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TURKISH ELECTIONS COULD OPEN WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IN TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS
By Armen Grigoryan (04/27/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst)
The upcoming parliamentary elections in Turkey should clarify whether
Turkish-Armenian relations may improve in a short-term perspective,
opening for a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and regional
cooperation in the South Caucasus. Regardless of the outcome of the
elections, it will clarify the fate of the Turkish-Armenian protocols
signed in October 2009. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP
party seems capable of securing a majority in the newly elected
parliament and to form a new government. After the elections, the AKP
will not be under the threat of instantly losing the support of voters
due to opposition criticism, so its leadership may consider the
ratification of the protocols safer.
Such a decisive move followed by an opening of the border, without
explicitly linking the normalization of relations with the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, would change the
regional situation radically. The Turkish opposition and Azerbaijan's
government, which have opposed normalization, do not believe that
Armenia will become more willing to make concessions if
Turkish-Armenian relations are normalized. However, such thinking does
not take into account that Armenia's excessive dependence on Russia is
the main issue requiring a solution.
When the normalization process came to a standstill, Russia easily
persuaded Armenia to extend its basing rights. An agreement was signed
in August 2010, during President Medvedev's visit to Yerevan. In
general, events during recent years have shown that the policy of
isolating Armenia and the militaristic rhetoric of Azerbaijani
officials will not bring about progress in the conflict resolution
process on Nagorno-Karabakh through unilateral concessions from the
Armenian side. Instead, Russia's and to a certain extent Iran's
influence has been growing continuously.
At the same time, the internal political situation in Armenia, where
the opposition has been organizing mass demonstrations demanding
extraordinary presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as a
complete failure of the financial and economic policy of the Armenian
government should be taken into account. The weak legitimacy of
President Sargsyan's administration may induce him to seek
international support and financial assistance. An opening of the
Turkish-Armenian border would allow Sargsyan to save face and avoid
criticism from the opposition and Armenian Diaspora for being
`defeatist'. Before the standstill, Sargsyan had enjoyed the image of
a realistic politician trying to put an end to a decades-long enmity
and could make use of it again. It is telling that although the
ratification of the protocols by Armenia's National Assembly was
suspended in 2010, Sargsyan has not called off his signature despite
the opposition urging him to do so by.
An opening of the border would reduce internal political tension in
Armenia, as it would partly relieve the economic hardship that the
country's population is experiencing. Besides, the possibility of
transport communication via Turkish territory would reduce Armenia's
dependence on Russia and promote mutual trust. Therefore, it would
ultimately benefit also Azerbaijan and Georgia. Better opportunities
to maneuver independently from Russia and seeking further
international assistance for legitimating his rule would stimulate
Sargsyan and the ruling coalition to be more flexible on the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
At the same time, Sargsyan should not be considered a politician with
truly progressive views. His approach is rather opportunistic. If the
newly formed Turkish government refuses to ratify the protocols,
Sargsyan will most probably seek legitimacy by playing to nationalist
sentiments. By denouncing the protocols and actively exploiting the
genocide issue politically, Sargsyan could secure the support of all
factions of the National Assembly and mobilize the active support of
the Diaspora.
In summary, the window of opportunity for normalizing Turkish-Armenian
relations and stimulating regional cooperation in the South Caucasus
will be open for quite a short time after the elections in Turkey. If
the issue is not solved promptly, pressure by the opposition will very
soon motivate Sargsyan to start advocating more hardcore nationalist
policies. In fact, the 20th anniversary of independence in September
could become a convenient starting point. It should also be remembered
that sensitive issues such as Turkish-Armenian relations and the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are unlikely to progress in pre-election
periods. Campaigning for the May 2012 parliamentary elections in
Armenia will begin shortly and will be followed by campaigning for the
February 2013 presidential elections. Growing sentiments will also
induce both government and opposition to compete for a more
`patriotic' image while moving towards 2015 - the 100th anniversary of
the genocide. Therefore, even the small opportunity to normalize
Turkish-Armenian relations and advance the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may be lost, and that would benefit neither
Turkey, nor Armenia, nor Azerbaijan.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5550
From: A. Papazian
By Armen Grigoryan (04/27/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst)
The upcoming parliamentary elections in Turkey should clarify whether
Turkish-Armenian relations may improve in a short-term perspective,
opening for a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and regional
cooperation in the South Caucasus. Regardless of the outcome of the
elections, it will clarify the fate of the Turkish-Armenian protocols
signed in October 2009. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP
party seems capable of securing a majority in the newly elected
parliament and to form a new government. After the elections, the AKP
will not be under the threat of instantly losing the support of voters
due to opposition criticism, so its leadership may consider the
ratification of the protocols safer.
Such a decisive move followed by an opening of the border, without
explicitly linking the normalization of relations with the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, would change the
regional situation radically. The Turkish opposition and Azerbaijan's
government, which have opposed normalization, do not believe that
Armenia will become more willing to make concessions if
Turkish-Armenian relations are normalized. However, such thinking does
not take into account that Armenia's excessive dependence on Russia is
the main issue requiring a solution.
When the normalization process came to a standstill, Russia easily
persuaded Armenia to extend its basing rights. An agreement was signed
in August 2010, during President Medvedev's visit to Yerevan. In
general, events during recent years have shown that the policy of
isolating Armenia and the militaristic rhetoric of Azerbaijani
officials will not bring about progress in the conflict resolution
process on Nagorno-Karabakh through unilateral concessions from the
Armenian side. Instead, Russia's and to a certain extent Iran's
influence has been growing continuously.
At the same time, the internal political situation in Armenia, where
the opposition has been organizing mass demonstrations demanding
extraordinary presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as a
complete failure of the financial and economic policy of the Armenian
government should be taken into account. The weak legitimacy of
President Sargsyan's administration may induce him to seek
international support and financial assistance. An opening of the
Turkish-Armenian border would allow Sargsyan to save face and avoid
criticism from the opposition and Armenian Diaspora for being
`defeatist'. Before the standstill, Sargsyan had enjoyed the image of
a realistic politician trying to put an end to a decades-long enmity
and could make use of it again. It is telling that although the
ratification of the protocols by Armenia's National Assembly was
suspended in 2010, Sargsyan has not called off his signature despite
the opposition urging him to do so by.
An opening of the border would reduce internal political tension in
Armenia, as it would partly relieve the economic hardship that the
country's population is experiencing. Besides, the possibility of
transport communication via Turkish territory would reduce Armenia's
dependence on Russia and promote mutual trust. Therefore, it would
ultimately benefit also Azerbaijan and Georgia. Better opportunities
to maneuver independently from Russia and seeking further
international assistance for legitimating his rule would stimulate
Sargsyan and the ruling coalition to be more flexible on the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
At the same time, Sargsyan should not be considered a politician with
truly progressive views. His approach is rather opportunistic. If the
newly formed Turkish government refuses to ratify the protocols,
Sargsyan will most probably seek legitimacy by playing to nationalist
sentiments. By denouncing the protocols and actively exploiting the
genocide issue politically, Sargsyan could secure the support of all
factions of the National Assembly and mobilize the active support of
the Diaspora.
In summary, the window of opportunity for normalizing Turkish-Armenian
relations and stimulating regional cooperation in the South Caucasus
will be open for quite a short time after the elections in Turkey. If
the issue is not solved promptly, pressure by the opposition will very
soon motivate Sargsyan to start advocating more hardcore nationalist
policies. In fact, the 20th anniversary of independence in September
could become a convenient starting point. It should also be remembered
that sensitive issues such as Turkish-Armenian relations and the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are unlikely to progress in pre-election
periods. Campaigning for the May 2012 parliamentary elections in
Armenia will begin shortly and will be followed by campaigning for the
February 2013 presidential elections. Growing sentiments will also
induce both government and opposition to compete for a more
`patriotic' image while moving towards 2015 - the 100th anniversary of
the genocide. Therefore, even the small opportunity to normalize
Turkish-Armenian relations and advance the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may be lost, and that would benefit neither
Turkey, nor Armenia, nor Azerbaijan.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5550
From: A. Papazian