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IRAN 'MAJOR FACTOR' THAT COULD CHANGE SOUTH CAUCASUS
news.az
May 11 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az reprints from Bakinskiy Rabochiy newspaper an interview with
Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the journal Russia in Global
Affairs.
What's your opinion of the current level of Russian-Azerbaijani
relations and the potential for further development?
I would describe Russian-Azeri relations at present as very promising.
In general, the attitude of the Russian ruling elite and public to
Azerbaijan has been changing over recent years in the sense that
Azerbaijan is perceived as a serious country on which much depends.
Baku is committed to an independent policy which cannot be ignored
and Azerbaijan is critical in any future geopolitical configurations.
Is Azerbaijan playing an important role in these configurations and
what geographical area does it cover?
International developments have recently become not merely
unpredictable, but chaotic, irrational, making it senseless to analyse
anything. As for Russian-Azerbaijani relations, Azerbaijan is an
important element in geopolitics not only in the Caucasus but also in
the region from southwest Asia to the Middle East. Azerbaijan sees
its role in these regions growing thanks to energy, geopolitics and
the changing balance of interests and powers between the superstates.
Today we can see a completely new self-perception in Turkey, and a new
role for Iran in the Middle East. We can see a different position of
the leading powers, primarily the United States, who are reviewing
their system of priorities in the Middle East, while the European
Union is practically vanishing from politics in these regions.
Now that Azerbaijan is such an important policy-forming element in
the region, what mutually favourable points of contact may enhance
Russian-Azerbaijani ties?
It may be trite to point to the energy factor, but Russia and
Azerbaijan are countries where energy policy dominates and these
priorities will never change, whatever happens in the coming decades.
For this reason, the balance of Russian-Azerbaijani interests largely
depends on the energy transit waltz around Europe the outcome of which
is not yet clear. There are also a raft of external factors that do
not depend on either Russia or Azerbaijan, particularly related to the
international perception of Iran and further events in North Africa,
which is currently convulsed in revolution.
Azerbaijan and Russia may remain rivals in energy transit but this is
normal. If the situation across Europe gets bogged down, the triangle
Moscow - Baku - Ankara may coordinate action in the energy sector.
Though these three countries compete on most issues, there are even
more reasons to pull together which requires non-standard ways for
cooperation.
How can events in the Arab world and North African influence European
energy policy and Russian-Azerbaijani energy relations?
It takes time to set aside emotions and analyse events in the Arab
world and North Africa. First and foremost, the question must be
answered: "What has changed there?" Certainly the world faced a
feeling of complete uncertainty which has a strong effect on the
thoughts and actions of plenty of countries. But for example, the
wave of unrest in Egypt has calmed down, with some generals replacing
others. Meanwhile, people from the same group, with the same outlook,
the same age and even older than President Ben Ali was, have come
to power in Tunisia. Though things in Libya are completely unclear,
it seems that expectations that Gaddafi will step are evaporating
as time passes. There is a subjective feeling of complete collapse,
whereas no objective evidence for it can be seen yet.
The media covering events in those countries were largely responsible
for the biased feeling of collapse.
Yes, there is no doubt that the role of the mass media is significant
here and the feeling of collapse, however artificial, is sometimes
enough to wreck the established strategy and search for new ways. To
return to energy policy and Russian-Azerbaijani ties, I should
note that during his recent visit to Europe, speaking with his
characteristic slight sarcasm, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
drew the attention of European partners to the fact that before the
events in the Arab world, they had sought diversification, describing
Russia as "an unreliable supplier". But events in the Arab world
have made this diversification, oriented on North Africa, Algeria,
Libya, Qatar, doubtful, to put it mildly. This means that factors
emerged objectively which will give an impetus back to Russia and
will partially lead to attempts to revive Nabucco.
What steps may Russia take in this situation, as an important energy
supplier to Europe?
Europe may revise its energy strategy, probably, laying emphasis
on the "magic" shale gas. However, traditional power sources remain
and all that is left for us to do is to hold a psychotherapy course
for European customers to persuade them that our supplies are the
most reliable. I think Russia and Azerbaijan will be engaged in this
while Turkey is also concerned. Meanwhile, revolutionary changes will
possibly be linked to Iran and the way the United States is going to
build its relations with this country.
What is the United States planning for Iran?
It all depends on the way the United States builds its relations -
either through force or peacefully. Maybe there will be a miracle and
a bloodless revolution will happen in Iran which suits all parties,
though the chances are slim.
Is all the fuss in the Arab world and North Africa really about Iran
and attempts to influence this state?
Well, I think this fuss has no specific reasons, but complications. As
for the reasons, they will emerge later.
Will the reasons be made up later?
They could invent them later, since they have no problems doing this,
immediately finding precise, in-depth explanations about how it all
happened. However, now it does not seem that Iran is engulfed by a
revolutionary war. On the contrary, in the medium term the US role will
further decline in this and other regions. For example, even in Egypt
if everything continues as it is now, that is, if the military elite
remain on top to elect "the right" president, even in this favourable
scenario for the USA politics in the region will be different.
The situation is on course to release Egypt from trailing in America's
wake.
The US role in the Greater Middle East will diminish for the mere
reason that the leaders of the regional countries have again seen that
the US cannot be relied upon in the event of trouble. Additionally,
the leaders of North Africa and the Middle East will have to heed
anti-American public sentiment on the streets. It means that Egypt,
which used to play an important role in Washington's Arab policy,
will now take its own course, which will expand the unknown quantities
in this geopolitical equation.
US positions appear to be weakening not only in the Middle East but
also in the South Caucasus. The Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and unrest
in the Arab world created a vacuum here in terms of global actors. In
the aftermath, the South Caucasus is still facing three unsettled
conflicts with the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh
the most explosive.
Russia has plans for the region as the status quo does not suit it.
However, things can be planned if you have building materials,
a blueprint and method, but sometimes there is nothing to show
for what you have "built". Much has changed in the region since the
Russian-Georgian war of 2008, since this war showed the sole reality:
however strong the US interest in the region, there is a limit to the
risks that the United States will undertake. The political bubble
that was blown in the United States during the Bush administration
turned out to be empty; in other words, expansion is good if it is
backed by real force, which turned out not to be the case in Georgia.
This has quite strongly changed the situation, but as Russian foreign
policy remains largely reactive, it triggered the paradox that as long
as external forces tried to oust Russia from different parts of the
post-Soviet area, Russia was on alert and ready to resist. But when,
as a result of objective circumstances including the Georgian war,
the subsequent world economic crisis and the problems in other parts of
the world, many expected an active foreign policy from Russia to fill
the vacuum, this never materialized. Russia's foreign policy becomes
much more passive in the absence of an external impulse or pressure.
That is, for the Russian establishment and Russian society the war in
Georgia was small revenge for the 20-year retreat before the USA. But
after savouring its revenge, Russia realized its real potential:
this is what we can do but anything more requires a sober assessment
of desires and potential.
So it was all about the fight and not the geopolitical objectives?
It was all about the fight and proving to ourselves, yes, we can do
this. And when we proved it, then we began to think what we should
do next. That is, the Georgian war became a symbolic threshold which
marked an end to the post-Soviet period in 1991-2008. A new stage
followed. It finally became clear, I would say, on a psychological
level that there will be no return to the Union. It is left in the past
and now Russia should build policies based not on past, but on present
and future challenges that will shape the situation in 10-15 years.
Regional countries such as Iran and Turkey have stepped up their
efforts against this backdrop.
This turn of events does not usually end well. The problem is that
the ambitions of regional players such as Turkey and Iran are indeed
rising along with their increasing weight, but this does not mean that
they are able to establish order. This applies to various initiatives,
which do not get approval from the world's leading powers.
For example, last year, two powerful regional states - Turkey and
Brazil - tried to resolve the Iranian nuclear program. Turkish and
Brazilian executives travelled to Tehran to announce that they could
solve the problem of Iranian nuclear power, but the major powers
viewed this with hostility and ignored the agreement reached there.
More precisely, they did not take them seriously. As a result,
nothing has changed on the Iranian issue.
This showed that regional powers do not yet have the political
traditions or sufficient authority to resolve these issues. They just
will not be allowed to do this.
They can put forward initiatives, but they are unable to solve
problems.
Is the strength of the regional powers growing, not because they are
stronger in themselves, but because the leading powers are growing
weaker?
Of course, it is growing against the backdrop of the weakening
positions of the leading powers.
In this case, the regional states may try to build their policy.
Attempts to resolve the chronic Armenian-Turkish conflict made it
clear that the regional states and the South Caucasus countries can
make a stubborn refusal and nothing can be done about it. It looked
as though all the initiatives to resolve the problem with Armenia were
to be realized, but the stance of the great powers, which seemed to be
in favour but to avoid taking tough steps, did not yield any results.
So the status quo in the South Caucasus suits the leading powers?
The status quo is not suitable because it may have unpredictable
political consequences, as happened in Georgia in 2008.
The current Russian leadership, headed by President Medvedev, I think,
is making quite sincere efforts, because Russia really wants the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to come out of the impasse.
Why is Russia attempting to resolve the Karabakh conflict precisely
now?
If events evolve to include the use of force, Russia will be in a tough
position. What will it do when it has a formal commitment to Armenia
and an informal understanding of the critical importance of Azerbaijan?
It is unclear whether the Russian military presence in Armenia
guarantees that events can be controlled. It is also unclear what
the Russian leadership would do in this case.
This is a complex dilemma. However, all the parties understand that
the status quo will not last forever and it is still unclear what to
do about it.
Knowing that the status quo is not permanent, what do the super powers
plan to do? Good intentions are unlikely to be enough to avoid a
military solution to the conflict.
Of course, good intentions will not change the situation for the
better. This requires serious diplomatic effort, will and desire on
the part of the leading powers.
If it were not for the Karabakh problem, there would be ample economic,
transit and political opportunities. As to how long the status quo in
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will last, based on the experience
of recent years one can say that the status will not last forever. I
think great changes will take place in the coming 10 years.
What major factor can change the situation in the South Caucasus?
Iran. Much depends on the fate of this country and American-Iranian
relations. Much also depends on the reaction of regional leaders such
as Turkey and Saudi Arabia to Iran's attempts to spread its influence
in the Middle East and other regions.
And the position of Russia, the Caspian countries and other regional
states depends precisely on whether Iran is open to the world as
a powerful source of energy, or whether the United States fails to
bring this about.
From: Baghdasarian
news.az
May 11 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az reprints from Bakinskiy Rabochiy newspaper an interview with
Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the journal Russia in Global
Affairs.
What's your opinion of the current level of Russian-Azerbaijani
relations and the potential for further development?
I would describe Russian-Azeri relations at present as very promising.
In general, the attitude of the Russian ruling elite and public to
Azerbaijan has been changing over recent years in the sense that
Azerbaijan is perceived as a serious country on which much depends.
Baku is committed to an independent policy which cannot be ignored
and Azerbaijan is critical in any future geopolitical configurations.
Is Azerbaijan playing an important role in these configurations and
what geographical area does it cover?
International developments have recently become not merely
unpredictable, but chaotic, irrational, making it senseless to analyse
anything. As for Russian-Azerbaijani relations, Azerbaijan is an
important element in geopolitics not only in the Caucasus but also in
the region from southwest Asia to the Middle East. Azerbaijan sees
its role in these regions growing thanks to energy, geopolitics and
the changing balance of interests and powers between the superstates.
Today we can see a completely new self-perception in Turkey, and a new
role for Iran in the Middle East. We can see a different position of
the leading powers, primarily the United States, who are reviewing
their system of priorities in the Middle East, while the European
Union is practically vanishing from politics in these regions.
Now that Azerbaijan is such an important policy-forming element in
the region, what mutually favourable points of contact may enhance
Russian-Azerbaijani ties?
It may be trite to point to the energy factor, but Russia and
Azerbaijan are countries where energy policy dominates and these
priorities will never change, whatever happens in the coming decades.
For this reason, the balance of Russian-Azerbaijani interests largely
depends on the energy transit waltz around Europe the outcome of which
is not yet clear. There are also a raft of external factors that do
not depend on either Russia or Azerbaijan, particularly related to the
international perception of Iran and further events in North Africa,
which is currently convulsed in revolution.
Azerbaijan and Russia may remain rivals in energy transit but this is
normal. If the situation across Europe gets bogged down, the triangle
Moscow - Baku - Ankara may coordinate action in the energy sector.
Though these three countries compete on most issues, there are even
more reasons to pull together which requires non-standard ways for
cooperation.
How can events in the Arab world and North African influence European
energy policy and Russian-Azerbaijani energy relations?
It takes time to set aside emotions and analyse events in the Arab
world and North Africa. First and foremost, the question must be
answered: "What has changed there?" Certainly the world faced a
feeling of complete uncertainty which has a strong effect on the
thoughts and actions of plenty of countries. But for example, the
wave of unrest in Egypt has calmed down, with some generals replacing
others. Meanwhile, people from the same group, with the same outlook,
the same age and even older than President Ben Ali was, have come
to power in Tunisia. Though things in Libya are completely unclear,
it seems that expectations that Gaddafi will step are evaporating
as time passes. There is a subjective feeling of complete collapse,
whereas no objective evidence for it can be seen yet.
The media covering events in those countries were largely responsible
for the biased feeling of collapse.
Yes, there is no doubt that the role of the mass media is significant
here and the feeling of collapse, however artificial, is sometimes
enough to wreck the established strategy and search for new ways. To
return to energy policy and Russian-Azerbaijani ties, I should
note that during his recent visit to Europe, speaking with his
characteristic slight sarcasm, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
drew the attention of European partners to the fact that before the
events in the Arab world, they had sought diversification, describing
Russia as "an unreliable supplier". But events in the Arab world
have made this diversification, oriented on North Africa, Algeria,
Libya, Qatar, doubtful, to put it mildly. This means that factors
emerged objectively which will give an impetus back to Russia and
will partially lead to attempts to revive Nabucco.
What steps may Russia take in this situation, as an important energy
supplier to Europe?
Europe may revise its energy strategy, probably, laying emphasis
on the "magic" shale gas. However, traditional power sources remain
and all that is left for us to do is to hold a psychotherapy course
for European customers to persuade them that our supplies are the
most reliable. I think Russia and Azerbaijan will be engaged in this
while Turkey is also concerned. Meanwhile, revolutionary changes will
possibly be linked to Iran and the way the United States is going to
build its relations with this country.
What is the United States planning for Iran?
It all depends on the way the United States builds its relations -
either through force or peacefully. Maybe there will be a miracle and
a bloodless revolution will happen in Iran which suits all parties,
though the chances are slim.
Is all the fuss in the Arab world and North Africa really about Iran
and attempts to influence this state?
Well, I think this fuss has no specific reasons, but complications. As
for the reasons, they will emerge later.
Will the reasons be made up later?
They could invent them later, since they have no problems doing this,
immediately finding precise, in-depth explanations about how it all
happened. However, now it does not seem that Iran is engulfed by a
revolutionary war. On the contrary, in the medium term the US role will
further decline in this and other regions. For example, even in Egypt
if everything continues as it is now, that is, if the military elite
remain on top to elect "the right" president, even in this favourable
scenario for the USA politics in the region will be different.
The situation is on course to release Egypt from trailing in America's
wake.
The US role in the Greater Middle East will diminish for the mere
reason that the leaders of the regional countries have again seen that
the US cannot be relied upon in the event of trouble. Additionally,
the leaders of North Africa and the Middle East will have to heed
anti-American public sentiment on the streets. It means that Egypt,
which used to play an important role in Washington's Arab policy,
will now take its own course, which will expand the unknown quantities
in this geopolitical equation.
US positions appear to be weakening not only in the Middle East but
also in the South Caucasus. The Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and unrest
in the Arab world created a vacuum here in terms of global actors. In
the aftermath, the South Caucasus is still facing three unsettled
conflicts with the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh
the most explosive.
Russia has plans for the region as the status quo does not suit it.
However, things can be planned if you have building materials,
a blueprint and method, but sometimes there is nothing to show
for what you have "built". Much has changed in the region since the
Russian-Georgian war of 2008, since this war showed the sole reality:
however strong the US interest in the region, there is a limit to the
risks that the United States will undertake. The political bubble
that was blown in the United States during the Bush administration
turned out to be empty; in other words, expansion is good if it is
backed by real force, which turned out not to be the case in Georgia.
This has quite strongly changed the situation, but as Russian foreign
policy remains largely reactive, it triggered the paradox that as long
as external forces tried to oust Russia from different parts of the
post-Soviet area, Russia was on alert and ready to resist. But when,
as a result of objective circumstances including the Georgian war,
the subsequent world economic crisis and the problems in other parts of
the world, many expected an active foreign policy from Russia to fill
the vacuum, this never materialized. Russia's foreign policy becomes
much more passive in the absence of an external impulse or pressure.
That is, for the Russian establishment and Russian society the war in
Georgia was small revenge for the 20-year retreat before the USA. But
after savouring its revenge, Russia realized its real potential:
this is what we can do but anything more requires a sober assessment
of desires and potential.
So it was all about the fight and not the geopolitical objectives?
It was all about the fight and proving to ourselves, yes, we can do
this. And when we proved it, then we began to think what we should
do next. That is, the Georgian war became a symbolic threshold which
marked an end to the post-Soviet period in 1991-2008. A new stage
followed. It finally became clear, I would say, on a psychological
level that there will be no return to the Union. It is left in the past
and now Russia should build policies based not on past, but on present
and future challenges that will shape the situation in 10-15 years.
Regional countries such as Iran and Turkey have stepped up their
efforts against this backdrop.
This turn of events does not usually end well. The problem is that
the ambitions of regional players such as Turkey and Iran are indeed
rising along with their increasing weight, but this does not mean that
they are able to establish order. This applies to various initiatives,
which do not get approval from the world's leading powers.
For example, last year, two powerful regional states - Turkey and
Brazil - tried to resolve the Iranian nuclear program. Turkish and
Brazilian executives travelled to Tehran to announce that they could
solve the problem of Iranian nuclear power, but the major powers
viewed this with hostility and ignored the agreement reached there.
More precisely, they did not take them seriously. As a result,
nothing has changed on the Iranian issue.
This showed that regional powers do not yet have the political
traditions or sufficient authority to resolve these issues. They just
will not be allowed to do this.
They can put forward initiatives, but they are unable to solve
problems.
Is the strength of the regional powers growing, not because they are
stronger in themselves, but because the leading powers are growing
weaker?
Of course, it is growing against the backdrop of the weakening
positions of the leading powers.
In this case, the regional states may try to build their policy.
Attempts to resolve the chronic Armenian-Turkish conflict made it
clear that the regional states and the South Caucasus countries can
make a stubborn refusal and nothing can be done about it. It looked
as though all the initiatives to resolve the problem with Armenia were
to be realized, but the stance of the great powers, which seemed to be
in favour but to avoid taking tough steps, did not yield any results.
So the status quo in the South Caucasus suits the leading powers?
The status quo is not suitable because it may have unpredictable
political consequences, as happened in Georgia in 2008.
The current Russian leadership, headed by President Medvedev, I think,
is making quite sincere efforts, because Russia really wants the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to come out of the impasse.
Why is Russia attempting to resolve the Karabakh conflict precisely
now?
If events evolve to include the use of force, Russia will be in a tough
position. What will it do when it has a formal commitment to Armenia
and an informal understanding of the critical importance of Azerbaijan?
It is unclear whether the Russian military presence in Armenia
guarantees that events can be controlled. It is also unclear what
the Russian leadership would do in this case.
This is a complex dilemma. However, all the parties understand that
the status quo will not last forever and it is still unclear what to
do about it.
Knowing that the status quo is not permanent, what do the super powers
plan to do? Good intentions are unlikely to be enough to avoid a
military solution to the conflict.
Of course, good intentions will not change the situation for the
better. This requires serious diplomatic effort, will and desire on
the part of the leading powers.
If it were not for the Karabakh problem, there would be ample economic,
transit and political opportunities. As to how long the status quo in
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will last, based on the experience
of recent years one can say that the status will not last forever. I
think great changes will take place in the coming 10 years.
What major factor can change the situation in the South Caucasus?
Iran. Much depends on the fate of this country and American-Iranian
relations. Much also depends on the reaction of regional leaders such
as Turkey and Saudi Arabia to Iran's attempts to spread its influence
in the Middle East and other regions.
And the position of Russia, the Caspian countries and other regional
states depends precisely on whether Iran is open to the world as
a powerful source of energy, or whether the United States fails to
bring this about.
From: Baghdasarian