A 'LONELY' DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL ASIA
Guner Ozkan
Journal of Turkish Weekly
Nov 4 2011
Kyrgyzstan is situated in a neighborhood in which no other resembles
it. Like it or not, and if not still showing a first class success,
Kyrgyzstan has managed to build a kind of democracy that was working
as seen few days ago. Kyrgyzstan conducted Presidential elections
on 30 October that was free, transparent and democratic in Central
Asian standards. Since the ouster of Kurmanbak Bakiyev in April 2010,
Kyrgyzstan has improved its democratic credentials, and people of the
country have shown their approval of this by voting yes to the leaders
of April 2010 'revolution' with % 63 in the elections. Few screams of
the defeated were heard but remained minor and weak. There are however
still great domestic challenges that both the President and government
in the country have to deal with from imrovement of economic well-being
and reduction of corruption to reconcliation between Kyrgyz and Uzbek
ethnic groups living in the south of the country. Prolongation of
these problems will always put the Kyrgyz politics into the risk
of facing violent social and political changes similar to the ones
withnessed twice within 20 years of its short independence.
If domestic problems all together is one thing, external challenge
is another in the case of Kyrgyzstan. They are, of course, strongly
linked to one another in what shape and intensity they would take. Due
to the weakness of the state and country, Kyrgyz democracy is very
much open to external influences that are exerted in the forms of
geopolitical games played by strong powers and antagonism exerted
by neighbouring Central Asian states. Of these actors, Russia is the
most important and influencial one. While Russia strongly being in the
region, it can be seen that Kyrgyzstan can and will only be able to
have a level of democracy that Armenia has since independence enjoyed
under Russia's orbit. Of couse not without any condition, that is, if
Kyrgyzstan plays the game according to the rules set by Vladimir Putin.
The 'Land', The 'Lord' and the Return of the 'King'
Central Asia as a whole is a land whose 'lordship' has gradually moved
back to Russia's orbit especially under Putin- a 'King' who is now
getting ready to re-claim his 'throne' in the Kremlin. Russia's renewed
dynamism in economic, political and security arenas in Central Asia
and Kyrgyzstan in particular is perhaps the most crucial determining
factor on the fate of Kyrgyz democracy in the coming years.
While he was still being the Prime Minister of the country, the
newly-elected President, Almazbek Atambayev, already uttered positive
views on whether his country should be part of Russian-led Customs
Union that came into force in January 2010 between the Russian
Federation, Belarus and Kazakstan. Despite some opposite views that
participation of Kyrgyzstan could harm country's economic interests
referring particulalry to those with China and committments made in
the World Trade Organisation, Atambayev has all along been willing
to joining to the grouping of the three. This decision of Atambayev
seemed to be perhaps made out of both economic necessity and political
'obligation' towards Russia. By doing this, Kyrgyzstan will secure
some economic gains like continuing to get Russian fuel with lower
cost, new financial loans and credits that were cancelled due for the
most part to Bakiyev's mischiefs before he was ousted in April 2010,
and free movement of migrant Kygzy workers in the Russian Federation,
number of whom are reported to be 600 thousands. It is important to
note that remittances of Kyrgyz workers in Russia are made up of 40 %
of Kyrgyzstan's annual budget- a significant income for a country in
which most people only earn about $ 1000 for their annual livelihoods.
In his Article in Izvestia on 4 October, Putin said "we are not
going to stop here [Customs Union] and are setting an ambitious goal-
to achieve an even higher integration level in the Eurasian Union."
Neither will the latest Eurasian Union proposal of Putin face a
challenge from Atambayev on Kyrgyzstan's own part since the latter
already thanked the soon-to-be-'recrowned King' of the Kremlin in a
number of times for his support in hard times of the country and the
run up to the Presidential elections. It is not indeed a coincidence
for many observers in and out of Kyrgyzstan that Atambayev was a man
of Putin and whose support was seen as the main factor in the recent
race to the top job in the Kyrgyz elections.
On the security sector, Russia, or in true sense of the word Putin,
factor can be clearly seen and heard. The new President of Kyrgyzstan
has repeated again and again that Manas Air Base used by the US in
the war effort in Afghanistan will be closed by the end of the lease
in 2014. Why does he need to repeat this pledge so often while there
are still a lengty time to discuss the contract? Likewise, Kyrgyz,
Russian and American parties recently sorted out the most contentious
fuel delivery issue to the Manas Base since the overthrow of Bakiyev
by taking the Russian side into the business. Nothing, but the Putin
factor tells the truth. It is him who was all the way strongly opposed
to the maintenance of the Manas Base during the Bakiyev reign. It was
one of the main factors that led to the ouster of Bakiyev. In fact,
Putin's opposition to the Manas Base was not necessarily caused by
its harm to the Russia's national interests. Just the opposite, when
realistically thinking, the Manas Base was and is an important element
in the figth against radicalism and drug trafficking in Afghanistan
and whose stabilisation is of great importance for the security of
Russian Federation. Why then? It is just for pride Putin feels and so
to play a greater role in the region and not to leave the place like
a free land where the US seems to have largely rode its own horses.
What will then all these make with Kyrgyz democracy?
Armenian Model for Kyrgyz Democracy
Cutting it short, Russia is the main actor in the region and Kyrgyzstan
in particular. It seems to continue like that for a considerable time
period as Putin, the main architect of a numer of Russian economic,
politcal and security assertiveness in Cenral Asia since 2000, set
off for the Kremlin in 2012. All these do not suggest Kyrgyz democracy
will fail in its accomplishment of more proggress.
Quite the opposite, it can still make.
Kyrgyzstan will not have anything better to offer in the name of
democracy in Post-Soviet space than what Armenia has already offered.
Unlike other states in post-Soviet territories, Armenia has enjoyed at
least a certain degree of electoral democracy- smooth successions of
Presidents/governments via elections which were faily transparant and
democratic. But this has been succeeded by the Armenian policy makers
only through political, economic and security integration with Russia.
Today at least 80 %, if not all, Armenian economy is owned and run by
Russian capital from construction and telecomunication industries to
energy sector. Country's security has been long taken under guarantee
by Russian arms sold in lower prices to Yerevan and military base in
Gymri, the lease of which was extended up until 2044 with the agrement
signed in August 2010. Also, Armenia is the most enthusiastic supporter
among all post-Soviet countries on stronger political and military
integration around Russian-led organisations like Commonwealth of
Independent States and Collective Security Threaty Organisation. Hence,
Armenia has long been safe and secure in economic and political terms
thanks to Russia, and able to excersise its 'unique' democracy under
that protection, and will look like to be so at least until the year
2044. After then? Who knows what happens in this geography!
All these suggest very clearly that as long as Kyrgyzstan continues
to act in line with what Putin wants it to act in political, economic
and security matters, then Kyrgyzstan can excercise as much freedom
and democracy as it would like to have. The Kyrgyz state, no matter
if it is democratic or not, is far from resolving its heavy domestic
problems. It has always been, and will likey be, in need of material,
financial and security asistance from outside. No other power,
but Russia, is willing to provide such a level of assistance to
Kyrgyzstan. It appears that Atambayev has already been promissed of
getting Russian financial aid since the release of about $ 107 million
loan to Kyrgyzstan through Minister of Finance of Russia is being in
these days talked. Other actors like the US and EU are very cautious
and weary about what kind of solid policies they should adopt towards
Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia in general. Comparing Russian presence in
the country, economic and military engagement of these actors always
remained cautiously designed and stingily implemented. In terms of
their democracy advocacy, both the US and the EU already threw in
the towel as seen in the examples of their re-engagemet with Islam
Kerimov of Uzbekistan without any condition on the latter's appalling
democracy rank and human rights crimes.
In such a domestic and international environment, the new democracy
attempt of Kyrgyzstan will probably be bound to what others are
thinking and doing about it. Most importantly, it will be Putin,
as the new 'King' in the Kremlin from 2012 onwards. As long as
Kyrgyz leadership manages to establish a fine balance and sustains it
manly between Russia and the US, it may have a chance to enhance its
democratic development, at least in electoral form, in a confined space
of country's trecherous borders. Kyrgyz democracy will therefore still
be as lonely as it has been in Central Asia for a long time, just like
the one Armenia has about 20 years 'relished' in the South Caucasus.
Guner Ozkan
Journal of Turkish Weekly
Nov 4 2011
Kyrgyzstan is situated in a neighborhood in which no other resembles
it. Like it or not, and if not still showing a first class success,
Kyrgyzstan has managed to build a kind of democracy that was working
as seen few days ago. Kyrgyzstan conducted Presidential elections
on 30 October that was free, transparent and democratic in Central
Asian standards. Since the ouster of Kurmanbak Bakiyev in April 2010,
Kyrgyzstan has improved its democratic credentials, and people of the
country have shown their approval of this by voting yes to the leaders
of April 2010 'revolution' with % 63 in the elections. Few screams of
the defeated were heard but remained minor and weak. There are however
still great domestic challenges that both the President and government
in the country have to deal with from imrovement of economic well-being
and reduction of corruption to reconcliation between Kyrgyz and Uzbek
ethnic groups living in the south of the country. Prolongation of
these problems will always put the Kyrgyz politics into the risk
of facing violent social and political changes similar to the ones
withnessed twice within 20 years of its short independence.
If domestic problems all together is one thing, external challenge
is another in the case of Kyrgyzstan. They are, of course, strongly
linked to one another in what shape and intensity they would take. Due
to the weakness of the state and country, Kyrgyz democracy is very
much open to external influences that are exerted in the forms of
geopolitical games played by strong powers and antagonism exerted
by neighbouring Central Asian states. Of these actors, Russia is the
most important and influencial one. While Russia strongly being in the
region, it can be seen that Kyrgyzstan can and will only be able to
have a level of democracy that Armenia has since independence enjoyed
under Russia's orbit. Of couse not without any condition, that is, if
Kyrgyzstan plays the game according to the rules set by Vladimir Putin.
The 'Land', The 'Lord' and the Return of the 'King'
Central Asia as a whole is a land whose 'lordship' has gradually moved
back to Russia's orbit especially under Putin- a 'King' who is now
getting ready to re-claim his 'throne' in the Kremlin. Russia's renewed
dynamism in economic, political and security arenas in Central Asia
and Kyrgyzstan in particular is perhaps the most crucial determining
factor on the fate of Kyrgyz democracy in the coming years.
While he was still being the Prime Minister of the country, the
newly-elected President, Almazbek Atambayev, already uttered positive
views on whether his country should be part of Russian-led Customs
Union that came into force in January 2010 between the Russian
Federation, Belarus and Kazakstan. Despite some opposite views that
participation of Kyrgyzstan could harm country's economic interests
referring particulalry to those with China and committments made in
the World Trade Organisation, Atambayev has all along been willing
to joining to the grouping of the three. This decision of Atambayev
seemed to be perhaps made out of both economic necessity and political
'obligation' towards Russia. By doing this, Kyrgyzstan will secure
some economic gains like continuing to get Russian fuel with lower
cost, new financial loans and credits that were cancelled due for the
most part to Bakiyev's mischiefs before he was ousted in April 2010,
and free movement of migrant Kygzy workers in the Russian Federation,
number of whom are reported to be 600 thousands. It is important to
note that remittances of Kyrgyz workers in Russia are made up of 40 %
of Kyrgyzstan's annual budget- a significant income for a country in
which most people only earn about $ 1000 for their annual livelihoods.
In his Article in Izvestia on 4 October, Putin said "we are not
going to stop here [Customs Union] and are setting an ambitious goal-
to achieve an even higher integration level in the Eurasian Union."
Neither will the latest Eurasian Union proposal of Putin face a
challenge from Atambayev on Kyrgyzstan's own part since the latter
already thanked the soon-to-be-'recrowned King' of the Kremlin in a
number of times for his support in hard times of the country and the
run up to the Presidential elections. It is not indeed a coincidence
for many observers in and out of Kyrgyzstan that Atambayev was a man
of Putin and whose support was seen as the main factor in the recent
race to the top job in the Kyrgyz elections.
On the security sector, Russia, or in true sense of the word Putin,
factor can be clearly seen and heard. The new President of Kyrgyzstan
has repeated again and again that Manas Air Base used by the US in
the war effort in Afghanistan will be closed by the end of the lease
in 2014. Why does he need to repeat this pledge so often while there
are still a lengty time to discuss the contract? Likewise, Kyrgyz,
Russian and American parties recently sorted out the most contentious
fuel delivery issue to the Manas Base since the overthrow of Bakiyev
by taking the Russian side into the business. Nothing, but the Putin
factor tells the truth. It is him who was all the way strongly opposed
to the maintenance of the Manas Base during the Bakiyev reign. It was
one of the main factors that led to the ouster of Bakiyev. In fact,
Putin's opposition to the Manas Base was not necessarily caused by
its harm to the Russia's national interests. Just the opposite, when
realistically thinking, the Manas Base was and is an important element
in the figth against radicalism and drug trafficking in Afghanistan
and whose stabilisation is of great importance for the security of
Russian Federation. Why then? It is just for pride Putin feels and so
to play a greater role in the region and not to leave the place like
a free land where the US seems to have largely rode its own horses.
What will then all these make with Kyrgyz democracy?
Armenian Model for Kyrgyz Democracy
Cutting it short, Russia is the main actor in the region and Kyrgyzstan
in particular. It seems to continue like that for a considerable time
period as Putin, the main architect of a numer of Russian economic,
politcal and security assertiveness in Cenral Asia since 2000, set
off for the Kremlin in 2012. All these do not suggest Kyrgyz democracy
will fail in its accomplishment of more proggress.
Quite the opposite, it can still make.
Kyrgyzstan will not have anything better to offer in the name of
democracy in Post-Soviet space than what Armenia has already offered.
Unlike other states in post-Soviet territories, Armenia has enjoyed at
least a certain degree of electoral democracy- smooth successions of
Presidents/governments via elections which were faily transparant and
democratic. But this has been succeeded by the Armenian policy makers
only through political, economic and security integration with Russia.
Today at least 80 %, if not all, Armenian economy is owned and run by
Russian capital from construction and telecomunication industries to
energy sector. Country's security has been long taken under guarantee
by Russian arms sold in lower prices to Yerevan and military base in
Gymri, the lease of which was extended up until 2044 with the agrement
signed in August 2010. Also, Armenia is the most enthusiastic supporter
among all post-Soviet countries on stronger political and military
integration around Russian-led organisations like Commonwealth of
Independent States and Collective Security Threaty Organisation. Hence,
Armenia has long been safe and secure in economic and political terms
thanks to Russia, and able to excersise its 'unique' democracy under
that protection, and will look like to be so at least until the year
2044. After then? Who knows what happens in this geography!
All these suggest very clearly that as long as Kyrgyzstan continues
to act in line with what Putin wants it to act in political, economic
and security matters, then Kyrgyzstan can excercise as much freedom
and democracy as it would like to have. The Kyrgyz state, no matter
if it is democratic or not, is far from resolving its heavy domestic
problems. It has always been, and will likey be, in need of material,
financial and security asistance from outside. No other power,
but Russia, is willing to provide such a level of assistance to
Kyrgyzstan. It appears that Atambayev has already been promissed of
getting Russian financial aid since the release of about $ 107 million
loan to Kyrgyzstan through Minister of Finance of Russia is being in
these days talked. Other actors like the US and EU are very cautious
and weary about what kind of solid policies they should adopt towards
Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia in general. Comparing Russian presence in
the country, economic and military engagement of these actors always
remained cautiously designed and stingily implemented. In terms of
their democracy advocacy, both the US and the EU already threw in
the towel as seen in the examples of their re-engagemet with Islam
Kerimov of Uzbekistan without any condition on the latter's appalling
democracy rank and human rights crimes.
In such a domestic and international environment, the new democracy
attempt of Kyrgyzstan will probably be bound to what others are
thinking and doing about it. Most importantly, it will be Putin,
as the new 'King' in the Kremlin from 2012 onwards. As long as
Kyrgyz leadership manages to establish a fine balance and sustains it
manly between Russia and the US, it may have a chance to enhance its
democratic development, at least in electoral form, in a confined space
of country's trecherous borders. Kyrgyz democracy will therefore still
be as lonely as it has been in Central Asia for a long time, just like
the one Armenia has about 20 years 'relished' in the South Caucasus.