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Ten tasks for Turkey's new government
by Hugh Pope*
New cities, high-speed trains, suspension bridges, airports, tax
holidays, a `crazy' grand canal parallel to the Bosporus waterway,
iPads for all -- the campaign trail ahead of Turkey's June 12
parliamentary elections is strewn with promises of great times coming.
Resolution of vexed questions in the domestic and foreign policy
sphere has been relegated to the list of things `to be done after the
election.' These more mundane challenges will, however, resurface as
soon as the political class gets back to work.
So, based on the Crisis Group's four years of reporting in Turkey --
and not counting the many challenges of the country's booming economy,
or what its external partners should also do -- here are 10
outstanding diplomatic and political tasks that we think should be
tackled with determination by the new Turkish government.
1. Relaunch Turkey's EU accession process
The EU's internal divisions and some European politicians' hostility
to Turks joining the club have done much to harm the EU's appeal in
Turkey. Indeed, the fact that Turkey's EU membership negotiations in
progress since 2005 have virtually ground to a halt has barely been
mentioned in the election campaign. But Turkish (and European) leaders
should remember that if there is one single factor that makes Turkey
stand out in its troubled region, it is the country's convergence with
Europe - arguably nearly two centuries old, but treaty-based for
nearly 50 years. EU standards are the locomotive of Turkish reform,
some four million people of Turkish origin live in Europe, half of
Turkey's trade is with Europe, most tourists to Turkey come from
Europe, NATO is the cornerstone of Turkish defense and two-thirds of
Turkey's foreign investment comes from EU states. Turkey and Europe
shared many of these fundamental interests for decades, and the two
sides stepped back from the brink with an attempt to restart the
process in 2009. Yet Turkey's EU process is now hanging by a thread,
since there are almost no negotiating chapters left to open. Turkey
holds the key to unlocking EU blocks on at least eight of these
chapters (see Cyprus below). EU politicians' talk of an alternative
`Privileged Partnership' for Turkey seems empty, as the Crisis Group
has argued. But with Europe distracted by its internal struggles, the
idea is being pushed back on the agenda. The new Turkish government
must proactively find a way to allow lifeblood back into the
relationship.
2. Fix Cyprus
Ankara must refocus on the strategic goal it set itself in 2004:
removing the Cyprus problem from the international agenda through
achieving the reunification of the island. An easy first step is to
implement the Additional Protocol, namely, opening Turkey's ports and
airports to Greek Cypriot traffic, a commitment Ankara formally signed
in 2005 as a condition for starting EU negotiations. The EU could have
helped by allowing direct, preferential trade to Turkish Cypriots - as
the Crisis Group pointed out here - but it did not, and Turkey's best
interest is now to help itself. Implementing the Additional Protocol
has no direct link to any Turkish position on a Cyprus settlement and
serves a double purpose: freeing several blocked EU negotiating
chapters, and helping to normalize relations between the Turks of
Turkey and Greek Cypriots. As the Crisis Group argued in its 2011
paper Six Steps to a Settlement, and on our blog, a mutual absence of
trust between Ankara and Nicosia is the single biggest obstacle to
reunification of the island. The new government would also do well to
start a real, structured dialogue with Greek Cypriot officials to give
a new impetus to ongoing talks to solve the Cyprus problem. Failure to
achieve a compromise settlement will cause real damage, as set out in
our 2009 report Reunification or Partition.
3. Undertake broad, inclusive constitutional reform
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has promised a
reformist, inclusive new constitution. As the Crisis Group detailed in
its 2008 report on the Decisive Year Ahead, implementing AKP's ideas
for a new constitution promised in the 2007 election campaign would go
far to reduce ethnic tensions and modernize the way Turkey is governed
(for instance, by removing ethnic attributes from Turkish citizenship,
making Turkish the official and not the only recognized language,
removing parliamentarians' immunity). EU-oriented reforms over the
past decade have already changed about one third of the 1982
Constitution, drawn up under military rule. The AKP has promised a
whole new text. For it to stick, it must be the product of a genuine
consensus, including the Kurdish national movement, not a top-down
imposition. Changes must first reduce sources of domestic conflict,
before trying potentially divisive new ideas like moving to a new
presidential system. At a minimum, any marks of ethnic discrimination
should be removed and freedom of expression further anchored. The idea
of increased powers for local government, a main demand of many ethnic
Kurds, is now supported by some opposition parties including the
biggest Republican People's Party (CHP).
4. Broaden and deepen reforms to solve the Kurdish problem
The AKP's taboo-breaking 'Democratic Opening' to reach out to Turkey's
approximately 15 percent Kurdish community, helped put a long-term
settlement of the Kurdish problem within reach and will be the subject
of a forthcoming Crisis Group report. As the strongest party to the
conflict, the new government must broaden and deepen this initiative,
offering permission to towns and villages to revert to their original
names, more local government and the right to bilingual education. The
AKP has scored genuine breakthroughs, prosecuting members of now
inactive death squads, granting respect to Kurdish culture and
embracing the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq (see the Crisis
Group's 2008 analysis of Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds). Consequently, an
apparent majority of Turkish Kurds no longer profess an ambition for a
separate state in Turkey's Southeast, nor support the use of force by
the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
5. Sustain Turkey's engagement in the Middle East
The revolts in the Arab world set back Turkey's hopes of rapid
progress to a more stable, prosperous neighborhood, evaluated by the
Crisis Group in its 2010 report Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions
and Constraints. But Ankara should continue to work towards Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's `zero problem' foreign policy goals: a
better-governed, more interdependent region with more efficient
borders, integrated infrastructure, visa-free travel and free trade.
Turkey is too unique to be a one-size-fits-all model, as we pointed
out here, but Ankara should continue to use its influence and
experience where it can to urge regional regimes towards more
representative government. It should also remember that it is the
charisma, investment and higher standards that have flowed from the EU
accession process that have helped Turkey rise above the troubles of
the Middle East and made the country such an object of regional
admiration.
6. Seek chances to normalize relations with Israel
A voyage planned by a new international flotilla to break the Israeli
blockade of Gaza at the end of June will pose an early test for the
new government. Turkish NGOs plan to participate in large numbers
amongst the approximately 10 ships from around the world. Ankara says
there is nothing it can do to stop them, but taking into account the
risk of a repeat of the Israeli killing of nine Turkish members of
last year's flotilla, the potential for further damage to Turkey's
relationship with the US, Egypt's opening of its border with Gaza and
Israel's partial lifting of its blockade, the government is showing no
more inclination than in 2010 to participate directly in the flotilla.
After the 2010 disaster, the Crisis Group detailed Turkey's
miscalculations, and Israel's rapid use of deadly force in Turkey's
crises with Israel and Iran, and we analyzed a pertinent UN
investigation. Going forward, Turkey should seek chances to normalize
relations with Israel in the consciousness that its international
leverage is most effective when it has productive ties with all
parties in the region.
7. Seize any opportunity to normalize relations with Armenia
Two ground-breaking protocols signed between Turkey and Armenia in
2009 on normalizing relations, explained in our Opening Minds, Opening
Borders, have floundered on a Turkish condition that Armenia first
withdraw from at least some Azerbaijani territory occupied around
Nagorno-Karabakh (see our blog here). Since then, a growing number of
armed incidents, soaring military budgets and belligerent rhetoric
threatens to trigger new conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as
the Crisis Group recently warned in Preventing War. Disappointment in
the failed protocols increases intransigence in Armenia, while better
Turkish-Armenia relations could support conflict resolution. The new
Turkish government should seize on any breakthrough to find ways to
implement the protocols on re-opening the Armenian border and
establishing diplomatic relations.
8. Finesse the Aegean Sea dispute
The new government can take bold steps to resolve Turkey's 40-year-old
territorial disputes with neighboring Greece over the Aegean Sea.
Ankara and Athens have done much to consolidate normalization since
1999, as the Crisis Group detailed in 2007 in The Way Ahead. Official
talks on the Aegean since 2002 now seem tantalizingly close to
agreement. In private, both sides agree that the time has come to
settle the dispute, especially since it is more psychological and
political than real. As will be laid out in a forthcoming Crisis Group
briefing, the new government can help by preparing the rhetorical
ground for compromise, along with similar steps by Greece's
leadership, which has an urgent interest in reducing defense spending.
Turkey is far more powerful militarily and can help by eliminating
Turkish military flights over inhabited Greek islands and
demonstrating that theoretical Aegean disputes can be talked about
rather than fought over.
9. Seek long-term domestic improvements, prioritizing the judiciary,
the education system, women's rights and freedom of expression
In the first two terms in office, the AKP government, building on the
work of its predecessors, registered remarkable progress. Torture
almost disappeared from Turkish jails, single-party government brought
more policy consistency and better municipalities have brightened the
face of most Turkish cities. Looking forward, four more areas of
domestic governance still need attention. Firstly, Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has rightly made reform of Turkey's judiciary a
major goal, and judicial publications are filled with articles by
judges, prosecutors and lawyers about how to make the system work
better. Secondly, UN indexes show Turkey's education system lagging
behind Iran, Algeria and Tunisia and in need of a well-planned
overhaul. Thirdly, Turkey must address its shocking neglect of women's
rights - in 2010, it ranked 126th of 131 countries in the World
Economic Forum's Gender Gap Report - and plug the legal, educational
and policing gaps that result in 42 percent of women in the country
experiencing physical and sexual abuse (according to the first
comprehensive report on the issue by Hacettepe University in 2009).
Fourthly, laws and regulations and judicial mindsets must be changed
across the board to prevent ethnic groups, journalists or critics of
the government from being jailed or prosecuted for the simple
expression of peaceful opinions.
10. Continue to widen democratic participation
The democratic legitimacy of Turkey's elections make it the stand-out
country in the region - ballot-stuffing, intimidation and violence are
remarkably rare. Now it is time to raise the democratic level of the
system itself, as set out in the Crisis Group's The Decisive Year
Ahead. Political parties need to move to a system that is more
bottom-up and less top-down, to end the scandalously low participation
of women in politics and to encourage more young people to join
parties and work their way up them. The 10 percent threshold for a
party to win election to Parliament is by far the highest among the 47
member states of the Council of Europe (double that of the next
country, Germany's 5 percent threshold) and should be lowered.
Finally, parliamentary regulations need to be reformed to allow more
efficient legislation drafting and to win greater public trust in the
assembly's workings.
*Hugh Pope is Director of International Crisis Group's Turkey/Cyprus
project and author of three books on Turkey, the Turkic World and the
Middle East. This article was first published on the International
Crisis Group Website, www.crisisgroup.org, on June 10.
Ten tasks for Turkey's new government
by Hugh Pope*
New cities, high-speed trains, suspension bridges, airports, tax
holidays, a `crazy' grand canal parallel to the Bosporus waterway,
iPads for all -- the campaign trail ahead of Turkey's June 12
parliamentary elections is strewn with promises of great times coming.
Resolution of vexed questions in the domestic and foreign policy
sphere has been relegated to the list of things `to be done after the
election.' These more mundane challenges will, however, resurface as
soon as the political class gets back to work.
So, based on the Crisis Group's four years of reporting in Turkey --
and not counting the many challenges of the country's booming economy,
or what its external partners should also do -- here are 10
outstanding diplomatic and political tasks that we think should be
tackled with determination by the new Turkish government.
1. Relaunch Turkey's EU accession process
The EU's internal divisions and some European politicians' hostility
to Turks joining the club have done much to harm the EU's appeal in
Turkey. Indeed, the fact that Turkey's EU membership negotiations in
progress since 2005 have virtually ground to a halt has barely been
mentioned in the election campaign. But Turkish (and European) leaders
should remember that if there is one single factor that makes Turkey
stand out in its troubled region, it is the country's convergence with
Europe - arguably nearly two centuries old, but treaty-based for
nearly 50 years. EU standards are the locomotive of Turkish reform,
some four million people of Turkish origin live in Europe, half of
Turkey's trade is with Europe, most tourists to Turkey come from
Europe, NATO is the cornerstone of Turkish defense and two-thirds of
Turkey's foreign investment comes from EU states. Turkey and Europe
shared many of these fundamental interests for decades, and the two
sides stepped back from the brink with an attempt to restart the
process in 2009. Yet Turkey's EU process is now hanging by a thread,
since there are almost no negotiating chapters left to open. Turkey
holds the key to unlocking EU blocks on at least eight of these
chapters (see Cyprus below). EU politicians' talk of an alternative
`Privileged Partnership' for Turkey seems empty, as the Crisis Group
has argued. But with Europe distracted by its internal struggles, the
idea is being pushed back on the agenda. The new Turkish government
must proactively find a way to allow lifeblood back into the
relationship.
2. Fix Cyprus
Ankara must refocus on the strategic goal it set itself in 2004:
removing the Cyprus problem from the international agenda through
achieving the reunification of the island. An easy first step is to
implement the Additional Protocol, namely, opening Turkey's ports and
airports to Greek Cypriot traffic, a commitment Ankara formally signed
in 2005 as a condition for starting EU negotiations. The EU could have
helped by allowing direct, preferential trade to Turkish Cypriots - as
the Crisis Group pointed out here - but it did not, and Turkey's best
interest is now to help itself. Implementing the Additional Protocol
has no direct link to any Turkish position on a Cyprus settlement and
serves a double purpose: freeing several blocked EU negotiating
chapters, and helping to normalize relations between the Turks of
Turkey and Greek Cypriots. As the Crisis Group argued in its 2011
paper Six Steps to a Settlement, and on our blog, a mutual absence of
trust between Ankara and Nicosia is the single biggest obstacle to
reunification of the island. The new government would also do well to
start a real, structured dialogue with Greek Cypriot officials to give
a new impetus to ongoing talks to solve the Cyprus problem. Failure to
achieve a compromise settlement will cause real damage, as set out in
our 2009 report Reunification or Partition.
3. Undertake broad, inclusive constitutional reform
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has promised a
reformist, inclusive new constitution. As the Crisis Group detailed in
its 2008 report on the Decisive Year Ahead, implementing AKP's ideas
for a new constitution promised in the 2007 election campaign would go
far to reduce ethnic tensions and modernize the way Turkey is governed
(for instance, by removing ethnic attributes from Turkish citizenship,
making Turkish the official and not the only recognized language,
removing parliamentarians' immunity). EU-oriented reforms over the
past decade have already changed about one third of the 1982
Constitution, drawn up under military rule. The AKP has promised a
whole new text. For it to stick, it must be the product of a genuine
consensus, including the Kurdish national movement, not a top-down
imposition. Changes must first reduce sources of domestic conflict,
before trying potentially divisive new ideas like moving to a new
presidential system. At a minimum, any marks of ethnic discrimination
should be removed and freedom of expression further anchored. The idea
of increased powers for local government, a main demand of many ethnic
Kurds, is now supported by some opposition parties including the
biggest Republican People's Party (CHP).
4. Broaden and deepen reforms to solve the Kurdish problem
The AKP's taboo-breaking 'Democratic Opening' to reach out to Turkey's
approximately 15 percent Kurdish community, helped put a long-term
settlement of the Kurdish problem within reach and will be the subject
of a forthcoming Crisis Group report. As the strongest party to the
conflict, the new government must broaden and deepen this initiative,
offering permission to towns and villages to revert to their original
names, more local government and the right to bilingual education. The
AKP has scored genuine breakthroughs, prosecuting members of now
inactive death squads, granting respect to Kurdish culture and
embracing the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq (see the Crisis
Group's 2008 analysis of Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds). Consequently, an
apparent majority of Turkish Kurds no longer profess an ambition for a
separate state in Turkey's Southeast, nor support the use of force by
the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
5. Sustain Turkey's engagement in the Middle East
The revolts in the Arab world set back Turkey's hopes of rapid
progress to a more stable, prosperous neighborhood, evaluated by the
Crisis Group in its 2010 report Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions
and Constraints. But Ankara should continue to work towards Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's `zero problem' foreign policy goals: a
better-governed, more interdependent region with more efficient
borders, integrated infrastructure, visa-free travel and free trade.
Turkey is too unique to be a one-size-fits-all model, as we pointed
out here, but Ankara should continue to use its influence and
experience where it can to urge regional regimes towards more
representative government. It should also remember that it is the
charisma, investment and higher standards that have flowed from the EU
accession process that have helped Turkey rise above the troubles of
the Middle East and made the country such an object of regional
admiration.
6. Seek chances to normalize relations with Israel
A voyage planned by a new international flotilla to break the Israeli
blockade of Gaza at the end of June will pose an early test for the
new government. Turkish NGOs plan to participate in large numbers
amongst the approximately 10 ships from around the world. Ankara says
there is nothing it can do to stop them, but taking into account the
risk of a repeat of the Israeli killing of nine Turkish members of
last year's flotilla, the potential for further damage to Turkey's
relationship with the US, Egypt's opening of its border with Gaza and
Israel's partial lifting of its blockade, the government is showing no
more inclination than in 2010 to participate directly in the flotilla.
After the 2010 disaster, the Crisis Group detailed Turkey's
miscalculations, and Israel's rapid use of deadly force in Turkey's
crises with Israel and Iran, and we analyzed a pertinent UN
investigation. Going forward, Turkey should seek chances to normalize
relations with Israel in the consciousness that its international
leverage is most effective when it has productive ties with all
parties in the region.
7. Seize any opportunity to normalize relations with Armenia
Two ground-breaking protocols signed between Turkey and Armenia in
2009 on normalizing relations, explained in our Opening Minds, Opening
Borders, have floundered on a Turkish condition that Armenia first
withdraw from at least some Azerbaijani territory occupied around
Nagorno-Karabakh (see our blog here). Since then, a growing number of
armed incidents, soaring military budgets and belligerent rhetoric
threatens to trigger new conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as
the Crisis Group recently warned in Preventing War. Disappointment in
the failed protocols increases intransigence in Armenia, while better
Turkish-Armenia relations could support conflict resolution. The new
Turkish government should seize on any breakthrough to find ways to
implement the protocols on re-opening the Armenian border and
establishing diplomatic relations.
8. Finesse the Aegean Sea dispute
The new government can take bold steps to resolve Turkey's 40-year-old
territorial disputes with neighboring Greece over the Aegean Sea.
Ankara and Athens have done much to consolidate normalization since
1999, as the Crisis Group detailed in 2007 in The Way Ahead. Official
talks on the Aegean since 2002 now seem tantalizingly close to
agreement. In private, both sides agree that the time has come to
settle the dispute, especially since it is more psychological and
political than real. As will be laid out in a forthcoming Crisis Group
briefing, the new government can help by preparing the rhetorical
ground for compromise, along with similar steps by Greece's
leadership, which has an urgent interest in reducing defense spending.
Turkey is far more powerful militarily and can help by eliminating
Turkish military flights over inhabited Greek islands and
demonstrating that theoretical Aegean disputes can be talked about
rather than fought over.
9. Seek long-term domestic improvements, prioritizing the judiciary,
the education system, women's rights and freedom of expression
In the first two terms in office, the AKP government, building on the
work of its predecessors, registered remarkable progress. Torture
almost disappeared from Turkish jails, single-party government brought
more policy consistency and better municipalities have brightened the
face of most Turkish cities. Looking forward, four more areas of
domestic governance still need attention. Firstly, Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has rightly made reform of Turkey's judiciary a
major goal, and judicial publications are filled with articles by
judges, prosecutors and lawyers about how to make the system work
better. Secondly, UN indexes show Turkey's education system lagging
behind Iran, Algeria and Tunisia and in need of a well-planned
overhaul. Thirdly, Turkey must address its shocking neglect of women's
rights - in 2010, it ranked 126th of 131 countries in the World
Economic Forum's Gender Gap Report - and plug the legal, educational
and policing gaps that result in 42 percent of women in the country
experiencing physical and sexual abuse (according to the first
comprehensive report on the issue by Hacettepe University in 2009).
Fourthly, laws and regulations and judicial mindsets must be changed
across the board to prevent ethnic groups, journalists or critics of
the government from being jailed or prosecuted for the simple
expression of peaceful opinions.
10. Continue to widen democratic participation
The democratic legitimacy of Turkey's elections make it the stand-out
country in the region - ballot-stuffing, intimidation and violence are
remarkably rare. Now it is time to raise the democratic level of the
system itself, as set out in the Crisis Group's The Decisive Year
Ahead. Political parties need to move to a system that is more
bottom-up and less top-down, to end the scandalously low participation
of women in politics and to encourage more young people to join
parties and work their way up them. The 10 percent threshold for a
party to win election to Parliament is by far the highest among the 47
member states of the Council of Europe (double that of the next
country, Germany's 5 percent threshold) and should be lowered.
Finally, parliamentary regulations need to be reformed to allow more
efficient legislation drafting and to win greater public trust in the
assembly's workings.
*Hugh Pope is Director of International Crisis Group's Turkey/Cyprus
project and author of three books on Turkey, the Turkic World and the
Middle East. This article was first published on the International
Crisis Group Website, www.crisisgroup.org, on June 10.