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'EU HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY PRESENT IN ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD'
news.az
Aug 12 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews Jana Kobzova an independent think tank of the
European Council of Foreign Relations.
How would you characterize the EU's foreign policy towards the Eastern
partnership countries?
Through the Eastern Partnership policy, the EU aims to help promote
economic and political convergence of its eastern neighbours with
the European Union. In practice, this means the EU is helping to
bolster market economy and strengthen democracy and rule of law in
its neighbourhood.
In other words, it's a policy of great aspirations which has yet to
bear its fruit: until now, the results have been more limited than
it was hoped for: in fact, in the last five years, democracy has
worsened in all countries of Eastern partnership except for Moldova,
corruption is on rise and human rights situation has deteriorated in
Belarus or Ukraine - this is hardly the convergence the EU hoped for.
At the same time, the policy was never meant to change things on
the ground - the EU cannot do it, local population and their elected
representatives in Eastern partnership have to do that - the policy was
meant to help those who want to make these changes at home. The case
of Moldova, which since the democratic elections in 2009 has made a
significant use of the EU's eastern partnership offer to simplify the
visa regime with the European Union or embark on negotiations about
deep and comprehensive free trade area, which would eventually open
up the EU's internal market for Moldova. In other words, when there
is a will, the EU policy of Eastern partnership can help a lot.
However, it must be said that due to the economic crisis, revolts
in the North Africa and Eurozone crisis, the EU has devoted less
political attention to its eastern neighbours than before. The EU did
criticise the rigged elections in Belarus or the political trial of
Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine, however, despite worsening of democracy
in its eastern neighbourhood, the EU's attention has been elsewhere,
making the EU's eastern partnership something of a 'do it yourself'
offer for its eastern neighbours. This may change as the EU's External
Action Service shapes up and settles down - but it may take more time
than many initially thought.
What are your expectations from the upcoming Eastern partnership
in Warsaw?
Due to the on-going turmoil in Eurozone as well as the continued
unrest in Middle East and North Africa, at the moment, the Eastern
neighbourhood has not been the number 1 or number 2 priority for the
EU member states. At the same time, the summit is hosted by Poland,
whose foreign policy focus rests on Eastern partnership - Warsaw has
been previously quite effective in engaging other key member states
of the EU such as Germany to keep their attention on the Eastern
Partnership. In addition, Commissioner Fule and his team have made
a remarkable job in making sure the Eastern neighbourhood does not
slip for the EU's radar screen.
One of the open questions is whether Belarusian official
representatives would be invited to the summit - due to the crackdown
on civil society, the EU has suspended most of the official contacts
with the regime and there are dividing opinions whether to exclude
Belarus from the summit or not given the fact that the state of
democracy is not rosy on most other Eastern partnership countries.
More than a year ago, the EU launched a review of its European
Neighbourhood Policy, which also covers the Eastern partnership
countries - the review has now been concluded and its results will be
discussed with the Eastern partners (who also inputted in the review).
The main challenge for the EU is how to implement one of the review's
key recommendations, i.e. tougher application of conditionality in its
neighbourhood, given the slow pace of reform in most of the Eastern
partnership countries (i.e. more funds for more reforms, less funds
for less reforms).
Do you expect any resistance from Russia to European integration of
its neighbors?
The EU has been increasingly present in its eastern neighbourhood:
it is the biggest trade partner for all Eastern partnership countries
except for Belarus and has border-monitoring and monitoring missions
on Ukraine-Moldova's border as well as in Georgia. In case of Ukraine,
Russia has exercised quite a strong pressure on Kyiv not to continue
negotiations with the EU on a deep and comprehensive trade agreement -
instead, Moscow wanted Ukraine to join the Customs Union with Belarus
and Kazakhstan. Russia still perceives its neighbours as part of
its 'near abroad' and would continue to try to maintain its leading
role in the region, however, Russia is no longer ready to commit the
enormous resources it used to commit - such as cheap energy subsidies
or numerous peacekeepers - to maintain its position: Russia did not
intervene in Kyrgyzstan and it is unlikely that Moscow would repeat
the military intervention it did in Georgia in 2008 elsewhere in
the region.
At the same time, due to the reasons described below, the full
integration of the Eastern partnership countries into the EU is
currently off the table: due to disappointments with Ukraine but also
due to the EU's internal problems, the EU's enlargement - except for
Croatia and maybe Iceland - will remain a non-starter for the next
couple of years. This doesn't mean that the countries should not
continue reforms and democratization - the Baltic states or Central
European states launched their reforms in 1990s at the time when no
one seriously talked about their potential EU accession.
May the European integration assist somehow to bring closer positions
of Azerbaijan and Armenia on Karabakh?
Countries with unresolved border disputes cannot join the European
Union - so resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh will have to take place
before Armenia's or Azerbaijan's accession. Political and economic
reforms required from the countries to join the EU are not directly
aimed at conflict resolution, however, integration process would
help focus the attention on issues other than Nagorno Karabakh and
potentially decrease the tensions.
The EU is already supporting the conflict resolution through a number
of ways, including supporting projects on the ground and the mediation
of the Minsk Group. Ultimately, it will be up to the people of both
states and Nagorno Karabakh population to resolve the issue. However,
given the current tensions and lack of progress on negotiations,
the process looks rather long-term.
What kind of role may the EU play in the settlement such kind of
territorial disputes near its Eastern borders?
With the consent of the concerned parties, the EU can deploy
peacekeeping or monitoring missions and assist - financially or
through experts - with mediation between the sides of the conflict.
For example, in the case of Transnistria, the EU deployed its border
assistance and monitoring mission to Moldova and Ukraine, which helps
improve border and customs management along the two states' border
(including Transnistria). At the same time, as mentioned, the EU acts
upon the consent of the involved sides - which also limits the scope
of its assistance, as in the case of Georgia, where the EU Monitoring
Mission has no access to Abkhazia or South Ossetia.
news.az
Aug 12 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews Jana Kobzova an independent think tank of the
European Council of Foreign Relations.
How would you characterize the EU's foreign policy towards the Eastern
partnership countries?
Through the Eastern Partnership policy, the EU aims to help promote
economic and political convergence of its eastern neighbours with
the European Union. In practice, this means the EU is helping to
bolster market economy and strengthen democracy and rule of law in
its neighbourhood.
In other words, it's a policy of great aspirations which has yet to
bear its fruit: until now, the results have been more limited than
it was hoped for: in fact, in the last five years, democracy has
worsened in all countries of Eastern partnership except for Moldova,
corruption is on rise and human rights situation has deteriorated in
Belarus or Ukraine - this is hardly the convergence the EU hoped for.
At the same time, the policy was never meant to change things on
the ground - the EU cannot do it, local population and their elected
representatives in Eastern partnership have to do that - the policy was
meant to help those who want to make these changes at home. The case
of Moldova, which since the democratic elections in 2009 has made a
significant use of the EU's eastern partnership offer to simplify the
visa regime with the European Union or embark on negotiations about
deep and comprehensive free trade area, which would eventually open
up the EU's internal market for Moldova. In other words, when there
is a will, the EU policy of Eastern partnership can help a lot.
However, it must be said that due to the economic crisis, revolts
in the North Africa and Eurozone crisis, the EU has devoted less
political attention to its eastern neighbours than before. The EU did
criticise the rigged elections in Belarus or the political trial of
Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine, however, despite worsening of democracy
in its eastern neighbourhood, the EU's attention has been elsewhere,
making the EU's eastern partnership something of a 'do it yourself'
offer for its eastern neighbours. This may change as the EU's External
Action Service shapes up and settles down - but it may take more time
than many initially thought.
What are your expectations from the upcoming Eastern partnership
in Warsaw?
Due to the on-going turmoil in Eurozone as well as the continued
unrest in Middle East and North Africa, at the moment, the Eastern
neighbourhood has not been the number 1 or number 2 priority for the
EU member states. At the same time, the summit is hosted by Poland,
whose foreign policy focus rests on Eastern partnership - Warsaw has
been previously quite effective in engaging other key member states
of the EU such as Germany to keep their attention on the Eastern
Partnership. In addition, Commissioner Fule and his team have made
a remarkable job in making sure the Eastern neighbourhood does not
slip for the EU's radar screen.
One of the open questions is whether Belarusian official
representatives would be invited to the summit - due to the crackdown
on civil society, the EU has suspended most of the official contacts
with the regime and there are dividing opinions whether to exclude
Belarus from the summit or not given the fact that the state of
democracy is not rosy on most other Eastern partnership countries.
More than a year ago, the EU launched a review of its European
Neighbourhood Policy, which also covers the Eastern partnership
countries - the review has now been concluded and its results will be
discussed with the Eastern partners (who also inputted in the review).
The main challenge for the EU is how to implement one of the review's
key recommendations, i.e. tougher application of conditionality in its
neighbourhood, given the slow pace of reform in most of the Eastern
partnership countries (i.e. more funds for more reforms, less funds
for less reforms).
Do you expect any resistance from Russia to European integration of
its neighbors?
The EU has been increasingly present in its eastern neighbourhood:
it is the biggest trade partner for all Eastern partnership countries
except for Belarus and has border-monitoring and monitoring missions
on Ukraine-Moldova's border as well as in Georgia. In case of Ukraine,
Russia has exercised quite a strong pressure on Kyiv not to continue
negotiations with the EU on a deep and comprehensive trade agreement -
instead, Moscow wanted Ukraine to join the Customs Union with Belarus
and Kazakhstan. Russia still perceives its neighbours as part of
its 'near abroad' and would continue to try to maintain its leading
role in the region, however, Russia is no longer ready to commit the
enormous resources it used to commit - such as cheap energy subsidies
or numerous peacekeepers - to maintain its position: Russia did not
intervene in Kyrgyzstan and it is unlikely that Moscow would repeat
the military intervention it did in Georgia in 2008 elsewhere in
the region.
At the same time, due to the reasons described below, the full
integration of the Eastern partnership countries into the EU is
currently off the table: due to disappointments with Ukraine but also
due to the EU's internal problems, the EU's enlargement - except for
Croatia and maybe Iceland - will remain a non-starter for the next
couple of years. This doesn't mean that the countries should not
continue reforms and democratization - the Baltic states or Central
European states launched their reforms in 1990s at the time when no
one seriously talked about their potential EU accession.
May the European integration assist somehow to bring closer positions
of Azerbaijan and Armenia on Karabakh?
Countries with unresolved border disputes cannot join the European
Union - so resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh will have to take place
before Armenia's or Azerbaijan's accession. Political and economic
reforms required from the countries to join the EU are not directly
aimed at conflict resolution, however, integration process would
help focus the attention on issues other than Nagorno Karabakh and
potentially decrease the tensions.
The EU is already supporting the conflict resolution through a number
of ways, including supporting projects on the ground and the mediation
of the Minsk Group. Ultimately, it will be up to the people of both
states and Nagorno Karabakh population to resolve the issue. However,
given the current tensions and lack of progress on negotiations,
the process looks rather long-term.
What kind of role may the EU play in the settlement such kind of
territorial disputes near its Eastern borders?
With the consent of the concerned parties, the EU can deploy
peacekeeping or monitoring missions and assist - financially or
through experts - with mediation between the sides of the conflict.
For example, in the case of Transnistria, the EU deployed its border
assistance and monitoring mission to Moldova and Ukraine, which helps
improve border and customs management along the two states' border
(including Transnistria). At the same time, as mentioned, the EU acts
upon the consent of the involved sides - which also limits the scope
of its assistance, as in the case of Georgia, where the EU Monitoring
Mission has no access to Abkhazia or South Ossetia.