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EU ADMISSION REMAINS A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE FOR THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
news.am, Azerbaijan
Nov 2 2011
News.Az interviews Marina Vorotnyuk, research fellow of the Center
for International Studies of Odessa National University. Turkey has
lately assumed the role of leader of Islamic countries in the region
coming up with a number of peacekeeping initiatives. How successful
is this mission?
Turkey has actually intensified efforts in non-Western line of its
foreign policy seeking to improve relations with Muslim countries.
Turkey positions itself as a natural ~Smodel~T of how a country with
Muslim population develops secular democracy and market economy.
Ankara saw a special opportunity to renew its image as a model in
events of the "Arab Spring" in 2011. In wake of these events, it
particularly intensified dialogue with the Arab East, and it should be
noted that Turkey is indeed perceived as a model by certain segments
of the population of Muslim countries, including Turkic-speaking
nations. In general, it is very positive.
However, not everyone is happy at Turkey~Rs leadership ambitions and
it is doubtful that the forces that acceded to the power in Egypt,
Tunisia and Libya will follow Turkey~Rs path of development. The
question is to what degree Turkish model may be applicable in the
context of democratization of Arab countries. After all, there are
some doubts that the Turkish experience can be imposed on political
processes in these countries.
There seems to be less talk about EU admission in Turkey as of late.
Is Turkey really fed up with remarks by separate European leaders
pointing to reluctance to accept Turkey to a single European family?
EU admission remains a strategic objective for the Turkish Republic.
Wide-ranging reforms are still under way in all spheres of life
of Turkish society. And a special annual report on the progress
made by Turkey, developed by the EU institutions of the Union,
clearly indicates that there is a significant progress in terms of
the Europeanization of society. However, significant problems still
persist.
And despite the harsh statements by some European leaders and remote
prospects of Turkey~Rs EU membership, Turkey still continues to link
its future with the EU. Turkey believes this is not inconsistent at all
with its ambitions to achieve a regional and even global leadership,
'new' relations with the Arab East, Africa and Latin America -
previously "forgotten" regions in Turkey's foreign policy.
So, I believe it is premature and even groundless to say that the West,
Europe, in particular, has ~Slost~T Turkey. I believe the apocalyptic
scenarios that Turkey experiences religious revival and becomes ~Sa
second Iran~T are equally groundless.
Self-identification with the West is part of the Turkish mentality,
essential characteristic of the Turkish nation who lives in harmony
with other forms of identity - the Middle East, Balkans, etc.
What are your comments on Turkey-Russian rapprochement that we have
witnessed lately? Is this about economy only?
Russian-Turkish rapprochement, of course, is based on pragmatism,
but this not just about economy.
At the time, these relations experienced evolution partly because
Ankara~Rs plans to become a regional leader required it to ensure
rather predictable and stable atmosphere around it. And stable
relations with Russia were important precisely in this plane.
One Turkish scholar, in my view, has rightly described Russian-Turkish
relations as "managed rivalry" in which the parties can even work out
common positions on a number of issues, which does not eliminate their
competitive nature. However, this approach has its own "reefs." It
seems that current Russian political elite is not quite aware of the
nature of ongoing transformations in Turkey. And this alliance is
more of tactical nature rather than strategic and long-term.
What are chances of Armenia-Turkey normalization?
Unfortunately, the prospects of Turkey~Rs "policy of no problems with
neighbors", part of which was to normalize relations with Armenia,
is rather vague because of certain reasons. As of October 2011, Turkey
has not succeeded to reduce the existing conflicts to "zero." On top
of all, new contradictions have appeared.
Thus, Turkey found itself surrounded by the perimeter of countries
contradictions with which affect its regional policy. They are Armenia,
Syria, Iran, Israel, Cyprus and Greece. In my opinion, the idea that
the Turkish-Armenian normalization is possible in isolation from
the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh was doomed to failure from the very
start. As it was expected, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict inevitably
had an impact on Turkish-Armenian dialogue.
Shortly after the Georgia-Russia war, Turkey came up with several
initiatives to consolidate stability in the South Caucasus. But,
as it was expected, Armenia opposed Turkey's mediation in resolving
the Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, what are Ankara chances for
diplomatic maneuvers in this region?
It should be admitted that these opportunities are fairly limited. The
idea to create Caucasus Stability Platform, which would include
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Turkey, is, unfortunately,
only speculative construction, absolutely unattainable in practice
because of the regional realities at the current stage. In my opinion,
possible Turkish mediation in the Karabakh conflict does not meet
the requirements for this kind of interaction when the mediator is
expected by both conflicting parties to be neutral and impartial.
news.am, Azerbaijan
Nov 2 2011
News.Az interviews Marina Vorotnyuk, research fellow of the Center
for International Studies of Odessa National University. Turkey has
lately assumed the role of leader of Islamic countries in the region
coming up with a number of peacekeeping initiatives. How successful
is this mission?
Turkey has actually intensified efforts in non-Western line of its
foreign policy seeking to improve relations with Muslim countries.
Turkey positions itself as a natural ~Smodel~T of how a country with
Muslim population develops secular democracy and market economy.
Ankara saw a special opportunity to renew its image as a model in
events of the "Arab Spring" in 2011. In wake of these events, it
particularly intensified dialogue with the Arab East, and it should be
noted that Turkey is indeed perceived as a model by certain segments
of the population of Muslim countries, including Turkic-speaking
nations. In general, it is very positive.
However, not everyone is happy at Turkey~Rs leadership ambitions and
it is doubtful that the forces that acceded to the power in Egypt,
Tunisia and Libya will follow Turkey~Rs path of development. The
question is to what degree Turkish model may be applicable in the
context of democratization of Arab countries. After all, there are
some doubts that the Turkish experience can be imposed on political
processes in these countries.
There seems to be less talk about EU admission in Turkey as of late.
Is Turkey really fed up with remarks by separate European leaders
pointing to reluctance to accept Turkey to a single European family?
EU admission remains a strategic objective for the Turkish Republic.
Wide-ranging reforms are still under way in all spheres of life
of Turkish society. And a special annual report on the progress
made by Turkey, developed by the EU institutions of the Union,
clearly indicates that there is a significant progress in terms of
the Europeanization of society. However, significant problems still
persist.
And despite the harsh statements by some European leaders and remote
prospects of Turkey~Rs EU membership, Turkey still continues to link
its future with the EU. Turkey believes this is not inconsistent at all
with its ambitions to achieve a regional and even global leadership,
'new' relations with the Arab East, Africa and Latin America -
previously "forgotten" regions in Turkey's foreign policy.
So, I believe it is premature and even groundless to say that the West,
Europe, in particular, has ~Slost~T Turkey. I believe the apocalyptic
scenarios that Turkey experiences religious revival and becomes ~Sa
second Iran~T are equally groundless.
Self-identification with the West is part of the Turkish mentality,
essential characteristic of the Turkish nation who lives in harmony
with other forms of identity - the Middle East, Balkans, etc.
What are your comments on Turkey-Russian rapprochement that we have
witnessed lately? Is this about economy only?
Russian-Turkish rapprochement, of course, is based on pragmatism,
but this not just about economy.
At the time, these relations experienced evolution partly because
Ankara~Rs plans to become a regional leader required it to ensure
rather predictable and stable atmosphere around it. And stable
relations with Russia were important precisely in this plane.
One Turkish scholar, in my view, has rightly described Russian-Turkish
relations as "managed rivalry" in which the parties can even work out
common positions on a number of issues, which does not eliminate their
competitive nature. However, this approach has its own "reefs." It
seems that current Russian political elite is not quite aware of the
nature of ongoing transformations in Turkey. And this alliance is
more of tactical nature rather than strategic and long-term.
What are chances of Armenia-Turkey normalization?
Unfortunately, the prospects of Turkey~Rs "policy of no problems with
neighbors", part of which was to normalize relations with Armenia,
is rather vague because of certain reasons. As of October 2011, Turkey
has not succeeded to reduce the existing conflicts to "zero." On top
of all, new contradictions have appeared.
Thus, Turkey found itself surrounded by the perimeter of countries
contradictions with which affect its regional policy. They are Armenia,
Syria, Iran, Israel, Cyprus and Greece. In my opinion, the idea that
the Turkish-Armenian normalization is possible in isolation from
the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh was doomed to failure from the very
start. As it was expected, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict inevitably
had an impact on Turkish-Armenian dialogue.
Shortly after the Georgia-Russia war, Turkey came up with several
initiatives to consolidate stability in the South Caucasus. But,
as it was expected, Armenia opposed Turkey's mediation in resolving
the Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, what are Ankara chances for
diplomatic maneuvers in this region?
It should be admitted that these opportunities are fairly limited. The
idea to create Caucasus Stability Platform, which would include
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Turkey, is, unfortunately,
only speculative construction, absolutely unattainable in practice
because of the regional realities at the current stage. In my opinion,
possible Turkish mediation in the Karabakh conflict does not meet
the requirements for this kind of interaction when the mediator is
expected by both conflicting parties to be neutral and impartial.