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KARABAKH NEGOTIATIONS 'TO FAIL'
news.az
June 22 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews political scientist Dr Tigran Torosyan, chairman
of the National Assembly of Armenia between 2006 and 2008.
What do you think about the upcoming Kazan meeting of the presidents
of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which you have described as "Zurich-2"?
Unfortunately, it will not bring anything positive either to Armenia
or to Azerbaijan and "Nagorno-Karabakh", even if the basic principles
are signed. Moreover, the signing of those will bring us closer to
the failure of negotiations rather than conflict resolution - since
when one adds new layers (steps) to a wall (the negotiating process)
which has serious shortcomings, it brings closer the collapse of the
wall under its own weight. The negotiations and their foundation have
very serious flaws. Let me point out the most absurd reality. With
the approval of intermediaries and consent of the negotiating parties
three principles were set as the basis of negotiations, one of which
was the right to self-determination. But it is only Armenia and
Azerbaijan that are participating in the negotiation process. Can
anyone with sound logic insist that Armenia or Azerbaijan is in the
process of self-determination?
So how are they discussing the issue of self-determination without
the self-determining side? Another point - everyone understands that
the main issue at stake is the status of "Nagorno-Karabakh". Armenia
declares that according to the basic principles a "Nagorno-Karabakh"
independence referendum should be held in which the population of
"Nagorno-Karabakh" should participate, while Azerbaijan declares that
"Nagorno-Karabakh's status should be autonomy. The controversy is
more than apparent but the intermediaries pretend that they do not
see or hear it. This is diplomatic cynicism. Who are they going to
cheat in the final analysis? A number of other serious mistakes can
be found among the strategy of the negotiations and six principles
comprising the Basic Principles. It is simply impossible to develop
a peace treaty and implement it based on this reality, however much
the intermediaries talk about it. I would like to remind you that at
Key West [peace talks in 2001] a similar agreement was developed and
agreed by the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan but after his return
[then Azerbaijani President] Heydar Aliyev renounced it.
As far as "Zurich-2" is concerned, I believe that the Deauville
Declaration is in a vein reminiscent of the Armenian-Turkish
Protocols. Please pay attention to the following part - "Once an
agreement has been reached, we stand ready to witness the formal
acceptance of these Principles." If a document is to be signed and
made public, then the promise of Mr Medvedev, Mr Obama and Mr Sarkozy
on witnessing it, will have no meaning. Thus they are proposing that
the Basic Principles be signed and they will confirm that the document
has been signed, but the contents of the document will be kept secret,
otherwise it will be revealed that one of the signatories is lying,
at least on the issue of the status of "Nagorno-Karabakh". It may be
difficult to believe that the document will not be made public, but
two years ago a precedent was set. In April 2009 it was declared that
Armenian-Turkish Protocols and a Road Map had been developed. This
was confirmed also by the representative of Switzerland, which had
joined the declaration but during the subsequent four months the
documents were not made public.
Moreover, in the current case as well, the format is very similar
with the only difference that it is now Azerbaijan instead of Turkey.
Therefore, the Deauville Agreement suggests that the negotiating
parties sign the Basic Principles but not make them public if the
presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan choose to refrain from publishing
the documents. If this step takes place, then a second similarity in
the processes will emerge - will the current process fail as was the
case with the Armenian-Turkish Protocols? Shall the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, who would lose most from such developments,
agree to take that path? It is difficult to believe that sound logic
has abandoned them, especially a short time before the elections.
In their Deauville statement, the heads of the co-chairing countries
for the first time addressed the threat of a new war. "The use of
force created the current situation of confrontation and instability.
Its use again would only bring more suffering and devastation, and
would be condemned by the international community. We strongly urge the
leaders of the sides to prepare their populations for peace, not war,"
they said. What do you think is more realistic today: war or peace?
It appears difficult to believe in the sincerity of the presidents
of the three states. In my article published on the Regnum agency
website, I recall another "brilliant" example of diplomatic cynicism
that we encountered in 2008. First, in February when Kosovo again
declared its independence, and the United States and a number of
countries acknowledged it, Russia declared that this was against
international law.
Months afterwards, in the autumn, Russia acknowledged the independence
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the United States declared that it
was against international law. Meanwhile, none of the sides bothered
to justify their arguments in their declarations or to explain the
180-degree turn in their own positions in just a matter of months.
In your article "Karabakh conflict: Deauville-Kazan-'Zurich-2'?" you
said that "If representatives of the Minsk Group really want to avoid
a new war, they should not pretend not to know who poses this threat,
which party has significantly increased its military spending over
the past few years, who periodically violates the ceasefire agreement
and organizes diversions in the opponent's territory. If the mediators
are unable to stop a 'sniper war', how can they avert a real war?"
In this case, you state that the threat of war comes from Baku. But
why don't you point to the fact that a nine-year-old boy was killed by
an Armenian sniper on 8 March, as he was playing outside his house,
that Armenia has acquired Smerch and Scud missiles with a range as
far as Baku and finally that Russia has granted Armenia weapons worth
more than $800m?
Please do read carefully the part of my article ("Peace and not War")
that you have quoted. While listing the factors through the prevention
of which the co-chairing countries can contribute to maintaining and
strengthening peace in deeds not words, I never mentioned Azerbaijan
or Baku. But after reading about the list, you yourself concluded
that all this concerns Baku. I believe this conclusion says it all.
Let me refer to the points that you have raised. The topic of arms
worth $800 million has been discussed for years. Even if this figure
corresponds to reality, it still bears no comparison with the billions
of dollars of Azerbaijani military expenditure. One needs to be armed
for self-defence as well. As far as the tragic death of the child
is concerned, the Armenian side has declared that the place where
this happened cannot be fired at from its positions. Therefore,
we again have to come back to the issue that I raised in my
article. The intermediaries have to confirm or deny the murder and
by doing so put an end to the quarrel. If they cannot stop even the
"sniper war", how then they will be in a position to prevent a real
war? However, Azerbaijan can take an important step forward and agree
with the suggestion that has been made numerous times by Armenia and
"Nagorno-Karabakh" on removing the snipers from the front line.
You insist that the Nagorno-Karabakh status quo will be disrupted. How
will the situation develop further, if the status quo is disrupted?
Which of the parties will benefit?
First of all it is not me who insists that the status quo will be
disrupted, but the presidents of Russia, the United States and France
who in their declarations view the acceptance of the Basic Principles
as a way of disrupting the status quo - "This document, based on the
Helsinki Final Act and elements outlined in our joint declarations
in L'Aquila in July 2009 and Muskoka in June 2010, provides a way
for all sides to move beyond the unacceptable status quo." However,
the breaking of the status quo cannot serve as an aim; it can be
desirable only in one case - if a fair solution is offered in the
framework of international law. I believe that without this condition
the disruption of the status quo cannot be useful for any of the three
sides to the conflict. The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 was exactly
a result of a disruption of the status quo, the aim of which was
resolution of the Russian-American confrontation in the South Caucasus.
The struggle for redistribution of zones of influence is not over
yet; moreover, a new Karabakh war may become another phase of this
struggle. Why should Armenian and Azerbaijani young men die for the
sake of Russian or American interests? Although, as I have already
mentioned, the restarting of war is not likely in practice in the
foreseeable future. Thus, in Kazan either no document will be signed
and the negotiation crisis will continue (the existence of a crisis
is apparent from the comparative analysis of the declarations of
the three presidents) or a document will be signed and peace treaty
negotiations will start and this will finally lead to the failure of
the negotiations. The reason for both possible scenarios is the same -
the serious flaws in the Basic Principles. Hence, in order to achieve
a real solution those flaws should be amended as soon as possible.
Yerevan states that Armenia has the right to expect an appropriate
response from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
in the event of "Azerbaijan's military aggression towards Nagorno
Karabakh". Do you also think that the CSTO may take part in a new
Nagorno-Karabakh war?
I find such declarations wrong and have said so on several occasions
in the Armenian press. The representatives of the member states of
the Collective Security Treaty have already declared that they will
not interfere should the Karabakh war restart. Even this is not the
essential point. The experience of the 1992-1994 war proved that the
interference of even highly experienced outside forces (Hekmatiar
Mujahideen and the Basayev Chechen groups) does not have an impact
on the outcome of the war. Another point is way more important.
Unlike the cases of many other conflicts, in 1994 Armenia, Azerbaijan
and "Nagorno-Karabakh" managed to sign a ceasefire treaty without the
military intervention of other states, and we should have the healthy
reasoning to maintain this achievement. I am confident that Armenia
and "Nagorno-Karabakh" will do that, I hope that Azerbaijan will as
well. And it will be right if we, all three sides, again ourselves
initiate the process of harmonizing the Basic Principles with the
norms of international law.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
news.az
June 22 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews political scientist Dr Tigran Torosyan, chairman
of the National Assembly of Armenia between 2006 and 2008.
What do you think about the upcoming Kazan meeting of the presidents
of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which you have described as "Zurich-2"?
Unfortunately, it will not bring anything positive either to Armenia
or to Azerbaijan and "Nagorno-Karabakh", even if the basic principles
are signed. Moreover, the signing of those will bring us closer to
the failure of negotiations rather than conflict resolution - since
when one adds new layers (steps) to a wall (the negotiating process)
which has serious shortcomings, it brings closer the collapse of the
wall under its own weight. The negotiations and their foundation have
very serious flaws. Let me point out the most absurd reality. With
the approval of intermediaries and consent of the negotiating parties
three principles were set as the basis of negotiations, one of which
was the right to self-determination. But it is only Armenia and
Azerbaijan that are participating in the negotiation process. Can
anyone with sound logic insist that Armenia or Azerbaijan is in the
process of self-determination?
So how are they discussing the issue of self-determination without
the self-determining side? Another point - everyone understands that
the main issue at stake is the status of "Nagorno-Karabakh". Armenia
declares that according to the basic principles a "Nagorno-Karabakh"
independence referendum should be held in which the population of
"Nagorno-Karabakh" should participate, while Azerbaijan declares that
"Nagorno-Karabakh's status should be autonomy. The controversy is
more than apparent but the intermediaries pretend that they do not
see or hear it. This is diplomatic cynicism. Who are they going to
cheat in the final analysis? A number of other serious mistakes can
be found among the strategy of the negotiations and six principles
comprising the Basic Principles. It is simply impossible to develop
a peace treaty and implement it based on this reality, however much
the intermediaries talk about it. I would like to remind you that at
Key West [peace talks in 2001] a similar agreement was developed and
agreed by the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan but after his return
[then Azerbaijani President] Heydar Aliyev renounced it.
As far as "Zurich-2" is concerned, I believe that the Deauville
Declaration is in a vein reminiscent of the Armenian-Turkish
Protocols. Please pay attention to the following part - "Once an
agreement has been reached, we stand ready to witness the formal
acceptance of these Principles." If a document is to be signed and
made public, then the promise of Mr Medvedev, Mr Obama and Mr Sarkozy
on witnessing it, will have no meaning. Thus they are proposing that
the Basic Principles be signed and they will confirm that the document
has been signed, but the contents of the document will be kept secret,
otherwise it will be revealed that one of the signatories is lying,
at least on the issue of the status of "Nagorno-Karabakh". It may be
difficult to believe that the document will not be made public, but
two years ago a precedent was set. In April 2009 it was declared that
Armenian-Turkish Protocols and a Road Map had been developed. This
was confirmed also by the representative of Switzerland, which had
joined the declaration but during the subsequent four months the
documents were not made public.
Moreover, in the current case as well, the format is very similar
with the only difference that it is now Azerbaijan instead of Turkey.
Therefore, the Deauville Agreement suggests that the negotiating
parties sign the Basic Principles but not make them public if the
presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan choose to refrain from publishing
the documents. If this step takes place, then a second similarity in
the processes will emerge - will the current process fail as was the
case with the Armenian-Turkish Protocols? Shall the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, who would lose most from such developments,
agree to take that path? It is difficult to believe that sound logic
has abandoned them, especially a short time before the elections.
In their Deauville statement, the heads of the co-chairing countries
for the first time addressed the threat of a new war. "The use of
force created the current situation of confrontation and instability.
Its use again would only bring more suffering and devastation, and
would be condemned by the international community. We strongly urge the
leaders of the sides to prepare their populations for peace, not war,"
they said. What do you think is more realistic today: war or peace?
It appears difficult to believe in the sincerity of the presidents
of the three states. In my article published on the Regnum agency
website, I recall another "brilliant" example of diplomatic cynicism
that we encountered in 2008. First, in February when Kosovo again
declared its independence, and the United States and a number of
countries acknowledged it, Russia declared that this was against
international law.
Months afterwards, in the autumn, Russia acknowledged the independence
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the United States declared that it
was against international law. Meanwhile, none of the sides bothered
to justify their arguments in their declarations or to explain the
180-degree turn in their own positions in just a matter of months.
In your article "Karabakh conflict: Deauville-Kazan-'Zurich-2'?" you
said that "If representatives of the Minsk Group really want to avoid
a new war, they should not pretend not to know who poses this threat,
which party has significantly increased its military spending over
the past few years, who periodically violates the ceasefire agreement
and organizes diversions in the opponent's territory. If the mediators
are unable to stop a 'sniper war', how can they avert a real war?"
In this case, you state that the threat of war comes from Baku. But
why don't you point to the fact that a nine-year-old boy was killed by
an Armenian sniper on 8 March, as he was playing outside his house,
that Armenia has acquired Smerch and Scud missiles with a range as
far as Baku and finally that Russia has granted Armenia weapons worth
more than $800m?
Please do read carefully the part of my article ("Peace and not War")
that you have quoted. While listing the factors through the prevention
of which the co-chairing countries can contribute to maintaining and
strengthening peace in deeds not words, I never mentioned Azerbaijan
or Baku. But after reading about the list, you yourself concluded
that all this concerns Baku. I believe this conclusion says it all.
Let me refer to the points that you have raised. The topic of arms
worth $800 million has been discussed for years. Even if this figure
corresponds to reality, it still bears no comparison with the billions
of dollars of Azerbaijani military expenditure. One needs to be armed
for self-defence as well. As far as the tragic death of the child
is concerned, the Armenian side has declared that the place where
this happened cannot be fired at from its positions. Therefore,
we again have to come back to the issue that I raised in my
article. The intermediaries have to confirm or deny the murder and
by doing so put an end to the quarrel. If they cannot stop even the
"sniper war", how then they will be in a position to prevent a real
war? However, Azerbaijan can take an important step forward and agree
with the suggestion that has been made numerous times by Armenia and
"Nagorno-Karabakh" on removing the snipers from the front line.
You insist that the Nagorno-Karabakh status quo will be disrupted. How
will the situation develop further, if the status quo is disrupted?
Which of the parties will benefit?
First of all it is not me who insists that the status quo will be
disrupted, but the presidents of Russia, the United States and France
who in their declarations view the acceptance of the Basic Principles
as a way of disrupting the status quo - "This document, based on the
Helsinki Final Act and elements outlined in our joint declarations
in L'Aquila in July 2009 and Muskoka in June 2010, provides a way
for all sides to move beyond the unacceptable status quo." However,
the breaking of the status quo cannot serve as an aim; it can be
desirable only in one case - if a fair solution is offered in the
framework of international law. I believe that without this condition
the disruption of the status quo cannot be useful for any of the three
sides to the conflict. The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 was exactly
a result of a disruption of the status quo, the aim of which was
resolution of the Russian-American confrontation in the South Caucasus.
The struggle for redistribution of zones of influence is not over
yet; moreover, a new Karabakh war may become another phase of this
struggle. Why should Armenian and Azerbaijani young men die for the
sake of Russian or American interests? Although, as I have already
mentioned, the restarting of war is not likely in practice in the
foreseeable future. Thus, in Kazan either no document will be signed
and the negotiation crisis will continue (the existence of a crisis
is apparent from the comparative analysis of the declarations of
the three presidents) or a document will be signed and peace treaty
negotiations will start and this will finally lead to the failure of
the negotiations. The reason for both possible scenarios is the same -
the serious flaws in the Basic Principles. Hence, in order to achieve
a real solution those flaws should be amended as soon as possible.
Yerevan states that Armenia has the right to expect an appropriate
response from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
in the event of "Azerbaijan's military aggression towards Nagorno
Karabakh". Do you also think that the CSTO may take part in a new
Nagorno-Karabakh war?
I find such declarations wrong and have said so on several occasions
in the Armenian press. The representatives of the member states of
the Collective Security Treaty have already declared that they will
not interfere should the Karabakh war restart. Even this is not the
essential point. The experience of the 1992-1994 war proved that the
interference of even highly experienced outside forces (Hekmatiar
Mujahideen and the Basayev Chechen groups) does not have an impact
on the outcome of the war. Another point is way more important.
Unlike the cases of many other conflicts, in 1994 Armenia, Azerbaijan
and "Nagorno-Karabakh" managed to sign a ceasefire treaty without the
military intervention of other states, and we should have the healthy
reasoning to maintain this achievement. I am confident that Armenia
and "Nagorno-Karabakh" will do that, I hope that Azerbaijan will as
well. And it will be right if we, all three sides, again ourselves
initiate the process of harmonizing the Basic Principles with the
norms of international law.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress