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'THE PATRIARCHATE PERCEPTION' IN TURKEY'S GLOBAL STRATEGY
by Bekir Gunay & Emrah Usta*
Today's Zaman
July 19 2011
Turkey
The institution known officially as the Fener Greek Patriarchate in
Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the rest of the world,
serves as the spiritual leader of the Orthodox community, whose
members exceed 250 million.
After the Roman Empire split into East and West, the Christians in the
Byzantine Empire were subordinated to the Ä°stanbul Orthodox Church,
whereas the Orthodox Church known as the Oriental Church separated
from the Catholic Church in the fifth century. Noticing this dual
distinction between religious groups, Fatih Sultan Mehmet recognized
the depth of all these in the Patriarch of the Byzantine Empire.
It could be said that Mehmet relied on some expansionist policies
that did not actually seem pursuable at the beginning. A problem
arose in the vast empire stretching from Dardanelles to Edirne and
even Trachea. This problem was born in an empire unable to penetrate
the Balkans and expand its territories. This structure, the Orthodox
Patriarch, controlled the Orthodox world and enjoyed vast territory
stretching from the Balkans to Moscow, from Jerusalem to Alexandria.
Attempting to create such a powerful front is the main motive for
Fatih Sultan Mehmet's decision to emphasize the state vision through
Ä°stanbul on the one hand and Rome and Madrid on the other. The key
to this attempt was the conquest of Ä°stanbul, which was controlled
by the Byzantines.
In line with this policy, the Ottoman sultan issued some decrees
recognizing some privileges for the Patriarchate and this became a
custom of the state up until Mahmud II. The Ottoman rulers, under
this custom, granted privileges to the Patriarchate and thus the
legal status of the Fener Greek Patriarchate became permanent.
Where does Turkey stand in the Patriarchate issue?
Turkey has been trying to identify specific policies regarding the
Patriarchate issue since 2003. The foreign policy changes in the
second term of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party)
also had implications for domestic policies. This was followed by
attempts to integrate non-Muslims and non-Turks into the system
through a democratization process that peaked in the Sept. 12, 2010
referendum. While it is too early to witness the results of the opening
process, further moves should follow. The main goal here is to expedite
the creation of a democratic constitution by President Abdullah Gul,
who acts independent of political considerations and governmental
priorities, and to contribute to the emergence of a civilian approach.
Contrary to popular belief, the Patriarchate issue and similar
problems are not only related to foreign affairs but also to domestic
politics. In recent years, the government has acted humbly, not
taking the European court's decision to an upper appeal chamber in
the aftermath of Hrant Dink's murder and adopting a lenient discourse
toward the Armenians, which has had constructive impacts on the Greek
minority in Turkey as well.
A moderate stance was adopted on this matter by granting Armenians
permission to hold religious services in the Akhdamar Church in Van
province and Greeks in the Sumela Monastery in Trabzon province.
Armenian Daron Acemoglu's being offered the position of permanent
representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) is further proof of Turkey's changing policy towards
non-Muslims in the country. However, giving the impression that these
policies were adopted to facilitate Turkey's accession to the EU is
not a proper strategy.
Considering all these elements, it is evident that the issue of the
Patriarchate's status will sooner or later be the most serious issue
for Turkey to address. Turkey should adopt a more comprehensive
approach than simply subordinating the Patriarchate to the Fatih
District Governor's Office and it should redesign this institution
within its 2023 vision. Turkey should be able to use this as part of
a global power strategy.
Evidently, a number of states, including the US, Germany and Russia,
are interested in the Patriarchate issue. It is also apparent that
Russia has a particular interest and that the current policies will
cause some sort of tension with Russia. While Russian the perspective
overlaps with the Turkish stance in regards to the reopening the
Halki Seminary, it is obvious that it will pursue a more aggressive
policy -- despite its strategic ties with Turkey -- in case of the
Patriarch's death or sickness.
Russian interests
Russia wants to consolidate its domination over the Patriarch and
the Orthodox people by ensuring the opening of Halki Seminary because
the Patriarch has to be a graduate of the Halki Seminary, despite the
fact that he is a Turkish citizen under the Treaty of Lausanne. The
Patriarchate remains disinterested in this issue for now. Another
power that will be influential in the multidimensional relations
of the Patriarchate will be the European Union line stretching from
England to Greece.
Turkey should place trust in the Patriarchate to continue its
domination over the Orthodox world and the establishment of a
check-and-balance mechanism. To this end, the measures to be taken in
connection with the 2023 vision include opening the Halki Seminary,
which should be opened not only for the Greek minority, but also for
Armenian and Assyrian citizens. Further steps should also include
assigning the graduates of the seminary as public servants, redefining
the status of the Patriarch, having heads of state and the prime
minister attend some religious services and establishing a ministry
of religious and sectarian unity instead of the current Religious
Affairs Directorate. The Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency
(TÄ°KA) should take steps towards the Orthodox world as well.
The AK Party, which well understands arguments within the system of
religion and belief, should make greater efforts to offer lasting
solutions to the ongoing problems that the Patriarchate and non-Muslim
citizens encounter (reopening of the Halki Seminary, the assets of
the foundations). It appears that the party is determined to take
constructive steps in the matter. Such a constructive approach will
raise t non-Muslims' confidence in the state authority and consolidate
the country's strength against European and other regional states.
In conclusion, it is impossible to comprehend the issue of the
Patriarchate, which suffered greatly from a firm legal status in
the late stages of the Ottoman Empire and the early stages of the
republican era, through 21st century policies. To this end, Turkey
needs to consider this issue to devise a proper global strategy in
connection with the 2023 vision. Turkey's current ambivalence toward
the issue is mainly attributable to its susceptibility to foreign
interference and nationalistic sentiments in the country. However,
it should also be recalled that such problems may be overcome by
integrating different communities from the Orthodox world in the
process.
*Bekir Gunay is an associate professor at Ä°stanbul Suleyman Å~^ah
University and a Central Asia fellow at the Wise Men Center for
Strategic Studies (BÄ°LGESAM) in Ä°stanbul and co-author, Emrah Usta
is a transatlantic fellow at the Praxis Thinking Institute.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Bekir Gunay & Emrah Usta*
Today's Zaman
July 19 2011
Turkey
The institution known officially as the Fener Greek Patriarchate in
Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the rest of the world,
serves as the spiritual leader of the Orthodox community, whose
members exceed 250 million.
After the Roman Empire split into East and West, the Christians in the
Byzantine Empire were subordinated to the Ä°stanbul Orthodox Church,
whereas the Orthodox Church known as the Oriental Church separated
from the Catholic Church in the fifth century. Noticing this dual
distinction between religious groups, Fatih Sultan Mehmet recognized
the depth of all these in the Patriarch of the Byzantine Empire.
It could be said that Mehmet relied on some expansionist policies
that did not actually seem pursuable at the beginning. A problem
arose in the vast empire stretching from Dardanelles to Edirne and
even Trachea. This problem was born in an empire unable to penetrate
the Balkans and expand its territories. This structure, the Orthodox
Patriarch, controlled the Orthodox world and enjoyed vast territory
stretching from the Balkans to Moscow, from Jerusalem to Alexandria.
Attempting to create such a powerful front is the main motive for
Fatih Sultan Mehmet's decision to emphasize the state vision through
Ä°stanbul on the one hand and Rome and Madrid on the other. The key
to this attempt was the conquest of Ä°stanbul, which was controlled
by the Byzantines.
In line with this policy, the Ottoman sultan issued some decrees
recognizing some privileges for the Patriarchate and this became a
custom of the state up until Mahmud II. The Ottoman rulers, under
this custom, granted privileges to the Patriarchate and thus the
legal status of the Fener Greek Patriarchate became permanent.
Where does Turkey stand in the Patriarchate issue?
Turkey has been trying to identify specific policies regarding the
Patriarchate issue since 2003. The foreign policy changes in the
second term of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party)
also had implications for domestic policies. This was followed by
attempts to integrate non-Muslims and non-Turks into the system
through a democratization process that peaked in the Sept. 12, 2010
referendum. While it is too early to witness the results of the opening
process, further moves should follow. The main goal here is to expedite
the creation of a democratic constitution by President Abdullah Gul,
who acts independent of political considerations and governmental
priorities, and to contribute to the emergence of a civilian approach.
Contrary to popular belief, the Patriarchate issue and similar
problems are not only related to foreign affairs but also to domestic
politics. In recent years, the government has acted humbly, not
taking the European court's decision to an upper appeal chamber in
the aftermath of Hrant Dink's murder and adopting a lenient discourse
toward the Armenians, which has had constructive impacts on the Greek
minority in Turkey as well.
A moderate stance was adopted on this matter by granting Armenians
permission to hold religious services in the Akhdamar Church in Van
province and Greeks in the Sumela Monastery in Trabzon province.
Armenian Daron Acemoglu's being offered the position of permanent
representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) is further proof of Turkey's changing policy towards
non-Muslims in the country. However, giving the impression that these
policies were adopted to facilitate Turkey's accession to the EU is
not a proper strategy.
Considering all these elements, it is evident that the issue of the
Patriarchate's status will sooner or later be the most serious issue
for Turkey to address. Turkey should adopt a more comprehensive
approach than simply subordinating the Patriarchate to the Fatih
District Governor's Office and it should redesign this institution
within its 2023 vision. Turkey should be able to use this as part of
a global power strategy.
Evidently, a number of states, including the US, Germany and Russia,
are interested in the Patriarchate issue. It is also apparent that
Russia has a particular interest and that the current policies will
cause some sort of tension with Russia. While Russian the perspective
overlaps with the Turkish stance in regards to the reopening the
Halki Seminary, it is obvious that it will pursue a more aggressive
policy -- despite its strategic ties with Turkey -- in case of the
Patriarch's death or sickness.
Russian interests
Russia wants to consolidate its domination over the Patriarch and
the Orthodox people by ensuring the opening of Halki Seminary because
the Patriarch has to be a graduate of the Halki Seminary, despite the
fact that he is a Turkish citizen under the Treaty of Lausanne. The
Patriarchate remains disinterested in this issue for now. Another
power that will be influential in the multidimensional relations
of the Patriarchate will be the European Union line stretching from
England to Greece.
Turkey should place trust in the Patriarchate to continue its
domination over the Orthodox world and the establishment of a
check-and-balance mechanism. To this end, the measures to be taken in
connection with the 2023 vision include opening the Halki Seminary,
which should be opened not only for the Greek minority, but also for
Armenian and Assyrian citizens. Further steps should also include
assigning the graduates of the seminary as public servants, redefining
the status of the Patriarch, having heads of state and the prime
minister attend some religious services and establishing a ministry
of religious and sectarian unity instead of the current Religious
Affairs Directorate. The Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency
(TÄ°KA) should take steps towards the Orthodox world as well.
The AK Party, which well understands arguments within the system of
religion and belief, should make greater efforts to offer lasting
solutions to the ongoing problems that the Patriarchate and non-Muslim
citizens encounter (reopening of the Halki Seminary, the assets of
the foundations). It appears that the party is determined to take
constructive steps in the matter. Such a constructive approach will
raise t non-Muslims' confidence in the state authority and consolidate
the country's strength against European and other regional states.
In conclusion, it is impossible to comprehend the issue of the
Patriarchate, which suffered greatly from a firm legal status in
the late stages of the Ottoman Empire and the early stages of the
republican era, through 21st century policies. To this end, Turkey
needs to consider this issue to devise a proper global strategy in
connection with the 2023 vision. Turkey's current ambivalence toward
the issue is mainly attributable to its susceptibility to foreign
interference and nationalistic sentiments in the country. However,
it should also be recalled that such problems may be overcome by
integrating different communities from the Orthodox world in the
process.
*Bekir Gunay is an associate professor at Ä°stanbul Suleyman Å~^ah
University and a Central Asia fellow at the Wise Men Center for
Strategic Studies (BÄ°LGESAM) in Ä°stanbul and co-author, Emrah Usta
is a transatlantic fellow at the Praxis Thinking Institute.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress