Tweet
New Europe
July 3 2011
Turkish foreign policy: Where to next?
Author: Demir Murat Seyrek and Amanda Paul
3 July 2011 - Issue : 942
The proactive approach of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) to foreign policy making has changed traditional dynamics
and taken Turkey to a totally different level of influence and power
in its neighbourhood over the last few years. Nowadays Turkey has
developed a far more independent foreign policy than hitherto. While
maintaining strong links with the West, being a long time member of
NATO, Ankara has begun to consider the national interests of the
Turkey first and foremost which was not always the case in the past.
This independent approach has raised the eyebrows of many western
experts who interpret this as the West losing Turkey, as Ankara
becomes increasing engaged in its other neighbourhoods, most
particularly the Middle East. Some explain this `shift' as a natural
result of Turkey's growing influence in the region, while others have
described it as the imperialist concept of `neo-Ottomanism', which
refers to the increasing involvement of Turkey in the former
territories of the Ottoman Empire, including the Balkans, Middle East,
and North Africa.
While the AKP's third landslide victory, taking almost 50% of the vote
at the 12th June Parliamentary elections, is expected to have several
implications for Turkey's domestic politics, whether this success will
take Turkey further away from the West or result in better dialogue
and cooperation between the West and Ankara on foreign policy issues
still remains to be seen. Although the AKP's main foreign policy
dynamics are unlikely to change, regional developments, including the
recent uprising in Syria, may force Turkey to have closer cooperation
and dialogue with western allies, particular the US.
Presently, Syria represents the first foreign policy challenge of
AKP's third term. The once close relationship between Turkish Prime
Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad,
came to an end following al-Assad's failure to introduce expected
reforms and the on-going brutal attacks on civilians by the security
forces. Sharing a border with Syria means that Turkey is one of the
first countries to be directly affected by chaos and instability, and
this fact therefore rules out the possibility of maintaining a
low-profile as has been the case with Libya. Turkey's policy on
Syria, and the level of coordination with its Western allies in
building this policy, has consequences for Turkey's relations with the
West and Israel. Moreover, potential regime change in Syria increases
concern in Iran, which is starting to take a more critical approach
towards Turkey's deepening role in Syria. In this respect, the Syrian
crisis may act as a litmus test for the reshaping of foreign policy
dynamics in this region: on the one hand, dialogue between Turkey and
Iran may run into trouble, while on the other, it may create an
opportunity for rapprochement between Turkey and Israel.
The future of Turkey-Israel relations is another important issue. US
attempts to `reset' Turkey-Israel relations prior to the elections
came as no surprise. With developments in the Arab world, and Iran's
nuclear programme bringing instability to the region, the US desires
an end to the tensions between its two democratic, reliable and stable
allies. Thus, we should expect an increasing amount of American
diplomacy to reconcile Turkey and Israel in the coming period. AKP's
efforts to prevent a second flotilla incident can be viewed as a
consequence of this. It would be naïve to expect the reestablishment
of strong ties between Turkey and Israel in short and mid-term.
However, normalization of relations and Turkey's return to the
negotiation table in the Middle East as a mediator may be expected.
Turkish-US relations may also enter a new era following the Arab
Spring. While Washington has recently taken a critical approach
towards several issues in Turkey, including media freedom and freedom
of expression, mutual strategic interests and the increasing regional
role of Turkey may re-strengthen the strategic ties between two old
allies. The US needs Turkey's support and consistent approach on
Syria and Iran while Turkey needs concrete steps from the US in
eliminating terror camps in the Northern Iraq while at the same time
making greater efforts into solving the Kurdish issue in a peaceful
way through domestic reforms.
While expectation for re-strengthening Turkish-American relations are
high, the same cannot be said for EU-Turkey relations which are set to
remain deadlocked unless there is a change vis-à-vis the decades old
Cyprus problem or from the leadership of those countries (in
particular France and Germany) that are opposed to Turkish membership.
There are currently eighteen negotiating chapters frozen due to vetoes
by France, Germany and Cyprus. While France and Germany block for
political reasons, Cyprus blocks due to Turkey's failure to fully meet
it's Custom's Union (the Additional Protocol) obligations and open its
airspace and harbours to the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish policy has
always been to link the implementation of the Additional Protocol to
the EU delivering on the commitments it made to Turkish Cypriots in
the aftermath of the 2004 Annan Plan Referendum for the reunification
of Cyprus, when Turkish Cypriots voted `yes' while Greek Cypriots
voted `no'. The EU offered Turkish Cypriots an economic deal which
included a Direct Trade Regulation, but it has never materialized due
to Greek Cypriot opposition.
With such a big mandate, Erdogan could now take steps and extend the
Additional Protocol. This would immediately unblock 8 chapters, boost
Turkey's credibility and take way some of the ammunition used by those
opposed to Turkish accession. However, Ankara is unlikely to do this
as long as the EU makes no effort to demonstrate commitment to Turkish
membership. Given that nowadays the EU remains bogged down with the
Euro-crisis, has had a negative reaction to immigrants coming from
North Africa, and seems to lack any vision at all, it does not seem
likely that a `reset of talks' is about to happen.
Turkey would also probably welcome an opportunity to reopen
rapprochement talks with Armenia, which collapsed last year,
principally as a result of Turkey's decision to link it to progress on
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan
(following pressure from Baku) which was not part of the agreement
negotiated between Yerevan and Ankara. Given that Erdogan has already
underlined the importance of Azerbaijan for Turkey, it is unlikely he
will risk upsetting Baku again. For Turkey to have a real role in the
region Ankara first needs to concentrate on implementing `zero
problems' within regional countries. Therefore, as long as Turkey
does not normalise relations with Armenia, Ankara will be unable to
have such a role.
While Turkey's new approach to foreign policy is aimed at making
Turkey a significant regional player, Turkey also want to go beyond
this and Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu took several
initiatives in different regions of the world, over the last two
years. Turkey continues to strengthen ties with Russia, Ukraine and
China while also quickly moving into Africa and even South America.
Although there is no doubt Turkey is playing an increasingly important
role in its region, Ankara needs to be careful not to spread itself
too thinly by trying to be everything to everyone. Regional
developments may require Turkey to focus on a few strategic issues,
which may have direct consequences for Turkey and the regional
balance. Furthermore, while Turkey has positioned itself as an
active regional player it has not managed to solve any of the most
thorny regional issues (Cyprus, Armenian issue, the Aegean issue, Iran
nuclear issue, the Middle East conflict). If not final solutions, at
least some concrete improvements in some of these issues will be
required in order to preserve the consistency and validity of `zero
problems with neighbours' and `pro-active foreign policy' approaches
of AKP.
Demir Murat Seyrek (Managing Partner of Glocal Communications) Amanda
Paul (Policy Analyst for the European Policy Centre in Brussels).
http://www.neurope.eu/articles/107379.php
July 3 2011
Turkish foreign policy: Where to next?
Author: Demir Murat Seyrek and Amanda Paul
3 July 2011 - Issue : 942
The proactive approach of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) to foreign policy making has changed traditional dynamics
and taken Turkey to a totally different level of influence and power
in its neighbourhood over the last few years. Nowadays Turkey has
developed a far more independent foreign policy than hitherto. While
maintaining strong links with the West, being a long time member of
NATO, Ankara has begun to consider the national interests of the
Turkey first and foremost which was not always the case in the past.
This independent approach has raised the eyebrows of many western
experts who interpret this as the West losing Turkey, as Ankara
becomes increasing engaged in its other neighbourhoods, most
particularly the Middle East. Some explain this `shift' as a natural
result of Turkey's growing influence in the region, while others have
described it as the imperialist concept of `neo-Ottomanism', which
refers to the increasing involvement of Turkey in the former
territories of the Ottoman Empire, including the Balkans, Middle East,
and North Africa.
While the AKP's third landslide victory, taking almost 50% of the vote
at the 12th June Parliamentary elections, is expected to have several
implications for Turkey's domestic politics, whether this success will
take Turkey further away from the West or result in better dialogue
and cooperation between the West and Ankara on foreign policy issues
still remains to be seen. Although the AKP's main foreign policy
dynamics are unlikely to change, regional developments, including the
recent uprising in Syria, may force Turkey to have closer cooperation
and dialogue with western allies, particular the US.
Presently, Syria represents the first foreign policy challenge of
AKP's third term. The once close relationship between Turkish Prime
Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad,
came to an end following al-Assad's failure to introduce expected
reforms and the on-going brutal attacks on civilians by the security
forces. Sharing a border with Syria means that Turkey is one of the
first countries to be directly affected by chaos and instability, and
this fact therefore rules out the possibility of maintaining a
low-profile as has been the case with Libya. Turkey's policy on
Syria, and the level of coordination with its Western allies in
building this policy, has consequences for Turkey's relations with the
West and Israel. Moreover, potential regime change in Syria increases
concern in Iran, which is starting to take a more critical approach
towards Turkey's deepening role in Syria. In this respect, the Syrian
crisis may act as a litmus test for the reshaping of foreign policy
dynamics in this region: on the one hand, dialogue between Turkey and
Iran may run into trouble, while on the other, it may create an
opportunity for rapprochement between Turkey and Israel.
The future of Turkey-Israel relations is another important issue. US
attempts to `reset' Turkey-Israel relations prior to the elections
came as no surprise. With developments in the Arab world, and Iran's
nuclear programme bringing instability to the region, the US desires
an end to the tensions between its two democratic, reliable and stable
allies. Thus, we should expect an increasing amount of American
diplomacy to reconcile Turkey and Israel in the coming period. AKP's
efforts to prevent a second flotilla incident can be viewed as a
consequence of this. It would be naïve to expect the reestablishment
of strong ties between Turkey and Israel in short and mid-term.
However, normalization of relations and Turkey's return to the
negotiation table in the Middle East as a mediator may be expected.
Turkish-US relations may also enter a new era following the Arab
Spring. While Washington has recently taken a critical approach
towards several issues in Turkey, including media freedom and freedom
of expression, mutual strategic interests and the increasing regional
role of Turkey may re-strengthen the strategic ties between two old
allies. The US needs Turkey's support and consistent approach on
Syria and Iran while Turkey needs concrete steps from the US in
eliminating terror camps in the Northern Iraq while at the same time
making greater efforts into solving the Kurdish issue in a peaceful
way through domestic reforms.
While expectation for re-strengthening Turkish-American relations are
high, the same cannot be said for EU-Turkey relations which are set to
remain deadlocked unless there is a change vis-à-vis the decades old
Cyprus problem or from the leadership of those countries (in
particular France and Germany) that are opposed to Turkish membership.
There are currently eighteen negotiating chapters frozen due to vetoes
by France, Germany and Cyprus. While France and Germany block for
political reasons, Cyprus blocks due to Turkey's failure to fully meet
it's Custom's Union (the Additional Protocol) obligations and open its
airspace and harbours to the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish policy has
always been to link the implementation of the Additional Protocol to
the EU delivering on the commitments it made to Turkish Cypriots in
the aftermath of the 2004 Annan Plan Referendum for the reunification
of Cyprus, when Turkish Cypriots voted `yes' while Greek Cypriots
voted `no'. The EU offered Turkish Cypriots an economic deal which
included a Direct Trade Regulation, but it has never materialized due
to Greek Cypriot opposition.
With such a big mandate, Erdogan could now take steps and extend the
Additional Protocol. This would immediately unblock 8 chapters, boost
Turkey's credibility and take way some of the ammunition used by those
opposed to Turkish accession. However, Ankara is unlikely to do this
as long as the EU makes no effort to demonstrate commitment to Turkish
membership. Given that nowadays the EU remains bogged down with the
Euro-crisis, has had a negative reaction to immigrants coming from
North Africa, and seems to lack any vision at all, it does not seem
likely that a `reset of talks' is about to happen.
Turkey would also probably welcome an opportunity to reopen
rapprochement talks with Armenia, which collapsed last year,
principally as a result of Turkey's decision to link it to progress on
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan
(following pressure from Baku) which was not part of the agreement
negotiated between Yerevan and Ankara. Given that Erdogan has already
underlined the importance of Azerbaijan for Turkey, it is unlikely he
will risk upsetting Baku again. For Turkey to have a real role in the
region Ankara first needs to concentrate on implementing `zero
problems' within regional countries. Therefore, as long as Turkey
does not normalise relations with Armenia, Ankara will be unable to
have such a role.
While Turkey's new approach to foreign policy is aimed at making
Turkey a significant regional player, Turkey also want to go beyond
this and Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu took several
initiatives in different regions of the world, over the last two
years. Turkey continues to strengthen ties with Russia, Ukraine and
China while also quickly moving into Africa and even South America.
Although there is no doubt Turkey is playing an increasingly important
role in its region, Ankara needs to be careful not to spread itself
too thinly by trying to be everything to everyone. Regional
developments may require Turkey to focus on a few strategic issues,
which may have direct consequences for Turkey and the regional
balance. Furthermore, while Turkey has positioned itself as an
active regional player it has not managed to solve any of the most
thorny regional issues (Cyprus, Armenian issue, the Aegean issue, Iran
nuclear issue, the Middle East conflict). If not final solutions, at
least some concrete improvements in some of these issues will be
required in order to preserve the consistency and validity of `zero
problems with neighbours' and `pro-active foreign policy' approaches
of AKP.
Demir Murat Seyrek (Managing Partner of Glocal Communications) Amanda
Paul (Policy Analyst for the European Policy Centre in Brussels).
http://www.neurope.eu/articles/107379.php