Tweet
NAGORNO-KARABAKH IN THE SHADOW OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
Today's Zaman
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-250246-opinion-nagorno-karabakh-in-the-shadow-of-russian-influence.html
July 12 2011
Turkey
Last year I met with a Russian official at an international conference
in Moscow. During our long and contentious discussion on the problem
of settling the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, he argued that any
attempt by Armenian leadership to try to change the status quo in
a positive sense will result in events similar to those that took
place in 1997 when former President Levon Ter-Petrosian was forced
to resign, or in 1999, when several top local officials were shot
dead by terrorists in the national parliament. I was not surprised to
hear such a strongly held opinion from my Russian colleague, just as
I was not surprised to learn of a new failure of the opposing parties
to reach a breakthrough in the peace talks recently held in Kazan.
In reality, the factor of external powers has always held a special
place in the conflict settlement process. Many agree that there are
outside strategic concerns behind the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis.
Clearly, an influential group of principal powers (in which Russia,
the US and the European Union dominate) plays a key role in the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) when it
comes to the issue of conflict resolution. In recent years Russia has
taken a proactive stance in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process,
thus trying to convince the West that the Kremlin has quite a big
potential to impose a diplomatic solution on the parties, or at least
to be a credible mediator.
Indeed Moscow has succeeded in strengthening ties with both Yerevan
and Baku, with the West progressively losing ground to increasing
Russian economic, military and political advancement in the region,
as reflected in Russia's military agreement with Armenia and growing
energy ties with Azerbaijan. Moscow is trying to create a new balance
of relations in the Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan triangle, and all the
latest diplomatic steps by the Kremlin have been aimed at maintaining
a geopolitical equilibrium in the conflict-torn region. By doing so,
Russia has enhanced its position in the South Caucasus.
Russia's successful foreign policy in the region also results from the
failure of other international players, or at least the systemized
weakening of their stances. The Obama administration's shortsighted
policy has seriously weakened US strategic objectives in the South
Caucasus. Washington's failure to craft any coherent vision as to how
the region fits into broader US strategy has allowed America's role
to be increasingly defined through the prism of Russia. The lack of a
meaningful US response to the challenge presented by the protracted
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh not only highlights the low level of
US engagement in this troubled region but also renders questionable
America's ability to be an effective player in the OSCE Minsk Group.
Likewise, the EU lacks a visionary and principled approach in its
policy toward resolving the conflict. Brussels has practically no
role in the conflict settlement and therefore does not have the
necessary tools to intervene in the peace process, offering only
confidence-building activities. Such a situation strongly limits the
influence of the EU in the region and dramatically hinders Brussels'
capacity to formulate meaningful policy to deal with simmering
secessionist conflicts. The resulting lack of a common and integrated
strategy may lead in the near future to a withdrawal of the West from
the South Caucasus and the loss of ground to Russia's more assertive
foreign policy.
Therefore, Russia is seen as essentially having a monopoly over the
peacemaking process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a role which the
OSCE has effectively forsaken. By orchestrating the negotiations, the
Kremlin seeks to enhance Russia's "sphere of influence" and to cause
Euro-Atlantic security arrangements in the region to disintegrate. The
failure of the OSCE not only shows the EU to be effectively lacking
the ability to speak in the face of the South Caucasus crisis, but
also demonstrates their inability to build international support
around interests in competition with Russian ones.
Meanwhile, Moscow's mediating mission has given rise to intensive
speculation as to whether Russia is presently interested in a
definitive solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. More precisely,
the question that needs to be answered is: Does Russia want a quick
resolution of the conflict? It is very unlikely that Russian-led peace
talks will effectively solve the crisis in the near future. Instead
it is likely that Moscow will exploit the peace process to gain
more economic, military and political power. In order bring about
a progressive shift of the region into its own orbit of influence,
Russia needs only to keep things as they are in the South Caucasus.
Given these circumstances, Russia is simply interested in maintaining
the "managed instability" in the region.
Nevertheless, Russia's role in finding an ultimate solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh crisis is very critical. Without doubt, the Kremlin
holds the key to the Armenian-Azerbaijani quandary. Russia does have
a golden opportunity for ending this protracted territorial conflict
and helping reconcile the two nations. However, Moscow seems to
be waiting for a time when a new, beneficial political situation
that fits well into Russian strategic interests is realized in the
post-Soviet Southern Tier. Until this happens, the game goes on
and the end is still ahead. The Western democracies are surely not
powerless to bring about a change in Russian behavior in Europe's
backyard. The US and the EU must understand that stand to lose all
influence in this strategically important area. Moreover, the Western
players will risk losing a major geopolitical game if they continue to
pursue a "Russia first" policy and watch calmly how Russian economic,
military and political influence extends in the aftermath of the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.
*Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev was Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellow at the
Peace Research Institute (Bonn, 2000-2003). He is currently professor
of political science at Western University in Baku, Azerbaijan,
and the author of "The South Caucasus at the Crossroads" (LIT, Berlin).
Today's Zaman
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-250246-opinion-nagorno-karabakh-in-the-shadow-of-russian-influence.html
July 12 2011
Turkey
Last year I met with a Russian official at an international conference
in Moscow. During our long and contentious discussion on the problem
of settling the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, he argued that any
attempt by Armenian leadership to try to change the status quo in
a positive sense will result in events similar to those that took
place in 1997 when former President Levon Ter-Petrosian was forced
to resign, or in 1999, when several top local officials were shot
dead by terrorists in the national parliament. I was not surprised to
hear such a strongly held opinion from my Russian colleague, just as
I was not surprised to learn of a new failure of the opposing parties
to reach a breakthrough in the peace talks recently held in Kazan.
In reality, the factor of external powers has always held a special
place in the conflict settlement process. Many agree that there are
outside strategic concerns behind the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis.
Clearly, an influential group of principal powers (in which Russia,
the US and the European Union dominate) plays a key role in the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) when it
comes to the issue of conflict resolution. In recent years Russia has
taken a proactive stance in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process,
thus trying to convince the West that the Kremlin has quite a big
potential to impose a diplomatic solution on the parties, or at least
to be a credible mediator.
Indeed Moscow has succeeded in strengthening ties with both Yerevan
and Baku, with the West progressively losing ground to increasing
Russian economic, military and political advancement in the region,
as reflected in Russia's military agreement with Armenia and growing
energy ties with Azerbaijan. Moscow is trying to create a new balance
of relations in the Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan triangle, and all the
latest diplomatic steps by the Kremlin have been aimed at maintaining
a geopolitical equilibrium in the conflict-torn region. By doing so,
Russia has enhanced its position in the South Caucasus.
Russia's successful foreign policy in the region also results from the
failure of other international players, or at least the systemized
weakening of their stances. The Obama administration's shortsighted
policy has seriously weakened US strategic objectives in the South
Caucasus. Washington's failure to craft any coherent vision as to how
the region fits into broader US strategy has allowed America's role
to be increasingly defined through the prism of Russia. The lack of a
meaningful US response to the challenge presented by the protracted
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh not only highlights the low level of
US engagement in this troubled region but also renders questionable
America's ability to be an effective player in the OSCE Minsk Group.
Likewise, the EU lacks a visionary and principled approach in its
policy toward resolving the conflict. Brussels has practically no
role in the conflict settlement and therefore does not have the
necessary tools to intervene in the peace process, offering only
confidence-building activities. Such a situation strongly limits the
influence of the EU in the region and dramatically hinders Brussels'
capacity to formulate meaningful policy to deal with simmering
secessionist conflicts. The resulting lack of a common and integrated
strategy may lead in the near future to a withdrawal of the West from
the South Caucasus and the loss of ground to Russia's more assertive
foreign policy.
Therefore, Russia is seen as essentially having a monopoly over the
peacemaking process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a role which the
OSCE has effectively forsaken. By orchestrating the negotiations, the
Kremlin seeks to enhance Russia's "sphere of influence" and to cause
Euro-Atlantic security arrangements in the region to disintegrate. The
failure of the OSCE not only shows the EU to be effectively lacking
the ability to speak in the face of the South Caucasus crisis, but
also demonstrates their inability to build international support
around interests in competition with Russian ones.
Meanwhile, Moscow's mediating mission has given rise to intensive
speculation as to whether Russia is presently interested in a
definitive solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. More precisely,
the question that needs to be answered is: Does Russia want a quick
resolution of the conflict? It is very unlikely that Russian-led peace
talks will effectively solve the crisis in the near future. Instead
it is likely that Moscow will exploit the peace process to gain
more economic, military and political power. In order bring about
a progressive shift of the region into its own orbit of influence,
Russia needs only to keep things as they are in the South Caucasus.
Given these circumstances, Russia is simply interested in maintaining
the "managed instability" in the region.
Nevertheless, Russia's role in finding an ultimate solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh crisis is very critical. Without doubt, the Kremlin
holds the key to the Armenian-Azerbaijani quandary. Russia does have
a golden opportunity for ending this protracted territorial conflict
and helping reconcile the two nations. However, Moscow seems to
be waiting for a time when a new, beneficial political situation
that fits well into Russian strategic interests is realized in the
post-Soviet Southern Tier. Until this happens, the game goes on
and the end is still ahead. The Western democracies are surely not
powerless to bring about a change in Russian behavior in Europe's
backyard. The US and the EU must understand that stand to lose all
influence in this strategically important area. Moreover, the Western
players will risk losing a major geopolitical game if they continue to
pursue a "Russia first" policy and watch calmly how Russian economic,
military and political influence extends in the aftermath of the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.
*Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev was Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellow at the
Peace Research Institute (Bonn, 2000-2003). He is currently professor
of political science at Western University in Baku, Azerbaijan,
and the author of "The South Caucasus at the Crossroads" (LIT, Berlin).