Tweet
INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AROUND NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
by ZAUR SHIRIYEV
Today's Zaman
Dec 9 2011
Turkey
International media have a long history of presenting political events
in terms of their religious context.
Reports on the recent Egyptian elections, for example, cast the
election results as an "Islamist win"; political commentary was shaped
by the parties' religious backgrounds. Similar tendencies were seen in
the Caucasus during the 1990s, where ethnic conflicts were portrayed
as religious divisions.
Recently, a meeting of the presidium of the Inter-Religious Council
of the Commonwealth Independent States was held in Yerevan, Armenia,
on Nov. 29-30. Catholicos Garegin II (head of the Armenian Apostolic
Church), Sheikh ul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazade (grand mufti of the
Caucasus) and Russian Patriarch Kirill II all attended the presidium
meeting in Yerevan, and held a trilateral meeting.
Some international observers were surprised that Pashazade visited
Yerevan, especially given that there were debates in both Azerbaijan
and Armenia about what the meeting would offer on the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. After the meeting, Garegin II sent a letter
to Pashazade in which he emphasized the importance of discussions
between regional religious leaders with regard to resolving key
regional issues, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Pashazade
proposed during the meeting that the spiritual leaders should also
meet at the front line between the Azerbaijan and Armenian armies,
a proposal that was accepted by the Armenian church.
Over the past year and a half, there appears to have been renewed
interest in engaging Armenia and Azerbaijan's religious leaders in the
peace process, even if only on a symbolic level. On April 26, 2010,
Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II attended a meeting of world
religious leaders in Azerbaijan upon the invitation of Azerbaijani
Shiite leader Sheikh al-Islam Pashazade. During his visit, Catholicos
Garegin II met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and went to
pray in an abandoned Armenian church in Baku. Garegin II's visit to
the Armenian Church of St. Gregory the Illuminator in central Baku also
raised an important direction of potential collaboration and mutually
beneficial confidence-building measures: the joint preservation of
cultural monuments and heritage.
During my recent conversation with Onnik Krikorian, an Armenian
journalist, he suggested that this inter-religious dialogue has the
potential to ease bilateral relations, especially if it receives
greater publicity. "Pashazade's visit to Yerevan is of course
important and will hopefully result in more high-level exchanges, or
even discussion between civil society activists and journalists. But
few people in Armenia seemed to know about the visit, and even then,
the wife of a major opposition figure I spoke with who did [know],
didn't know that the Catholicos had visited Baku and conducted a
service in the Armenian church in April of last year. Nonetheless,
the two visits at least serve to underscore that the Karabakh conflict
is not a religious dispute."
The Caucasus region is extremely diverse in terms of both religion and
ethnicity, a true mosaic of cultures. Perceptions of this diversity
have suffered as a consequence of misleading and reductive commentary
in the Western media. During the 1990s, Western reporters often framed
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as "the conflict between Christian
Armenians and Muslim Azerbaijanis." As a result, theorists such as
Samuel Huntington have happily used the Caucasus, and especially
Nagorno-Karabakh, to demonstrate the concept of "fault lines" between
"civilizations," where the risk of violent clashes is greater. There
is a tendency to assume that when there are religious differences,
these differences must be at the heart of the conflict, but such
an explanation is often incomplete. In the case of the Karabakh
conflict, it is misplaced and misleading. While it is the case that the
Catholicos of all Armenians, Vazgen I, wrote to Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev in February 1988, asking him to accept the demands of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, and even went on Armenian television
to speak about his request, it is also true that spiritual leaders
were never at the forefront of the respective movements and their
behavior was driven more by desire for peace. In 1994, Vazgen I,
Pashazade and the Russian Orthodox Church jointly encouraged the
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders to work together for peace.
It is interesting, then, that following the signing of a cease-fire
agreement in 1994, religious discourse has not played a bigger role
in conflict resolution. During the war, Armenia destroyed many of
Azerbaijan's unique cultural, historical and religious sites. The
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) -- now known as the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation -- has on several occasions raised
the importance of the Azerbaijani history, culture, archaeology and
ethnography that is located in the territories occupied by Armenia,
naming these sites and artifacts an integral part of Islamic heritage,
and noting the damage wrought upon the Islamic heritage in the occupied
territories. Azerbaijan is currently supporting inter-religious and
inter-cultural dialogue and cooperation between various nations,
the World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue, for example, as well as
the restoration of the Udi Church, with the aim of preserving the
rich cultural heritage of the South Caucasus.
Given the emotional intensity of this deeply entrenched conflict,
there will be many who urge caution in heralding these meetings as
signs of a new, more positive phase in the negotiating process. These
types of interactions are valuable for Track 2 diplomacy (non-state
actors), though ultimately they are subordinate to Track 1 (state
actors). Azerbaijani society in general recognizes the importance of
Track 2 diplomacy, but there are more than 1 million displaced persons
from the occupied territories who need to see political developments.
Rather than seeing greater civil society interaction as a potential
catalyst for confidence building, given the massive highs and
lows of expectation and disappointment brought by the Minsk Group
negotiations, Armenia seems to be taking a hard line, ignoring civil
society initiatives.
Officials from the Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-Karabakh region
recently tried to meet with Karabakh Armenians, but the meeting was
never held. At the same time, deaths at the front line have risen. For
both sides, increased contact at community levels will create a pool
of experience informing each side's choices in the peace process,
and can contribute to Track 1 diplomacy. First, Armenia must recognize
that Nagorno-Karabakh has two communities, Azerbaijanis and Armenians.
Second, pursuing Track 2 diplomacy could increase confidence building
measures, and demonstrate that political will can be supported by
other conflict resolution methods. Finally, the Armenian government
must understand that the prolongation of the status quo will help
no one -- on the contrary, it will amplify the mistrust between the
parties to the conflict.
by ZAUR SHIRIYEV
Today's Zaman
Dec 9 2011
Turkey
International media have a long history of presenting political events
in terms of their religious context.
Reports on the recent Egyptian elections, for example, cast the
election results as an "Islamist win"; political commentary was shaped
by the parties' religious backgrounds. Similar tendencies were seen in
the Caucasus during the 1990s, where ethnic conflicts were portrayed
as religious divisions.
Recently, a meeting of the presidium of the Inter-Religious Council
of the Commonwealth Independent States was held in Yerevan, Armenia,
on Nov. 29-30. Catholicos Garegin II (head of the Armenian Apostolic
Church), Sheikh ul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazade (grand mufti of the
Caucasus) and Russian Patriarch Kirill II all attended the presidium
meeting in Yerevan, and held a trilateral meeting.
Some international observers were surprised that Pashazade visited
Yerevan, especially given that there were debates in both Azerbaijan
and Armenia about what the meeting would offer on the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. After the meeting, Garegin II sent a letter
to Pashazade in which he emphasized the importance of discussions
between regional religious leaders with regard to resolving key
regional issues, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Pashazade
proposed during the meeting that the spiritual leaders should also
meet at the front line between the Azerbaijan and Armenian armies,
a proposal that was accepted by the Armenian church.
Over the past year and a half, there appears to have been renewed
interest in engaging Armenia and Azerbaijan's religious leaders in the
peace process, even if only on a symbolic level. On April 26, 2010,
Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II attended a meeting of world
religious leaders in Azerbaijan upon the invitation of Azerbaijani
Shiite leader Sheikh al-Islam Pashazade. During his visit, Catholicos
Garegin II met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and went to
pray in an abandoned Armenian church in Baku. Garegin II's visit to
the Armenian Church of St. Gregory the Illuminator in central Baku also
raised an important direction of potential collaboration and mutually
beneficial confidence-building measures: the joint preservation of
cultural monuments and heritage.
During my recent conversation with Onnik Krikorian, an Armenian
journalist, he suggested that this inter-religious dialogue has the
potential to ease bilateral relations, especially if it receives
greater publicity. "Pashazade's visit to Yerevan is of course
important and will hopefully result in more high-level exchanges, or
even discussion between civil society activists and journalists. But
few people in Armenia seemed to know about the visit, and even then,
the wife of a major opposition figure I spoke with who did [know],
didn't know that the Catholicos had visited Baku and conducted a
service in the Armenian church in April of last year. Nonetheless,
the two visits at least serve to underscore that the Karabakh conflict
is not a religious dispute."
The Caucasus region is extremely diverse in terms of both religion and
ethnicity, a true mosaic of cultures. Perceptions of this diversity
have suffered as a consequence of misleading and reductive commentary
in the Western media. During the 1990s, Western reporters often framed
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as "the conflict between Christian
Armenians and Muslim Azerbaijanis." As a result, theorists such as
Samuel Huntington have happily used the Caucasus, and especially
Nagorno-Karabakh, to demonstrate the concept of "fault lines" between
"civilizations," where the risk of violent clashes is greater. There
is a tendency to assume that when there are religious differences,
these differences must be at the heart of the conflict, but such
an explanation is often incomplete. In the case of the Karabakh
conflict, it is misplaced and misleading. While it is the case that the
Catholicos of all Armenians, Vazgen I, wrote to Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev in February 1988, asking him to accept the demands of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, and even went on Armenian television
to speak about his request, it is also true that spiritual leaders
were never at the forefront of the respective movements and their
behavior was driven more by desire for peace. In 1994, Vazgen I,
Pashazade and the Russian Orthodox Church jointly encouraged the
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders to work together for peace.
It is interesting, then, that following the signing of a cease-fire
agreement in 1994, religious discourse has not played a bigger role
in conflict resolution. During the war, Armenia destroyed many of
Azerbaijan's unique cultural, historical and religious sites. The
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) -- now known as the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation -- has on several occasions raised
the importance of the Azerbaijani history, culture, archaeology and
ethnography that is located in the territories occupied by Armenia,
naming these sites and artifacts an integral part of Islamic heritage,
and noting the damage wrought upon the Islamic heritage in the occupied
territories. Azerbaijan is currently supporting inter-religious and
inter-cultural dialogue and cooperation between various nations,
the World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue, for example, as well as
the restoration of the Udi Church, with the aim of preserving the
rich cultural heritage of the South Caucasus.
Given the emotional intensity of this deeply entrenched conflict,
there will be many who urge caution in heralding these meetings as
signs of a new, more positive phase in the negotiating process. These
types of interactions are valuable for Track 2 diplomacy (non-state
actors), though ultimately they are subordinate to Track 1 (state
actors). Azerbaijani society in general recognizes the importance of
Track 2 diplomacy, but there are more than 1 million displaced persons
from the occupied territories who need to see political developments.
Rather than seeing greater civil society interaction as a potential
catalyst for confidence building, given the massive highs and
lows of expectation and disappointment brought by the Minsk Group
negotiations, Armenia seems to be taking a hard line, ignoring civil
society initiatives.
Officials from the Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-Karabakh region
recently tried to meet with Karabakh Armenians, but the meeting was
never held. At the same time, deaths at the front line have risen. For
both sides, increased contact at community levels will create a pool
of experience informing each side's choices in the peace process,
and can contribute to Track 1 diplomacy. First, Armenia must recognize
that Nagorno-Karabakh has two communities, Azerbaijanis and Armenians.
Second, pursuing Track 2 diplomacy could increase confidence building
measures, and demonstrate that political will can be supported by
other conflict resolution methods. Finally, the Armenian government
must understand that the prolongation of the status quo will help
no one -- on the contrary, it will amplify the mistrust between the
parties to the conflict.