KAZAN SUMMIT: NOT A FAILURE, JUST A MEETING
Hurriyet Daily News
July 11 2011
Turkey
The foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia met behind
closed doors in Kazan, the capital of Russia's Republic of Tatarstan
on June 24. The talks, which were mediated by Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev, failed to produce an agreement on the basic principles for
a Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement.
On May 26, at the G8 Summit in Deauville, Medvedev, U.S. President
Obama and French President Sarkozy issued a joint statement that urged
Armenia and Azerbaijan to reach an agreement. While international
mediators, Russia, France and the U.S., had clearly expressed the
urgency of a deal, Russia's goal for the late-June meeting in Kazan
was to persuade the sides to agree to the set of "basic principles"
negotiated four years ago. The basic principles were first formally
presented to Armenia and Azerbaijan in late 2007. They have since
undergone several modifications aimed at making them more acceptable to
both sides. The latest meeting which brought Armenian and Azerbaijani
leaders together highlighted a number of issues that are independent
from each other, but affect one another. During the last three years,
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has internalized the role of "chief
broker" and organized a dozen meetings between the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan "under the auspices of Russia."
Such a situation not only strengthens Russia's position but also
decreases the effectiveness of the Minsk Group. Because even though
the mentioned initiatives are being taken within the framework of the
Minsk Group, Moscow appears to be the most active actor. Moreover,
as the number of Russia's initiatives increase, the closer both
Armenia and Azerbaijan become to Russia since they start to believe
it is necessary to have close relations to meet their demands.
Second, there have been a number of meetings in various ways to
conciliate Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders. There is a clear lesson
to be drawn from previous meetings. Conciliating both leaders is not
enough since the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is a matter of concern
in the domestic politics of both countries. Nagorno-Karabakh is a
domestic political issue as well as an international dispute. It is
vitally important to note that since any attempt to solve the problem
is being evaluated as compensation, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem has
unseated numbers of politicians in the past. Preparing societies
for change is a necessary prerequisite to awaiting further steps
from these leaders toward any solution. Third, Russia's priorities
in the region and its role during the negotiation process should be
emphasized. Russia's active participation in the Minsk process is
derived from Moscow's understanding that any possible solution should
take place under Russian leadership. For Russia, the solution of the
problem could strengthen Russia's position in the region by showing
that it is the only actor capable of mediating in its backyard. As a
result of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the Russian presence continues
not only in military aspects but also politically. Hence, it seems
the only winner in both scenarios is Russia. Fourth, Russia, which
is one of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group established to solve
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, is also the main promoter of Armenia.
Moreover, taking Russia's support for granted does not make Armenia
more flexible. Last but not least, the two sides are simply too far
apart in the very essence of the problem. There's no political will
for a solution since the key to conflict resolution is not urgent
for any part.
In conclusion, the Kazan summit should not be seen as a failure
since it is only one of many meetings. The zero-sum game understanding
between Armenia and Azerbaijan could not yet be replaced with a win-win
understanding. Under these circumstances high expectations from the
summit had no ground. Furthermore, without "perception change" it
would be hard to see progression. The only concrete result of the
Kazan Summit is to see Russia once again as a mediator on the one
hand and an actor that wins in any scenario on the other.
Habibe Ozdal is a researcher at USAK center for Eurasian Studies,
International Strategic Research Organization
Hurriyet Daily News
July 11 2011
Turkey
The foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia met behind
closed doors in Kazan, the capital of Russia's Republic of Tatarstan
on June 24. The talks, which were mediated by Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev, failed to produce an agreement on the basic principles for
a Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement.
On May 26, at the G8 Summit in Deauville, Medvedev, U.S. President
Obama and French President Sarkozy issued a joint statement that urged
Armenia and Azerbaijan to reach an agreement. While international
mediators, Russia, France and the U.S., had clearly expressed the
urgency of a deal, Russia's goal for the late-June meeting in Kazan
was to persuade the sides to agree to the set of "basic principles"
negotiated four years ago. The basic principles were first formally
presented to Armenia and Azerbaijan in late 2007. They have since
undergone several modifications aimed at making them more acceptable to
both sides. The latest meeting which brought Armenian and Azerbaijani
leaders together highlighted a number of issues that are independent
from each other, but affect one another. During the last three years,
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has internalized the role of "chief
broker" and organized a dozen meetings between the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan "under the auspices of Russia."
Such a situation not only strengthens Russia's position but also
decreases the effectiveness of the Minsk Group. Because even though
the mentioned initiatives are being taken within the framework of the
Minsk Group, Moscow appears to be the most active actor. Moreover,
as the number of Russia's initiatives increase, the closer both
Armenia and Azerbaijan become to Russia since they start to believe
it is necessary to have close relations to meet their demands.
Second, there have been a number of meetings in various ways to
conciliate Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders. There is a clear lesson
to be drawn from previous meetings. Conciliating both leaders is not
enough since the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is a matter of concern
in the domestic politics of both countries. Nagorno-Karabakh is a
domestic political issue as well as an international dispute. It is
vitally important to note that since any attempt to solve the problem
is being evaluated as compensation, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem has
unseated numbers of politicians in the past. Preparing societies
for change is a necessary prerequisite to awaiting further steps
from these leaders toward any solution. Third, Russia's priorities
in the region and its role during the negotiation process should be
emphasized. Russia's active participation in the Minsk process is
derived from Moscow's understanding that any possible solution should
take place under Russian leadership. For Russia, the solution of the
problem could strengthen Russia's position in the region by showing
that it is the only actor capable of mediating in its backyard. As a
result of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the Russian presence continues
not only in military aspects but also politically. Hence, it seems
the only winner in both scenarios is Russia. Fourth, Russia, which
is one of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group established to solve
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, is also the main promoter of Armenia.
Moreover, taking Russia's support for granted does not make Armenia
more flexible. Last but not least, the two sides are simply too far
apart in the very essence of the problem. There's no political will
for a solution since the key to conflict resolution is not urgent
for any part.
In conclusion, the Kazan summit should not be seen as a failure
since it is only one of many meetings. The zero-sum game understanding
between Armenia and Azerbaijan could not yet be replaced with a win-win
understanding. Under these circumstances high expectations from the
summit had no ground. Furthermore, without "perception change" it
would be hard to see progression. The only concrete result of the
Kazan Summit is to see Russia once again as a mediator on the one
hand and an actor that wins in any scenario on the other.
Habibe Ozdal is a researcher at USAK center for Eurasian Studies,
International Strategic Research Organization