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WAR CLOUDS GATHERING AGAIN IN THE CAUCASUS - MOSCOW TIMES
Peter Rutland
Tert.am
28.07.11
"Three years after the Russia-Georgia armed conflict, war clouds are
again gathering in the Caucasus.
"Already deadlocked for years, the peace negotiations between
Armenia and Azerbaijan hit a brick wall on June 24 in Kazan, when a
much-anticipated peace summit broke up without agreement. President
Dmitry Medvedev had put his personal authority behind the talks,
having personally convened nine previous meetings between the two
leaders over the past two years.
"Now, there is increasing talk of war - a war that would be presumably
started by Azerbaijan in a bid to regain the province of Karabakh and
the surrounding districts that were seized by Armenian forces during
the war from 1992 to 1994. Armenia argues that the Armenian residents
of Karabakh have a right to independence and that it is unrealistic
to expect Armenians to live as a minority under Azerbaijan's rule
given the history of animosity between the two sides. Each side cites
atrocities against civilians committed by their adversary during a
conflict that erupted in 1988.
"It has become common to describe the standoff as a clash between
two competing principles - "self-determination" for Karabakh versus
"territorial integrity" for Azerbaijan. This makes the dispute sound
like a technical difference of opinion, one that a few good lawyers
could easily resolve.
"In reality, there is no difference over moral or legal principles
between the two sides. Rather, as in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,
it is a question of "two peoples - one land." The disagreement is
over who owns a specific piece of real estate: Karabakh, a land-locked
mountain region having no particular economic or strategic value and
with a population of just over 100,000.
"Karabakh has come to have deep symbolic significance for both
parties. For Azerbaijan, it is a question of erasing the humiliation of
military defeat and seeking justice for the 600,000 refugees that fled
into the remainder of Azerbaijan as a result of the war. The refugees
are roughly equal to the number of Palestinians who fled Israel
in 1948, yet they have been virtually ignored by the international
community. For Armenia, it is about holding on to territory after
a century during which Armenian residents have been progressively
driven from their lands. That process culminated in the massacres -
or genocide - that occurred during World War I, a tragedy that still
overshadows and immeasurably complicates the conflict over Karabakh.
"The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe proposed some
basic principles for a peace settlement back in 2007. The core idea
is temporary recognition of Karabakh's self-rule in return for the
withdrawal of Armenian forces from the other occupied districts. These
Madrid Principles fudge the question of sovereignty by allowing for
a referendum on self-determination in Karabakh at some point in the
future. Armenia is being asked to give up something concrete -occupied
territories - in return for something ephemeral - promises about a
future referendum.
"The main carrot being offered Armenia in return for leaving the
occupied districts around Karabakh is the opening of the border with
Turkey, which was closed by Ankara in solidarity with Azerbaijan in
1993. The 2008 Russia-Georgia war threatened Armenia's land transit
route through Georgia, leaving them dependent on access from Iran. A
concerted international effort to persuade Turkey to open the border
narrowly failed in October 2009, when domestic political opposition
caused Turkey to retreat from an agreement to open the border that
was signed with great fanfare in Zurich.
"Azerbaijan's president, Ilham Aliyev, has repeatedly stated that
independence for Karabakh is non-negotiable, so Armenia's reticence
about moving ahead with the peace process is understandable. Why is
Aliyev continuing to negotiate in the face of Armenian intransigence?
If Aliyev can convince the international community that Armenia is
blocking the Madrid Principles, that could give him some political
cover for launching a war. Aliyev claims that time is on Baku's side,
since Armenia's population is shrinking due to its stagnant economy,
while Azerbaijan is booming thanks to its oil wealth. But Aliyev
faces re-election in 2013, and keeping the lid on the opposition
will be more difficult absent some progress on Karabakh. In addition,
starting in 2014, Azerbaijan's oil production will be past its peak,
and revenues will start to fall.
"Even some liberals are saying that a short war - a war in which
neither side would probably achieve victory - could clear the way
for real negotiations. The model is the 1973 Yom Kippur war, which
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat claimed as a victory and which opened
the door to the Camp David peace talks.
"More important, an indecisive war would discredit the hawks on both
sides, enabling peacemakers to strike a bargain without facing a
coup when they returned home. Azerbaijan's gross domestic product is
five times that of Armenia, and Baku spent $3 billion in 2010 on its
military, more than Armenia's entire budget. But Armenia has taken
delivery of sophisticated Russian hardware, including the S-300 air
defense system and is home to a Russian military base housing 5,000
troops, whose tenure was extended last year through 2044.
"Thus, an attack on Armenia by Azerbaijan could well trigger Russian
intervention, just like Russia's response to the Georgian attack
on South Ossetia in 2008. Aliyev has been trying to maintain good
relations with Russia in the hope that Moscow will press Armenia
to agree to a settlement and will stay on the sidelines in a future
conflict.
"The main factor preventing a war is that none of the great powers
want to see a resumption of hostilities. The West does not want to
see a disruption of oil supplies, and for Russia a war would trigger a
wave of refugees and possibly increased Western intervention in their
Caucasus backyard. But the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 was a reminder
that the major powers cannot always control their smaller allies and
client states. If war were to break out, Russia would probably back
Armenia because it must be seen as standing up for its main ally
in the region. The mere threat of Russian intervention serves as a
deterrent to Turkey entering the war in support of Azerbaijan. At
the same time, however, Azerbaijan is arguably a more valuable ally
for Russia than Armenia because of its important strategic location
on the Caspian. Winning Azerbaijan away from the United States would
be a substantial strategic gain for Moscow.
"In any event, given the large and influential Armenian diaspora in the
West, Armenia should not be placed indefinitely in the Russia camp. A
few years down the road and a color revolution in Yerevan could see
a pro-Western government there. Hopefully, cool heads will prevail,
and the existing situation of neither war nor peace will stagger on
through another hot summer."
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Peter Rutland
Tert.am
28.07.11
"Three years after the Russia-Georgia armed conflict, war clouds are
again gathering in the Caucasus.
"Already deadlocked for years, the peace negotiations between
Armenia and Azerbaijan hit a brick wall on June 24 in Kazan, when a
much-anticipated peace summit broke up without agreement. President
Dmitry Medvedev had put his personal authority behind the talks,
having personally convened nine previous meetings between the two
leaders over the past two years.
"Now, there is increasing talk of war - a war that would be presumably
started by Azerbaijan in a bid to regain the province of Karabakh and
the surrounding districts that were seized by Armenian forces during
the war from 1992 to 1994. Armenia argues that the Armenian residents
of Karabakh have a right to independence and that it is unrealistic
to expect Armenians to live as a minority under Azerbaijan's rule
given the history of animosity between the two sides. Each side cites
atrocities against civilians committed by their adversary during a
conflict that erupted in 1988.
"It has become common to describe the standoff as a clash between
two competing principles - "self-determination" for Karabakh versus
"territorial integrity" for Azerbaijan. This makes the dispute sound
like a technical difference of opinion, one that a few good lawyers
could easily resolve.
"In reality, there is no difference over moral or legal principles
between the two sides. Rather, as in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,
it is a question of "two peoples - one land." The disagreement is
over who owns a specific piece of real estate: Karabakh, a land-locked
mountain region having no particular economic or strategic value and
with a population of just over 100,000.
"Karabakh has come to have deep symbolic significance for both
parties. For Azerbaijan, it is a question of erasing the humiliation of
military defeat and seeking justice for the 600,000 refugees that fled
into the remainder of Azerbaijan as a result of the war. The refugees
are roughly equal to the number of Palestinians who fled Israel
in 1948, yet they have been virtually ignored by the international
community. For Armenia, it is about holding on to territory after
a century during which Armenian residents have been progressively
driven from their lands. That process culminated in the massacres -
or genocide - that occurred during World War I, a tragedy that still
overshadows and immeasurably complicates the conflict over Karabakh.
"The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe proposed some
basic principles for a peace settlement back in 2007. The core idea
is temporary recognition of Karabakh's self-rule in return for the
withdrawal of Armenian forces from the other occupied districts. These
Madrid Principles fudge the question of sovereignty by allowing for
a referendum on self-determination in Karabakh at some point in the
future. Armenia is being asked to give up something concrete -occupied
territories - in return for something ephemeral - promises about a
future referendum.
"The main carrot being offered Armenia in return for leaving the
occupied districts around Karabakh is the opening of the border with
Turkey, which was closed by Ankara in solidarity with Azerbaijan in
1993. The 2008 Russia-Georgia war threatened Armenia's land transit
route through Georgia, leaving them dependent on access from Iran. A
concerted international effort to persuade Turkey to open the border
narrowly failed in October 2009, when domestic political opposition
caused Turkey to retreat from an agreement to open the border that
was signed with great fanfare in Zurich.
"Azerbaijan's president, Ilham Aliyev, has repeatedly stated that
independence for Karabakh is non-negotiable, so Armenia's reticence
about moving ahead with the peace process is understandable. Why is
Aliyev continuing to negotiate in the face of Armenian intransigence?
If Aliyev can convince the international community that Armenia is
blocking the Madrid Principles, that could give him some political
cover for launching a war. Aliyev claims that time is on Baku's side,
since Armenia's population is shrinking due to its stagnant economy,
while Azerbaijan is booming thanks to its oil wealth. But Aliyev
faces re-election in 2013, and keeping the lid on the opposition
will be more difficult absent some progress on Karabakh. In addition,
starting in 2014, Azerbaijan's oil production will be past its peak,
and revenues will start to fall.
"Even some liberals are saying that a short war - a war in which
neither side would probably achieve victory - could clear the way
for real negotiations. The model is the 1973 Yom Kippur war, which
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat claimed as a victory and which opened
the door to the Camp David peace talks.
"More important, an indecisive war would discredit the hawks on both
sides, enabling peacemakers to strike a bargain without facing a
coup when they returned home. Azerbaijan's gross domestic product is
five times that of Armenia, and Baku spent $3 billion in 2010 on its
military, more than Armenia's entire budget. But Armenia has taken
delivery of sophisticated Russian hardware, including the S-300 air
defense system and is home to a Russian military base housing 5,000
troops, whose tenure was extended last year through 2044.
"Thus, an attack on Armenia by Azerbaijan could well trigger Russian
intervention, just like Russia's response to the Georgian attack
on South Ossetia in 2008. Aliyev has been trying to maintain good
relations with Russia in the hope that Moscow will press Armenia
to agree to a settlement and will stay on the sidelines in a future
conflict.
"The main factor preventing a war is that none of the great powers
want to see a resumption of hostilities. The West does not want to
see a disruption of oil supplies, and for Russia a war would trigger a
wave of refugees and possibly increased Western intervention in their
Caucasus backyard. But the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 was a reminder
that the major powers cannot always control their smaller allies and
client states. If war were to break out, Russia would probably back
Armenia because it must be seen as standing up for its main ally
in the region. The mere threat of Russian intervention serves as a
deterrent to Turkey entering the war in support of Azerbaijan. At
the same time, however, Azerbaijan is arguably a more valuable ally
for Russia than Armenia because of its important strategic location
on the Caspian. Winning Azerbaijan away from the United States would
be a substantial strategic gain for Moscow.
"In any event, given the large and influential Armenian diaspora in the
West, Armenia should not be placed indefinitely in the Russia camp. A
few years down the road and a color revolution in Yerevan could see
a pro-Western government there. Hopefully, cool heads will prevail,
and the existing situation of neither war nor peace will stagger on
through another hot summer."
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress