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The Voice of Russia
July 3 2011
Nagorno-Karabakh: the story of hatred
Kudashkina Ekaterina Jul 3, 2011 11:12 Moscow Time
Interview with Sabina Frazer, Director of the European program with
the International Crisis Group.
Of course, the Kazan Summit was a big disappointment. This is
especially because the co-chairs before the summit, had expressed a
great deal of hope and optimism that there would be an agreement on
the basic principles at this summit. And the fact that the sides
couldn't agree on the basic principles is very disappointing. But even
the statement that they did sign is quite worrying, because it says
that the two sides have agreed to certain issues, which makes us
assume that there are other issues that they fundamentally disagree
on. So, it's not about language in the text or about temporary
disagreement - but it's really still fundamental issues that separate
Azerbaijan and Armenia. And I think that here we have to go back to
the origins of the conflict. Where the two sides fundamentally
disagree is on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. For the Armenian side,
they want to have an agreement where the right to self-determination
and secession of Nagorno-Karabakh will be clear and, on the other
hand, for the Azerbaijani site, they want to make sure that
Nagorno-Karabakh will continue to remain inside the borders of
Azerbaijan or, if it does get independence, this will be once the rest
of Azerbaijan agrees to that. So, fundamentally, there is a very clear
disconnect between the sides, and the co-chairs have been trying to
deal with it by saying let's have an interim status and postponements
of any kind of vote on Nagorno-Karabakh status. But, on the one hand,
it would be a very good solution, the solution that I believe the
co-chairs should continue to promote - but what we see is that neither
Azerbaijan nor Armenia are willing to go for that. And it was clear
prior to Kazan that they had not been trying to inform their people
and to convince their people that the solution was necessary. And I
think it's also very worrying that we still see very radical rhetoric
coming particularly from Baku, but also in Armenia. In Armenia we see
that people are less and less willing to consider full withdrawal from
the occupied territories of Nagorno-Karabakh. That is also a very
worrying trend. So, it is clear that, if there is going to be an
agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh, the presidency in both Azerbaijan and
Armenia has to be much clearer in public, in Baku and in Yerevan,
explain to people that this agreement is necessary to avoid a future
war.
What do you think is the major problem why they come to terms? This is
an area where people lived side by side - Armenians and Azerbaijanis -
and it wasn't as explosive as it is now. So, why that happened?
Armenians and Azerbaijanis have lived side by side for four centuries.
But we have a situation of 20 years of separation, where there are a
large number of IDPs, there is territory that is occupied. In addition
to that there has been a very negative rhetoric, where people were
brought up basically hating each other. And it's going to take years
for people to change that and to again feel trust and confidence with
each other. That is why it is clear that, unless the president makes
it very clear to the population that something is changed and it is
necessary to reach an agreement now, it is going to be very difficult
for there to be public support for any compromise.
As I spoke to a number of analysts, they were telling me that there
are some fears that the whole situation might explode again. I have my
doubt. How do you see that?
I am also concerned that there is a possibility that a war will start
again. If this negotiation process fails, it will put us in a very
precarious situation. I believe that Russian President Medvedev has
played a very important role over the past couple of years. And it's
now questionable whether or not, in the election period, he will be
able to continue playing such a hands-on role. But it's also prone
with the French and the Americans who are also going to have elections
soon. So, if we don't get an agreement in the coming couple of months,
it's clear that the negotiations are going to go onto the backburner.
Without an active negotiations process, it's going to encourage both
sides to think more about military conflict. Of course, both countries
are spending more and more money on purchasing military equipment.
And, when you start doing that, the kind of natural tendency is to
have a desire to use it. So, what I'd be worried about is even if
neither Baku nor Yerevan are planning the offensive tomorrow then a
war may start by accident, because of this increased belligerent
rhetoric, increased weaponry that is on the ground and this kind of
natural tendency to want to try it out.
Wouldn't it be absolutely crazy, with Azerbaijan looking to expand its
ties with NATO, and NATO, as far as I know, has got serious
reservations about nations with inner conflict, on the one hand? And
then on both nations are looking at expanding their ties with the EU.
Once the war starts, all their hopes would be dashed.
Correct. I think neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia are too keen to join
NATO right now. Of course, they are keen on increasing their ties with
NATO, but NATO membership is very far down the line. The same thing is
with the EU. None of the countries of the South Caucasus has a clear
EU membership commitment. So, it's very difficult for either NATO or
the EU to really put pressure on Azerbaijan or Armenia to resist a
war, because they don't have anything to offer, no clear `carrot' of
either NATO or EU membership for these two countries
How about economic considerations? Because as far as I understand Baku
is home to considerable oil and gas interests.
It is true that, if Azerbaijan went to war, this would undermine their
capacity to export oil and gas. On one hand, it's possible that the
reserves of Azerbaijan will start to diminish, and as they will have
less of the qualms to go to war, because they will have less oil and
gas to export, but also I think that they feel this could be a quick
war, and that they could take back one or three of the occupied
territories in a few days, and that this wouldn't have a direct effect
on their pipelines. The second is wrong calculus, because the
Armenians are also prepared to retaliate. So, if a war starts, I don't
think it will be a short war. It will be something that will last
numerous months and years, which would have an impact on Azerbaijan's
ability to export its reserves.
Did you travel there?
Yes, I've been to Karabakh. I haven't been there for some time, I have
to admit. It was a few years ago that I was there. But I did go there,
so I've seen the realities on the ground. And one additional element
that we don't talk about is the people of Karabakh itself - both
Karabakh Azeris and Karabakh Armenians. It's clear that if there was
an agreement on basic principles, it would be necessary to include
them more in how to implement this agreement and how to reach a
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The process is that first there should
be the basic principles and after that the sides will have to sit down
and talk about the details and sign Comprehensive Peace Agreement. For
that, you'll need input from Karabakhsis themselves, both the Armenian
and Azeris, because they will obviously play a key role in the
implementation.
What is their sentiment?
Their sentiment, especially of Karabakh Armenians is in more hard-line
than the sentiment in Yerevan, because they feel the security threats
more clearly. That is why for any peace agreement to work, it will
have to have very clear security guarantees, there will need to be
deployment of international peacekeepers, so that way people living in
Karabakh could feel more confident with the situation. That is also
why the interim status is so important - because, again, the people of
Karabakh would be able to feel that they have a status, not a
full-fledged independent status, but something that would allow them,
for example, to be represented abroad and to be able to talk with
countries outside the region.
http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/07/03/52674196.html
July 3 2011
Nagorno-Karabakh: the story of hatred
Kudashkina Ekaterina Jul 3, 2011 11:12 Moscow Time
Interview with Sabina Frazer, Director of the European program with
the International Crisis Group.
Of course, the Kazan Summit was a big disappointment. This is
especially because the co-chairs before the summit, had expressed a
great deal of hope and optimism that there would be an agreement on
the basic principles at this summit. And the fact that the sides
couldn't agree on the basic principles is very disappointing. But even
the statement that they did sign is quite worrying, because it says
that the two sides have agreed to certain issues, which makes us
assume that there are other issues that they fundamentally disagree
on. So, it's not about language in the text or about temporary
disagreement - but it's really still fundamental issues that separate
Azerbaijan and Armenia. And I think that here we have to go back to
the origins of the conflict. Where the two sides fundamentally
disagree is on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. For the Armenian side,
they want to have an agreement where the right to self-determination
and secession of Nagorno-Karabakh will be clear and, on the other
hand, for the Azerbaijani site, they want to make sure that
Nagorno-Karabakh will continue to remain inside the borders of
Azerbaijan or, if it does get independence, this will be once the rest
of Azerbaijan agrees to that. So, fundamentally, there is a very clear
disconnect between the sides, and the co-chairs have been trying to
deal with it by saying let's have an interim status and postponements
of any kind of vote on Nagorno-Karabakh status. But, on the one hand,
it would be a very good solution, the solution that I believe the
co-chairs should continue to promote - but what we see is that neither
Azerbaijan nor Armenia are willing to go for that. And it was clear
prior to Kazan that they had not been trying to inform their people
and to convince their people that the solution was necessary. And I
think it's also very worrying that we still see very radical rhetoric
coming particularly from Baku, but also in Armenia. In Armenia we see
that people are less and less willing to consider full withdrawal from
the occupied territories of Nagorno-Karabakh. That is also a very
worrying trend. So, it is clear that, if there is going to be an
agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh, the presidency in both Azerbaijan and
Armenia has to be much clearer in public, in Baku and in Yerevan,
explain to people that this agreement is necessary to avoid a future
war.
What do you think is the major problem why they come to terms? This is
an area where people lived side by side - Armenians and Azerbaijanis -
and it wasn't as explosive as it is now. So, why that happened?
Armenians and Azerbaijanis have lived side by side for four centuries.
But we have a situation of 20 years of separation, where there are a
large number of IDPs, there is territory that is occupied. In addition
to that there has been a very negative rhetoric, where people were
brought up basically hating each other. And it's going to take years
for people to change that and to again feel trust and confidence with
each other. That is why it is clear that, unless the president makes
it very clear to the population that something is changed and it is
necessary to reach an agreement now, it is going to be very difficult
for there to be public support for any compromise.
As I spoke to a number of analysts, they were telling me that there
are some fears that the whole situation might explode again. I have my
doubt. How do you see that?
I am also concerned that there is a possibility that a war will start
again. If this negotiation process fails, it will put us in a very
precarious situation. I believe that Russian President Medvedev has
played a very important role over the past couple of years. And it's
now questionable whether or not, in the election period, he will be
able to continue playing such a hands-on role. But it's also prone
with the French and the Americans who are also going to have elections
soon. So, if we don't get an agreement in the coming couple of months,
it's clear that the negotiations are going to go onto the backburner.
Without an active negotiations process, it's going to encourage both
sides to think more about military conflict. Of course, both countries
are spending more and more money on purchasing military equipment.
And, when you start doing that, the kind of natural tendency is to
have a desire to use it. So, what I'd be worried about is even if
neither Baku nor Yerevan are planning the offensive tomorrow then a
war may start by accident, because of this increased belligerent
rhetoric, increased weaponry that is on the ground and this kind of
natural tendency to want to try it out.
Wouldn't it be absolutely crazy, with Azerbaijan looking to expand its
ties with NATO, and NATO, as far as I know, has got serious
reservations about nations with inner conflict, on the one hand? And
then on both nations are looking at expanding their ties with the EU.
Once the war starts, all their hopes would be dashed.
Correct. I think neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia are too keen to join
NATO right now. Of course, they are keen on increasing their ties with
NATO, but NATO membership is very far down the line. The same thing is
with the EU. None of the countries of the South Caucasus has a clear
EU membership commitment. So, it's very difficult for either NATO or
the EU to really put pressure on Azerbaijan or Armenia to resist a
war, because they don't have anything to offer, no clear `carrot' of
either NATO or EU membership for these two countries
How about economic considerations? Because as far as I understand Baku
is home to considerable oil and gas interests.
It is true that, if Azerbaijan went to war, this would undermine their
capacity to export oil and gas. On one hand, it's possible that the
reserves of Azerbaijan will start to diminish, and as they will have
less of the qualms to go to war, because they will have less oil and
gas to export, but also I think that they feel this could be a quick
war, and that they could take back one or three of the occupied
territories in a few days, and that this wouldn't have a direct effect
on their pipelines. The second is wrong calculus, because the
Armenians are also prepared to retaliate. So, if a war starts, I don't
think it will be a short war. It will be something that will last
numerous months and years, which would have an impact on Azerbaijan's
ability to export its reserves.
Did you travel there?
Yes, I've been to Karabakh. I haven't been there for some time, I have
to admit. It was a few years ago that I was there. But I did go there,
so I've seen the realities on the ground. And one additional element
that we don't talk about is the people of Karabakh itself - both
Karabakh Azeris and Karabakh Armenians. It's clear that if there was
an agreement on basic principles, it would be necessary to include
them more in how to implement this agreement and how to reach a
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The process is that first there should
be the basic principles and after that the sides will have to sit down
and talk about the details and sign Comprehensive Peace Agreement. For
that, you'll need input from Karabakhsis themselves, both the Armenian
and Azeris, because they will obviously play a key role in the
implementation.
What is their sentiment?
Their sentiment, especially of Karabakh Armenians is in more hard-line
than the sentiment in Yerevan, because they feel the security threats
more clearly. That is why for any peace agreement to work, it will
have to have very clear security guarantees, there will need to be
deployment of international peacekeepers, so that way people living in
Karabakh could feel more confident with the situation. That is also
why the interim status is so important - because, again, the people of
Karabakh would be able to feel that they have a status, not a
full-fledged independent status, but something that would allow them,
for example, to be represented abroad and to be able to talk with
countries outside the region.
http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/07/03/52674196.html