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Saturday, 07 May 2011, 09:29 GMT
The Kurdish question and the Soviet Union (1917-1991)
The Kurdish Globe
By Salah Bayaziddi
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I in
1918, it was inevitable that the map of the Middle East would be
redrawn.
The Anglo-French planners immediately filled the vacuum created by
Russia's withdrawal from the colonial schemes and divided up the
Kurdish territories among themselves. It is crucial to mention that
the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) had recognized the predominance of
Russia in Armenia and a portion of Kurdistan (including the vilayets
of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis). The revolutionary upheaval in
Russia during 1917 and that state's withdrawal from the Entente
rendered many of the provisions of these early agreements inoperative.
In the eyes of the victorious Western allies, Russia, to which the
Sykes-Picot Agreement had allocated most of Kurdistan, had fallen to
the Soviets and no longer had territorial designs upon neighboring
countries (Chaliand, p. 30). The official policy of the Soviet regime
between 1917 and 1921 is often obscure. Until the end of this period,
the Soviet regime did not assume control of Russia because of the
civil war. So, the Bolshevik leaders had to keep a policy of
stabilization of the situation and friendly attitude along the
southern frontiers of the Soviet state in the Transcaucasia region.
Meanwhile, in its search for potential allies in the Middle East, the
Soviet government had become aware of the nationalist movement in Iran
and Turkey shortly after its inception in 1919 and had followed its
development with great interest. The official conclusion that the
Kurds were not only tribal society but conscious instruments of
British policy in the region made such a cooperation unthinkable.
After the conclusion in that year of treaties of friendship with Iran
and Turkey, however, official sympathy for Kurdish aspirations became
impolitic as well (Howell, p. 7).
The idea of the independence of Kurdistan came very close to
realization following the fall and dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire. This period presented the Kurdish people with their best ever
opportunity to set up their own nation state. The Fourteen points
Declaration by Woodrow Wilson, the president of the United States who
suggested the right of self-determination for the minorities of the
Ottoman Empire, was a form of international recognition of the idea of
an independent Kurdish state. Hopes of an independent Kurdistan were
boosted in the aftermath of World War I, with the Treaty of Sevres of
August 1920, when the victorious Western allies and a defeated Turkey,
as part of a drastic scheme for rearrangement of territory, promised
the Kurds their own national state (Hyman, p. 2). The Soviet
government which was skeptical about the Anglo-French schemes in the
Middle East prejudged the outcome of the Treaty of Sevres as well. The
Bolshevik leaders viewed an independent Kurdish state as an
imperialist buffer zone against spreading the Soviet experiment to the
south of Transcaucasia. So, the Soviet regime ignored its own
professed plan of self-determination right of minorities when it
established full economic and political relations with ultra
nationalist states of Iran and Turkey. "In any case, the new Turkish
regime, like its Iranian counterpart, rejected Kurdish separatism and
the Bolsheviks, by signing the treaty of 1921, precluded official
support for the Kurdish national movement for the moment" (Howell, p.
311). However, the Soviet government always had dismissed this kind of
criticism by arguing it was a matter of political necessity for its
regional policies as the sole communist state in a hostile capitalist
world.
The Treaty of Sevres, which had been imposed on the defeated Ottoman
Empire was never ratified. Indeed two new developments towards the end
of 1920, destroyed Kurdish hopes of achieving independence in Ottoman
Kurdistan. The rise of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish nationalist leader
in Anatolia, and factional division among the Kurds themselves
shattered the independence of Kurdistan. In the beginning, Kemal was
careful not to mention the Turkish state. Instead, he stressed either
the fraternity between Kurds and Turks, or the Ottoman nation in
conflict with foreign occupation forces. "The Turkish nationalists
established a national assembly at Ankara which, shortly before the
Sevres Treaty was signed, announced that it would not recognize any
agreement signed by the Ottoman government in occupied Constantinople"
(Bulloch, P. 91). While many Kurdish nationalists sought support of
the Allies for Kurdish national aims, a considerable number also
supported the Turkish Sultan in the name of loyalty to the head of
Islam. In fact, Kemal became able to form a Turkish nation-state when
the Kurds turned in favor of his pan-Islamic propaganda and stood
against their national interests. The Soviet government was also
against the Allied powers' plan for Kurdistan (the idea of Kurdish
state as British buffer zone) and supported the Turkish nationalists
who were refusing to accept the Treaty of Sevres. Reflecting on these
developments with obvious bitterness, Sureya Badir-Khan, a Kurdish
journalist in Ottoman Kurdistan, subsequently wrote: "It should here
be noted that the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks, who were without the
pale of international law, might perhaps justify themselves in
resorting to common actions against those whom they recognized as
their enemies" (Howell, p. 314). In 1921, the Soviet government
concluded with the new Turkish regime a Treaty of Friendship which set
the limits of official Soviet policy toward the Kurds for most of the
interwar period.
The Treaty of Sevres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.
With the entry into force of this treaty on Aug. 6, 1924, the
international consideration of the Kurdish question, growing out of
World War I, was terminated. Already, it was painfully obvious not
only that the aspirations of the Kurdish nationalists were to be
unfulfilled in the final peace settlement but that the nationalists
themselves were not accepted in international circles. There was no
Kurdish representation at the Lausanne Conference and the Kurds played
no significant role in the decisions reached there (Kutschera, pp.
51-52). Kemal, who by this time had established the Turkish
nation-state, immediately broke his promise of the Kurdish autonomy
and dissolved the Kurdish National Assembly. He abolished Kurdish
schools, and outlawed the use of the Kurdish language. Kurds were
officially labeled "mountain Turks" and the land called "Eastern
Anatolia." The Kurdish response was a series of uprisings throughout
the 1920s and 1930s, led by a combination of tribal and feudal
leaders, some of whom had religious backgrounds, and urban
intellectuals. All of these revolts were completely crushed by the
vastly superior Turkish military force. Howell, once again, emphasized
the importance of the cooperation of the Soviet authorities with Kemal
in this crucial period when he said, "By this time it became clear
that Kurdish confidence in the implementation of the Treaty of Sevres
was unfounded, Kemal, in part because of the support and assistance
which he received from the Soviet government, was in a position to
crush the Kurdish resistance" (Howell, p. 314). In short, the failure
of the Treaty of Serves was a tremendous blow to the Kurdish
nationalists but had little effect upon their determination to achieve
their objectives.
The official Soviet policy on the Kurds during the interwar period did
not change and classified them (the Kurds) as the instruments of
"imperialist" plot in the region. The Soviet regime planned to fire
back at the Anglo-French schemes and worked out a series of friendship
treaties that allied that country with Iran and Turkey. These
alliances not only assured the Soviet of peace to the south, but also,
by inducing the two countries to develop mechanisms for settling
quarrels between themselves, ensured that meddling foreign powers
(like Great Britain) could not find pretexts to intervene in the
region. However, there is not enough evidence that the British were
supporting the Kurdish insurgency by the mid-1920s. In fact, during
this period there were several Kurdish revolts against central
government of Iran, but while Britain (which at the time had status in
Iran) permitted local forces to crush the rebellion, the Soviet
government also refused to let them move into north. For a short
period, under the Soviet patronage the Kurds (Ismail Agha Simko in
western Iran), whose Iranian lands fell largely within the Soviet
zone, stepped up their campaign for independence (Kutschera, pp.
90-94). At this point, it seems that the fate of the Kurds became
subordinated to the Anglo-Soviet struggle for power and influence in
the region. At the same time, neither the Soviet government nor the
Western powers were willing to forgo the possibility of friendship and
cooperation with Turkey and Iran for the sake of an independent
Kurdistan. The Kurdish nationalists also professed that the Soviet's
"good neighbor policy" played a major role in defeating their revolts
by the governments of both Turkey and Iran during the interwar period.
From: A. Papazian
Saturday, 07 May 2011, 09:29 GMT
The Kurdish question and the Soviet Union (1917-1991)
The Kurdish Globe
By Salah Bayaziddi
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I in
1918, it was inevitable that the map of the Middle East would be
redrawn.
The Anglo-French planners immediately filled the vacuum created by
Russia's withdrawal from the colonial schemes and divided up the
Kurdish territories among themselves. It is crucial to mention that
the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) had recognized the predominance of
Russia in Armenia and a portion of Kurdistan (including the vilayets
of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis). The revolutionary upheaval in
Russia during 1917 and that state's withdrawal from the Entente
rendered many of the provisions of these early agreements inoperative.
In the eyes of the victorious Western allies, Russia, to which the
Sykes-Picot Agreement had allocated most of Kurdistan, had fallen to
the Soviets and no longer had territorial designs upon neighboring
countries (Chaliand, p. 30). The official policy of the Soviet regime
between 1917 and 1921 is often obscure. Until the end of this period,
the Soviet regime did not assume control of Russia because of the
civil war. So, the Bolshevik leaders had to keep a policy of
stabilization of the situation and friendly attitude along the
southern frontiers of the Soviet state in the Transcaucasia region.
Meanwhile, in its search for potential allies in the Middle East, the
Soviet government had become aware of the nationalist movement in Iran
and Turkey shortly after its inception in 1919 and had followed its
development with great interest. The official conclusion that the
Kurds were not only tribal society but conscious instruments of
British policy in the region made such a cooperation unthinkable.
After the conclusion in that year of treaties of friendship with Iran
and Turkey, however, official sympathy for Kurdish aspirations became
impolitic as well (Howell, p. 7).
The idea of the independence of Kurdistan came very close to
realization following the fall and dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire. This period presented the Kurdish people with their best ever
opportunity to set up their own nation state. The Fourteen points
Declaration by Woodrow Wilson, the president of the United States who
suggested the right of self-determination for the minorities of the
Ottoman Empire, was a form of international recognition of the idea of
an independent Kurdish state. Hopes of an independent Kurdistan were
boosted in the aftermath of World War I, with the Treaty of Sevres of
August 1920, when the victorious Western allies and a defeated Turkey,
as part of a drastic scheme for rearrangement of territory, promised
the Kurds their own national state (Hyman, p. 2). The Soviet
government which was skeptical about the Anglo-French schemes in the
Middle East prejudged the outcome of the Treaty of Sevres as well. The
Bolshevik leaders viewed an independent Kurdish state as an
imperialist buffer zone against spreading the Soviet experiment to the
south of Transcaucasia. So, the Soviet regime ignored its own
professed plan of self-determination right of minorities when it
established full economic and political relations with ultra
nationalist states of Iran and Turkey. "In any case, the new Turkish
regime, like its Iranian counterpart, rejected Kurdish separatism and
the Bolsheviks, by signing the treaty of 1921, precluded official
support for the Kurdish national movement for the moment" (Howell, p.
311). However, the Soviet government always had dismissed this kind of
criticism by arguing it was a matter of political necessity for its
regional policies as the sole communist state in a hostile capitalist
world.
The Treaty of Sevres, which had been imposed on the defeated Ottoman
Empire was never ratified. Indeed two new developments towards the end
of 1920, destroyed Kurdish hopes of achieving independence in Ottoman
Kurdistan. The rise of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish nationalist leader
in Anatolia, and factional division among the Kurds themselves
shattered the independence of Kurdistan. In the beginning, Kemal was
careful not to mention the Turkish state. Instead, he stressed either
the fraternity between Kurds and Turks, or the Ottoman nation in
conflict with foreign occupation forces. "The Turkish nationalists
established a national assembly at Ankara which, shortly before the
Sevres Treaty was signed, announced that it would not recognize any
agreement signed by the Ottoman government in occupied Constantinople"
(Bulloch, P. 91). While many Kurdish nationalists sought support of
the Allies for Kurdish national aims, a considerable number also
supported the Turkish Sultan in the name of loyalty to the head of
Islam. In fact, Kemal became able to form a Turkish nation-state when
the Kurds turned in favor of his pan-Islamic propaganda and stood
against their national interests. The Soviet government was also
against the Allied powers' plan for Kurdistan (the idea of Kurdish
state as British buffer zone) and supported the Turkish nationalists
who were refusing to accept the Treaty of Sevres. Reflecting on these
developments with obvious bitterness, Sureya Badir-Khan, a Kurdish
journalist in Ottoman Kurdistan, subsequently wrote: "It should here
be noted that the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks, who were without the
pale of international law, might perhaps justify themselves in
resorting to common actions against those whom they recognized as
their enemies" (Howell, p. 314). In 1921, the Soviet government
concluded with the new Turkish regime a Treaty of Friendship which set
the limits of official Soviet policy toward the Kurds for most of the
interwar period.
The Treaty of Sevres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.
With the entry into force of this treaty on Aug. 6, 1924, the
international consideration of the Kurdish question, growing out of
World War I, was terminated. Already, it was painfully obvious not
only that the aspirations of the Kurdish nationalists were to be
unfulfilled in the final peace settlement but that the nationalists
themselves were not accepted in international circles. There was no
Kurdish representation at the Lausanne Conference and the Kurds played
no significant role in the decisions reached there (Kutschera, pp.
51-52). Kemal, who by this time had established the Turkish
nation-state, immediately broke his promise of the Kurdish autonomy
and dissolved the Kurdish National Assembly. He abolished Kurdish
schools, and outlawed the use of the Kurdish language. Kurds were
officially labeled "mountain Turks" and the land called "Eastern
Anatolia." The Kurdish response was a series of uprisings throughout
the 1920s and 1930s, led by a combination of tribal and feudal
leaders, some of whom had religious backgrounds, and urban
intellectuals. All of these revolts were completely crushed by the
vastly superior Turkish military force. Howell, once again, emphasized
the importance of the cooperation of the Soviet authorities with Kemal
in this crucial period when he said, "By this time it became clear
that Kurdish confidence in the implementation of the Treaty of Sevres
was unfounded, Kemal, in part because of the support and assistance
which he received from the Soviet government, was in a position to
crush the Kurdish resistance" (Howell, p. 314). In short, the failure
of the Treaty of Serves was a tremendous blow to the Kurdish
nationalists but had little effect upon their determination to achieve
their objectives.
The official Soviet policy on the Kurds during the interwar period did
not change and classified them (the Kurds) as the instruments of
"imperialist" plot in the region. The Soviet regime planned to fire
back at the Anglo-French schemes and worked out a series of friendship
treaties that allied that country with Iran and Turkey. These
alliances not only assured the Soviet of peace to the south, but also,
by inducing the two countries to develop mechanisms for settling
quarrels between themselves, ensured that meddling foreign powers
(like Great Britain) could not find pretexts to intervene in the
region. However, there is not enough evidence that the British were
supporting the Kurdish insurgency by the mid-1920s. In fact, during
this period there were several Kurdish revolts against central
government of Iran, but while Britain (which at the time had status in
Iran) permitted local forces to crush the rebellion, the Soviet
government also refused to let them move into north. For a short
period, under the Soviet patronage the Kurds (Ismail Agha Simko in
western Iran), whose Iranian lands fell largely within the Soviet
zone, stepped up their campaign for independence (Kutschera, pp.
90-94). At this point, it seems that the fate of the Kurds became
subordinated to the Anglo-Soviet struggle for power and influence in
the region. At the same time, neither the Soviet government nor the
Western powers were willing to forgo the possibility of friendship and
cooperation with Turkey and Iran for the sake of an independent
Kurdistan. The Kurdish nationalists also professed that the Soviet's
"good neighbor policy" played a major role in defeating their revolts
by the governments of both Turkey and Iran during the interwar period.
From: A. Papazian