THE MADRID PRINCIPLES: PEACE OR A NEW WAR?
Today's Zaman
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-250381-the-madrid-principles-peace-or-a-new-war-by-halit-gulsen*.html
July 13 2011
Turkey
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has been going on for
approximately 20 years now, has so far failed to reach a permanent
solution.
The initiatives of the Minsk Group, which have increased in recent
years (especially after the Russia-Georgia war in 2008), and the
Madrid Principles put forth in 2007 have also failed to bring the
parties in the conflict to find a middle ground. The leaders, who
have frequently come together to discuss a solution, most recently
met in Kazan, but again no results have been obtained. Azerbaijani and
Armenian officials continue to direct accusations at each other. There
is more than one reason for this situation.
First of all, we should draw attention to the following point:
If there is a conflict between any two countries, under normal
conditions it would be expected of both sides to make concessions on
some points in order to reach a solution. However, normal conditions
unfortunately do not apply to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict because
there is no concession that Azerbaijan could make since 20 percent of
its territory is under occupation. Therefore, the side which must make
concessions is Armenia. However, not only is Armenia not willing to
make this concession, there is also no power willing to push Armenia
to make this concession.
The second point concerns the Madrid Principles, which were put forth
by the Minsk Group in order for a solution to be reached. However,
it is very difficult for the Madrid Principles, in their current form,
to be adopted and implemented by the parties. The essential reason for
this is that although the principles foresee the Armenians withdrawing
from the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, they leave the
final status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined by a referendum to
be made in the following years. It is very clear that this means that
Azerbaijan will lose Nagorno-Karabakh and, therefore, there is almost
no possibility for Azerbaijan to accept these kinds of suggestions.
The problem reaches a deadlock regarding what the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh will be.
On the other hand, if the parties are able to reach a compromise
on the Madrid Principles, there is a possibility that the following
scenario will arise:
In terms of Armenia: Although Armenia will get what it wants in
Nagorno-Karabakh if the principles are adopted, evacuating the
territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh will elicit strong reactions
from the public. According to this argument, recent opposition protests
in the country will give way to much greater mass demonstrations and
this situation will create complications for the country. Moreover,
how Nagorno-Karabakh, surrounded by Azerbaijan, will be affected by
this situation is another big question that would need to be addressed.
In terms of Azerbaijan: If Azerbaijan adopts the principles in their
current form, this will have more significant consequences for it
compared to the consequences for Armenia because leaving the status
of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined by a referendum to be made 10-15
years later will cause the Aliyev administration to face the potential
of massive protests. Furthermore, it is also likely that cracks will
occur within the administration. This situation could pave the way
for instability, whose end cannot be predicted, within the internal
politics of Azerbaijan.
As can be seen, the Madrid Principles have the potential to uncover
much deeper problems, especially in the medium and long terms. On
this point, attention must be drawn to the approach of the Minsk
Group and of Russia in particular.
Despite the fact that the Minsk Group has been holding negotiations
with the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for approximately
20 years, that it has still not being able to obtain results raises
questions about its function and efficiency. In Azerbaijan especially,
serious concerns exist that the Minsk Group is pursuing a policy of
delaying. As a matter of fact, we should note that this view is not
that incorrect because there is a situation in Nagorno-Karabakh such
that changing the existing status quo, even with a text of peace,
could create unexpected results in the region. Since the results
cannot be predicted, the Minsk Group and co-chairs are proceeding
cautiously. However, it is quite clear that South Ossetia and Abkhazia
declaring their independence following the Russia-Georgia war in 2008
has created concerns within the Minsk Group, as nearly 15 meetings have
been held between the leaders since that year. Rather than increasing
the frequency of the talks, the Minsk Group co-chairs should clearly
convey their stance regarding the status of Karabakh.
Or else, it will be quite unlikely to obtain a result from the talks
concerning a just resolution.
On the other hand, as a dominant power and a Minsk Group co-chair,
Russia could influence the policies of both countries. Russia
is the big power most able to bring both parties together at the
negotiation table and which could apply pressure over Armenia in
particular. Until now, Russia has been the country benefitting the
most from a solution not being reached because the current situation
causes both Armenia and Azerbaijan to become more dependent on Russia
in both regional and international politics. In this context, the
key to the Nagorno-Karabakh deadlock is in Russia's hands.
Amid all of this complexity, responding positively to the question of
whether the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could be truly resolved through
politics and diplomacy is very difficult.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Halit GulÅ~_en is a Russia-Caucasia researcher working with the
Center for Eurasian Studies (AVÄ°M).
Today's Zaman
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-250381-the-madrid-principles-peace-or-a-new-war-by-halit-gulsen*.html
July 13 2011
Turkey
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has been going on for
approximately 20 years now, has so far failed to reach a permanent
solution.
The initiatives of the Minsk Group, which have increased in recent
years (especially after the Russia-Georgia war in 2008), and the
Madrid Principles put forth in 2007 have also failed to bring the
parties in the conflict to find a middle ground. The leaders, who
have frequently come together to discuss a solution, most recently
met in Kazan, but again no results have been obtained. Azerbaijani and
Armenian officials continue to direct accusations at each other. There
is more than one reason for this situation.
First of all, we should draw attention to the following point:
If there is a conflict between any two countries, under normal
conditions it would be expected of both sides to make concessions on
some points in order to reach a solution. However, normal conditions
unfortunately do not apply to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict because
there is no concession that Azerbaijan could make since 20 percent of
its territory is under occupation. Therefore, the side which must make
concessions is Armenia. However, not only is Armenia not willing to
make this concession, there is also no power willing to push Armenia
to make this concession.
The second point concerns the Madrid Principles, which were put forth
by the Minsk Group in order for a solution to be reached. However,
it is very difficult for the Madrid Principles, in their current form,
to be adopted and implemented by the parties. The essential reason for
this is that although the principles foresee the Armenians withdrawing
from the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, they leave the
final status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined by a referendum to
be made in the following years. It is very clear that this means that
Azerbaijan will lose Nagorno-Karabakh and, therefore, there is almost
no possibility for Azerbaijan to accept these kinds of suggestions.
The problem reaches a deadlock regarding what the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh will be.
On the other hand, if the parties are able to reach a compromise
on the Madrid Principles, there is a possibility that the following
scenario will arise:
In terms of Armenia: Although Armenia will get what it wants in
Nagorno-Karabakh if the principles are adopted, evacuating the
territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh will elicit strong reactions
from the public. According to this argument, recent opposition protests
in the country will give way to much greater mass demonstrations and
this situation will create complications for the country. Moreover,
how Nagorno-Karabakh, surrounded by Azerbaijan, will be affected by
this situation is another big question that would need to be addressed.
In terms of Azerbaijan: If Azerbaijan adopts the principles in their
current form, this will have more significant consequences for it
compared to the consequences for Armenia because leaving the status
of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined by a referendum to be made 10-15
years later will cause the Aliyev administration to face the potential
of massive protests. Furthermore, it is also likely that cracks will
occur within the administration. This situation could pave the way
for instability, whose end cannot be predicted, within the internal
politics of Azerbaijan.
As can be seen, the Madrid Principles have the potential to uncover
much deeper problems, especially in the medium and long terms. On
this point, attention must be drawn to the approach of the Minsk
Group and of Russia in particular.
Despite the fact that the Minsk Group has been holding negotiations
with the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for approximately
20 years, that it has still not being able to obtain results raises
questions about its function and efficiency. In Azerbaijan especially,
serious concerns exist that the Minsk Group is pursuing a policy of
delaying. As a matter of fact, we should note that this view is not
that incorrect because there is a situation in Nagorno-Karabakh such
that changing the existing status quo, even with a text of peace,
could create unexpected results in the region. Since the results
cannot be predicted, the Minsk Group and co-chairs are proceeding
cautiously. However, it is quite clear that South Ossetia and Abkhazia
declaring their independence following the Russia-Georgia war in 2008
has created concerns within the Minsk Group, as nearly 15 meetings have
been held between the leaders since that year. Rather than increasing
the frequency of the talks, the Minsk Group co-chairs should clearly
convey their stance regarding the status of Karabakh.
Or else, it will be quite unlikely to obtain a result from the talks
concerning a just resolution.
On the other hand, as a dominant power and a Minsk Group co-chair,
Russia could influence the policies of both countries. Russia
is the big power most able to bring both parties together at the
negotiation table and which could apply pressure over Armenia in
particular. Until now, Russia has been the country benefitting the
most from a solution not being reached because the current situation
causes both Armenia and Azerbaijan to become more dependent on Russia
in both regional and international politics. In this context, the
key to the Nagorno-Karabakh deadlock is in Russia's hands.
Amid all of this complexity, responding positively to the question of
whether the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could be truly resolved through
politics and diplomacy is very difficult.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Halit GulÅ~_en is a Russia-Caucasia researcher working with the
Center for Eurasian Studies (AVÄ°M).