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RUSSIAN-ARMENIAN COOPERATION AND TURKISH FACTOR
Gagik Harutyunyan
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5775
16.05.2011
G.Harutyunyan - The Executive Director of "Noravank" Foundation
Based on the report presented at the round table on "The Prospects of
the Russian-Armenian Relation" held on March 25, 2011 in Tsakhkadzor
Armenian-Russian cooperation (which has stirred up after the meeting of
the presidents S. Sargsyan and D. Medvedev in August 2010) has several
strategic planes. In particular, as a result of the aforementioned
meeting the agreement on dislocation of the 102nd Military base in
Gyumri was extended (till 2044) and renewed (Russian party will provide
the security of the RA too). From the point of view of Armenia the
later is of great importance as it guarantees the security of Armenia
in case of the aggression on behalf of Turkey. It should be mentioned
that Turkey a factual participant of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict -
this country has been supplying weapons to Azerbaijan till now and
providing military "advisers" and during the war it also provided
the so-called "volunteers". But Turkey did not confine itself to
that. Twice, in 1992 and in 1993, Turkey was ready to meddle in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict immediately and to invade Armenia (all
those events are presented in the memoirs of the then ambassador of
Greece to Armenia) and in both cases Russia interfered and averted
war. Let us mention that in this issue the situation does not differ
much from the one before: Turkey has strengthened its status of a
"big brother" for Azerbaijan and there is no doubt that Azerbaijani
anti-Armenian rhetoric and bellicose attitude are conditioned not
only by the availability of "petrodollars" but, first of all, by the
Turkish military and political and ideological support.
Azerbaijan as a Turkish "outpost" on the post-Soviet territory. At
the same time curbing Turkish expansion is of great importance not
only from the point of view of the national interests of Armenia but
also of Russia. Applying "one nation, two states" political technology
Turkey and Azerbaijan set close cooperation. Such a format is very
comfortable as it allows carrying out flexible and versatile policy,
especially taking into consideration the fact that Azerbaijan is
a member of the CIS. In this context Azerbaijan is an "outpost" of
Turkey on the post-Soviet territory (one can say that Azerbaijan is
a kind of Trojan hoarse presented by Turkey to Russia), in both the
South Caucasus (not only in the context of conflict with Armenia but
also in the aspect of exerting Turkish-Azerbaijani pressure on Georgia)
and Central Asia, as well as in Russia - in North Caucasus and Turkic
language regions. In particular, Azerbaijan is a transition territory
for Turkey through which terrorism and separatism are "imported" to
Russia. The aggravation of the current intercivilizational relations
intensifies this tendency which can be seen on practice: the zone
of instability in some regions of Russia is widening. It is not a
mere chance that according to the forecasts of the head of STRATFOR
organization George Freedman in future the border between Russia and
Turkey may go through the North Caucasus and such forecasts are based
on the main strategic projects.
By the way, the ethnic intolerance in Russia should also be considered
within the context of Azerbaijani-Turkish activity. We suppose that in
this aspect Armenia and Armenian communities with their centuries-long
experience of associating with the Muslim world (those traditions
today are manifested in positive and constructive Armenian-Arab and
especially Armenian-Iranian relations) can play a positive role.
Let us also mention that Azerbaijan supports implementation of Turkish
political, ideological, economic (especially in the sphere of energy)
and military programmes in other regions too, e.g. in the issues
connected with Northern Cyprus.
The role of Turkey in multi-polar world. As it is known Turkey does
not restrict itself to increasing its presence in the post-Soviet
countries, i.e. the zone of the traditional Russian influence. In
modern Turkey expansion and revanchist ideologies are flourishing:
neo-Ottomanism, neo-Pan Turkism and pan-Islamism. Such a radicalization
of ideology is fueled by the economic success without which it
is difficult to imagine the implementation of the ideological and
expansionist postulates. Today the economy of that country is 16th in
the world and, according to some prospects in the foreseeable future
it can be in the top ten.
Anyway, it should be stated that the claims of Turkey have sharply
expanded; now it tends to acquire the status of a global actor. Today
it cannot be perceived as a country which is under the control of
the US and NATO and which implements only their programmes. This
last factor is not always got adequately by some part of the Russian
political elite which substantiates the rapprochement with Turkey
(besides purely economic purposes) by the necessity to alienate, to
"tear" it away from the US and NATO and to include it in the zone of
the Russian influence. There is an impression that this part of the
Russian political elite, in some sense, is guided by the geopolitical
logics, which was characteristic for the Soviet period.
Yes, the West (mainly the US) still attaches importance to the Turkish
factor, and Turkey also attaches importance to its relations with the
West. But, unlike the period of Cold War, this country is considered
by the US not like a kind of "barrier" against Russia but more like
a leader of the Muslim world (some parts of which, as we have already
mentioned are in Russia and thus, it constitute serious danger to the
later). Let us also mention that that programmes of usage of Turkey
as a "barrier" are still topical but in this case in the aspect of
possible Chinese economic and political expansion.
Turkey as a model for Muslim world. The well-known developments in
the Arab world will inevitably bring to redrawing (in the sense of
the political content) of the geopolitical map of the so-called New
Middle East. There are also distinct tendencies (which are by the way
presented by the US National Intelligence Council and European Union's
Institute for. Security Studies in "Global government 2025" policy
and forecast report) showing that in consequence of those developments
the region, especially in the civilizational sense, will be isolated
to some extent from the "rest of the world" and there will be, if we
may say so, "a special Muslim world" formed. According to the European
political ideas Turkey should play a special role in this world, as
Turks manage to combine, at least to some extent, secular democracy and
Muslim and religious traditions. So, the Turkish model of development
seems to be rather attractive especially for the United States.
It is not a mere chance that the political developments in the New
Middle East are similar in the sense of the content to those which
took place on Turkey when the moderate Islamists of Recep Erdogan
came to power. Let us also mention that the political technology of
"moderate Islamism" is based on RAND's "Formation of the moderate
Islamist networks" project. So there is occasion to state that the
current ideas concerning the role of Turkey and particularly its role
as a "coordinator" in the Muslim world are not simply situational
but they are the result of the preliminary strategic elaborations.
Let us also state in this concern that the changes taking place in the
Arab world and possible growth of Turkey's influence in the New Middle
East (as we can see it in the developments in Libya where Russia had
made rather considerable investments) also tend to restrict Russian
economic presence in the region.
Possible scenarios of future. At the same time, rather big part of
the expert community is convinced that moderate Islamism, sooner or
later, will shift into the fundamentalism and such a tendency can be
observed in Turkey. It proves that in multi-polar world the abundance
of military-political, economic and civilizational variables do not
allow programming unequivocally the developments in the future and
in this case it is more suitable to use scenario elaborations (see
"ON FORECASTS"). Two cardinally different scenarios can be offered
to Russian and Armenian analytical community as possible directions
for such elaborations.
According to the scenario which is called conventionally
"Mighty Turkey" this country is getting stronger and powerful in
military-political (particularly it possesses nuclear weapon) and
economic aspects and turns into a leader of the Muslim world. The
presence of such a power should be a serious challenge for the
Armenian-Russian alliance. At the same time such scenario as "Split
Turkey" is also possible; according to it, Kurdish factor and the
problems connected with the identities of numerous ethnic groups
living in that country may cause uncontrollable processes, which may
bring to the collapse of the country.
Current realities. But, despite the scenarios concerning the future, it
should be stated that currently Turkey rather successfully manoeuvres
between its long-time western allies and newly-made Russian partners,
but at the same time its assigns primary importance to its own,
Turkish interests.
E.g. recently the Turkish prime-minister Erdogan has celebrated in
Moscow the 90th anniversary of the Moscow Treaty, in accordance to
which Kars and Surmalu were left to Turkey. It is approximately the
same as if the prime-minister of Japan would have celebrated in Moscow
the Portsmouth Peace Treaty which put an end to the Russian-Japanese
war or German chancellor would have celebrated the anniversary of
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the logical continuation of which was
the Moscow Treaty. It is obvious that in case if there were the
Armenian-Russian analytical and political mechanisms it would be
possible to avoid mistakes. The emotions, which, by the way, should
also be taken into consideration, are not the point; well-known
actions of protests should have made happy our ill-wishers. It is
clear that Russia carries out global policy, and it is not always
that it can take into consideration the feelings of its partners. But
this case contradicts the national interests of Russia and it should
be considered as serious diplomatic failure.
In this respect, it should be remembered that geopolitics is rather
exact science: since 18th century Russia has conducted 12 wars against
Turkey. There could have been 13 wars but for the US and Britain
which backed Turkey after the World War II. And such regularities
must be taken into consideration in both the analyses of the present
situation and forecasts of the future.
"Globus National Security", issue 3, 2011
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
~UON FORECASTS[03.03.2011] ~UINTERNET STRUCTURES IN THE CONTEXT OF
POST-DEMOCRACY AND ISSUES OF INFORMATION SECURITY[23.11.2010] ~UON NKR
AND REGIONAL ISSUES [29.07.2010] ~USTRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT[21.05.2010]
~UAFGHANISTAN: PEACE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT [18.03.2010]
Gagik Harutyunyan
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5775
16.05.2011
G.Harutyunyan - The Executive Director of "Noravank" Foundation
Based on the report presented at the round table on "The Prospects of
the Russian-Armenian Relation" held on March 25, 2011 in Tsakhkadzor
Armenian-Russian cooperation (which has stirred up after the meeting of
the presidents S. Sargsyan and D. Medvedev in August 2010) has several
strategic planes. In particular, as a result of the aforementioned
meeting the agreement on dislocation of the 102nd Military base in
Gyumri was extended (till 2044) and renewed (Russian party will provide
the security of the RA too). From the point of view of Armenia the
later is of great importance as it guarantees the security of Armenia
in case of the aggression on behalf of Turkey. It should be mentioned
that Turkey a factual participant of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict -
this country has been supplying weapons to Azerbaijan till now and
providing military "advisers" and during the war it also provided
the so-called "volunteers". But Turkey did not confine itself to
that. Twice, in 1992 and in 1993, Turkey was ready to meddle in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict immediately and to invade Armenia (all
those events are presented in the memoirs of the then ambassador of
Greece to Armenia) and in both cases Russia interfered and averted
war. Let us mention that in this issue the situation does not differ
much from the one before: Turkey has strengthened its status of a
"big brother" for Azerbaijan and there is no doubt that Azerbaijani
anti-Armenian rhetoric and bellicose attitude are conditioned not
only by the availability of "petrodollars" but, first of all, by the
Turkish military and political and ideological support.
Azerbaijan as a Turkish "outpost" on the post-Soviet territory. At
the same time curbing Turkish expansion is of great importance not
only from the point of view of the national interests of Armenia but
also of Russia. Applying "one nation, two states" political technology
Turkey and Azerbaijan set close cooperation. Such a format is very
comfortable as it allows carrying out flexible and versatile policy,
especially taking into consideration the fact that Azerbaijan is
a member of the CIS. In this context Azerbaijan is an "outpost" of
Turkey on the post-Soviet territory (one can say that Azerbaijan is
a kind of Trojan hoarse presented by Turkey to Russia), in both the
South Caucasus (not only in the context of conflict with Armenia but
also in the aspect of exerting Turkish-Azerbaijani pressure on Georgia)
and Central Asia, as well as in Russia - in North Caucasus and Turkic
language regions. In particular, Azerbaijan is a transition territory
for Turkey through which terrorism and separatism are "imported" to
Russia. The aggravation of the current intercivilizational relations
intensifies this tendency which can be seen on practice: the zone
of instability in some regions of Russia is widening. It is not a
mere chance that according to the forecasts of the head of STRATFOR
organization George Freedman in future the border between Russia and
Turkey may go through the North Caucasus and such forecasts are based
on the main strategic projects.
By the way, the ethnic intolerance in Russia should also be considered
within the context of Azerbaijani-Turkish activity. We suppose that in
this aspect Armenia and Armenian communities with their centuries-long
experience of associating with the Muslim world (those traditions
today are manifested in positive and constructive Armenian-Arab and
especially Armenian-Iranian relations) can play a positive role.
Let us also mention that Azerbaijan supports implementation of Turkish
political, ideological, economic (especially in the sphere of energy)
and military programmes in other regions too, e.g. in the issues
connected with Northern Cyprus.
The role of Turkey in multi-polar world. As it is known Turkey does
not restrict itself to increasing its presence in the post-Soviet
countries, i.e. the zone of the traditional Russian influence. In
modern Turkey expansion and revanchist ideologies are flourishing:
neo-Ottomanism, neo-Pan Turkism and pan-Islamism. Such a radicalization
of ideology is fueled by the economic success without which it
is difficult to imagine the implementation of the ideological and
expansionist postulates. Today the economy of that country is 16th in
the world and, according to some prospects in the foreseeable future
it can be in the top ten.
Anyway, it should be stated that the claims of Turkey have sharply
expanded; now it tends to acquire the status of a global actor. Today
it cannot be perceived as a country which is under the control of
the US and NATO and which implements only their programmes. This
last factor is not always got adequately by some part of the Russian
political elite which substantiates the rapprochement with Turkey
(besides purely economic purposes) by the necessity to alienate, to
"tear" it away from the US and NATO and to include it in the zone of
the Russian influence. There is an impression that this part of the
Russian political elite, in some sense, is guided by the geopolitical
logics, which was characteristic for the Soviet period.
Yes, the West (mainly the US) still attaches importance to the Turkish
factor, and Turkey also attaches importance to its relations with the
West. But, unlike the period of Cold War, this country is considered
by the US not like a kind of "barrier" against Russia but more like
a leader of the Muslim world (some parts of which, as we have already
mentioned are in Russia and thus, it constitute serious danger to the
later). Let us also mention that that programmes of usage of Turkey
as a "barrier" are still topical but in this case in the aspect of
possible Chinese economic and political expansion.
Turkey as a model for Muslim world. The well-known developments in
the Arab world will inevitably bring to redrawing (in the sense of
the political content) of the geopolitical map of the so-called New
Middle East. There are also distinct tendencies (which are by the way
presented by the US National Intelligence Council and European Union's
Institute for. Security Studies in "Global government 2025" policy
and forecast report) showing that in consequence of those developments
the region, especially in the civilizational sense, will be isolated
to some extent from the "rest of the world" and there will be, if we
may say so, "a special Muslim world" formed. According to the European
political ideas Turkey should play a special role in this world, as
Turks manage to combine, at least to some extent, secular democracy and
Muslim and religious traditions. So, the Turkish model of development
seems to be rather attractive especially for the United States.
It is not a mere chance that the political developments in the New
Middle East are similar in the sense of the content to those which
took place on Turkey when the moderate Islamists of Recep Erdogan
came to power. Let us also mention that the political technology of
"moderate Islamism" is based on RAND's "Formation of the moderate
Islamist networks" project. So there is occasion to state that the
current ideas concerning the role of Turkey and particularly its role
as a "coordinator" in the Muslim world are not simply situational
but they are the result of the preliminary strategic elaborations.
Let us also state in this concern that the changes taking place in the
Arab world and possible growth of Turkey's influence in the New Middle
East (as we can see it in the developments in Libya where Russia had
made rather considerable investments) also tend to restrict Russian
economic presence in the region.
Possible scenarios of future. At the same time, rather big part of
the expert community is convinced that moderate Islamism, sooner or
later, will shift into the fundamentalism and such a tendency can be
observed in Turkey. It proves that in multi-polar world the abundance
of military-political, economic and civilizational variables do not
allow programming unequivocally the developments in the future and
in this case it is more suitable to use scenario elaborations (see
"ON FORECASTS"). Two cardinally different scenarios can be offered
to Russian and Armenian analytical community as possible directions
for such elaborations.
According to the scenario which is called conventionally
"Mighty Turkey" this country is getting stronger and powerful in
military-political (particularly it possesses nuclear weapon) and
economic aspects and turns into a leader of the Muslim world. The
presence of such a power should be a serious challenge for the
Armenian-Russian alliance. At the same time such scenario as "Split
Turkey" is also possible; according to it, Kurdish factor and the
problems connected with the identities of numerous ethnic groups
living in that country may cause uncontrollable processes, which may
bring to the collapse of the country.
Current realities. But, despite the scenarios concerning the future, it
should be stated that currently Turkey rather successfully manoeuvres
between its long-time western allies and newly-made Russian partners,
but at the same time its assigns primary importance to its own,
Turkish interests.
E.g. recently the Turkish prime-minister Erdogan has celebrated in
Moscow the 90th anniversary of the Moscow Treaty, in accordance to
which Kars and Surmalu were left to Turkey. It is approximately the
same as if the prime-minister of Japan would have celebrated in Moscow
the Portsmouth Peace Treaty which put an end to the Russian-Japanese
war or German chancellor would have celebrated the anniversary of
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the logical continuation of which was
the Moscow Treaty. It is obvious that in case if there were the
Armenian-Russian analytical and political mechanisms it would be
possible to avoid mistakes. The emotions, which, by the way, should
also be taken into consideration, are not the point; well-known
actions of protests should have made happy our ill-wishers. It is
clear that Russia carries out global policy, and it is not always
that it can take into consideration the feelings of its partners. But
this case contradicts the national interests of Russia and it should
be considered as serious diplomatic failure.
In this respect, it should be remembered that geopolitics is rather
exact science: since 18th century Russia has conducted 12 wars against
Turkey. There could have been 13 wars but for the US and Britain
which backed Turkey after the World War II. And such regularities
must be taken into consideration in both the analyses of the present
situation and forecasts of the future.
"Globus National Security", issue 3, 2011
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
~UON FORECASTS[03.03.2011] ~UINTERNET STRUCTURES IN THE CONTEXT OF
POST-DEMOCRACY AND ISSUES OF INFORMATION SECURITY[23.11.2010] ~UON NKR
AND REGIONAL ISSUES [29.07.2010] ~USTRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT[21.05.2010]
~UAFGHANISTAN: PEACE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT [18.03.2010]