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US versus Eurasia
Geopolitical Tensions and the Multipolar System: The US versus Eurasia
by Tiberio Graziani
Global Research , May 13, 2011
The transition from the unipolar system to a multipolar one is generating
tensions in two particular areas of the Eurasian landmass: the Mediterranean
and Central Asia. The process of consolidation of polycentrism seems to be
undergoing an impasse caused by the `regionalist' behavior adopted by the
Eurasian powers. The identification of a single great Mediterranean-Central
Asian space, functioning as the hinge of the Euro-Afro-Asian landmass, could
provide operational elements for Eurasian integration.
In the process of transition between the unipolar moment and the new
polycentric system geopolitical tensions are observed that are discharging
principally in areas of high strategic value. Among these, the Mediterranean
basin and Central Asia, real hinges in the Euro-Afro-Asian structure, have,
since 1 March 2003, taken on a particular interest in the setting of
geopolitical analysis regarding relations between the US, the main Eurasian
nations and the countries of North Africa. Remember that on that date, the
parliament of Turkey, that nation-bridge par excellence between the
Central Asian republics and the Mediterranean, decided to deny the support
requested by the US for the war in Iraq1. This fact, far from being merely
a negotiating point between Washington and Ankara, as it might have seemed
at first (and certainly it was also this, because of two opposing elements:
Turkish loyalty to its North American ally and the worry in Ankara for the
effect of the hypothetical creation of a Kurdistan, which at the
then-expected plan to divide Iraq into three parts, would have led to an
unresolved `Kurdish question'), nonetheless established the beginning of an
reversal of the 50-year trend in Turkish foreign policy2. Since then, with
continuous growth until today, Turkey, particularly through its closeness to
Russia (aided by the lack of propensity in the European Union to admit Ankara)
and the new good neighbor policies, has tried to practice a sort of `escape'
from US protection, effectively making it an unreliable base for North
American penetration into the Eurasian landmass. Besides the obstacles
represented by Iran and Syria, Washington and Pentagon strategists now have
to keep the new and little-malleable Turkey in mind.
The change in Turkey's conduct came in the context of a more general and
complex transformation of the Eurasian scenario, characterized by notable
elements such as the reaffirmation of Russia on the continental and global
scale, the strong geo-economic and financial emergence of China and India,
and the deterioration of US military power in Afghanistan and Iraq.
>From the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet downfall there seemed to
be an unstoppable advance of the `Necessary Nation' toward the center of the
Eurasian continent, following the two following predetermined lines of
march:
- first, proceeding from continental Europe, aimed, through coups of
`colorful revolution', at the inclusion in its own sphere of influence
of
the neighboring ex-Soviet states, quickly dubbed the `New Europe' by
Rumsfeld's definition, and strategically destined, in time, to press against
a Russia reaching the end of its strength;
- second, made up of a long road from the Mediterranean extending toward the
new Central Asian republics, aimed at cutting in two the Euro-Afro-Asian
landmass and creating a permanent geopolitical vulnus in the heart of
Eurasia;
This was all stopped in just a few years of the Afghan morass.
The last few attempts at `colorful revolution' have failed and the agitation
controlled by Washington in the Caucasus and in the Central Asian republics,
respectively because of Moscow's determination and by the joint Eurasian
policies of China and Russia, put into action through, among others, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Community
and the consolidation of friendly relations and military cooperation. At the
end of the first decade of the new century the US had to reformulate its
Eurasian strategies.
The usual Atlantic Hegemony Procedure
The assumption of the Western system geopolitical paradigm as led by the US,
laid out in the dichotomy of the US versus Eurasia and in the concept of
`strategic danger'3, leads the analysts practicing it to favor the critical
aspects of the different Atlantic target areas. Such aspects are commonly
made up of endogenous tensions due in particular to interethnic problems,
social imbalances, lack of religious and cultural homogeneity4 and
geopolitical friction. The ready solutions regard actions ranging from the
role of the US and its allies in the `reconstruction' of `failed states' in
different ways (all in any case aimed at spreading the `Western values' of
democracy and free enterprise, without taking into account at all the local
cultural peculiarities and traditions), to direct military intervention.
This is often justified, according to the situation, as a necessary response
to defend US interests and the so-called international order, or in the
specific case of states or governments that the West already and
significantly considers, according to the rule of soft power, `rogue,'
needing an extreme remedy to defend its people and safeguard human rights5.
Considering that the US's geopolitical perspective is typically that of a
sea power, interpreting its relationship with other nations or geopolitical
entities from its situation as an `island'6, it identifies the Mediterranean
basin and the Central Asian area as two zones characterized by strong
instability. The two areas are located in the so-called arc of instability
as defined by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The arc of instability or of crisis
constitutes, as noted, an evolution and expansion of the geostrategic
concept of rimland (maritme and coastal margin) developed by Nicholas J.
Spykman7. Control of the rimland would have permitted, in the context of the
bipolar system, control of the Eurasian landmass and so the containment of
its main nation, the Soviet Union, for the exclusive benefit of the `North
American island'.
In the new unipolar context, the US-defined geopolitical area of the Great
Middle East runs in a wide band from Morocco through Central Asia, a band
that, according to Washington, needed to be `pacified' because it
represented an ample arc of crisis, with conflicts generated by the lack of
homogeneity as mentioned above. Such a view spread by Samuel Huntington's
research and Zigbniew Brzezinski's analysis, fully explains the practice
followed by the US in order to open a passage in the Eurasian continental
landmass and from there press on the Russian space to assume world
domination. Nevertheless some `unexpected' factors such as the `recovery' of
Russia, the Eurasian policies practiced by Putin in Central Asia, new
agreements between Moscow and Peking, as well as the emergence of the new
Turkey (factors that recalling the relative and contemporary `emancipations'
of some South American countries delineate a multipolar or poly-centric
system) have influenced the redefinition of the area as a New Middle East.
Such evolution, emblematically, was made official in the course of the
Israeli-Lebanese war of 2006. The then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
said: « I have no interest in diplomacy for the sake of returning Lebanon
and Israel to the status quo ante. I think it would be a mistake. What we're
seeing here, in a sense, is the growing -- the birth pangs of a new Middle
East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we're pushing forward to
the new Middle East not going back to the old one. »8. The new definition
was, obviously, pragmatic; in fact it aimed at the reaffirmation of the
strategic partnership with Tel Aviv and the crushing - weakening of the
near and mid-east area that few days after Condoleezza Rice's declaration
was specified by Israeli Prime Minister Olmert to be the `New Order' in the
`Middle East'. Similarly programmatic was Brzezinski coining of `Eurasian
Balkans', referring to the Central Asian area, seeing its use to the
formulation of a geostrategic practice that, through the destabilization
based on endogenous tensions of Central Asia, it had (and has) the aim of
making the possible geopolitical union between China and Russia
problematic.
In the years between 2006 up to the `Odyssey Dawn' operation against Lybia
(2011), the US, notwithstanding the rhetoric initiated from 2009 with the
new occupant of the White House, has in fact followed a strategy aimed at
the militarization of the entire swath made up of the Mediterranean and
Central Asia. In particular, in 2008 the US put military device in the field
for Africa, Africom, currently (March 2011) involved in the Libyan `crisis',
intended to root the American presence in Africa in terms of control and
rapid intervention in the African continent, but also directed toward the
`new' Middle East and Central Asia. Briefly, the US strategy consists of
militarization of the Mediterranean-Central Asian arch. Its principle aims
are:
a) To create a wedge between southern Europe and northern Africa;
b) To assure Washington's military control over northern Africa and the
Near East (including using the Camp Bondsteel base in Kosovo i Metohija),
with particular attention in the area of Turkey, Syria and Iran;
c) To `cut' in two the Eurasian landmass;
d) To enlarge the so-called arc of crisis in Central Asia.
In the setting of the first and second objectives, Washington's interests
are turned mainly toward Italy and Turkey. The two Mediterranean countries,
for different reasons (notably of energy and industrial policy for Italy and
more strictly geopolitical for Ankara, wishing to take on a regional role of
the first level, moreover in direct competition with Israel) have in recent
years woven international relationships that, in perspective, since
relations with Moscow are strong, could have (and can) be useful levers for
a potential Turkish-Italian exit strategy from the North American sphere of
influence. The objective attempt by Rome and Ankara to increase their own
degrees of liberty in the international contest collided not only with the
general geopolitical interests of Washington and London but also with the
more `provincial' ones of Sarkozy's Union méditerranéenne.
Multipolarism between Regionalist and Eurasian Perspectives
The practice applied by the Western system, led by the US and intended, as
described above, to amplify the crises in Eurasia and in the Mediterranean
is not aimed at their stabilization. On the contrary, such a procedure is
devoted to maintain its own hegemony, through militarization of
international relationships and involvement of local actors. Moreover, this
kind of geopolitical `road map' is aimed at identifying other future
probable targets (Iran, Syria, Turkey) useful for the United State of
America's foothold in Eurasia, laying out some reflections regarding the
`health' of the US and the structuring of the multipolar system.
In a less superficial analysis, the aggression toward Libya by the US, Great
Britain and France, is not at all a sporadic case but a symptom of
Washington's difficulty in working diplomatically and with the sense of
responsibility that a global actor should have. This is shown by the
rapacious nature typical of a declining power. The American political
scientist and economist David. P. Calleo, critic of `unipolar folly' and
scholar of the decline of the US, noted in long-ago 1987 that, generally,
powers in the process of decline, rather than regulate and adapt themselves,
seek to cement its staggering dominance by transforming it in rapacious
hegemony10. Luca Lauriola in Scacco matto all'America e a Israele. Fine
dell'ultimo Impero11, (Checkmate for the US and Israel. The end of the last
empire) believes, reasonably, that the Eurasian powers Russia, China and
India handle the overseas power (i.e. USA), by now `lost and crazed', in a
way to not provoke reactions that could lead to planetary catastrophes.
Regarding the structuring of the multipolar system, it must be noted that
this advances slowly, not because of recent US actions in North Africa, but
rather because of the `regionalist' attitude adopted by the Eurasian actors
(Turkey, Russia and China) who, in evaluating the Mediterranean and Central
Asia as a function of their own national interests, fail to gather the
geostrategic significance that these areas perform in the larger scenario of
conflict between far-flung (US) and Eurasian geopolitical interests. The
rediscovery of a sole great Mediterranean-Central Asian space, highlighting
the role of `hinge' that this takes on in the Euro-Afro-Asian subdivision,
could provide operating elements to overcome the `regionalist' impasse
that
the unipolar-multipolar transition process is undergoing.
Tiberio Graziani, Director of Eurasia
and the series `Quaderni di Geopolitica (Edizioni all'insegna del Veltro,
Parma), is the President of the ISAG (Institute of Advance Studies in
Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences). He is the co-founder of the IEMASVO
(Institute of Advanced Studies for the Near and Middle East) and
vice-president for the years 2007-2008. He is a speaker at the international
conference World Public Forum - Dialogue of Civilizations. He was a lecturer
at the University of Perugia and L'Aquila. He has taught courses for the ICE
(Institute for Foreign Trade) in many countries, such as Uzbekistan, China,
India, Libya and Argentina. He may be contacted at:
[email protected]
NOTES
1 Elena Mazzeo, `La Turchia tra Europa e Asia', Eurasia. Rivista di Studi
Geopolitici, a. VIII, n.1 2011.
2 Turkey signed the Nato Treaty on 18 February 1952.
3 `Geopolitically, America is an island off the shores of the large
landmass of Eurasia, whose resources and population far exceed those of the
United States. The domination by a single power of either Eurasia's two
principal spheres - Europe or Asia - remains a good definition of strategic
danger for America, Cold War or no Cold War. For such a grouping would have
the capacity to outstrip America economically and, in the end, militarily.
That danger would have to be resisted even were the dominant power
apparently benevolent, for if the intentions ever changed, America would
find itself with a grossly diminished capacity for effective resistance and
a growing inability to shape events.' Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1994 p.813.
`Eurasia is the world's axial supercontinent. A power that dominated
Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world's three most
economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia. A glance at
the map also suggests that a country dominant in Eurasia would almost
automatically control the Middle East and Africa. With Eurasia now serving
as the decisive geopolitical chessboard, it no longer suffices to fashion
one policy for Europe and another for Asia. What happens with the
distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive
importance to America's global primacy and historical legacy.' Zbigniew
Brzezinski, "A Geostrategy for Eurasia," Foreign Affairs, 76:5,
September/October 1997.
4 Enrico Galoppini, Islamofobia, Edizioni all'insegna del Veltro, Parma
2008.
5 Jean Bricmont, Impérialisme humanitaire. Droits de l'homme, droit
d'ingérence, droit du plus fort?, Éditions Aden, Bruxelles 2005; Danilo
Zolo, Chi dice umanità. Guerra, diritto e ordine globale, Einaudi,
Torino 2000; Danilo Zolo, Terrorismo umanitario. Dalla guerra del Golfo
alla strage di Gaza, Diabasis, Reggio Emilia 2009.
6 `America as an `island' has become a common geopolitical descriptor,
quite similar to the geopolitics of England and Japan. Such an expression
underlies its maritime traditions of trade and of military intervention
overseas, and, of course, of its security-in- isolation and in distance.'.
Phil Kelly, `Geopolitica degli Stati Uniti d'America', Eurasia. Rivista
di Studi Geopolitici, a. VII, n.3 2010.
7 Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States
and the Balance of Power, Harcourt Brace, New York 1942.
8 `But I have no interest in diplomacy for the sake of returning Lebanon
and Israel to the status quo ante. I think it would be a mistake. What we're
seeing here, in a sense, is the growing - the birth pangs of a new Middle
East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we're pushing forward
to
the new Middle East not going back to the old one,' Special Briefing on
Travel to the Middle East and Europe, US, Department of State, 21 July 2006
9 Tiberio Graziani, `U.S. strategy in Eurasia and drug production in
Afghanistan', Moscow, 9-10 June 2010 (
http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/4670/u-s-strategy-in-eurasia-and-drug-production-in-afghanistan
)
10 David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The future of the Western
Alliance, New York 1987, p. 142.
11 Luca Lauriola, Scacco matto all'America e a Israele. Fine dell'ultimo
Impero, Palomar, Bari 2007.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=24747
Geopolitical Tensions and the Multipolar System: The US versus Eurasia
by Tiberio Graziani
Global Research , May 13, 2011
The transition from the unipolar system to a multipolar one is generating
tensions in two particular areas of the Eurasian landmass: the Mediterranean
and Central Asia. The process of consolidation of polycentrism seems to be
undergoing an impasse caused by the `regionalist' behavior adopted by the
Eurasian powers. The identification of a single great Mediterranean-Central
Asian space, functioning as the hinge of the Euro-Afro-Asian landmass, could
provide operational elements for Eurasian integration.
In the process of transition between the unipolar moment and the new
polycentric system geopolitical tensions are observed that are discharging
principally in areas of high strategic value. Among these, the Mediterranean
basin and Central Asia, real hinges in the Euro-Afro-Asian structure, have,
since 1 March 2003, taken on a particular interest in the setting of
geopolitical analysis regarding relations between the US, the main Eurasian
nations and the countries of North Africa. Remember that on that date, the
parliament of Turkey, that nation-bridge par excellence between the
Central Asian republics and the Mediterranean, decided to deny the support
requested by the US for the war in Iraq1. This fact, far from being merely
a negotiating point between Washington and Ankara, as it might have seemed
at first (and certainly it was also this, because of two opposing elements:
Turkish loyalty to its North American ally and the worry in Ankara for the
effect of the hypothetical creation of a Kurdistan, which at the
then-expected plan to divide Iraq into three parts, would have led to an
unresolved `Kurdish question'), nonetheless established the beginning of an
reversal of the 50-year trend in Turkish foreign policy2. Since then, with
continuous growth until today, Turkey, particularly through its closeness to
Russia (aided by the lack of propensity in the European Union to admit Ankara)
and the new good neighbor policies, has tried to practice a sort of `escape'
from US protection, effectively making it an unreliable base for North
American penetration into the Eurasian landmass. Besides the obstacles
represented by Iran and Syria, Washington and Pentagon strategists now have
to keep the new and little-malleable Turkey in mind.
The change in Turkey's conduct came in the context of a more general and
complex transformation of the Eurasian scenario, characterized by notable
elements such as the reaffirmation of Russia on the continental and global
scale, the strong geo-economic and financial emergence of China and India,
and the deterioration of US military power in Afghanistan and Iraq.
>From the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet downfall there seemed to
be an unstoppable advance of the `Necessary Nation' toward the center of the
Eurasian continent, following the two following predetermined lines of
march:
- first, proceeding from continental Europe, aimed, through coups of
`colorful revolution', at the inclusion in its own sphere of influence
of
the neighboring ex-Soviet states, quickly dubbed the `New Europe' by
Rumsfeld's definition, and strategically destined, in time, to press against
a Russia reaching the end of its strength;
- second, made up of a long road from the Mediterranean extending toward the
new Central Asian republics, aimed at cutting in two the Euro-Afro-Asian
landmass and creating a permanent geopolitical vulnus in the heart of
Eurasia;
This was all stopped in just a few years of the Afghan morass.
The last few attempts at `colorful revolution' have failed and the agitation
controlled by Washington in the Caucasus and in the Central Asian republics,
respectively because of Moscow's determination and by the joint Eurasian
policies of China and Russia, put into action through, among others, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Community
and the consolidation of friendly relations and military cooperation. At the
end of the first decade of the new century the US had to reformulate its
Eurasian strategies.
The usual Atlantic Hegemony Procedure
The assumption of the Western system geopolitical paradigm as led by the US,
laid out in the dichotomy of the US versus Eurasia and in the concept of
`strategic danger'3, leads the analysts practicing it to favor the critical
aspects of the different Atlantic target areas. Such aspects are commonly
made up of endogenous tensions due in particular to interethnic problems,
social imbalances, lack of religious and cultural homogeneity4 and
geopolitical friction. The ready solutions regard actions ranging from the
role of the US and its allies in the `reconstruction' of `failed states' in
different ways (all in any case aimed at spreading the `Western values' of
democracy and free enterprise, without taking into account at all the local
cultural peculiarities and traditions), to direct military intervention.
This is often justified, according to the situation, as a necessary response
to defend US interests and the so-called international order, or in the
specific case of states or governments that the West already and
significantly considers, according to the rule of soft power, `rogue,'
needing an extreme remedy to defend its people and safeguard human rights5.
Considering that the US's geopolitical perspective is typically that of a
sea power, interpreting its relationship with other nations or geopolitical
entities from its situation as an `island'6, it identifies the Mediterranean
basin and the Central Asian area as two zones characterized by strong
instability. The two areas are located in the so-called arc of instability
as defined by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The arc of instability or of crisis
constitutes, as noted, an evolution and expansion of the geostrategic
concept of rimland (maritme and coastal margin) developed by Nicholas J.
Spykman7. Control of the rimland would have permitted, in the context of the
bipolar system, control of the Eurasian landmass and so the containment of
its main nation, the Soviet Union, for the exclusive benefit of the `North
American island'.
In the new unipolar context, the US-defined geopolitical area of the Great
Middle East runs in a wide band from Morocco through Central Asia, a band
that, according to Washington, needed to be `pacified' because it
represented an ample arc of crisis, with conflicts generated by the lack of
homogeneity as mentioned above. Such a view spread by Samuel Huntington's
research and Zigbniew Brzezinski's analysis, fully explains the practice
followed by the US in order to open a passage in the Eurasian continental
landmass and from there press on the Russian space to assume world
domination. Nevertheless some `unexpected' factors such as the `recovery' of
Russia, the Eurasian policies practiced by Putin in Central Asia, new
agreements between Moscow and Peking, as well as the emergence of the new
Turkey (factors that recalling the relative and contemporary `emancipations'
of some South American countries delineate a multipolar or poly-centric
system) have influenced the redefinition of the area as a New Middle East.
Such evolution, emblematically, was made official in the course of the
Israeli-Lebanese war of 2006. The then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
said: « I have no interest in diplomacy for the sake of returning Lebanon
and Israel to the status quo ante. I think it would be a mistake. What we're
seeing here, in a sense, is the growing -- the birth pangs of a new Middle
East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we're pushing forward to
the new Middle East not going back to the old one. »8. The new definition
was, obviously, pragmatic; in fact it aimed at the reaffirmation of the
strategic partnership with Tel Aviv and the crushing - weakening of the
near and mid-east area that few days after Condoleezza Rice's declaration
was specified by Israeli Prime Minister Olmert to be the `New Order' in the
`Middle East'. Similarly programmatic was Brzezinski coining of `Eurasian
Balkans', referring to the Central Asian area, seeing its use to the
formulation of a geostrategic practice that, through the destabilization
based on endogenous tensions of Central Asia, it had (and has) the aim of
making the possible geopolitical union between China and Russia
problematic.
In the years between 2006 up to the `Odyssey Dawn' operation against Lybia
(2011), the US, notwithstanding the rhetoric initiated from 2009 with the
new occupant of the White House, has in fact followed a strategy aimed at
the militarization of the entire swath made up of the Mediterranean and
Central Asia. In particular, in 2008 the US put military device in the field
for Africa, Africom, currently (March 2011) involved in the Libyan `crisis',
intended to root the American presence in Africa in terms of control and
rapid intervention in the African continent, but also directed toward the
`new' Middle East and Central Asia. Briefly, the US strategy consists of
militarization of the Mediterranean-Central Asian arch. Its principle aims
are:
a) To create a wedge between southern Europe and northern Africa;
b) To assure Washington's military control over northern Africa and the
Near East (including using the Camp Bondsteel base in Kosovo i Metohija),
with particular attention in the area of Turkey, Syria and Iran;
c) To `cut' in two the Eurasian landmass;
d) To enlarge the so-called arc of crisis in Central Asia.
In the setting of the first and second objectives, Washington's interests
are turned mainly toward Italy and Turkey. The two Mediterranean countries,
for different reasons (notably of energy and industrial policy for Italy and
more strictly geopolitical for Ankara, wishing to take on a regional role of
the first level, moreover in direct competition with Israel) have in recent
years woven international relationships that, in perspective, since
relations with Moscow are strong, could have (and can) be useful levers for
a potential Turkish-Italian exit strategy from the North American sphere of
influence. The objective attempt by Rome and Ankara to increase their own
degrees of liberty in the international contest collided not only with the
general geopolitical interests of Washington and London but also with the
more `provincial' ones of Sarkozy's Union méditerranéenne.
Multipolarism between Regionalist and Eurasian Perspectives
The practice applied by the Western system, led by the US and intended, as
described above, to amplify the crises in Eurasia and in the Mediterranean
is not aimed at their stabilization. On the contrary, such a procedure is
devoted to maintain its own hegemony, through militarization of
international relationships and involvement of local actors. Moreover, this
kind of geopolitical `road map' is aimed at identifying other future
probable targets (Iran, Syria, Turkey) useful for the United State of
America's foothold in Eurasia, laying out some reflections regarding the
`health' of the US and the structuring of the multipolar system.
In a less superficial analysis, the aggression toward Libya by the US, Great
Britain and France, is not at all a sporadic case but a symptom of
Washington's difficulty in working diplomatically and with the sense of
responsibility that a global actor should have. This is shown by the
rapacious nature typical of a declining power. The American political
scientist and economist David. P. Calleo, critic of `unipolar folly' and
scholar of the decline of the US, noted in long-ago 1987 that, generally,
powers in the process of decline, rather than regulate and adapt themselves,
seek to cement its staggering dominance by transforming it in rapacious
hegemony10. Luca Lauriola in Scacco matto all'America e a Israele. Fine
dell'ultimo Impero11, (Checkmate for the US and Israel. The end of the last
empire) believes, reasonably, that the Eurasian powers Russia, China and
India handle the overseas power (i.e. USA), by now `lost and crazed', in a
way to not provoke reactions that could lead to planetary catastrophes.
Regarding the structuring of the multipolar system, it must be noted that
this advances slowly, not because of recent US actions in North Africa, but
rather because of the `regionalist' attitude adopted by the Eurasian actors
(Turkey, Russia and China) who, in evaluating the Mediterranean and Central
Asia as a function of their own national interests, fail to gather the
geostrategic significance that these areas perform in the larger scenario of
conflict between far-flung (US) and Eurasian geopolitical interests. The
rediscovery of a sole great Mediterranean-Central Asian space, highlighting
the role of `hinge' that this takes on in the Euro-Afro-Asian subdivision,
could provide operating elements to overcome the `regionalist' impasse
that
the unipolar-multipolar transition process is undergoing.
Tiberio Graziani, Director of Eurasia
and the series `Quaderni di Geopolitica (Edizioni all'insegna del Veltro,
Parma), is the President of the ISAG (Institute of Advance Studies in
Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences). He is the co-founder of the IEMASVO
(Institute of Advanced Studies for the Near and Middle East) and
vice-president for the years 2007-2008. He is a speaker at the international
conference World Public Forum - Dialogue of Civilizations. He was a lecturer
at the University of Perugia and L'Aquila. He has taught courses for the ICE
(Institute for Foreign Trade) in many countries, such as Uzbekistan, China,
India, Libya and Argentina. He may be contacted at:
[email protected]
NOTES
1 Elena Mazzeo, `La Turchia tra Europa e Asia', Eurasia. Rivista di Studi
Geopolitici, a. VIII, n.1 2011.
2 Turkey signed the Nato Treaty on 18 February 1952.
3 `Geopolitically, America is an island off the shores of the large
landmass of Eurasia, whose resources and population far exceed those of the
United States. The domination by a single power of either Eurasia's two
principal spheres - Europe or Asia - remains a good definition of strategic
danger for America, Cold War or no Cold War. For such a grouping would have
the capacity to outstrip America economically and, in the end, militarily.
That danger would have to be resisted even were the dominant power
apparently benevolent, for if the intentions ever changed, America would
find itself with a grossly diminished capacity for effective resistance and
a growing inability to shape events.' Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1994 p.813.
`Eurasia is the world's axial supercontinent. A power that dominated
Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world's three most
economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia. A glance at
the map also suggests that a country dominant in Eurasia would almost
automatically control the Middle East and Africa. With Eurasia now serving
as the decisive geopolitical chessboard, it no longer suffices to fashion
one policy for Europe and another for Asia. What happens with the
distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive
importance to America's global primacy and historical legacy.' Zbigniew
Brzezinski, "A Geostrategy for Eurasia," Foreign Affairs, 76:5,
September/October 1997.
4 Enrico Galoppini, Islamofobia, Edizioni all'insegna del Veltro, Parma
2008.
5 Jean Bricmont, Impérialisme humanitaire. Droits de l'homme, droit
d'ingérence, droit du plus fort?, Éditions Aden, Bruxelles 2005; Danilo
Zolo, Chi dice umanità. Guerra, diritto e ordine globale, Einaudi,
Torino 2000; Danilo Zolo, Terrorismo umanitario. Dalla guerra del Golfo
alla strage di Gaza, Diabasis, Reggio Emilia 2009.
6 `America as an `island' has become a common geopolitical descriptor,
quite similar to the geopolitics of England and Japan. Such an expression
underlies its maritime traditions of trade and of military intervention
overseas, and, of course, of its security-in- isolation and in distance.'.
Phil Kelly, `Geopolitica degli Stati Uniti d'America', Eurasia. Rivista
di Studi Geopolitici, a. VII, n.3 2010.
7 Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States
and the Balance of Power, Harcourt Brace, New York 1942.
8 `But I have no interest in diplomacy for the sake of returning Lebanon
and Israel to the status quo ante. I think it would be a mistake. What we're
seeing here, in a sense, is the growing - the birth pangs of a new Middle
East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we're pushing forward
to
the new Middle East not going back to the old one,' Special Briefing on
Travel to the Middle East and Europe, US, Department of State, 21 July 2006
9 Tiberio Graziani, `U.S. strategy in Eurasia and drug production in
Afghanistan', Moscow, 9-10 June 2010 (
http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/4670/u-s-strategy-in-eurasia-and-drug-production-in-afghanistan
)
10 David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The future of the Western
Alliance, New York 1987, p. 142.
11 Luca Lauriola, Scacco matto all'America e a Israele. Fine dell'ultimo
Impero, Palomar, Bari 2007.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=24747