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news.az, Azerbaijan
Aug 26 2011
Russia suffers from 'siege mentality'
Fri 26 August 2011 14:00 GMT | 10:00 Local Time
News.Az interviews Narcis Balasoiu of the Conflict Prevention Centre
in Bucharest.
May we expect the West to be more active in the post-Soviet area,
despite the enormous Russian influence in this region?
First of all, I think the supposedly enormous Russian influence in the
post-Soviet area is debatable today. In the Soviet era this was indeed
an axiomatic reality. Facing its own internal difficulties, and unable
to exert the same influence, Moscow, I would rather say, is mostly
focused on keeping the West out of its `back yard'. The fall of the
Iron Curtain in the early 90s brought to life a new geopolitical
paradigm, so-called unipolarism with the United States in the leading
role. Democracy prevailed but the fall of the Soviet Union also led to
a security vacuum in the region.
The lack of power created a security vacuum and no one was able to
fill it properly. Even though it may sound cynical, there are cases in
which the Western democratic model is not fully applicable. There are
historical, cultural differences that cannot be overcome, so all we
could obtain would be forms without substance. Except for the Baltic
States, looking at the post-Soviet area today we can see a bleak
picture in which the West is hardly noticeable. On the other hand, it
would be inaccurate to put under the microscope the West's relations
with the post-Soviet area as a monolithic bloc. As you know, we deal
with interest-driven relations. In this context Europe cannot ignore
the proximity of states like the Republic of Moldova, Georgia or
Ukraine. From this perspective, Azerbaijan is seen as a strategic
foothold in the region, a bridgehead, not to mention its huge reserves
of hydrocarbons.
The energy sector may bring relations to an unprecedented level, so we
should keep an eye on projects like Nabucco. If there is interest, and
there definitely is, we may expect the West to play its cards.
However, the process is complicated and little can happen overnight.
What are the main differences in the Russian and Western approaches to
the newly independent republics in the post-Soviet area?
Historically speaking, Russia had two major problems - first, it has
always experienced a deep cleavage between social and politic, between
society and power. Secondly, Moscow is haunted by a "siege mentality".
It actually has a pathological incapacity to deal with its neighbours
as partners - it also honours the concept that its security is
stronger if its neighbours are weak and insecure. Like any other
fallen empire, Russia is experiencing some anxiety about these
countries, with all their thirst for independence. As for the
approach, we are referring basically to the influence that Russia is
trying to impose and the West is trying to win. Moscow will not
hesitate to wield its influence in order to put the `right' leadership
in place in these republics. It doesn't mean that the West has no
interests, or that it is not going to use its levers of power, but it
all happens in consonance with democratic values. Even as we speak a
relevant example is developing - Syria. The number of victims exceeds
2,000 people, but Russia is still blocking a UN resolution,
considering that President Bashar al-Assad can implement the necessary
reforms. This shows us that the Kremlin is more concerned with
preserving its own interests in the region, than with the people that
are being slaughtered.
It is true that President Dmitriy Medvedev engaged Russia in a
transformative and modernizing process, but there's so much to be done
and so little time until the spring 2012 elections. This is a big test
for Russia which might also end with Putin's return to the Kremlin -
but let's stay optimistic...
How realistic is NATO membership for any of the post-Soviet republics?
Any assessment pf NATO's enlargement policy should take into account
the programme documents, published last year during the Lisbon summit.
In this respect the New Strategic Concept reveals a change in the
alliance perspective towards enlargement, precisely a shift from
membership to an enhanced form of partnership. Closest to the
membership goal have been Georgia and Ukraine, but we all know how
badly it ended for both. The war in Georgia froze any Western
aspirations for Tbilisi, at least in the short term, while for
Ukraine, the seizure of power by President Yanukovych meant giving-up
pro-Western ambitions (the `non-bloc' policy, for example).
Obviously Russia has the leading role in obstructing these states on
their road to the West, and to be honest Moscow has done a pretty good
job until now, unfortunately at the expense of these nations. My
opinion is that in the short term membership is out of the question,
but different forms of partnership will be encouraged, and Azerbaijan
will benefit from this approach, considering the strategic interests
both sides have.
Anyway is NATO membership a guarantee to prevent the `Georgian
scenario' in August 2008 for the post-Soviet republic?
Yes, NATO could be a guarantee, strong enough to prevent an outcome
like the one in Gerogia in 2008. But the question is - will NATO take
under its umbrella countries with such unresolved security issues?
My answer is - never. It may sound cynical but the reality is that
NATO also works like a bank that will provide you with security if you
demonstrate that you don't really need it. In order to have access to
the exclusive club that is NATO, countries should resolve all their
important security issues, not to mention that each accession is
expected to strengthen the alliance. Georgia is undoubtedly a relevant
case study, revealing a simple but brutal strategy through which a
nation was blocked on its way to NATO.
Do the approaches of Russia and the West to the Karabakh conflict differ?
The Transcaucasus abounds in unresolved conflicts, but the Karabakh
dispute is the most complex and dramatic inter and intra-national
conflict in the region, with deep historical roots. For the Soviet
Union, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was at the time an excellent
pretext to legitimize the need for a powerful superstructure, but the
empire collapsed anyway. Not only in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
but in the Caucasus region as a whole, Russia plays a major role as an
internal actor but also an external one. It is widely known that
Moscow strongly supported the Armenian military, an aspect that
influenced decisively the outcome of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war,
leading to the cease-fire agreement under Russia's umbrella in May
1994. The Russian Federation is also very interested in Caspian Sea
resources, so placing its approach towards the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict outside this context would be inaccurate.
As for the United States and European Union, they are relatively new
actors in the Caucasus region, with some new priorities in the area,
after the September 2001 terrorist attacks. The West is mainly
interested in achieving certain levels of political stability,
resistance to religious extremism, but equally important is the bundle
of pipelines aiming to bring Caspian resources to European markets,
bypassing Iran and the Russian Federation. Considering their major
interests in the region, the US and Europe make great efforts as
conflict mediators, but little can be achieved without true
willingness on the part of the protagonists. It is a game of
compromise.
The Romanian president recently suggested the `territorial integrity
principle' as the proper solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a
position that was loudly criticized by the Armenian authorities which
accused Romania of unilateralism. Despite international efforts, my
strong belief is that a coherent and lasting solution can only come
from within.
F.H.
News.Az
From: A. Papazian
Aug 26 2011
Russia suffers from 'siege mentality'
Fri 26 August 2011 14:00 GMT | 10:00 Local Time
News.Az interviews Narcis Balasoiu of the Conflict Prevention Centre
in Bucharest.
May we expect the West to be more active in the post-Soviet area,
despite the enormous Russian influence in this region?
First of all, I think the supposedly enormous Russian influence in the
post-Soviet area is debatable today. In the Soviet era this was indeed
an axiomatic reality. Facing its own internal difficulties, and unable
to exert the same influence, Moscow, I would rather say, is mostly
focused on keeping the West out of its `back yard'. The fall of the
Iron Curtain in the early 90s brought to life a new geopolitical
paradigm, so-called unipolarism with the United States in the leading
role. Democracy prevailed but the fall of the Soviet Union also led to
a security vacuum in the region.
The lack of power created a security vacuum and no one was able to
fill it properly. Even though it may sound cynical, there are cases in
which the Western democratic model is not fully applicable. There are
historical, cultural differences that cannot be overcome, so all we
could obtain would be forms without substance. Except for the Baltic
States, looking at the post-Soviet area today we can see a bleak
picture in which the West is hardly noticeable. On the other hand, it
would be inaccurate to put under the microscope the West's relations
with the post-Soviet area as a monolithic bloc. As you know, we deal
with interest-driven relations. In this context Europe cannot ignore
the proximity of states like the Republic of Moldova, Georgia or
Ukraine. From this perspective, Azerbaijan is seen as a strategic
foothold in the region, a bridgehead, not to mention its huge reserves
of hydrocarbons.
The energy sector may bring relations to an unprecedented level, so we
should keep an eye on projects like Nabucco. If there is interest, and
there definitely is, we may expect the West to play its cards.
However, the process is complicated and little can happen overnight.
What are the main differences in the Russian and Western approaches to
the newly independent republics in the post-Soviet area?
Historically speaking, Russia had two major problems - first, it has
always experienced a deep cleavage between social and politic, between
society and power. Secondly, Moscow is haunted by a "siege mentality".
It actually has a pathological incapacity to deal with its neighbours
as partners - it also honours the concept that its security is
stronger if its neighbours are weak and insecure. Like any other
fallen empire, Russia is experiencing some anxiety about these
countries, with all their thirst for independence. As for the
approach, we are referring basically to the influence that Russia is
trying to impose and the West is trying to win. Moscow will not
hesitate to wield its influence in order to put the `right' leadership
in place in these republics. It doesn't mean that the West has no
interests, or that it is not going to use its levers of power, but it
all happens in consonance with democratic values. Even as we speak a
relevant example is developing - Syria. The number of victims exceeds
2,000 people, but Russia is still blocking a UN resolution,
considering that President Bashar al-Assad can implement the necessary
reforms. This shows us that the Kremlin is more concerned with
preserving its own interests in the region, than with the people that
are being slaughtered.
It is true that President Dmitriy Medvedev engaged Russia in a
transformative and modernizing process, but there's so much to be done
and so little time until the spring 2012 elections. This is a big test
for Russia which might also end with Putin's return to the Kremlin -
but let's stay optimistic...
How realistic is NATO membership for any of the post-Soviet republics?
Any assessment pf NATO's enlargement policy should take into account
the programme documents, published last year during the Lisbon summit.
In this respect the New Strategic Concept reveals a change in the
alliance perspective towards enlargement, precisely a shift from
membership to an enhanced form of partnership. Closest to the
membership goal have been Georgia and Ukraine, but we all know how
badly it ended for both. The war in Georgia froze any Western
aspirations for Tbilisi, at least in the short term, while for
Ukraine, the seizure of power by President Yanukovych meant giving-up
pro-Western ambitions (the `non-bloc' policy, for example).
Obviously Russia has the leading role in obstructing these states on
their road to the West, and to be honest Moscow has done a pretty good
job until now, unfortunately at the expense of these nations. My
opinion is that in the short term membership is out of the question,
but different forms of partnership will be encouraged, and Azerbaijan
will benefit from this approach, considering the strategic interests
both sides have.
Anyway is NATO membership a guarantee to prevent the `Georgian
scenario' in August 2008 for the post-Soviet republic?
Yes, NATO could be a guarantee, strong enough to prevent an outcome
like the one in Gerogia in 2008. But the question is - will NATO take
under its umbrella countries with such unresolved security issues?
My answer is - never. It may sound cynical but the reality is that
NATO also works like a bank that will provide you with security if you
demonstrate that you don't really need it. In order to have access to
the exclusive club that is NATO, countries should resolve all their
important security issues, not to mention that each accession is
expected to strengthen the alliance. Georgia is undoubtedly a relevant
case study, revealing a simple but brutal strategy through which a
nation was blocked on its way to NATO.
Do the approaches of Russia and the West to the Karabakh conflict differ?
The Transcaucasus abounds in unresolved conflicts, but the Karabakh
dispute is the most complex and dramatic inter and intra-national
conflict in the region, with deep historical roots. For the Soviet
Union, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was at the time an excellent
pretext to legitimize the need for a powerful superstructure, but the
empire collapsed anyway. Not only in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
but in the Caucasus region as a whole, Russia plays a major role as an
internal actor but also an external one. It is widely known that
Moscow strongly supported the Armenian military, an aspect that
influenced decisively the outcome of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war,
leading to the cease-fire agreement under Russia's umbrella in May
1994. The Russian Federation is also very interested in Caspian Sea
resources, so placing its approach towards the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict outside this context would be inaccurate.
As for the United States and European Union, they are relatively new
actors in the Caucasus region, with some new priorities in the area,
after the September 2001 terrorist attacks. The West is mainly
interested in achieving certain levels of political stability,
resistance to religious extremism, but equally important is the bundle
of pipelines aiming to bring Caspian resources to European markets,
bypassing Iran and the Russian Federation. Considering their major
interests in the region, the US and Europe make great efforts as
conflict mediators, but little can be achieved without true
willingness on the part of the protagonists. It is a game of
compromise.
The Romanian president recently suggested the `territorial integrity
principle' as the proper solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a
position that was loudly criticized by the Armenian authorities which
accused Romania of unilateralism. Despite international efforts, my
strong belief is that a coherent and lasting solution can only come
from within.
F.H.
News.Az
From: A. Papazian