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GLOBAL INSIDER: IRAN-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS
World Politics Review
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/9631/global-insider-iran-azerbaijan-relations
July 29, 2011
Earlier this month, a clash between Iranian soldiers and Azerbaijani
border guards left one Azerbaijani guard dead. In an email interview,
Brenda Shaffer, a senior lecturer at the University of Haifa and a
visiting professor at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, discussed
Iran-Azerbaijan relations.
WPR: What has been the trajectory of Iran-Azerbaijan relations over
the past 10 years?
Brenda Shaffer: Iran's policy toward Azerbaijan is one of the best
illustrations of the gap between Tehran's ideological declarations and
its actual realpolitik-guided policies. Despite sharing a common Shiite
identity with Azerbaijan, Tehran has worked to undermine Azerbaijan's
security since the latter's independence.
Following the Soviet breakup, neighboring Armenia invaded Azerbaijan
in 1992, capturing 20 percent of its territory and turning more than
800,000 Azerbaijanis into refugees. Iran, in contrast to its official
ideology of solidarity with Muslims, is a close ally of Armenia,
having served as a critical supplier of food and fuel during the war
with Azerbaijan. In 2007, Iran opened a gas pipeline to Armenia,
an important lifeline for Yerevan, and has since built additional
common energy projects.
Iran supports Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan because it
fears that Azerbaijan could be a source of attraction to Iran's
ethnic Azerbaijani minority, which comprises a third of the Iranian
population. Three majority ethnic Azerbaijani provinces in northwest
Iran border Azerbaijan. Iran does not allow its ethnic minorities,
which comprise 50 percent of its population, to educate their
children in their national languages, nor to use their language in
state institutions, such as courts.
In addition, to Iran's chagrin, Azerbaijan maintains close security
cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. Since Azerbaijan borders Iran,
its role in nonproliferation policies toward Iran is quite important.
WPR: What are the main areas of cooperation and conflict in the
bilateral relationship?
Shaffer: Despite Iran's fundamental opposition to Azerbaijan due to
its pro-U.S. policies and ethnic composition, on the surface both
Tehran and Baku are quite careful to maintain cordial diplomacy and
allow trade to develop between their peoples. For instance, Baku does
not make any formal overtures toward the ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran.
On July 5, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan convened a conference
of representatives of Azerbaijan's diaspora communities. But as part
of its policy of not interfering in Iran's internal matters, the
Azerbaijani government did not extend an invitation to representatives
of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Iran, the largest diaspora community
at 25 million.
In contrast, Tehran works to destabilize Azerbaijan through support for
radical Islamic groups in the country. In recent years, authorities
have uncovered a number of Iranian-sponsored cells in Azerbaijan
that have planned and attempted to conduct terrorist attacks against
government installations and foreign embassies in Baku.
In addition, Tehran openly opposes Baku's official separation of
religion and state policies, as well as the fact that Azerbaijan has
not designated an official state religion, despite 90 percent of its
population being Shiite Muslims. Most recently, Iran has attacked
Azerbaijan's policy of not allowing display of religious symbols,
such as girls' head coverings, in schools. Ironically, Washington
and Tehran have found themselves on the same side on this issue,
with both condemning Azerbaijan's domestic policy.
WPR: What are the wider regional and foreign policy implications of
the Iran-Azerbaijan relationship?
Shaffer: Washington may need to take a closer look at its policies
toward Azerbaijan. Baku pays a high price for its security cooperation
with the U.S. in terms of Iranian attempts to destabilize the country.
At the same time, Washington is often very critical of Baku's
counterterrorism policies aimed at thwarting activities sponsored
from Iran and other external players.
The recent increase in tension between Iran and Azerbaijan, illustrated
by the border incident, has also had a negative impact on the
Nagorno-Karabagh peace process. This is due to the fact that Armenia
most likely views Azerbaijan as weakened by the Iranian threat. Thus
this development will encourage Armenia to harden its positions.
World Politics Review
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/9631/global-insider-iran-azerbaijan-relations
July 29, 2011
Earlier this month, a clash between Iranian soldiers and Azerbaijani
border guards left one Azerbaijani guard dead. In an email interview,
Brenda Shaffer, a senior lecturer at the University of Haifa and a
visiting professor at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, discussed
Iran-Azerbaijan relations.
WPR: What has been the trajectory of Iran-Azerbaijan relations over
the past 10 years?
Brenda Shaffer: Iran's policy toward Azerbaijan is one of the best
illustrations of the gap between Tehran's ideological declarations and
its actual realpolitik-guided policies. Despite sharing a common Shiite
identity with Azerbaijan, Tehran has worked to undermine Azerbaijan's
security since the latter's independence.
Following the Soviet breakup, neighboring Armenia invaded Azerbaijan
in 1992, capturing 20 percent of its territory and turning more than
800,000 Azerbaijanis into refugees. Iran, in contrast to its official
ideology of solidarity with Muslims, is a close ally of Armenia,
having served as a critical supplier of food and fuel during the war
with Azerbaijan. In 2007, Iran opened a gas pipeline to Armenia,
an important lifeline for Yerevan, and has since built additional
common energy projects.
Iran supports Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan because it
fears that Azerbaijan could be a source of attraction to Iran's
ethnic Azerbaijani minority, which comprises a third of the Iranian
population. Three majority ethnic Azerbaijani provinces in northwest
Iran border Azerbaijan. Iran does not allow its ethnic minorities,
which comprise 50 percent of its population, to educate their
children in their national languages, nor to use their language in
state institutions, such as courts.
In addition, to Iran's chagrin, Azerbaijan maintains close security
cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. Since Azerbaijan borders Iran,
its role in nonproliferation policies toward Iran is quite important.
WPR: What are the main areas of cooperation and conflict in the
bilateral relationship?
Shaffer: Despite Iran's fundamental opposition to Azerbaijan due to
its pro-U.S. policies and ethnic composition, on the surface both
Tehran and Baku are quite careful to maintain cordial diplomacy and
allow trade to develop between their peoples. For instance, Baku does
not make any formal overtures toward the ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran.
On July 5, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan convened a conference
of representatives of Azerbaijan's diaspora communities. But as part
of its policy of not interfering in Iran's internal matters, the
Azerbaijani government did not extend an invitation to representatives
of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Iran, the largest diaspora community
at 25 million.
In contrast, Tehran works to destabilize Azerbaijan through support for
radical Islamic groups in the country. In recent years, authorities
have uncovered a number of Iranian-sponsored cells in Azerbaijan
that have planned and attempted to conduct terrorist attacks against
government installations and foreign embassies in Baku.
In addition, Tehran openly opposes Baku's official separation of
religion and state policies, as well as the fact that Azerbaijan has
not designated an official state religion, despite 90 percent of its
population being Shiite Muslims. Most recently, Iran has attacked
Azerbaijan's policy of not allowing display of religious symbols,
such as girls' head coverings, in schools. Ironically, Washington
and Tehran have found themselves on the same side on this issue,
with both condemning Azerbaijan's domestic policy.
WPR: What are the wider regional and foreign policy implications of
the Iran-Azerbaijan relationship?
Shaffer: Washington may need to take a closer look at its policies
toward Azerbaijan. Baku pays a high price for its security cooperation
with the U.S. in terms of Iranian attempts to destabilize the country.
At the same time, Washington is often very critical of Baku's
counterterrorism policies aimed at thwarting activities sponsored
from Iran and other external players.
The recent increase in tension between Iran and Azerbaijan, illustrated
by the border incident, has also had a negative impact on the
Nagorno-Karabagh peace process. This is due to the fact that Armenia
most likely views Azerbaijan as weakened by the Iranian threat. Thus
this development will encourage Armenia to harden its positions.