Tweet
NAGORNO KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS ENTERS RATHER DIFFICULT STAGE - THOMAS DE WAAL
Tert.am
29.07.11
The Nagorno Karabakh peace process has entered a rather difficult
stage, Thomas de Waal, expert at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, said, the Armenian service of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported.
At the recent meeting in Kazan, official Baku offered about ten
amendments to the Kremlin-prepared document thereby thwarting the
meeting, whereas both the Russian leader and the leaders of the mediao
states had high expectations of it.
The expert points out three groups of Azerbaijan's motives for acting
against the mediators' will and failing to reach an agreement: First,
official Baku has objections to Lachin as a corridor.
Azerbaijani diplomatic sources informed the expert that Kremlin-drafted
final version of the Basic Principles did not specify Lachin's status.
According to the document, Lachin may, for a while, have unspecified
status, which would take into account both the Armenian side's concerns
over security and Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
Official Baku objects, however: the borders of the Lachin corridor
are not specified nor does the document specify the status of the
39 villages forming part of the Lachin region without, however,
serving as part of the corridor. Moreover, the question is whether
the forcibly displaced Azerbaijanis will be granted the right to
return to the region.
Official Baku also objects to the idea according to which getting
interim status will afford Nagorno-Karabakh an opportunity to join
international organizations, the expert writes. However, Azerbaijan's
reasons for raising the issues at the Kazan meeting remain unclear.
The West expected serious progress at the meeting, the expert stressed.
Among the reasons may be Azerbaijan's second concern.
Baku considers Russia to be pro-Armenian. Moreover, it mistrusts
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, whose roots are of Armenian
descent.
On the other hand, Azerbaijan is not yet sure of who or which political
force will come to power in Russia after the 2012 presidential
election. So Azerbaijan's concern is that the agreements reached now
may be broken in case Vladimir Putin is nominated.
The third reason that, according to the expert, makes Azerbaijan
keep from reaching an agreement as soon as possible is that time is
in Azerbaijan's favor now.
Official Baku is sure that the regional arms race will eventually
make Armenia go bankrupt, and, just in a few years, the Armenian side
will be much weaker and forced into concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh's
status.
However, this belief is beyond all reason for any expert keeping
track of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, Thomas de Waal writes.
Specifically, Armenians respond that Armenia is much stronger now
than it was 20 years ago. It can always expect serious support from
the Armenian Diaspora. Moreover, as years pass, Nagorno-Karabakh's
unrecognized statehood is being consolidated, and most of the young
people under 30 have never seen Azerbaijanis, the expert writes.
From: A. Papazian
Tert.am
29.07.11
The Nagorno Karabakh peace process has entered a rather difficult
stage, Thomas de Waal, expert at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, said, the Armenian service of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported.
At the recent meeting in Kazan, official Baku offered about ten
amendments to the Kremlin-prepared document thereby thwarting the
meeting, whereas both the Russian leader and the leaders of the mediao
states had high expectations of it.
The expert points out three groups of Azerbaijan's motives for acting
against the mediators' will and failing to reach an agreement: First,
official Baku has objections to Lachin as a corridor.
Azerbaijani diplomatic sources informed the expert that Kremlin-drafted
final version of the Basic Principles did not specify Lachin's status.
According to the document, Lachin may, for a while, have unspecified
status, which would take into account both the Armenian side's concerns
over security and Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
Official Baku objects, however: the borders of the Lachin corridor
are not specified nor does the document specify the status of the
39 villages forming part of the Lachin region without, however,
serving as part of the corridor. Moreover, the question is whether
the forcibly displaced Azerbaijanis will be granted the right to
return to the region.
Official Baku also objects to the idea according to which getting
interim status will afford Nagorno-Karabakh an opportunity to join
international organizations, the expert writes. However, Azerbaijan's
reasons for raising the issues at the Kazan meeting remain unclear.
The West expected serious progress at the meeting, the expert stressed.
Among the reasons may be Azerbaijan's second concern.
Baku considers Russia to be pro-Armenian. Moreover, it mistrusts
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, whose roots are of Armenian
descent.
On the other hand, Azerbaijan is not yet sure of who or which political
force will come to power in Russia after the 2012 presidential
election. So Azerbaijan's concern is that the agreements reached now
may be broken in case Vladimir Putin is nominated.
The third reason that, according to the expert, makes Azerbaijan
keep from reaching an agreement as soon as possible is that time is
in Azerbaijan's favor now.
Official Baku is sure that the regional arms race will eventually
make Armenia go bankrupt, and, just in a few years, the Armenian side
will be much weaker and forced into concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh's
status.
However, this belief is beyond all reason for any expert keeping
track of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, Thomas de Waal writes.
Specifically, Armenians respond that Armenia is much stronger now
than it was 20 years ago. It can always expect serious support from
the Armenian Diaspora. Moreover, as years pass, Nagorno-Karabakh's
unrecognized statehood is being consolidated, and most of the young
people under 30 have never seen Azerbaijanis, the expert writes.
From: A. Papazian