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IRAN IN 2011: POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5352
03.02.2011
Sevak Sarukhanyan
S.Sarukhanyan - Deputy Director of `Noravank' Foundation, Head of the
Center of the Political Studies, Ph.D. in Political Sciences
2011 will be important from the point of view of the social-economic
and political development of Iran, as well as in the aspect of nuclear
programme and foreign and domestic political developments.
1. The main result of 2010
2010 was rather difficult year for Iran. Important developments took
place in the domestic and foreign political life of Iran. Those
developments challenged stable social-economic and political
development of the country.
In the domestic political life the positions of the radical
conservatives had been consolidated the main manifestation of which
was the discharge of `centrist' M. Motaki from the post of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the same time radical conservatives
attached more acuity to their confrontations with old `centric' ruling
elite (the later has demonstrated a kind of weakness of their strength
in the course of this controversy). The decision of the Iranian court
taken in November 2010 to arrest M. Hashemi, the son of the former
president A.A. Hashemi Rafsanjani, can be considered as one of the
most important developments in domestic political field because it
symbolized the relative defeat of the `centric' powers united round
Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Important foreign political developments were connected with the
nuclear programme, the implementation of which was not interrupted by
Iran; it even continually gained in scope. Sanctions imposed against
Iran had been of no effect. The abrupt deterioration of the relations
between Russia and Iran can also be considered as one of the most
important foreign political developments which were conditioned by
toughening of the stance of Kremlin on the issue of the nuclear
programme of Iran and the process of coordination of the `Iranian
policy' with the US.
The main results which were fixed last year will play an important
role in the processes which may take place in Iran in 2011.
2. Domestic political developments in Iran in 2011: possible processes
2011 will be of great importance in the domestic political life of
Iran because during this year the country will be preparing for the
parliamentary elections which are going to be held in February 2012.
Those elections will be the first national elections since 2009 when
M. Ahmadinejad was reelected as the president and when, probably the
most serious political crisis after the Islamic revolution burst out.
Taking into consideration this fact, the most serious powers in the
Iranian political field began eager preparations to the upcoming
elections in the shadow of which the political struggle of the coming
12 months will pass on. The informational and administrative struggle
initiated against the former president A.A. Hashemi Rafsanjani proves
that the radical conservatives united round the president M.
Ahmadinejad consider `centric powers' united round Hashemi Rafsanjani
as their main opponents. The decision about the arrest of the Mehdi
Hashemi, the son of the former president, was a serious blow to the
`centric powers', because Hashemi who is now in London is accused of
not only economic abuse and organizing anti-government rally but he is
also accused of cooperation with British special services. One may say
that the anti-oppositional propaganda carried out by the state mass
media will even intensify in 2011 and its keystone in 2010 was the
connections of the opposition with the British intelligence.
It should be mentioned that the accusations of the `British trace' has
been a kind of tradition in Iran since 1960 when it became obvious
that the Mossadiq government was overthrown by the British and
American intelligence services. But it should also be mentioned that a
part of the current Iranian opposition has really indirect connections
with Britain; some relatives of the leaders of opposition M. Karroubi
and M.H. Mousavi really live in Great Britain and this is fact is used
by the state propaganda. In their turn British special services add
fuel to the anti-British fire in Iran; after the statement of the head
of the British Mi-6 J. Sowers that Iranian nuclear programme should be
stopped not only by the discussions but also through special
intelligence operations, Iran officially declared the UK the main
organizer of diversions (including neutralization of the specialists
in nuclear physics) on its territory.
It can be expected that in 2011 state propaganda will fully identify
opposition to the traitors which may serve as a grounds for the
Council of the Guardians not to register active oppositional leaders
and their groups as parliamentary candidates.
At the same time in the oppositional camp the struggle for the role of
the leader of the opposition will unfold in 2011. Most probably the
main persons involved into that struggle will be M. H. Mousavi and M.
Karroubi. Positions of Mousavi in the oppositional field has weakened
since 2009 because many blame him in being unable to transform the
revolutionary power of thousands of people who went out for rally; it
is obvious that in 2009 it was a pre-revolutionary situation in Tehran
and Mousavi refused to turn into a revolutionary one. Taking into
consideration this fact, one can expect that in 2011 M. Karroubi whose
anti-governmental stance is tougher can undertake the role of the
oppositional leader in Iran. He makes everything to obtain this goal:
at the end of 2010 Karroubi had already criticized the spiritual
leader A. Khamenei, saying that he was responsible for the situation
in the country. The stance of Hashemi Rafsanjani will also influence
the processes going on inside the oppositional powers. Will he protect
directly opposition or after the campaign initiated against him and
his son he will agree to start a dialogue or cooperate with the
radical conservatives?
Let us mention that one of the main intrigues of the domestic
political developments will be the behavior of the former president M.
Khatami. Will he return to a big politics or not? Many believe that in
2013 M. Khatami must become oppositional candidate for the
presidential elections.
3. Possible foreign political developments round Iran in 2011
The issue of a nuclear programme will remain in the spotlight of the
foreign political developments round Iran. However, no serious shift
can be expected in this direction in 2011, because the negotiation
between Iran and `the six' which seemed to revive at the beginning of
the year will bring the parties to frequent meetings, discussion of
the options of the settlement of the issue, mutually discrepant
statements which can have no serious effect on ceasing of the nuclear
programme of Iran. It is possible that in 2011 the UN Security Council
will pass another package of sanctions against Iran which, however,
can hardly stop Iran on its way to become a nuclear power. It should
be mentioned that 2011 will be pre-election for both Russia and US
where the presidential elections are to be held in 2012.
If in case with Russia its policy in regard to Iran can hardly have
any serious effect, Iranian and US authorities will probably make the
statements and propaganda against each other tougher, but they will
have to act more carefully, as serious mistakes in the foreign
political field can affect seriously the possible results of the
presidential elections. At the same time, one can expect that B. Obama
in order to be re-elected must secure American presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan to restrain the discontent of the American electorate with
the failure of the American foreign policy. To obtain this purpose,
most probably, in 2011 the US will stir up its dialogue with Iran
concerning the assistance in settlement of the situation in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Taking into consideration the fact that the US
authorities and influential mass media have stated that the stability
in the region can hardly be achieved without participation of Iran,
Washington is already ready for cooperation.
Besides Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2011 the relations with Turkey and
situation in Pakistan will also be important for Iran. Turkish-Iranian
cooperation has already reached definite high level which must be
followed either by final strengthening and institutionalization of the
cooperation or a definite freezing of those relations. Taking into
consideration the circumstance that since the second half of 2010 at
the negotiations with the EU Turkish prime-minister has stopped
insisting on the participation of Iran in Nabucco project, one can
expect that in 2011 there will be no positive shift in the most
important, i.e. economic part (export of the Iranian gas to the EU
through the Turkish territory) of the Iranian-Turkish relations. As
for Pakistan, in 2011 Iran will spare no strength in order not to
allow accession to power of anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite radical Sunni
Islamists.
Thus, 2011 will be of great importance for Iran in terms of both
domestic and foreign political developments.
`Globus Energy and Regional Security', issue 1, 2011
From: A. Papazian
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5352
03.02.2011
Sevak Sarukhanyan
S.Sarukhanyan - Deputy Director of `Noravank' Foundation, Head of the
Center of the Political Studies, Ph.D. in Political Sciences
2011 will be important from the point of view of the social-economic
and political development of Iran, as well as in the aspect of nuclear
programme and foreign and domestic political developments.
1. The main result of 2010
2010 was rather difficult year for Iran. Important developments took
place in the domestic and foreign political life of Iran. Those
developments challenged stable social-economic and political
development of the country.
In the domestic political life the positions of the radical
conservatives had been consolidated the main manifestation of which
was the discharge of `centrist' M. Motaki from the post of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the same time radical conservatives
attached more acuity to their confrontations with old `centric' ruling
elite (the later has demonstrated a kind of weakness of their strength
in the course of this controversy). The decision of the Iranian court
taken in November 2010 to arrest M. Hashemi, the son of the former
president A.A. Hashemi Rafsanjani, can be considered as one of the
most important developments in domestic political field because it
symbolized the relative defeat of the `centric' powers united round
Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Important foreign political developments were connected with the
nuclear programme, the implementation of which was not interrupted by
Iran; it even continually gained in scope. Sanctions imposed against
Iran had been of no effect. The abrupt deterioration of the relations
between Russia and Iran can also be considered as one of the most
important foreign political developments which were conditioned by
toughening of the stance of Kremlin on the issue of the nuclear
programme of Iran and the process of coordination of the `Iranian
policy' with the US.
The main results which were fixed last year will play an important
role in the processes which may take place in Iran in 2011.
2. Domestic political developments in Iran in 2011: possible processes
2011 will be of great importance in the domestic political life of
Iran because during this year the country will be preparing for the
parliamentary elections which are going to be held in February 2012.
Those elections will be the first national elections since 2009 when
M. Ahmadinejad was reelected as the president and when, probably the
most serious political crisis after the Islamic revolution burst out.
Taking into consideration this fact, the most serious powers in the
Iranian political field began eager preparations to the upcoming
elections in the shadow of which the political struggle of the coming
12 months will pass on. The informational and administrative struggle
initiated against the former president A.A. Hashemi Rafsanjani proves
that the radical conservatives united round the president M.
Ahmadinejad consider `centric powers' united round Hashemi Rafsanjani
as their main opponents. The decision about the arrest of the Mehdi
Hashemi, the son of the former president, was a serious blow to the
`centric powers', because Hashemi who is now in London is accused of
not only economic abuse and organizing anti-government rally but he is
also accused of cooperation with British special services. One may say
that the anti-oppositional propaganda carried out by the state mass
media will even intensify in 2011 and its keystone in 2010 was the
connections of the opposition with the British intelligence.
It should be mentioned that the accusations of the `British trace' has
been a kind of tradition in Iran since 1960 when it became obvious
that the Mossadiq government was overthrown by the British and
American intelligence services. But it should also be mentioned that a
part of the current Iranian opposition has really indirect connections
with Britain; some relatives of the leaders of opposition M. Karroubi
and M.H. Mousavi really live in Great Britain and this is fact is used
by the state propaganda. In their turn British special services add
fuel to the anti-British fire in Iran; after the statement of the head
of the British Mi-6 J. Sowers that Iranian nuclear programme should be
stopped not only by the discussions but also through special
intelligence operations, Iran officially declared the UK the main
organizer of diversions (including neutralization of the specialists
in nuclear physics) on its territory.
It can be expected that in 2011 state propaganda will fully identify
opposition to the traitors which may serve as a grounds for the
Council of the Guardians not to register active oppositional leaders
and their groups as parliamentary candidates.
At the same time in the oppositional camp the struggle for the role of
the leader of the opposition will unfold in 2011. Most probably the
main persons involved into that struggle will be M. H. Mousavi and M.
Karroubi. Positions of Mousavi in the oppositional field has weakened
since 2009 because many blame him in being unable to transform the
revolutionary power of thousands of people who went out for rally; it
is obvious that in 2009 it was a pre-revolutionary situation in Tehran
and Mousavi refused to turn into a revolutionary one. Taking into
consideration this fact, one can expect that in 2011 M. Karroubi whose
anti-governmental stance is tougher can undertake the role of the
oppositional leader in Iran. He makes everything to obtain this goal:
at the end of 2010 Karroubi had already criticized the spiritual
leader A. Khamenei, saying that he was responsible for the situation
in the country. The stance of Hashemi Rafsanjani will also influence
the processes going on inside the oppositional powers. Will he protect
directly opposition or after the campaign initiated against him and
his son he will agree to start a dialogue or cooperate with the
radical conservatives?
Let us mention that one of the main intrigues of the domestic
political developments will be the behavior of the former president M.
Khatami. Will he return to a big politics or not? Many believe that in
2013 M. Khatami must become oppositional candidate for the
presidential elections.
3. Possible foreign political developments round Iran in 2011
The issue of a nuclear programme will remain in the spotlight of the
foreign political developments round Iran. However, no serious shift
can be expected in this direction in 2011, because the negotiation
between Iran and `the six' which seemed to revive at the beginning of
the year will bring the parties to frequent meetings, discussion of
the options of the settlement of the issue, mutually discrepant
statements which can have no serious effect on ceasing of the nuclear
programme of Iran. It is possible that in 2011 the UN Security Council
will pass another package of sanctions against Iran which, however,
can hardly stop Iran on its way to become a nuclear power. It should
be mentioned that 2011 will be pre-election for both Russia and US
where the presidential elections are to be held in 2012.
If in case with Russia its policy in regard to Iran can hardly have
any serious effect, Iranian and US authorities will probably make the
statements and propaganda against each other tougher, but they will
have to act more carefully, as serious mistakes in the foreign
political field can affect seriously the possible results of the
presidential elections. At the same time, one can expect that B. Obama
in order to be re-elected must secure American presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan to restrain the discontent of the American electorate with
the failure of the American foreign policy. To obtain this purpose,
most probably, in 2011 the US will stir up its dialogue with Iran
concerning the assistance in settlement of the situation in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Taking into consideration the fact that the US
authorities and influential mass media have stated that the stability
in the region can hardly be achieved without participation of Iran,
Washington is already ready for cooperation.
Besides Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2011 the relations with Turkey and
situation in Pakistan will also be important for Iran. Turkish-Iranian
cooperation has already reached definite high level which must be
followed either by final strengthening and institutionalization of the
cooperation or a definite freezing of those relations. Taking into
consideration the circumstance that since the second half of 2010 at
the negotiations with the EU Turkish prime-minister has stopped
insisting on the participation of Iran in Nabucco project, one can
expect that in 2011 there will be no positive shift in the most
important, i.e. economic part (export of the Iranian gas to the EU
through the Turkish territory) of the Iranian-Turkish relations. As
for Pakistan, in 2011 Iran will spare no strength in order not to
allow accession to power of anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite radical Sunni
Islamists.
Thus, 2011 will be of great importance for Iran in terms of both
domestic and foreign political developments.
`Globus Energy and Regional Security', issue 1, 2011
From: A. Papazian