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'BAKU CAN RAISE GABALA RENTAL DURING KARABAKH TALKS WITH MOSCOW'
news.az
Aug 18, 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews Andrey Rayevskiy, editor-in-chief of Russian news
agency Mediafax.
Much is spoken in Russia about the need to hold Saakashvili accountable
for the murder of civilians in Tskhinvali and Russian peacekeepers. Can
the head of state be brought to court for such actions? I have to
remind that Azerbaijan has the similar demands to many persons at
Armenian power today.
First of all, I have to remind you that on 13 August 2008, right after
the five-day war against Russia, official Tbilisi appealed to the UN
International Court in Hague with a claim, accusing Russia of holding
the policy of ethnic cleansing from 1993 until 2008. It is odd that
the UN International Court in Hague has been silent for almost three
years about the Georgian claim and only on 1 April 2011 there came
a report from Hague on the rejection of the International Court to
consider Georgia's complaint about Russia. And Dmitriy Medvedev has
recently made a response step, saying the Georgian president must be
brought to the international court.
However, even the Russian president understands that the possibility
of holding Saakashvili accountable equals to zero since the United
States or EU will not allow this. In his interview with Russian mass
media, Medvedev acknowledged that his idea of the international court
over Saakashvili cannot be realized 'because of the special stance of
some states'. Thus, it can be said for sure that Saakashvili will not
be brought to court and Medvedev's statement on this issue pursues
the only goal to tell the world that Saakashvili is an international
criminal.
As for Azerbaijan's demand to hold the International Court over
the Armenian leaders for the massacres against Khojaly residents,
there are no doubts that Baku's voice will not be heard in the West,
since positions of the Armenian lobby are very strong there. Armenia
also sets a reciprocal demand to hold accountable the culprits of the
Armenian pogroms in Sumgayit and Baku committed in January 1990. It
is clear that the International Court in Hague has turned into a
propagandist tool, which depends strongly on Washington and EU states.
After Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
Armenia voiced expectations that Moscow recognize independence of
other separatist formations in the post-Soviet area, primarily Nagorno
Karabakh. It didn't happen though the Russian leadership states the
need for single approaches to settlement of such conflicts. What is
the feature of Moscow's attitude to Karabakh conflict?
Naturally, the recognition by Russia of independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia does not mean that Moscow is further going to encourage
separatist at its borders. In other words, Russia-at least the current
tandem-is not going to recognize independence of Trans-Dniestria and
Nagorno Karabakh. It would probably not take such an extreme step as
a recognition of two tiny breakaway states, if Mikhail Saakashvili
held a more flexible policy on the Kremlin and had it not been for
his open confrontation against Russia. At a moment, the patience of
the ruling tandem of Russia exhausted and the Kremlin decided to
punish the Georgian leader. Dmitriy Medvedev has recently told in
an interview with Echo Moskvy that three years ago Russia's plans
to invade Tbilisi were not ruled out. "Saakashvili must thank me for
not ordering to invade Tbilisi", the Russian president said.
But Nagorno Karabakh is a different matter. Russia will never recognize
independence of Nagorno Karabakh, since it will thus lose all leverages
of pressure on Azerbaijan. Therefore, the Kremlin will further strive
to keep the issue in the air, when Baku looks at Russia hopefully
and tries to end Armenia aggression with Russia's help.
However, if in the future Azerbaijan will ignore Moscow's opinion
on key regional issues (for example, if it joins NATO) and if Baku
and Moscow start the cold war, Russia may naturally recognize the
independence of Nagorno Karabakh.
The determination Medvedev shows in persuading Aliyev and Sargsyan to
sign a road map on Karabakh conflict settlement arises the idea that
Russia wants to return its military presence in Azerbaijan. As is
known, Russian troops left Azerbaijan in February 1993 at the demand
of the Popular front. Since that time, beside 1.5 Russian militaries
who guard the Gabala radar station, there is not a single Russian
military unit in Azerbaijan. And now Russian troops are going to come
back but this time as peacekeeping troops that will be placed in the
so-called buffer zone between Nagorno Karabakh and the rest part of
Azerbaijan after the planned withdrawal of Armenian troops from five
Azerbaijani regions.
You see, Russian peacekeepers will be placed not on the
Azerbaijani-Armenian border but in Azerbaijan. In my last interview
in spring 2011 I voiced a supposition that Russian peacekeepers will
unlikely appear in the region of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. I
said then that Azerbaijan is against military presence of Russian
peacekeepers since the memories about the actions of the 366th
motorized infantry division during the tragedy in Khojaly in February
1992 are still bleeding.
However, the process of current negotiations with Russia's
participation shows that Ilham Aliyev agrees to deployment of Russian
peacekeepers under certain terms. I think there is a definite risk
here. Don't forget that the presence of Russian peacekeepers in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia since 1992 could not avert the five-day war in
August 2008. And after 'forcing Georgia to peace' Russia decided to
deploy Russian military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. An air
base is being created in Gudauta to house 3,000 servicemen and launch
S-300 missile division, while Smerch systems with the range covering
Tbilisi are placed in South Ossetia.
Is it possible to predict actions of Russia in case Azerbaijan decides
to liberate its lands by military means?
In an Ekho Moskvi interview mentioned above, Medvedev said
unambiguously that the 2008 war in South Ossetia was a lesson for
Armenia and Azerbaijan. He said the leaders of the two republics have
realized that it is very dangerous to test the patience of Moscow.
You can read the following text between the lines in Medvedev's
statement: "If Azerbaijan tries recover its occupied territory through
war, Russia will not keep silent and intervene. Baku will be punished
for disobedience, and that's when the 2008 scenario could be repeated -
Russia will be forced to recognize independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In addition, Russia, fulfilling its commitments to Armenia within
the framework of the CSTO, will render military aid to Yerevan to
counter the offensive of Azerbaijani troops.
This horrifying scenario for Azerbaijan is not invention of political
experts, but realities of the modern balance of forces. Therefore,
some "hot heads" in Baku should not be naive to believe that if they
start offensive at the front, the Armenian troops will scatter.
Unfortunately, the issue is much more complicated. Armenia is
a military ally of Russia who knows very well that that Yerevan
has committed aggression against Azerbaijan. However, the Kremlin
pretends that both sides are guilty in equal measure. That is,
Moscow is not going to force Armenia to leave occupied territories,
and if Azerbaijani troops try to do it without permission from Russia,
Baku will be immediately punished.
In the current situation Azerbaijan is left only one option:
to accept Moscow's terms and secure withdrawal from at least
five occupied districts around Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for
reciprocal concessions. Apparently, Ilham Aliyev has chosen this path
of negotiations with Moscow. During the recent four-hour secret talks
in Sochi, Medvedev and Aliyev discussed not only Karabakh issue, but
also a wide range of complicated problems, including two key issues
and concession in favor of Moscow over these issues could open a way
for Azerbaijan to liberate occupied territories.
First and foremost, this is a construction of a pipeline through the
bottom of the Caspian Sea, which is a painful issue for Russia.
Moscow opposes construction of this pipeline from the Turkmen city
of Turkmenbashi (formerly Krasnovodsk) to Baku. If this pipeline
is built, then three gas-producing Central Asian countries -
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan - will join the already
existing Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. It would mean a severe
defeat of Russia on a global gas market and put an end to Russia's
monopoly as a leading supplier of natural gas to the EU market.
Naturally, Aliyev may abandon plans for construction of this pipeline,
and demand de-occupation of occupied territories in exchange for
this concession.
Secondly, there is another topic for political bargaining. This is
a lease of Gabala radar by Russia which will expire in December 2012.
Azerbaijan can be tough in this issue. This radar is vital for
Russia for warning of possible ballistic missile launches from Iran,
Pakistan and India. Given strategic importance of the station, Russia
will unlikely refuse to renew the lease. Therefore, Baku can easily
inflate the value from the current $14 million a year to 140 million.
And here one should follow example of Kazakhstan which raised a
lease of Baikonur spaceport for Russia up to $115 million a year. And
despite all the side costs, Russia annually allocates $315 million
for Baikonur. It's still a respectable sum even for a not very poor
country like Russia. Therefore, Azerbaijan should put the question
bluntly: either we raise the price for Russia's lease of the Gabala
radar 10 times, or Moscow helps us to solve the Karabakh issue and
the rent remains the same or even lower.
The Unites States has intensified efforts to resolve security problems
in the South Caucasus over the last three years. Is this because of
consequences of the Russo-Georgia war and Washington's recognition
of this region as a region of influence of Russia first of all?
The 2008 war in Georgia showed that Moscow and Washington, like in
years of Cold War, have divided the planet into spheres of influence.
Americans gained a carte blanche to "restore order" in Iraq and
Afghanistan, while Russia has complete freedom of action in the CIS.
And Georgia was taught "a demonstrative lesson" to intimidate zealous
leaders of other CIS countries. We all remember how the United States
and the European Union kept silent when Russian tanks were preparing
to move in the direction of Tbilisi in August 2008. And if Moscow
wanted to take Tbilisi, it would have done it. And the West would
have grumbled at first and then resigned itself to it.
So, two decades after collapse of USSR, Moscow still continues to
consider itself a super power and Russia allocates tens of billions
of dollars from the state budget for arms race with the United States.
The current US administration led by Barack Obama has refused the
policies of junior Bush who tried to openly compete with Russia in
the CIS.
The end of the Soviet empire and demise of communism generated an
illusion in the US and Europe that further democratization of Russia
on the Western model and Moscow's abandoning military rivalry with
the West will contribute to harmonic integration of Russia into Europe.
However, Russo-Georgia war clearly showed the West that these hopes
were ungrounded.
news.az
Aug 18, 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews Andrey Rayevskiy, editor-in-chief of Russian news
agency Mediafax.
Much is spoken in Russia about the need to hold Saakashvili accountable
for the murder of civilians in Tskhinvali and Russian peacekeepers. Can
the head of state be brought to court for such actions? I have to
remind that Azerbaijan has the similar demands to many persons at
Armenian power today.
First of all, I have to remind you that on 13 August 2008, right after
the five-day war against Russia, official Tbilisi appealed to the UN
International Court in Hague with a claim, accusing Russia of holding
the policy of ethnic cleansing from 1993 until 2008. It is odd that
the UN International Court in Hague has been silent for almost three
years about the Georgian claim and only on 1 April 2011 there came
a report from Hague on the rejection of the International Court to
consider Georgia's complaint about Russia. And Dmitriy Medvedev has
recently made a response step, saying the Georgian president must be
brought to the international court.
However, even the Russian president understands that the possibility
of holding Saakashvili accountable equals to zero since the United
States or EU will not allow this. In his interview with Russian mass
media, Medvedev acknowledged that his idea of the international court
over Saakashvili cannot be realized 'because of the special stance of
some states'. Thus, it can be said for sure that Saakashvili will not
be brought to court and Medvedev's statement on this issue pursues
the only goal to tell the world that Saakashvili is an international
criminal.
As for Azerbaijan's demand to hold the International Court over
the Armenian leaders for the massacres against Khojaly residents,
there are no doubts that Baku's voice will not be heard in the West,
since positions of the Armenian lobby are very strong there. Armenia
also sets a reciprocal demand to hold accountable the culprits of the
Armenian pogroms in Sumgayit and Baku committed in January 1990. It
is clear that the International Court in Hague has turned into a
propagandist tool, which depends strongly on Washington and EU states.
After Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
Armenia voiced expectations that Moscow recognize independence of
other separatist formations in the post-Soviet area, primarily Nagorno
Karabakh. It didn't happen though the Russian leadership states the
need for single approaches to settlement of such conflicts. What is
the feature of Moscow's attitude to Karabakh conflict?
Naturally, the recognition by Russia of independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia does not mean that Moscow is further going to encourage
separatist at its borders. In other words, Russia-at least the current
tandem-is not going to recognize independence of Trans-Dniestria and
Nagorno Karabakh. It would probably not take such an extreme step as
a recognition of two tiny breakaway states, if Mikhail Saakashvili
held a more flexible policy on the Kremlin and had it not been for
his open confrontation against Russia. At a moment, the patience of
the ruling tandem of Russia exhausted and the Kremlin decided to
punish the Georgian leader. Dmitriy Medvedev has recently told in
an interview with Echo Moskvy that three years ago Russia's plans
to invade Tbilisi were not ruled out. "Saakashvili must thank me for
not ordering to invade Tbilisi", the Russian president said.
But Nagorno Karabakh is a different matter. Russia will never recognize
independence of Nagorno Karabakh, since it will thus lose all leverages
of pressure on Azerbaijan. Therefore, the Kremlin will further strive
to keep the issue in the air, when Baku looks at Russia hopefully
and tries to end Armenia aggression with Russia's help.
However, if in the future Azerbaijan will ignore Moscow's opinion
on key regional issues (for example, if it joins NATO) and if Baku
and Moscow start the cold war, Russia may naturally recognize the
independence of Nagorno Karabakh.
The determination Medvedev shows in persuading Aliyev and Sargsyan to
sign a road map on Karabakh conflict settlement arises the idea that
Russia wants to return its military presence in Azerbaijan. As is
known, Russian troops left Azerbaijan in February 1993 at the demand
of the Popular front. Since that time, beside 1.5 Russian militaries
who guard the Gabala radar station, there is not a single Russian
military unit in Azerbaijan. And now Russian troops are going to come
back but this time as peacekeeping troops that will be placed in the
so-called buffer zone between Nagorno Karabakh and the rest part of
Azerbaijan after the planned withdrawal of Armenian troops from five
Azerbaijani regions.
You see, Russian peacekeepers will be placed not on the
Azerbaijani-Armenian border but in Azerbaijan. In my last interview
in spring 2011 I voiced a supposition that Russian peacekeepers will
unlikely appear in the region of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. I
said then that Azerbaijan is against military presence of Russian
peacekeepers since the memories about the actions of the 366th
motorized infantry division during the tragedy in Khojaly in February
1992 are still bleeding.
However, the process of current negotiations with Russia's
participation shows that Ilham Aliyev agrees to deployment of Russian
peacekeepers under certain terms. I think there is a definite risk
here. Don't forget that the presence of Russian peacekeepers in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia since 1992 could not avert the five-day war in
August 2008. And after 'forcing Georgia to peace' Russia decided to
deploy Russian military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. An air
base is being created in Gudauta to house 3,000 servicemen and launch
S-300 missile division, while Smerch systems with the range covering
Tbilisi are placed in South Ossetia.
Is it possible to predict actions of Russia in case Azerbaijan decides
to liberate its lands by military means?
In an Ekho Moskvi interview mentioned above, Medvedev said
unambiguously that the 2008 war in South Ossetia was a lesson for
Armenia and Azerbaijan. He said the leaders of the two republics have
realized that it is very dangerous to test the patience of Moscow.
You can read the following text between the lines in Medvedev's
statement: "If Azerbaijan tries recover its occupied territory through
war, Russia will not keep silent and intervene. Baku will be punished
for disobedience, and that's when the 2008 scenario could be repeated -
Russia will be forced to recognize independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In addition, Russia, fulfilling its commitments to Armenia within
the framework of the CSTO, will render military aid to Yerevan to
counter the offensive of Azerbaijani troops.
This horrifying scenario for Azerbaijan is not invention of political
experts, but realities of the modern balance of forces. Therefore,
some "hot heads" in Baku should not be naive to believe that if they
start offensive at the front, the Armenian troops will scatter.
Unfortunately, the issue is much more complicated. Armenia is
a military ally of Russia who knows very well that that Yerevan
has committed aggression against Azerbaijan. However, the Kremlin
pretends that both sides are guilty in equal measure. That is,
Moscow is not going to force Armenia to leave occupied territories,
and if Azerbaijani troops try to do it without permission from Russia,
Baku will be immediately punished.
In the current situation Azerbaijan is left only one option:
to accept Moscow's terms and secure withdrawal from at least
five occupied districts around Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for
reciprocal concessions. Apparently, Ilham Aliyev has chosen this path
of negotiations with Moscow. During the recent four-hour secret talks
in Sochi, Medvedev and Aliyev discussed not only Karabakh issue, but
also a wide range of complicated problems, including two key issues
and concession in favor of Moscow over these issues could open a way
for Azerbaijan to liberate occupied territories.
First and foremost, this is a construction of a pipeline through the
bottom of the Caspian Sea, which is a painful issue for Russia.
Moscow opposes construction of this pipeline from the Turkmen city
of Turkmenbashi (formerly Krasnovodsk) to Baku. If this pipeline
is built, then three gas-producing Central Asian countries -
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan - will join the already
existing Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. It would mean a severe
defeat of Russia on a global gas market and put an end to Russia's
monopoly as a leading supplier of natural gas to the EU market.
Naturally, Aliyev may abandon plans for construction of this pipeline,
and demand de-occupation of occupied territories in exchange for
this concession.
Secondly, there is another topic for political bargaining. This is
a lease of Gabala radar by Russia which will expire in December 2012.
Azerbaijan can be tough in this issue. This radar is vital for
Russia for warning of possible ballistic missile launches from Iran,
Pakistan and India. Given strategic importance of the station, Russia
will unlikely refuse to renew the lease. Therefore, Baku can easily
inflate the value from the current $14 million a year to 140 million.
And here one should follow example of Kazakhstan which raised a
lease of Baikonur spaceport for Russia up to $115 million a year. And
despite all the side costs, Russia annually allocates $315 million
for Baikonur. It's still a respectable sum even for a not very poor
country like Russia. Therefore, Azerbaijan should put the question
bluntly: either we raise the price for Russia's lease of the Gabala
radar 10 times, or Moscow helps us to solve the Karabakh issue and
the rent remains the same or even lower.
The Unites States has intensified efforts to resolve security problems
in the South Caucasus over the last three years. Is this because of
consequences of the Russo-Georgia war and Washington's recognition
of this region as a region of influence of Russia first of all?
The 2008 war in Georgia showed that Moscow and Washington, like in
years of Cold War, have divided the planet into spheres of influence.
Americans gained a carte blanche to "restore order" in Iraq and
Afghanistan, while Russia has complete freedom of action in the CIS.
And Georgia was taught "a demonstrative lesson" to intimidate zealous
leaders of other CIS countries. We all remember how the United States
and the European Union kept silent when Russian tanks were preparing
to move in the direction of Tbilisi in August 2008. And if Moscow
wanted to take Tbilisi, it would have done it. And the West would
have grumbled at first and then resigned itself to it.
So, two decades after collapse of USSR, Moscow still continues to
consider itself a super power and Russia allocates tens of billions
of dollars from the state budget for arms race with the United States.
The current US administration led by Barack Obama has refused the
policies of junior Bush who tried to openly compete with Russia in
the CIS.
The end of the Soviet empire and demise of communism generated an
illusion in the US and Europe that further democratization of Russia
on the Western model and Moscow's abandoning military rivalry with
the West will contribute to harmonic integration of Russia into Europe.
However, Russo-Georgia war clearly showed the West that these hopes
were ungrounded.