If Serzh Makes Wrong Choice
HAKOB BADALYAN
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments24612.html
Published: 23:42:41 - 17/12/2011
Some members of parliament running businesses announced that they will
not run in the next elections. What helped Serzh Sargsyan persuade
those members of parliament not to run in the elections? Or did he
simply instruct them not to run for parliament?
There is an opinion that Sargsyan cannot give such instructions to the
oligarchs because they will turn back and tear him to parts. In
addition, this opinion is dominant regarding other issues related to
the oligarchs. For instance, the real struggle against the oligopoly
is considered as hardly possible because the oligarchy will turn back
and tear them to pieces.
This is an important issue. Is Serzh Sargsyan the prisoner of the
`oligarchs' or are they the `hostage' of the government? Levon
Ter-Petrosyan, for instance, announced that the oligarchy is the
hostage of the government. It is not absolutely true, of course, but
independent from the political motives and context, in the long run,
the oligarchy is the `hostage' of the government.
So the government is able to solve the problem of oligarchy, set this
segment in another setting, that of the liberal rules, set them equal
before the law, eliminate the economic, political and physical
privileges of the oligarchic class. The question is who the government
is, and whether Serzh Sargsyan is the government.
The fact that he is trying to be government is obvious. But the
question is how he is trying and why. Is he trying to subject the
oligarchy fully and forming his own team of oligarchs or is he trying
to be the government to promote reforms declared by him?
In Armenia, very few people believe that Serzh Sargsyan can be
committed to reforms, believe in democratic and liberal values to
underlie the rule of law in Armenia. And their doubts are justified
because Serzh Sargsyan has not proven the opposite yet. On the other
hand, democratic reforms in Armenia do not suppose that the
implementer or leader must be truly democratic and a genuine reformer.
The point is that the systemic crisis in Armenia has reached the point
of being unbearable, and he will have to implement reforms about which
he announced at international rostrums, even though he does not
believe it. His personal interest requires it, the instinct of
self-protection.
For many people, the situation grew unbearable very rapidly, for
others quite unexpectedly. But the system in Armenia expired too soon
because it coincided with the expiry of the world system, and it was
inevitable.
And the international crisis accelerated the systemic collapse of
Armenia. The only way out is reforms.
Serzh Sargsyan must establish his rule by the instinct of
self-preservation to be able to promote reforms. No doubt he is trying
to draft a scheme of succession of actions, seeking support to
establish his rule. `Help me establish my rule to go on to carry out
reforms,' Serzh Sargsyan seems to tell the international society.
It is obvious that his words are accepted, and he is supported to
establish his rule. Serzh Sargsyan may expect that after establishing
his rule he will be able to persuade the West and avoid reforms.
But Sargsyan must be aware of hopelessness of this expectation. The
West supports him to establish his rule, considering the parliamentary
elections of 2012 as a key haven but keep the mechanisms which will
neutralize Serzh Sargsyan's rule in a single minute, and power will go
to either Ter-Petrosyan or Kocharyan.
The point is that if no reforms will be held in Armenia, if Sargsyan
fails to keep his commitments for which he gets support, Armenia may
be controlled better through Ter-Petrosyan, and especially Kocharyan,
so the meaning of supporting Sargsyan will disappear both for the West
and Russia.
The role of Armenia in new geopolitical and economic developments
depends essentially on the democratic transition and establishment of
the rule of law. If this happens, it means that Armenia gets down to
the performance of its role. If not, it means that Serzh Sargsyan
fails to perform his role, and Serzh Sargsyan must leave, otherwise
Armenia will be removed from the map.
No doubt the West will not wish Armenia to leave, otherwise it would
not make so much effort toward reforms. Moreover, the society will not
wish Armenia's removal from global scenarios. Consequently, in case
Sargsyan tries to stop halfway and waive its role, the public and
international consensus will inevitably push his removal.
Big choice complicates choice. Serzh Sargsyan does not have a big
choice, so his choice will not be difficult. For him, the consequence
of the wrong choice may be complicated.
HAKOB BADALYAN
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments24612.html
Published: 23:42:41 - 17/12/2011
Some members of parliament running businesses announced that they will
not run in the next elections. What helped Serzh Sargsyan persuade
those members of parliament not to run in the elections? Or did he
simply instruct them not to run for parliament?
There is an opinion that Sargsyan cannot give such instructions to the
oligarchs because they will turn back and tear him to parts. In
addition, this opinion is dominant regarding other issues related to
the oligarchs. For instance, the real struggle against the oligopoly
is considered as hardly possible because the oligarchy will turn back
and tear them to pieces.
This is an important issue. Is Serzh Sargsyan the prisoner of the
`oligarchs' or are they the `hostage' of the government? Levon
Ter-Petrosyan, for instance, announced that the oligarchy is the
hostage of the government. It is not absolutely true, of course, but
independent from the political motives and context, in the long run,
the oligarchy is the `hostage' of the government.
So the government is able to solve the problem of oligarchy, set this
segment in another setting, that of the liberal rules, set them equal
before the law, eliminate the economic, political and physical
privileges of the oligarchic class. The question is who the government
is, and whether Serzh Sargsyan is the government.
The fact that he is trying to be government is obvious. But the
question is how he is trying and why. Is he trying to subject the
oligarchy fully and forming his own team of oligarchs or is he trying
to be the government to promote reforms declared by him?
In Armenia, very few people believe that Serzh Sargsyan can be
committed to reforms, believe in democratic and liberal values to
underlie the rule of law in Armenia. And their doubts are justified
because Serzh Sargsyan has not proven the opposite yet. On the other
hand, democratic reforms in Armenia do not suppose that the
implementer or leader must be truly democratic and a genuine reformer.
The point is that the systemic crisis in Armenia has reached the point
of being unbearable, and he will have to implement reforms about which
he announced at international rostrums, even though he does not
believe it. His personal interest requires it, the instinct of
self-protection.
For many people, the situation grew unbearable very rapidly, for
others quite unexpectedly. But the system in Armenia expired too soon
because it coincided with the expiry of the world system, and it was
inevitable.
And the international crisis accelerated the systemic collapse of
Armenia. The only way out is reforms.
Serzh Sargsyan must establish his rule by the instinct of
self-preservation to be able to promote reforms. No doubt he is trying
to draft a scheme of succession of actions, seeking support to
establish his rule. `Help me establish my rule to go on to carry out
reforms,' Serzh Sargsyan seems to tell the international society.
It is obvious that his words are accepted, and he is supported to
establish his rule. Serzh Sargsyan may expect that after establishing
his rule he will be able to persuade the West and avoid reforms.
But Sargsyan must be aware of hopelessness of this expectation. The
West supports him to establish his rule, considering the parliamentary
elections of 2012 as a key haven but keep the mechanisms which will
neutralize Serzh Sargsyan's rule in a single minute, and power will go
to either Ter-Petrosyan or Kocharyan.
The point is that if no reforms will be held in Armenia, if Sargsyan
fails to keep his commitments for which he gets support, Armenia may
be controlled better through Ter-Petrosyan, and especially Kocharyan,
so the meaning of supporting Sargsyan will disappear both for the West
and Russia.
The role of Armenia in new geopolitical and economic developments
depends essentially on the democratic transition and establishment of
the rule of law. If this happens, it means that Armenia gets down to
the performance of its role. If not, it means that Serzh Sargsyan
fails to perform his role, and Serzh Sargsyan must leave, otherwise
Armenia will be removed from the map.
No doubt the West will not wish Armenia to leave, otherwise it would
not make so much effort toward reforms. Moreover, the society will not
wish Armenia's removal from global scenarios. Consequently, in case
Sargsyan tries to stop halfway and waive its role, the public and
international consensus will inevitably push his removal.
Big choice complicates choice. Serzh Sargsyan does not have a big
choice, so his choice will not be difficult. For him, the consequence
of the wrong choice may be complicated.