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TURKEY'S NEW ROLE IN GEOSTRATEGIC LANDSCAPE OF EURO-MUSLIM RELATIONS
AnalysisWritten by: ISN Security Watch
http://www.eurasiareview.com/turkeys-new-role-in-geostrategic-landscape-of-euro-muslim-relations-analysis-07042011/
April 7, 2011
While Turkey increases its economic weight and prominence in energy
affairs and solidifies its geostrategic interdependence with Europe,
the latter approaches Ankara with a dangerous mistrust, expressed
through a new security architecture that seeks to marginalize Turkey's
influence.
By Andrea Bonzanni and Dorukhan I Aras for ISN Insights
Europe's collective imagination about Muslim peoples, rooted in the
crusades and centuries of strife, has been built on a foundation of
perceived confrontation. More recently, the tragedy of 9/11 and the
troubled integration of Muslim immigrants within Europe has renewed
this dichotomous mind-set, framing the 'long-bearded Muslim next
door' as the new enemy to replace the 'ruthless Russian communist'
of the Cold War era.
Nonetheless, a closer look at the last decade of Euro-Muslim relations
reveals that cooperation was more common than confrontation. This trend
has unfortunately been eclipsed by more negative attention-grabbing
events, driven by the sensationalist tendencies of the mass
media. While the War on Terror may cast a long shadow over the past
decade, the great deal of positive interaction that took place between
several Muslim countries and Europe should not be forgotten or ignored.
Turkey For instance, the young Republic of Azerbaijan, a majority
Shiite Muslim country, has developed solid ties with Europe and the
US. It did not fall into the orbit of neighboring Iran, nor has it
nurtured a significant home-grown Islamist movement. Similarly, the
long-standing alliance between Saudi Arabia and the West has only
been marginally weakened by the glaring ideological incompatibility
of their respective religious and socio-political creeds.
An uneasy relationship
The most interesting case, however, is Turkey. With its geographic
links with the Mediterranean, Mesopotamia, the Southern Caucasus and
the Black Sea, Turkey has an enviable location. The country not only
serves as a natural hub for the region, but also as a gateway to the
Balkans and North Africa.
A decade-long political transformation culminated in 2003 with
the election of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the
mildly-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). Under AKP rule,
Turkey has focused on developing a consistent strategy to strengthen
its geo-economic position and its role in the international arena,
skillfully taking advantage of its specific strengths.
European pundits, overplaying the cultural dimension, have
focused the debate on a supposed "Islamization" of Turkey and an
exaggerated " neo-Ottoman" element in Ankara's new stance. Finer
observers of Turkish affairs can easily dismiss such claims,
but this problematic discrepancy between cultural opposition and
functionalist European-Turkish interdependence should not, however,
be underestimated. The mainstreaming of this discourse may in fact
condition the future of relations between Europe and Turkey. Yet,
Turkey is now an indispensable partner to Europe in the economic
and security arenas, and Europe would harm itself if it restrained
engagement in the future.
A prominent economic player
Turkey has witnessed a decade of remarkable economic success, with
annual GDP growth averaging 6.6 percent between 2001 and 2008. Sound
monetary governance has rebalanced the Turkish economy and brought
the inflation rate- Turkey's notorious Achilles' heel- down to single
digit in 2005. The economy has also managed to escape the worst
of the 2008-9 global financial crisis: GDP has fallen by almost 5
percent in 2009 but the banking system has not collapsed and growth
has immediately revived.
Very importantly, this period of economic prosperity has been
coupled by a fast-paced integration in the world economy, much
in discontinuity with country's traditional inward looking and
protectionist model. Trade volume has more than tripled between 2000
and 2009.
Due to territorial proximity and the beneficial effects of a customs
union agreement signed in 1996, the EU is Turkey's largest trading
partner, receiving over 45 percent of export and providing 41 percent
of imports in 2009 but its ties have not been limited to its Western
neighbors. High-Level Cooperation Councils have been established with
all neighboring countries, from Greece to Syria.
Yet the sector where Ankara's multidirectional strategy is producing
the most significant results is energy trade. By leveraging its
geographical position, and thanks to its proximity to 72 percent of
the world's proven oil and gas reserves, Turkey has pro-actively turned
itself into a major energy hub, acting as a bridge between the world's
largest energy producers and energy consumers. The country is already
a significant outlet for Caspian and Iraqi oil: Two pipelines from
Baku and Kirkuk currently supply the Mediterranean terminal of Ceyhan
with 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd). The figure is set to double
in 2012 as an interconnection with the port of Samsun on the Black
Sea is completed. Moreover, Iraq plans to increase its production
from 2.4 to 12 bpd in the next six to seven years, and a substantial
share of this oil will likely flow northward to Turkey.
In addition, Ankara is set to assume an even more prominent role
in the natural gas trade, a highly strategic resource for European
countries. European countries find themselves in an uneasy position
vis-a-vis supplies from the Russian monopolist Gazprom. Following
repeated crises between Russia and transit countries such as Belarus
and Ukraine, the diversification of gas suppliers has become imperative
for the European Commission. This gives Turkey an opportunity to become
the alternative transit route for gas coming from the Caspian basin,
Central Asia and indeed the entire Middle East. The recent uprisings in
North Africa have further boosted Ankara's relevance in this respect as
fears of political instability and violence will inevitably deter the
development of Libyan, Egyptian and Algerian reserves, long considered
one of the most promising alternatives to imports from Russia.
A spider's web
Turkey and its pipeline operator BOTAS are one of the driving
forces behind the Nabucco pipeline, which, if successful, would
bring Azeri, Turkmen and Iraqi gas to Southern and South-Eastern
Europe through Turkey. However, Ankara has also granted access to its
territorial sector of the Black Sea to the South Stream consortium, a
Russian-Italian joint venture that is fiercely competing with Nabucco.
The purpose of the strategy is clear: Turkey is fundamental to both
the Nabucco and South Stream projects and-whatever the outcome of the
battle-the country will be a major transit route for future European
gas supplies.
As much as it is a blessing for the Turkish economy and culture
to be at the heart of such a vital geostrategic web, the idea that
such a position comes with security benefits is misguided. Realistic
deterrence in this volatile neighborhood - subject to the changing
moods of autocratic rulers and the vicissitudes of an ever-present
terrorist threat - requires a strong military presence. With Turkey's
growing involvement in 'energy flirts' with Europe, the Middle East
and Central Asia, as well as a game of energy sector hide-and-seek
with Russia and Iran, its need for security has naturally increased
and will only become a bigger headache in future.
As a key "hub-state", its own security needs are intertwined with the
needs of its partners. If so, wouldn't one argue that a collective
security should also be supported appropriately by all of its
beneficiaries? The direction in which the EU security architecture
has evolved in the past few years, combined with the alleged indirect
support of PKK units by some European governments, has made it perhaps
harder for Turkey to appreciate European contributions to Euro-Turkish
security cooperation.
Winning over the skeptics
How could Turkey enhance a joint security architecture centered
on energy cooperation between European and Muslim countries in
the region? Firstly, Turkey needs to embed itself deeper within
international organizations, through more efficient use of its
comparative advantage in intelligence harvesting and trust-building
with countries outside the EU's usual sphere. This would enable Ankara
to better negotiate its rights and functions on the international
stage.
Secondly, while NATO undergoes its second transformation, also known as
NATO 3.0, Turkey's position as a staunch ally has come under threat,
due to a perceived Islamization of the country. But what is seen as
a progressive accommodation with 'rogue states' like Syria and Iran
is rather the first piece of a great puzzle called "zero-problem
foreign policy", Turkey's new foreign stance has been conceptualized
and implemented largely as the result of the long-term strategic
vision of foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu with Turkey's approach to
regional security much more multifaceted than some Western analysts
imply. A closer look at the portfolio of new partners, including
traditional foes like Armenia, Russia shows that Turkey has not only
focused on a Muslim axis, but evolved into a regional pole. It has
made serious investments in building a functioning security radius,
despite the challenges and risks; among other organizations, Turkey is
a major player in the naval task force BLACKSEAFOR, the Development 8
(D8), the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
or the Joint Administration of Turkic Culture and Art (TURKSOY).
Ultimately though, to improve its ties to Europe, Ankara needs to
make its process of political transformation more transparent. It
will require a committed and concerted effort on the part of Turkey
to convince the skeptical minds at the Atlantic Alliance and the EU
that these changes are not tending toward the creation of a modern
Ottoman caliphate or a Muslim axis. Rather, it should be demonstrated
that the position of the 'new Turkey' - though more assertive and
independent - will nevertheless remain compatible with occidental
secular and democratic values.
Two major changes in European security identity redlined Turkey as a
security player: Since the EU aspired to become a security actor in
its own right, NATO's, thus Turkey's, presence in the European safety
management has decreased. Secondly, the EU took over the security
functions of the Western European Union, where Turkey is Associate
Member. This important metamorphose made Turkey in the new European
security architecture de facto obsolete. As a matter of fact, the EU
Common Security and Defense Policy marginalized Turkey's security role.
Future of Euro-Turkish relations
The categorical exclusion of Turkey from a European security identity
and/or EU accession negotiations would have abrupt and serious
consequences. For example, Turkey's withdrawal of its application
for EU membership might paralyze the operational functionality
of Europe's security architecture - especially if Turkey's unique
location and regional relationships are kept in mind. Besides a lack
of future cooperation in the case of a crisis in the neighborhood,
Turkey might also refuse to share its intelligence data with European
terrorism task forces. In addition, it could potentially make use of
its veto right to prevent the EU from utilizing certain NATO assets.
Europe should instead accept its partner's 'otherness' without trying
to drastically change it, but, at the same time, should not be ashamed
of engaging in geopolitical strategic maneuvers - necessary in a
world of conflicting interests.
Geostrategic interaction between Europe and Turkey, colored as it
is by occasional conflict and disagreement, is not the manifest
expression of a 'clash of civilizations'. Although the relationship
is still characterized by a degree of mistrust, suspicions should be
curbed and put into perspective: Turkey started its foreign policy
reorientation several decades ago. For the sake of a safer and more
prosperous Euro-Muslim relationship - Turkey should be more deeply
integrated into the European security and energy realms, as well
as key regional decision-making processes. It will only be through
such a determined, collaborative effort, that the foundations of the
Euro-Muslim relationship will continue to rest on solid ground now,
and in the future.
An alumnus of the Graduate Institute of International and Developments
Studies, Andrea Bonzanni has been a consultant for the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe and a research assistant for the
World Development Report of the World Bank. He regularly comments on
energy affairs and international politics at WorldPoliticsReview.com
and Affarinternazionali.it. He is currently a teaching assistant at
Sciences-Po in Paris.
Dorukhan I Aras has worked as the Assistant to the Representative of
the Rector of the United Nations University in New York and held a
traineeship in the Human Rights section of the Permanent Mission
of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the UN in Geneva. He studied
International Relations, with a focus on International Security,
at the Université de Genève and Geneva School of Diplomacy and
International Relations. Published by International Relations and
Security Network (ISN)
About the author: ISN Security Watch
The International Relations and Security Network (ISN) is a leading
open access information service for international relations and
security professionals.
From: A. Papazian
AnalysisWritten by: ISN Security Watch
http://www.eurasiareview.com/turkeys-new-role-in-geostrategic-landscape-of-euro-muslim-relations-analysis-07042011/
April 7, 2011
While Turkey increases its economic weight and prominence in energy
affairs and solidifies its geostrategic interdependence with Europe,
the latter approaches Ankara with a dangerous mistrust, expressed
through a new security architecture that seeks to marginalize Turkey's
influence.
By Andrea Bonzanni and Dorukhan I Aras for ISN Insights
Europe's collective imagination about Muslim peoples, rooted in the
crusades and centuries of strife, has been built on a foundation of
perceived confrontation. More recently, the tragedy of 9/11 and the
troubled integration of Muslim immigrants within Europe has renewed
this dichotomous mind-set, framing the 'long-bearded Muslim next
door' as the new enemy to replace the 'ruthless Russian communist'
of the Cold War era.
Nonetheless, a closer look at the last decade of Euro-Muslim relations
reveals that cooperation was more common than confrontation. This trend
has unfortunately been eclipsed by more negative attention-grabbing
events, driven by the sensationalist tendencies of the mass
media. While the War on Terror may cast a long shadow over the past
decade, the great deal of positive interaction that took place between
several Muslim countries and Europe should not be forgotten or ignored.
Turkey For instance, the young Republic of Azerbaijan, a majority
Shiite Muslim country, has developed solid ties with Europe and the
US. It did not fall into the orbit of neighboring Iran, nor has it
nurtured a significant home-grown Islamist movement. Similarly, the
long-standing alliance between Saudi Arabia and the West has only
been marginally weakened by the glaring ideological incompatibility
of their respective religious and socio-political creeds.
An uneasy relationship
The most interesting case, however, is Turkey. With its geographic
links with the Mediterranean, Mesopotamia, the Southern Caucasus and
the Black Sea, Turkey has an enviable location. The country not only
serves as a natural hub for the region, but also as a gateway to the
Balkans and North Africa.
A decade-long political transformation culminated in 2003 with
the election of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the
mildly-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). Under AKP rule,
Turkey has focused on developing a consistent strategy to strengthen
its geo-economic position and its role in the international arena,
skillfully taking advantage of its specific strengths.
European pundits, overplaying the cultural dimension, have
focused the debate on a supposed "Islamization" of Turkey and an
exaggerated " neo-Ottoman" element in Ankara's new stance. Finer
observers of Turkish affairs can easily dismiss such claims,
but this problematic discrepancy between cultural opposition and
functionalist European-Turkish interdependence should not, however,
be underestimated. The mainstreaming of this discourse may in fact
condition the future of relations between Europe and Turkey. Yet,
Turkey is now an indispensable partner to Europe in the economic
and security arenas, and Europe would harm itself if it restrained
engagement in the future.
A prominent economic player
Turkey has witnessed a decade of remarkable economic success, with
annual GDP growth averaging 6.6 percent between 2001 and 2008. Sound
monetary governance has rebalanced the Turkish economy and brought
the inflation rate- Turkey's notorious Achilles' heel- down to single
digit in 2005. The economy has also managed to escape the worst
of the 2008-9 global financial crisis: GDP has fallen by almost 5
percent in 2009 but the banking system has not collapsed and growth
has immediately revived.
Very importantly, this period of economic prosperity has been
coupled by a fast-paced integration in the world economy, much
in discontinuity with country's traditional inward looking and
protectionist model. Trade volume has more than tripled between 2000
and 2009.
Due to territorial proximity and the beneficial effects of a customs
union agreement signed in 1996, the EU is Turkey's largest trading
partner, receiving over 45 percent of export and providing 41 percent
of imports in 2009 but its ties have not been limited to its Western
neighbors. High-Level Cooperation Councils have been established with
all neighboring countries, from Greece to Syria.
Yet the sector where Ankara's multidirectional strategy is producing
the most significant results is energy trade. By leveraging its
geographical position, and thanks to its proximity to 72 percent of
the world's proven oil and gas reserves, Turkey has pro-actively turned
itself into a major energy hub, acting as a bridge between the world's
largest energy producers and energy consumers. The country is already
a significant outlet for Caspian and Iraqi oil: Two pipelines from
Baku and Kirkuk currently supply the Mediterranean terminal of Ceyhan
with 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd). The figure is set to double
in 2012 as an interconnection with the port of Samsun on the Black
Sea is completed. Moreover, Iraq plans to increase its production
from 2.4 to 12 bpd in the next six to seven years, and a substantial
share of this oil will likely flow northward to Turkey.
In addition, Ankara is set to assume an even more prominent role
in the natural gas trade, a highly strategic resource for European
countries. European countries find themselves in an uneasy position
vis-a-vis supplies from the Russian monopolist Gazprom. Following
repeated crises between Russia and transit countries such as Belarus
and Ukraine, the diversification of gas suppliers has become imperative
for the European Commission. This gives Turkey an opportunity to become
the alternative transit route for gas coming from the Caspian basin,
Central Asia and indeed the entire Middle East. The recent uprisings in
North Africa have further boosted Ankara's relevance in this respect as
fears of political instability and violence will inevitably deter the
development of Libyan, Egyptian and Algerian reserves, long considered
one of the most promising alternatives to imports from Russia.
A spider's web
Turkey and its pipeline operator BOTAS are one of the driving
forces behind the Nabucco pipeline, which, if successful, would
bring Azeri, Turkmen and Iraqi gas to Southern and South-Eastern
Europe through Turkey. However, Ankara has also granted access to its
territorial sector of the Black Sea to the South Stream consortium, a
Russian-Italian joint venture that is fiercely competing with Nabucco.
The purpose of the strategy is clear: Turkey is fundamental to both
the Nabucco and South Stream projects and-whatever the outcome of the
battle-the country will be a major transit route for future European
gas supplies.
As much as it is a blessing for the Turkish economy and culture
to be at the heart of such a vital geostrategic web, the idea that
such a position comes with security benefits is misguided. Realistic
deterrence in this volatile neighborhood - subject to the changing
moods of autocratic rulers and the vicissitudes of an ever-present
terrorist threat - requires a strong military presence. With Turkey's
growing involvement in 'energy flirts' with Europe, the Middle East
and Central Asia, as well as a game of energy sector hide-and-seek
with Russia and Iran, its need for security has naturally increased
and will only become a bigger headache in future.
As a key "hub-state", its own security needs are intertwined with the
needs of its partners. If so, wouldn't one argue that a collective
security should also be supported appropriately by all of its
beneficiaries? The direction in which the EU security architecture
has evolved in the past few years, combined with the alleged indirect
support of PKK units by some European governments, has made it perhaps
harder for Turkey to appreciate European contributions to Euro-Turkish
security cooperation.
Winning over the skeptics
How could Turkey enhance a joint security architecture centered
on energy cooperation between European and Muslim countries in
the region? Firstly, Turkey needs to embed itself deeper within
international organizations, through more efficient use of its
comparative advantage in intelligence harvesting and trust-building
with countries outside the EU's usual sphere. This would enable Ankara
to better negotiate its rights and functions on the international
stage.
Secondly, while NATO undergoes its second transformation, also known as
NATO 3.0, Turkey's position as a staunch ally has come under threat,
due to a perceived Islamization of the country. But what is seen as
a progressive accommodation with 'rogue states' like Syria and Iran
is rather the first piece of a great puzzle called "zero-problem
foreign policy", Turkey's new foreign stance has been conceptualized
and implemented largely as the result of the long-term strategic
vision of foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu with Turkey's approach to
regional security much more multifaceted than some Western analysts
imply. A closer look at the portfolio of new partners, including
traditional foes like Armenia, Russia shows that Turkey has not only
focused on a Muslim axis, but evolved into a regional pole. It has
made serious investments in building a functioning security radius,
despite the challenges and risks; among other organizations, Turkey is
a major player in the naval task force BLACKSEAFOR, the Development 8
(D8), the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
or the Joint Administration of Turkic Culture and Art (TURKSOY).
Ultimately though, to improve its ties to Europe, Ankara needs to
make its process of political transformation more transparent. It
will require a committed and concerted effort on the part of Turkey
to convince the skeptical minds at the Atlantic Alliance and the EU
that these changes are not tending toward the creation of a modern
Ottoman caliphate or a Muslim axis. Rather, it should be demonstrated
that the position of the 'new Turkey' - though more assertive and
independent - will nevertheless remain compatible with occidental
secular and democratic values.
Two major changes in European security identity redlined Turkey as a
security player: Since the EU aspired to become a security actor in
its own right, NATO's, thus Turkey's, presence in the European safety
management has decreased. Secondly, the EU took over the security
functions of the Western European Union, where Turkey is Associate
Member. This important metamorphose made Turkey in the new European
security architecture de facto obsolete. As a matter of fact, the EU
Common Security and Defense Policy marginalized Turkey's security role.
Future of Euro-Turkish relations
The categorical exclusion of Turkey from a European security identity
and/or EU accession negotiations would have abrupt and serious
consequences. For example, Turkey's withdrawal of its application
for EU membership might paralyze the operational functionality
of Europe's security architecture - especially if Turkey's unique
location and regional relationships are kept in mind. Besides a lack
of future cooperation in the case of a crisis in the neighborhood,
Turkey might also refuse to share its intelligence data with European
terrorism task forces. In addition, it could potentially make use of
its veto right to prevent the EU from utilizing certain NATO assets.
Europe should instead accept its partner's 'otherness' without trying
to drastically change it, but, at the same time, should not be ashamed
of engaging in geopolitical strategic maneuvers - necessary in a
world of conflicting interests.
Geostrategic interaction between Europe and Turkey, colored as it
is by occasional conflict and disagreement, is not the manifest
expression of a 'clash of civilizations'. Although the relationship
is still characterized by a degree of mistrust, suspicions should be
curbed and put into perspective: Turkey started its foreign policy
reorientation several decades ago. For the sake of a safer and more
prosperous Euro-Muslim relationship - Turkey should be more deeply
integrated into the European security and energy realms, as well
as key regional decision-making processes. It will only be through
such a determined, collaborative effort, that the foundations of the
Euro-Muslim relationship will continue to rest on solid ground now,
and in the future.
An alumnus of the Graduate Institute of International and Developments
Studies, Andrea Bonzanni has been a consultant for the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe and a research assistant for the
World Development Report of the World Bank. He regularly comments on
energy affairs and international politics at WorldPoliticsReview.com
and Affarinternazionali.it. He is currently a teaching assistant at
Sciences-Po in Paris.
Dorukhan I Aras has worked as the Assistant to the Representative of
the Rector of the United Nations University in New York and held a
traineeship in the Human Rights section of the Permanent Mission
of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the UN in Geneva. He studied
International Relations, with a focus on International Security,
at the Université de Genève and Geneva School of Diplomacy and
International Relations. Published by International Relations and
Security Network (ISN)
About the author: ISN Security Watch
The International Relations and Security Network (ISN) is a leading
open access information service for international relations and
security professionals.
From: A. Papazian