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ON SOUTH SUDAN: ETHNIC MINORITIES AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY
By Dr. Evgeni Klauber
Magazine - Independent commentary from Israel and the Palestinian territories
http://972mag.com/southern-sudans-independence-ethnic-minorities-and-political-autonomy/
June 29 2011
With Ethiopian peacekeepers en route to try and secure calm in Abyei,
a contested region that lies on the border between Sudan and Southern
Sudan, Dr. Evgeni Klauber considers how the future of the region will
determine relations between what will soon be two sovereign states.
Earlier this week, the leaders of the Sudanese government and the Sudan
People~Rs Liberation Movement agreed to withdraw their troops from the
contested Abyei region, after the United States requested that the UN
Security Council authorize the deployment of peacekeepers from Addis
Ababa to monitor the problematic region. Western commentators argued
that this is a good way to ease the tension along the border region
between the North and South ~V a border that will divide two sovereign
states, which will declare their independence on July 9. In January of
this year, the United States and the international community celebrated
with the people of South Sudan their future indepencence ~V a political
outcome of the referendum in which 98 percent of southerners agreed
to secede from the North and to establish their new independent state.
Issues of state building, nation building, and political arrangements
with ethnic minorities thus arise once again. What is the best
political arrangement that the future state of Southern Sudan should
adopt in order to solve the problem of ethnic groups, such as Misseriya
and Dinka in Abyei? Should it give these ethnic minorities group
rights to preserve their culture within Southern Sudan or should
the newly emerged state limit them to individual rights, which would
allow them to preserve their culture in the private sphere, but not
to sustain their uniqueness as a group? Can political autonomy provide
a feasible and peaceful solution for the minorities in the region?
The political status of Abyei, which is situated in the border area
between the North and the South, has yet to be decided. The Southern
region is rich in oil ~V about 80 percent of Sudan~Rs oil is in the
south). Various ethnic minorities live in the South ~V for example,
the Misseriya and Dinka, who identify with the country~Rs North
and South, respectively. If the Misseriya aren~Rt well-treated,
they will know to ask for military assistance from the militant,
failed and disintegrating North. The basis for the future conflict
can already be identified: earlier this month, Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir accused the militant forces of the South (SPLA) for
attacking the North~Rs forces (SAF) in the disputed region. Although
Western observers claimed that the South did not initiate any violence,
the president gave order to his fighter planes to bomb the civilian
population in the region. Primary victims of the bombing last month
were members of the Dinka ethnic group, who were historically located
in the Abyei region and for the thirty last years have suffered from
attacks from the North. This bombing of the Dinka earlier this month
is quintessential, after years of marginalization policies along
with the attempts to drive them from the region ~V a process that
would provide the North with the political claim to the area even
after the declaration of the South~Rs independence, which will most
probably include the Abyei area.
Under the agreement signed in 2005, the Abyei region is to hold a
referendum through which it will decide whether it wants to join
the Southern state or to stay with the North. The problem is that
al-Bashir makes great efforts to clean up Abyei from Dinka and to
insert nomadic Misseriya tribes who are closer in their political
views to the regime in Khartoum, the capital of the North. This
deliberate policy toward the Dinka was developed to strengthen the
North~Rs claim to the future of Abyei.
According to materialist logic, if the disputed area, rich in oil,
lies in the Southern state, then the North will do anything in
its power to regain control over the region. This could entail
supporting rebels who identify with the North, explaining to the
international community how its diaspora is being oppressed by the
~Sbloody~T Southern regime, and investing efforts to increase the
presence of the tribal Misseriya identified with the North in order
to gain a foothold in the region. But materialistic logic is not
always right: states do not necessarily tend to intervene to protect
their diasporas even in commercially benefical places. For example,
see Russia: it did not intervene on behalf of the Russian-speakers in
the coal-rich Donbas, or on behalf of the Russian-speaking minority
in Kazakhstan. Russia did intervene, however, in 2008, on behalf
of ethnic minorities who identified themselves with Russia but did
not provide the Russian state with unique economic benefits. This
was in the case, of course, of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two
autonomous regions inside Georgia, which after the events of August
2008 were recognized by Russia as sovereign states.
Intervention for minorities who are politically autonomous is more
common. States intervene on behalf of organized groups ~V those groups
that have enough institutional resources to become sovereign nations.
If so, what explains the intervention of one state on behalf
ethnic minorities in newly emerged states? I would argue that
what explains political intervention in newly emerged states is
a political arrangement, such as autonomy, that makes an ethnic
minority more ~Seligible~T for such assistance. If the newly emerged
state provides an ethnic minority with political autonomy (self-rule
within the territory of a sovereign state), then the intervention of
the homeland state on behalf of this minority is more likely. Countries
tend to intervene for organized minorities with functional elites that
control already existing organizational resources. Russians intervened
in Georgia for Russian-speaking autonomous regions ~V South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, but did not intervene to assist minorities that are
not organized by means of political autonomy (like Russian-speakers
in Baltic states). Armenians intervened in the autonomous Nagorno ~V
Karabakh region on behalf of their Armenian diaspora in Azerbaijan,
but they did not intervene to assist the not-autonomous Armenian
diaspora in Georgia.
If that is the case, what should we expect in Sudan? If Southern
Sudan~Rs future government grants Muslim minorities in the Abyei region
politically autonomous status, this may lead to a renewed conflict.
After gaining political autonomy, the Muslim minority will acquire
organizational resources, symbols of statehood, and will very quickly
formulate its claim for annexation back to Northern Sudan or for the
establishment of a new sovereign state in the region. This scenario
could end in another civil war. It is important to note that political
autonomy is not always the wrong solution: autonomy can be also a
useful tool that secures group rights for ethnic minorities. The
solution of political autonomy worked relatively well (as it turned
out recently) in the Basque country, Catalonia, South Tyrol, and
Scotland. But political autonomy may lead to violence in the context
of the newly emerged states, which build their nations at a faster
pace. For newly emerged countries, nationalism is not only a project
to acquire an independent state but also a tool to establish and
to accumulate political legitimacy. Newly emerged states are often
~Snationalizing states~T with an accelerated pace of nation and
state building. Autonomous minorities in newly emerged nationalizing
states may choose an exit strategy that leads to secession if they
feel scared. Fast nation building might scare autonomous minorities:
the newly emerged state can change its language overnight, for example.
Autonomous Muslim minorities, then, may rise in the future against
the government in the South ~V which will increase the chances of
the North~Rs intervention. This scenario can lead to more violence
in the region.
Let's turn now to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I argue that political
autonomy is an originating mechanism responsible for the genesis of
an institution, which make ethnic mobilization possible. Imagine a
newly emerged Palestinian state with a Jewish minority in Hebron. The
first scenario would be to integrate Jews into this newly emerged
Palestinian nation - an unlikely scenario due to the religious
differences between the two groups. Another scenario would be to
provide Jews in the newly emerged Palestinian state with group rights
- i.e. granting them political autonomy. This scenario will lead to
them acquiring institutional resources of self-governance that would
make Israeli intervention on behalf of its autonomous Jewish diaspora
more likely. We cannot imagine that Israel will intervene in Syria
on behalf of ill-treated Jews, because the Jewish minority in Syria
is not politically autonomous. Autonomous Jews in the newly emerged
Palestinian state, however, will be a different story. Here, chances
are that Israel will intervene once group rights or even individual
rights of this autonomous institutionalized diaspora will be violated.
As long as Israeli intervention in the possibly-emerging Palestinian
state depends on the political arrangement between the Jewish minority
and the Palestinian state, the status of Jews living within its
borders should be a top priority for resolution.
Dr. Evgeni Klauber received his PhD in Comparative Politics and
International Relations at the University of Delaware, specializing in
ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Republics. A Fulbright scholar,
he is now back at Tel-Aviv University as a visiting lecturer. His
current research concentrates on regime change in Russia and the
post-Soviet Bloc.
By Dr. Evgeni Klauber
Magazine - Independent commentary from Israel and the Palestinian territories
http://972mag.com/southern-sudans-independence-ethnic-minorities-and-political-autonomy/
June 29 2011
With Ethiopian peacekeepers en route to try and secure calm in Abyei,
a contested region that lies on the border between Sudan and Southern
Sudan, Dr. Evgeni Klauber considers how the future of the region will
determine relations between what will soon be two sovereign states.
Earlier this week, the leaders of the Sudanese government and the Sudan
People~Rs Liberation Movement agreed to withdraw their troops from the
contested Abyei region, after the United States requested that the UN
Security Council authorize the deployment of peacekeepers from Addis
Ababa to monitor the problematic region. Western commentators argued
that this is a good way to ease the tension along the border region
between the North and South ~V a border that will divide two sovereign
states, which will declare their independence on July 9. In January of
this year, the United States and the international community celebrated
with the people of South Sudan their future indepencence ~V a political
outcome of the referendum in which 98 percent of southerners agreed
to secede from the North and to establish their new independent state.
Issues of state building, nation building, and political arrangements
with ethnic minorities thus arise once again. What is the best
political arrangement that the future state of Southern Sudan should
adopt in order to solve the problem of ethnic groups, such as Misseriya
and Dinka in Abyei? Should it give these ethnic minorities group
rights to preserve their culture within Southern Sudan or should
the newly emerged state limit them to individual rights, which would
allow them to preserve their culture in the private sphere, but not
to sustain their uniqueness as a group? Can political autonomy provide
a feasible and peaceful solution for the minorities in the region?
The political status of Abyei, which is situated in the border area
between the North and the South, has yet to be decided. The Southern
region is rich in oil ~V about 80 percent of Sudan~Rs oil is in the
south). Various ethnic minorities live in the South ~V for example,
the Misseriya and Dinka, who identify with the country~Rs North
and South, respectively. If the Misseriya aren~Rt well-treated,
they will know to ask for military assistance from the militant,
failed and disintegrating North. The basis for the future conflict
can already be identified: earlier this month, Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir accused the militant forces of the South (SPLA) for
attacking the North~Rs forces (SAF) in the disputed region. Although
Western observers claimed that the South did not initiate any violence,
the president gave order to his fighter planes to bomb the civilian
population in the region. Primary victims of the bombing last month
were members of the Dinka ethnic group, who were historically located
in the Abyei region and for the thirty last years have suffered from
attacks from the North. This bombing of the Dinka earlier this month
is quintessential, after years of marginalization policies along
with the attempts to drive them from the region ~V a process that
would provide the North with the political claim to the area even
after the declaration of the South~Rs independence, which will most
probably include the Abyei area.
Under the agreement signed in 2005, the Abyei region is to hold a
referendum through which it will decide whether it wants to join
the Southern state or to stay with the North. The problem is that
al-Bashir makes great efforts to clean up Abyei from Dinka and to
insert nomadic Misseriya tribes who are closer in their political
views to the regime in Khartoum, the capital of the North. This
deliberate policy toward the Dinka was developed to strengthen the
North~Rs claim to the future of Abyei.
According to materialist logic, if the disputed area, rich in oil,
lies in the Southern state, then the North will do anything in
its power to regain control over the region. This could entail
supporting rebels who identify with the North, explaining to the
international community how its diaspora is being oppressed by the
~Sbloody~T Southern regime, and investing efforts to increase the
presence of the tribal Misseriya identified with the North in order
to gain a foothold in the region. But materialistic logic is not
always right: states do not necessarily tend to intervene to protect
their diasporas even in commercially benefical places. For example,
see Russia: it did not intervene on behalf of the Russian-speakers in
the coal-rich Donbas, or on behalf of the Russian-speaking minority
in Kazakhstan. Russia did intervene, however, in 2008, on behalf
of ethnic minorities who identified themselves with Russia but did
not provide the Russian state with unique economic benefits. This
was in the case, of course, of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two
autonomous regions inside Georgia, which after the events of August
2008 were recognized by Russia as sovereign states.
Intervention for minorities who are politically autonomous is more
common. States intervene on behalf of organized groups ~V those groups
that have enough institutional resources to become sovereign nations.
If so, what explains the intervention of one state on behalf
ethnic minorities in newly emerged states? I would argue that
what explains political intervention in newly emerged states is
a political arrangement, such as autonomy, that makes an ethnic
minority more ~Seligible~T for such assistance. If the newly emerged
state provides an ethnic minority with political autonomy (self-rule
within the territory of a sovereign state), then the intervention of
the homeland state on behalf of this minority is more likely. Countries
tend to intervene for organized minorities with functional elites that
control already existing organizational resources. Russians intervened
in Georgia for Russian-speaking autonomous regions ~V South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, but did not intervene to assist minorities that are
not organized by means of political autonomy (like Russian-speakers
in Baltic states). Armenians intervened in the autonomous Nagorno ~V
Karabakh region on behalf of their Armenian diaspora in Azerbaijan,
but they did not intervene to assist the not-autonomous Armenian
diaspora in Georgia.
If that is the case, what should we expect in Sudan? If Southern
Sudan~Rs future government grants Muslim minorities in the Abyei region
politically autonomous status, this may lead to a renewed conflict.
After gaining political autonomy, the Muslim minority will acquire
organizational resources, symbols of statehood, and will very quickly
formulate its claim for annexation back to Northern Sudan or for the
establishment of a new sovereign state in the region. This scenario
could end in another civil war. It is important to note that political
autonomy is not always the wrong solution: autonomy can be also a
useful tool that secures group rights for ethnic minorities. The
solution of political autonomy worked relatively well (as it turned
out recently) in the Basque country, Catalonia, South Tyrol, and
Scotland. But political autonomy may lead to violence in the context
of the newly emerged states, which build their nations at a faster
pace. For newly emerged countries, nationalism is not only a project
to acquire an independent state but also a tool to establish and
to accumulate political legitimacy. Newly emerged states are often
~Snationalizing states~T with an accelerated pace of nation and
state building. Autonomous minorities in newly emerged nationalizing
states may choose an exit strategy that leads to secession if they
feel scared. Fast nation building might scare autonomous minorities:
the newly emerged state can change its language overnight, for example.
Autonomous Muslim minorities, then, may rise in the future against
the government in the South ~V which will increase the chances of
the North~Rs intervention. This scenario can lead to more violence
in the region.
Let's turn now to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I argue that political
autonomy is an originating mechanism responsible for the genesis of
an institution, which make ethnic mobilization possible. Imagine a
newly emerged Palestinian state with a Jewish minority in Hebron. The
first scenario would be to integrate Jews into this newly emerged
Palestinian nation - an unlikely scenario due to the religious
differences between the two groups. Another scenario would be to
provide Jews in the newly emerged Palestinian state with group rights
- i.e. granting them political autonomy. This scenario will lead to
them acquiring institutional resources of self-governance that would
make Israeli intervention on behalf of its autonomous Jewish diaspora
more likely. We cannot imagine that Israel will intervene in Syria
on behalf of ill-treated Jews, because the Jewish minority in Syria
is not politically autonomous. Autonomous Jews in the newly emerged
Palestinian state, however, will be a different story. Here, chances
are that Israel will intervene once group rights or even individual
rights of this autonomous institutionalized diaspora will be violated.
As long as Israeli intervention in the possibly-emerging Palestinian
state depends on the political arrangement between the Jewish minority
and the Palestinian state, the status of Jews living within its
borders should be a top priority for resolution.
Dr. Evgeni Klauber received his PhD in Comparative Politics and
International Relations at the University of Delaware, specializing in
ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Republics. A Fulbright scholar,
he is now back at Tel-Aviv University as a visiting lecturer. His
current research concentrates on regime change in Russia and the
post-Soviet Bloc.