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Assyrian International News Agency
Aug 26 2011
Religious Freedom for Turkey?
The recent resignation of Turkey's military high command, along with
reports that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will subordinate the
military to civilian rule, could mark a new era for that nation.
Sweeping constitutional changes, however, are still needed to ensure
fundamental rights and avoid exchanging one form of repression for
another. The United States should challenge Turkey's civilian
leadership to make such long-overdue changes, especially regarding
religious freedom, including for religious minorities.
While Turkey has long been a formal democracy, it has been a decidedly
imperfect one. Since Kemal Ataturk founded the Republic of Turkey in
1923, his rigid state secularism has stifled religious freedom.
Restrictions have hindered the majority Sunni Muslim community and
have discriminated against and threatened religious minority
communities, including Greek, Armenian, and Syriac Orthodox Churches;
Catholic and Protestant Churches; the Jewish community; and the
Alevis.
Constitutionally, the military was the protector of the secular state
apparatus that engaged in or tolerated religious freedom violations.
Indeed, the context for the recent military resignations was Erdogan's
refusal to promote officers who allegedly plotted within Ergenekon, a
clandestine ultranationalist group, to topple his Islamic-oriented
government and commit violence against numerous faith communities and
their houses of worship.
As the inheritor of this legacy, Erdogan and his AK Party have faced
an uphill battle to deepen Turkey's democratic institutions and
culture. Their moves to bolster civilian rule have positive
implications for respecting international human rights norms,
including religious freedom.
Indeed, the AKP government has widened the opening for public
religious expression, which has helped Turkey's Sunni Muslim majority.
Since 2007, imams have had some autonomy in drafting their sermons.
While the ban on religious dress in state institutions continues, last
month, the Council of State overturned Turkey's high court ruling
which had barred the wearing of headscarves during the Selection
Examination for Academic Personnel and Graduate Studies. Enrollment in
Imam-Hatip religious schools has expanded notably. Without a doubt,
Sunni Islam flourishes.
When it comes to religious minorities, however, Turkey's record
remains disappointing.
To be sure, the AKP government has ushered in some improvements,
including the addition of worship services allowed for a particular
church, citizenship for the leaders of another, accurate national
identity cards for converts, and continued engagement with Alevis.
Yet, Turkey's widely publicized constitutional reform process
currently omits any attention to religious freedom, thereby suggesting
no systematic relief for Turkey's smallest minorities, such as
Christians and Jews.
Turkey's Christian minority has dwindled to just 0.15 percent of the
country. In the words of one church leader, it is an "endangered
species." In past centuries, violence exacted a horrific toll on
Turkey's Christians and their churches. This provides a frightening
context and familiar continuity to a number of recent high-profile
murders by ultranationalists.
Turkey's Jewish community also fears a reprise of past violence, such
as the 2003 al Qaeda-linked Istanbul synagogue bombings. Societal
anti-Semitism has been fueled in recent years by Erdogan's rhetoric
against Israel's activity in the Middle East and by negative
portrayals in Turkey's state-run media.
Today, however, it is the state's dense web of regulations that most
threatens Turkey's religious minorities.
Religious communities are being strangled by legal restrictions on
internal governance, education, houses of worship and wider property
rights. It is difficult even to have a frank national discussion about
their plight; those who have tried can face constitutional charges for
insulting "Turkishness", as well as a broader climate of impunity.
One example of the oppressive regulatory climate is the meddling in
internal governance, as seen in the interference in the election
procedure for the acting Armenian Patriarch, as well as in the refusal
to recognize the title of "ecumenical" of the Greek Orthodox Church's
Ecumenical Patriarch and the inherited titles of Alevi leaders.
Another is the government's refusal to allow non-Muslim clergy to be
trained in Turkey. The military's shuttering in 1971 of the Greek
Orthodox Theological School of Halki, once the educational center for
global Orthodox Christianity, is a case in point. Successive
governments' policies have put at risk the very survival of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate and its Greek Orthodox flock.
A third example is the expropriation of land from the 1,600-year-old
Mor Gabriel Monastery, the world's oldest Syriac Orthodox monastery.
Last January, Turkey's Supreme Court granted its treasury parts of the
monastery's territory. Besides impacting the church, such arbitrary
state expropriations encourage acts of impunity against all religious
minorities.
Finally, there is the status of the Alevis, the nation's largest
religious minority. Turkey refuses legal recognition of Alevi meeting
places (cemevi) as houses of worship, and has denied them construction
permits.
These examples underscore how Turkey's religious minorities still lack
full legal status and are deprived of full rights as citizens. To help
remedy this injustice, the United States should urge Erdogan to
fulfill his pledge to amend the military-drafted constitution of 1982
by making changes in line with religious freedom and the other human
rights guarantees found in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which Turkey ratified.
By strengthening civilian control, Turkey has an opportunity to chart
a clearer course toward greater freedom for all its citizens. It's
time for the country's leaders to embrace constitutional reform, end
impunity, protect religious diversity, and advance religious freedom
for every citizen.
By Elizabeth H. Prodromou and Nina Shea
www.thehill.com
Elizabeth H. Prodromou serves as Vice Chair of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). Nina Shea serves as a USCIRF
Commissioner. Both authors traveled to Turkey in February 2011 as part
of a USCIRF delegation.
http://www.aina.org/news/20110826180222.htm
Aug 26 2011
Religious Freedom for Turkey?
The recent resignation of Turkey's military high command, along with
reports that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will subordinate the
military to civilian rule, could mark a new era for that nation.
Sweeping constitutional changes, however, are still needed to ensure
fundamental rights and avoid exchanging one form of repression for
another. The United States should challenge Turkey's civilian
leadership to make such long-overdue changes, especially regarding
religious freedom, including for religious minorities.
While Turkey has long been a formal democracy, it has been a decidedly
imperfect one. Since Kemal Ataturk founded the Republic of Turkey in
1923, his rigid state secularism has stifled religious freedom.
Restrictions have hindered the majority Sunni Muslim community and
have discriminated against and threatened religious minority
communities, including Greek, Armenian, and Syriac Orthodox Churches;
Catholic and Protestant Churches; the Jewish community; and the
Alevis.
Constitutionally, the military was the protector of the secular state
apparatus that engaged in or tolerated religious freedom violations.
Indeed, the context for the recent military resignations was Erdogan's
refusal to promote officers who allegedly plotted within Ergenekon, a
clandestine ultranationalist group, to topple his Islamic-oriented
government and commit violence against numerous faith communities and
their houses of worship.
As the inheritor of this legacy, Erdogan and his AK Party have faced
an uphill battle to deepen Turkey's democratic institutions and
culture. Their moves to bolster civilian rule have positive
implications for respecting international human rights norms,
including religious freedom.
Indeed, the AKP government has widened the opening for public
religious expression, which has helped Turkey's Sunni Muslim majority.
Since 2007, imams have had some autonomy in drafting their sermons.
While the ban on religious dress in state institutions continues, last
month, the Council of State overturned Turkey's high court ruling
which had barred the wearing of headscarves during the Selection
Examination for Academic Personnel and Graduate Studies. Enrollment in
Imam-Hatip religious schools has expanded notably. Without a doubt,
Sunni Islam flourishes.
When it comes to religious minorities, however, Turkey's record
remains disappointing.
To be sure, the AKP government has ushered in some improvements,
including the addition of worship services allowed for a particular
church, citizenship for the leaders of another, accurate national
identity cards for converts, and continued engagement with Alevis.
Yet, Turkey's widely publicized constitutional reform process
currently omits any attention to religious freedom, thereby suggesting
no systematic relief for Turkey's smallest minorities, such as
Christians and Jews.
Turkey's Christian minority has dwindled to just 0.15 percent of the
country. In the words of one church leader, it is an "endangered
species." In past centuries, violence exacted a horrific toll on
Turkey's Christians and their churches. This provides a frightening
context and familiar continuity to a number of recent high-profile
murders by ultranationalists.
Turkey's Jewish community also fears a reprise of past violence, such
as the 2003 al Qaeda-linked Istanbul synagogue bombings. Societal
anti-Semitism has been fueled in recent years by Erdogan's rhetoric
against Israel's activity in the Middle East and by negative
portrayals in Turkey's state-run media.
Today, however, it is the state's dense web of regulations that most
threatens Turkey's religious minorities.
Religious communities are being strangled by legal restrictions on
internal governance, education, houses of worship and wider property
rights. It is difficult even to have a frank national discussion about
their plight; those who have tried can face constitutional charges for
insulting "Turkishness", as well as a broader climate of impunity.
One example of the oppressive regulatory climate is the meddling in
internal governance, as seen in the interference in the election
procedure for the acting Armenian Patriarch, as well as in the refusal
to recognize the title of "ecumenical" of the Greek Orthodox Church's
Ecumenical Patriarch and the inherited titles of Alevi leaders.
Another is the government's refusal to allow non-Muslim clergy to be
trained in Turkey. The military's shuttering in 1971 of the Greek
Orthodox Theological School of Halki, once the educational center for
global Orthodox Christianity, is a case in point. Successive
governments' policies have put at risk the very survival of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate and its Greek Orthodox flock.
A third example is the expropriation of land from the 1,600-year-old
Mor Gabriel Monastery, the world's oldest Syriac Orthodox monastery.
Last January, Turkey's Supreme Court granted its treasury parts of the
monastery's territory. Besides impacting the church, such arbitrary
state expropriations encourage acts of impunity against all religious
minorities.
Finally, there is the status of the Alevis, the nation's largest
religious minority. Turkey refuses legal recognition of Alevi meeting
places (cemevi) as houses of worship, and has denied them construction
permits.
These examples underscore how Turkey's religious minorities still lack
full legal status and are deprived of full rights as citizens. To help
remedy this injustice, the United States should urge Erdogan to
fulfill his pledge to amend the military-drafted constitution of 1982
by making changes in line with religious freedom and the other human
rights guarantees found in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which Turkey ratified.
By strengthening civilian control, Turkey has an opportunity to chart
a clearer course toward greater freedom for all its citizens. It's
time for the country's leaders to embrace constitutional reform, end
impunity, protect religious diversity, and advance religious freedom
for every citizen.
By Elizabeth H. Prodromou and Nina Shea
www.thehill.com
Elizabeth H. Prodromou serves as Vice Chair of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). Nina Shea serves as a USCIRF
Commissioner. Both authors traveled to Turkey in February 2011 as part
of a USCIRF delegation.
http://www.aina.org/news/20110826180222.htm