplementing its cultural
and historical links with a more resolute economic presence, including
investments in massive infrastructure projects. These include the
Anzab tunnel in Tajikistan, built by an Iranian company and financed
in part by Tehran, as well as railroad and highway construciton in
western Afghanistan. Central Asia and Afghanistan have also become
prime targets for Iran's increasingly refined use of soft power.
Scholarships for students from the Muslim world, economic aid --
Iran is a leading donor to Afghanistan -- and support for economic
and cultural projects are all elements of a renewed public diplomacy
that now plays an important role in Iran's foreign policy.
One of the main geopolitical paradoxes of the past decade has been
the outcomes of the American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where
in spite of the longstanding hostility between Washington and Tehran,
Iran has emerged as the main beneficiary. With regard to Afghanistan,
Iran has historically been the main supporter of the country's Shiite
groups, perceiving the Taliban as an existential threat. So avoiding
a Taliban return to power represents one of Tehran's key interests
in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, Tehran faces a strategic dilemma. On one hand, Iran is
clearly interested in a stable Afghanistan: Iran and Afghanistan are
linked by a "strategic geography," and problems due to instability
in one country can easily affect its neighbor. For example, Iran is
already deeply concerned about drug trafficking, refugee flows and
crime along its borders with Afghanistan. Only a stable government
in Kabul can reduce such threats.
On the other hand, Tehran perceives the longstanding presence of
American troops at its borders as a strategic threat. Moreover, the
ability to undermine American interests in Afghanistan can provide
Tehran with leverage over Washington on other issues, such as the
confrontation over its nuclear program. As a result, Tehran could
potentially see an interest in destabilizing Afghanistan in order to
affect the American military effort there.
This same unresolved ambiguity in Tehran's approach can also be seen,
if to a lesser extent, in Iran's relationships with Russia and China.
Moscow and Beijing have been Tehran's main supporters at the U.N.
Security Council in countering U.S. efforts to impose stiffened
sanctions over its nuclear program. However, both still view Iran
with suspicion. For example, Iran's application for full membership
in the Shangai Cooperation Organization, a Sino-Russian instrument
of influence in Central Asia, was recently rejected due to the U.N.
sanctions targeting the country, leaving Iran with its current
status as an observer. There were also reports that Russia and China
blocked an invitation to the Iranian president to this year's summit,
although Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov denied the claims,
stating that Ahmadinejad had been invited but decided not to come.
In short, rivalries and diverging interests on other issues are
preventing Iran from working with the three main global players
involved in the region -- the U.S., China and Russia -- toward the
stabilization of Afghanistan, one of the few global geopolitical
goals they all share.
Although for years Tehran's main focus was on its southern borders,
it has increasingly turned its attention to its northern and
eastern borders, regions with which it shares geographic, cultural
and historical ties. As a result, its influence in those areas has
increased and Tehran is now playing a major political and economic
role there -- one that can either reduce or exacerbate tensions
between Iran and the great powers involved in the region.
Afghanistan -- where Iran is investing significant amounts of money
and is one of the major diplomatic players determining the country's
future -- is a prime example. Iran, the U.S., China and Russia --
along with other countries -- have a common interest in a stable
Afghanistan free from Taliban rule. The same is true for a variety
of regional issues. But considerations related to external issues,
such as the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program or the persistent
mistrust existing between Iran and these countries -- above all the
U.S. -- could jeopardize this enormous opportunity for cooperation.
Dario Cristiani is a doctoral candidate in Middle East and
Mediterranean studies at King's College, University of London, and
a freelance political analyst on Mediterranean and global affairs.
Previously, he has was a teaching fellow in political science and
comparative politics at the University of Naples "L'Orientale" in
Italy, and a political analyst with the Power and Interest News Report
(PINR).
From: A. Papazian
Dario Cristiani
World Politics Review
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6369/irans-growing-interests-and-influence-in-central-asia
Sept 10 2010
In early August, at the fourth trilateral summit between Iran,
Afghanistan and Tajikistan held in Tehran, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad urged the leaders of the other two countries to join in
an alliance to counterbalance NATO's growing presence in Central Asia.
Though any such formal alliance is unlikely, the declaration reflects
Tehran's desire to play a larger role in Central Asia's regional
dynamics.
If Iran has always been geographically part of the regional context
of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Tehran's geopolitical orientation
has historically been focused southward, on the Persian Gulf. For more
than a century, Iranian interests in the area were limited to dealing
with Russia's -- and later the Soviet Union's -- expansionism. The
end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union opened new
opportunities on Iran's northern borders, even if Iran remained more
preoccupied with the need for domestic reconstruction following the
war with Iraq.
In the past 15 years, however, Tehran has been particularly active in
trying to create a deep net of institutional and economic links in the
region, in part to counter the increasing reach of Turkey, perceived
as an American proxy, and of Pakistan, historically an enemy of Iran.
Such an approach has been characterized by the "pragmatism" typical
of Iran's post-revolutionary leadership. Eschewing the idea of
exporting revolution, Iran has instead tried to improve ties with all
the countries of the region, focusing on those with which it shares
cultural and historical links. This explains the strong attention paid
by Tehran to Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which represent cornerstones
of the Iranian strategy in the region. At the same time, a clear
example of Iran's pragmatism is the close relationship it has forged
with Armenia, cemented by the common interest of containing Azerbaijan.
Iran's ultimate goal is to become a technological and economic power
in the region, and to this end, Tehran is supplementing its cultural
and historical links with a more resolute economic presence, including
investments in massive infrastructure projects. These include the
Anzab tunnel in Tajikistan, built by an Iranian company and financed
in part by Tehran, as well as railroad and highway construciton in
western Afghanistan. Central Asia and Afghanistan have also become
prime targets for Iran's increasingly refined use of soft power.
Scholarships for students from the Muslim world, economic aid --
Iran is a leading donor to Afghanistan -- and support for economic
and cultural projects are all elements of a renewed public diplomacy
that now plays an important role in Iran's foreign policy.
One of the main geopolitical paradoxes of the past decade has been
the outcomes of the American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where
in spite of the longstanding hostility between Washington and Tehran,
Iran has emerged as the main beneficiary. With regard to Afghanistan,
Iran has historically been the main supporter of the country's Shiite
groups, perceiving the Taliban as an existential threat. So avoiding
a Taliban return to power represents one of Tehran's key interests
in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, Tehran faces a strategic dilemma. On one hand, Iran is
clearly interested in a stable Afghanistan: Iran and Afghanistan are
linked by a "strategic geography," and problems due to instability
in one country can easily affect its neighbor. For example, Iran is
already deeply concerned about drug trafficking, refugee flows and
crime along its borders with Afghanistan. Only a stable government
in Kabul can reduce such threats.
On the other hand, Tehran perceives the longstanding presence of
American troops at its borders as a strategic threat. Moreover, the
ability to undermine American interests in Afghanistan can provide
Tehran with leverage over Washington on other issues, such as the
confrontation over its nuclear program. As a result, Tehran could
potentially see an interest in destabilizing Afghanistan in order to
affect the American military effort there.
This same unresolved ambiguity in Tehran's approach can also be seen,
if to a lesser extent, in Iran's relationships with Russia and China.
Moscow and Beijing have been Tehran's main supporters at the U.N.
Security Council in countering U.S. efforts to impose stiffened
sanctions over its nuclear program. However, both still view Iran
with suspicion. For example, Iran's application for full membership
in the Shangai Cooperation Organization, a Sino-Russian instrument
of influence in Central Asia, was recently rejected due to the U.N.
sanctions targeting the country, leaving Iran with its current
status as an observer. There were also reports that Russia and China
blocked an invitation to the Iranian president to this year's summit,
although Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov denied the claims,
stating that Ahmadinejad had been invited but decided not to come.
In short, rivalries and diverging interests on other issues are
preventing Iran from working with the three main global players
involved in the region -- the U.S., China and Russia -- toward the
stabilization of Afghanistan, one of the few global geopolitical
goals they all share.
Although for years Tehran's main focus was on its southern borders,
it has increasingly turned its attention to its northern and
eastern borders, regions with which it shares geographic, cultural
and historical ties. As a result, its influence in those areas has
increased and Tehran is now playing a major political and economic
role there -- one that can either reduce or exacerbate tensions
between Iran and the great powers involved in the region.
Afghanistan -- where Iran is investing significant amounts of money
and is one of the major diplomatic players determining the country's
future -- is a prime example. Iran, the U.S., China and Russia --
along with other countries -- have a common interest in a stable
Afghanistan free from Taliban rule. The same is true for a variety
of regional issues. But considerations related to external issues,
such as the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program or the persistent
mistrust existing between Iran and these countries -- above all the
U.S. -- could jeopardize this enormous opportunity for cooperation.
Dario Cristiani is a doctoral candidate in Middle East and
Mediterranean studies at King's College, University of London, and
a freelance political analyst on Mediterranean and global affairs.
Previously, he has was a teaching fellow in political science and
comparative politics at the University of Naples "L'Orientale" in
Italy, and a political analyst with the Power and Interest News Report
(PINR).
From: A. Papazian