RIA Novosti, Russia
May 27, 2011 Friday 2:05 PM GMT+3
West begins to reevaluate Saakashvili
RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin
After Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili broke up an opposition
rally in Tbilisi with rubber bullets, tear gas and clubs, Washington,
which provided one billion dollars in aid to Saakashvili two years
ago, was once again faced with the agonizing question of what to do
with the "first democrat" of the Caucasus.
This always happens when it is impossible to give up on somebody and
yet unqualified support seems inappropriate. It is always very
unpleasant to face the truth about one's political proteges. American
faced this situation repeatedly with its dictators in Central and
Latin America. President Franklin D. Roosevelt supposedly said of the
Nicaraguan dictator, "Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son
of a bitch." However, this is no basis for a foreign policy in the
21st century.
The last dictator and the first democrat
For all the differences between Alexander Lukashenko and Mikheil
Saakashvili, their attitude to demonstrations by the opposition is
very similar. This proposition may sound criminal until you look at it
through the lens of the law.
By law both Lukashenko and Saakashvili had every right to break up any
unsanctioned demonstration. This happened in Minsk last winter and in
Tbilisi on May 25. The consequences and response were completely
different, but this isn't the point, even though there was a lack of
objectivity in how they were portrayed. But everyone has the right to
political interpretation, and we do not live in an absolutely black
and white world.
However, as regards Saakashvili, especially after his performance with
clubs and police and his attempts to blame opposition leader Nino
Burdzhanadze for the death of a policeman during the effort to break
up the rally, the change of attitude is becoming more obvious. In this
volatile time of Arab revolutions and universal protest against
authoritarian rule (against dictators, tyrants, satraps and autocratic
rulers) it is very difficult to apply double standards - to see some
things in one place and turn a blind eye to very similar things in
others. All American and European newspapers acknowledge that the
change of attitude to Georgia and in Georgia itself would be much more
pronounced if Saakashvili did not have Russia for a neighbor. Both the
West and Georgia make allowances for Georgia's proximity to Russia in
order not to be blamed for being too pro-Russian.
Saakashvili's cessation from Georgia
The process of updating the view of the Georgian president, as well as
his government and entourage, is bound to develop faster after the
events of May 21-25. It will hardly lead to an early change in the
Tbilisi regime. Nobody is predicting a change of power in Georgia
before 2013 unless the opposition becomes strong enough for that, but
for the time being this looks unlikely.
However, the attitude toward Saakashvili is obviously changing. Many
more people understand now that democracy and Saakashvili are not
synonymous and that Georgia and Saakashvili are different things.
These metamorphoses are taking place not only in the expert community
but also, tacitly, in the U.S. administration. Jackson Diehl from The
Washington Post wrote about Saakashvili: "The truth is that it would
be considerably easier for the United States to defend Georgia and its
democracy [the author means 'from Russia' without mentioning this] if
it did not have to defend -- and depend on -- Saakashvili
himself...The crude public attacks on him by Putin and sidekick Dmitry
Medvedev, who publicly called him a 'lunatic' and 'bastard,' have only
served to strengthen Saakashvili both in Washington and Tbilisi." This
is usually said when it is clear that someone has become a burden but
"he's our son-of-a-bitch" and must be defended so that there is some
counterweight to the Russian bear.
Here is another brilliant passage worth quoting in full. Paul
Saunders, executive director of The Nixon Center, wrote: "Ultimately,
however, it wouldn't matter to Georgia's president whether the United
States was a democracy, a theocracy or ruled by Martians so long as he
could use Washington to change the dynamics of Georgian-Russian
relations."
Saakashvili should be given high marks for his ability to manipulate
public opinion. He is indeed very good at brainwashing his donors.
On the eve of U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Tbilisi in
2009, Saakashvili announced election reforms (direct elections of city
mayors) and promised the opposition a cable channel for broadcasting
all over Georgia. Biden, who is susceptible to flattery, was
surrounded with such attention that he promised Misha (Saakashvili) an
alliance for a long time to come. His words carried little weight but
had a big propaganda effect.
In the summer of 2010, Tbilisi was looking forward to the arrival of
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It was important to determine
how much Tbilisi could rely on the support of the Obama
administration. The opposition to Saakashvili was growing and his
former supporters were quitting his camp. Tbilisi was dying for a show
of U.S. sympathy.
It did not conceal that if Ms Clinton mentioned even once "Georgia's
illegally occupied territories" (that is, Abkhazia and South Ossetia),
the visit could be regarded a success. However, on this point Clinton
was evasive. She said only that Washington does not agree with the
presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and that the
U.S. and Russia are working together through the OSCE Minsk Group to
settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict even though they cannot agree on
Georgia. On her tour, Clinton repeatedly emphasized that although
Moscow and Washington are resetting their relations, they will not
necessarily agree on every issue. This statement was intended to
encourage the opponents of the reset, while not committing the Obama
administration to anything specific. But Clinton could have said the
same about the U.S. relations with Israel, France or Germany. It's
diplomatic boilerplate, nothing more. The expectations of the
Saakashvili regime were not quite justified.
Autocratic inheritance
Saakashvili's autocratic tendencies were noticed long before the
crackdowns on opposition demonstrations (in November 2007 or even
before and then this May). It was noticed even before the war in the
Caucasus in August 2008 and before he overthrew his patron, mentor and
benefactor Eduard Shevardnadze.
"I think that Misha tends toward the authoritarian," said Scott
Horton, a human rights lawyer in the United States who taught Mr.
Saakashvili when he was a student at Columbia Law School in the
mid-1990s, later hired him at a law firm in New York, and has remained
friendly with him. He mentioned Saakashvili's attitude to presidential
prerogatives and authority, attempts to marginalize the parliament and
belittle the opposition. But it cannot all be laid at Saakashvili's
door. Authoritarian tendencies are regional specialty.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
May 27, 2011 Friday 2:05 PM GMT+3
West begins to reevaluate Saakashvili
RIA Novosti political commentator Andrei Fedyashin
After Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili broke up an opposition
rally in Tbilisi with rubber bullets, tear gas and clubs, Washington,
which provided one billion dollars in aid to Saakashvili two years
ago, was once again faced with the agonizing question of what to do
with the "first democrat" of the Caucasus.
This always happens when it is impossible to give up on somebody and
yet unqualified support seems inappropriate. It is always very
unpleasant to face the truth about one's political proteges. American
faced this situation repeatedly with its dictators in Central and
Latin America. President Franklin D. Roosevelt supposedly said of the
Nicaraguan dictator, "Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son
of a bitch." However, this is no basis for a foreign policy in the
21st century.
The last dictator and the first democrat
For all the differences between Alexander Lukashenko and Mikheil
Saakashvili, their attitude to demonstrations by the opposition is
very similar. This proposition may sound criminal until you look at it
through the lens of the law.
By law both Lukashenko and Saakashvili had every right to break up any
unsanctioned demonstration. This happened in Minsk last winter and in
Tbilisi on May 25. The consequences and response were completely
different, but this isn't the point, even though there was a lack of
objectivity in how they were portrayed. But everyone has the right to
political interpretation, and we do not live in an absolutely black
and white world.
However, as regards Saakashvili, especially after his performance with
clubs and police and his attempts to blame opposition leader Nino
Burdzhanadze for the death of a policeman during the effort to break
up the rally, the change of attitude is becoming more obvious. In this
volatile time of Arab revolutions and universal protest against
authoritarian rule (against dictators, tyrants, satraps and autocratic
rulers) it is very difficult to apply double standards - to see some
things in one place and turn a blind eye to very similar things in
others. All American and European newspapers acknowledge that the
change of attitude to Georgia and in Georgia itself would be much more
pronounced if Saakashvili did not have Russia for a neighbor. Both the
West and Georgia make allowances for Georgia's proximity to Russia in
order not to be blamed for being too pro-Russian.
Saakashvili's cessation from Georgia
The process of updating the view of the Georgian president, as well as
his government and entourage, is bound to develop faster after the
events of May 21-25. It will hardly lead to an early change in the
Tbilisi regime. Nobody is predicting a change of power in Georgia
before 2013 unless the opposition becomes strong enough for that, but
for the time being this looks unlikely.
However, the attitude toward Saakashvili is obviously changing. Many
more people understand now that democracy and Saakashvili are not
synonymous and that Georgia and Saakashvili are different things.
These metamorphoses are taking place not only in the expert community
but also, tacitly, in the U.S. administration. Jackson Diehl from The
Washington Post wrote about Saakashvili: "The truth is that it would
be considerably easier for the United States to defend Georgia and its
democracy [the author means 'from Russia' without mentioning this] if
it did not have to defend -- and depend on -- Saakashvili
himself...The crude public attacks on him by Putin and sidekick Dmitry
Medvedev, who publicly called him a 'lunatic' and 'bastard,' have only
served to strengthen Saakashvili both in Washington and Tbilisi." This
is usually said when it is clear that someone has become a burden but
"he's our son-of-a-bitch" and must be defended so that there is some
counterweight to the Russian bear.
Here is another brilliant passage worth quoting in full. Paul
Saunders, executive director of The Nixon Center, wrote: "Ultimately,
however, it wouldn't matter to Georgia's president whether the United
States was a democracy, a theocracy or ruled by Martians so long as he
could use Washington to change the dynamics of Georgian-Russian
relations."
Saakashvili should be given high marks for his ability to manipulate
public opinion. He is indeed very good at brainwashing his donors.
On the eve of U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Tbilisi in
2009, Saakashvili announced election reforms (direct elections of city
mayors) and promised the opposition a cable channel for broadcasting
all over Georgia. Biden, who is susceptible to flattery, was
surrounded with such attention that he promised Misha (Saakashvili) an
alliance for a long time to come. His words carried little weight but
had a big propaganda effect.
In the summer of 2010, Tbilisi was looking forward to the arrival of
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It was important to determine
how much Tbilisi could rely on the support of the Obama
administration. The opposition to Saakashvili was growing and his
former supporters were quitting his camp. Tbilisi was dying for a show
of U.S. sympathy.
It did not conceal that if Ms Clinton mentioned even once "Georgia's
illegally occupied territories" (that is, Abkhazia and South Ossetia),
the visit could be regarded a success. However, on this point Clinton
was evasive. She said only that Washington does not agree with the
presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and that the
U.S. and Russia are working together through the OSCE Minsk Group to
settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict even though they cannot agree on
Georgia. On her tour, Clinton repeatedly emphasized that although
Moscow and Washington are resetting their relations, they will not
necessarily agree on every issue. This statement was intended to
encourage the opponents of the reset, while not committing the Obama
administration to anything specific. But Clinton could have said the
same about the U.S. relations with Israel, France or Germany. It's
diplomatic boilerplate, nothing more. The expectations of the
Saakashvili regime were not quite justified.
Autocratic inheritance
Saakashvili's autocratic tendencies were noticed long before the
crackdowns on opposition demonstrations (in November 2007 or even
before and then this May). It was noticed even before the war in the
Caucasus in August 2008 and before he overthrew his patron, mentor and
benefactor Eduard Shevardnadze.
"I think that Misha tends toward the authoritarian," said Scott
Horton, a human rights lawyer in the United States who taught Mr.
Saakashvili when he was a student at Columbia Law School in the
mid-1990s, later hired him at a law firm in New York, and has remained
friendly with him. He mentioned Saakashvili's attitude to presidential
prerogatives and authority, attempts to marginalize the parliament and
belittle the opposition. But it cannot all be laid at Saakashvili's
door. Authoritarian tendencies are regional specialty.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.