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BAKU: Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement: Time To Re-Consider?

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  • BAKU: Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement: Time To Re-Consider?

    TURKISH-ARMENIAN RAPPROCHEMENT: TIME TO RE-CONSIDER?

    news.az
    Nov 10 2011
    Azerbaijan

    by Zaur Shiriyev, analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies under
    the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

    The international media has shown renewed interest in the
    revitalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, which has spawned a
    number of conferences and meetings. It comes as no surprise that
    during the Annual Conference on U.S-Turkey relations on 31 October,
    U.S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that progress in
    Armenian-Turkish relations would be a positive step [if] the Turkish
    government will ratify the Armenian-Turkish protocol. Clinton's remark
    that "normalization takes bold choices and strong political will, not
    only on the part of Turkey, but on the part of all of the countries"
    indirectly underscored Azerbaijan's role in this process.

    Following the earthquake in Van (a city in south-eastern Turkey),
    Armenian officials declared their readiness to send a planeload of
    humanitarian aid to the survivors. The same response came from Israel,
    indicating that both countries are keen to use the Van eearthquake
    as a diplomatic tool, to open or revitalize diplomatic relations with
    Turkey. This "earthquake diplomacy" has a precedent- Greece provided
    assistance to Turkey, its historical rival, after thousands died in
    the 1999 Izmit earthquake. It is important to remember, however, that
    the rapprochement process between Greece and Turkey pre-dated Izmit,
    and that both countries' foreign ministers (George Papandreou of Greece
    and Ismail Cem of Turkey) were crucially involved in discussions.

    However, as Armenian media coverage shows, the responses of the
    Armenian government and the Armenian public to the Van earthquake have
    not been not entirely consistent, a factor which has implications for
    diplomatic relations. In Armenian Public radio's 2 November report,
    Armenian experts discussed the situation of "Armenian monuments",
    referring to Van as historical Armenian land. On 24 October, times.am
    website reported the earthquake in Van was most discussed topic
    on social media by Armenian users. The tragedy prompted different
    feelings among Armenians: some expressed sympathy, while others
    were indifferent. These examples indicate that there is significant
    variation in public attitudes towards the earthquake, which throws
    into doubt the Armenian government's "earthquake diplomacy" strategy-
    suggesting that it is motivated more by diplomatic image-building and
    PR concerns than genuine compassion. By its very nature, humanitarian
    aid must be non-ideological and must underscore the fact that humans,
    regardless of their differences, are victims of a shared tragedy -
    this not seen in Armenia.

    Given the international media's interest in the prospects of
    Turkish-Armenian normalization, the following question must be
    addressed: what changed two years after the protocols were signed?

    Two Years after the Protocols

    Exactly two years have passed since Turkey and Armenia signed two
    protocols in Zurich, one on the establishment of diplomatic relations,
    the other on the development of bilateral relations. On 29-30 October,
    important academic discussions were held in Istanbul, under the title,
    "The Normalization Process between Turkey and Armenia: Prospects for
    Revitalization". In attendance were experts from Turkey, Armenia,
    and Azerbaijan as well as international representatives. This was,
    significantly, the first time Azerbaijani experts have participated
    in rapprochement discussions. A number of Armenian experts declared
    that "the protocols are dead", but that Track 2 diplomacy (civil
    society engagement) remains in play. One Armenian expert, Richard
    Giragosian, expressed his anxiety that [if] the stars don't realign,
    and normalization doesn't return to Track 1 state level, there is
    a danger that next time we try this it will be that much harder, as
    he said to press.am on 1 November. It is interesting that Armenian
    experts are not denying that the Armenian Diaspora will force Turkey's
    acknowledgment of the 1915 events as genocide - one Armenian expert
    presented this attitude in a heartfelt and personalized manner:
    'Denying "genocide" is denying the existence of my grandfather". By
    all accounts, most experts agreed that normalization requires progress
    on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by the Minsk Group,
    and progress in that area does not seem possible [for now].

    Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement: Bullish forecasts, Miscalculations
    & Mistakes

    In fact, despite the hopeful forecasts by some analysts in the wake
    of the 2009 Turkish-Armenian protocols, an assessment two years on
    reveals the miscalculations and false assumptions that were made:

    1.Turkish-Armenian rapprochement will enable Armenia's integration
    to the West

    It was assumed both in the West and in Turkey that via the
    normalization process, Armenia would turn its face to the West. In
    terms of geography, Armenia's only access to Europe is via Turkey,
    and opening the border will be facilitate politically integration
    to Europe. Improvements in relations between Ankara and Yerevan,
    most U.S strategists contended, would help not only to stabilize
    the volatile South Caucasus but also to reduce Armenia's political
    and economic dependence on Russia and Iran - which clearly serves
    American interests.

    However, it is common knowledge that for as long as there are
    Russian military bases inside Armenia and along her borders, and
    Armenian airspace is under the protection of Russian forces, Armenia
    can easily resist any sort of pressure from Azerbaijan or Turkey,
    and can safely deter any threat to forcefully liberate the occupied
    territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. After all, it is clear to Russia and
    many others that peace with Turkey alone is not enough to integrate
    Yerevan to West or to reduce Russian influence in this country. This
    was proven, in part, when Armenia signed an agreement to prolong
    the lease for Russian military bases on its territory in mid-2010,
    a move which strengthened Russia's position in Armenia.

    2.Recognition of 1915 events as genocide would not happen with the
    normalization of relations with Armenia

    U.S President Barack Obama explicitly declared during his election
    campaign that the 1915 events should be recognized by U.S as genocide.

    Thus, in order to prevent "April Syndrome" - every year the U.S
    president makes a speech regarding the 1915 events, and Turkey always
    waits to see whether or not the term "genocide" will be used- the
    Turkish government chose a way to cooperate with the U.S-led peace and
    normalization process. The Obama administration played the role of a
    catalyst rather than a founder, since secret negotiations had already
    started between the two parties long before Obama was elected. While
    aiming to reduce international pressure regarding the genocide issue
    by improving relations with Armenia, Turkey risked losing its closest
    ally - Azerbaijan. In Armenia, the January 12 2010 session of the
    Constitutional Court emphasized that Armenia will continue its effort
    to achieve international recognition of the 1915 events as genocide
    - and indeed, on March 4 2010, the House of Representatives Foreign
    Affairs Committee of the U.S voted 'yes' with 23-22 votes to HR 252.

    This development reignited the debates in Turkey about the possible
    consequences of the U.S's genocide recognition, and the chances of
    salvaging the stalled "normalization process" with Armenia.

    3.Turkey will happily go against Azerbaijani interests

    The miscalculations on Armenia's part were based on the belief
    that Turkey would not balk at following policies running counter to
    Azerbaijani interests, and that the rapprochement would damage this
    strategic partnership. Turkish-Azerbaijani relations occasionally
    deteriorated, and sometimes were in crisis, but the Turkish-Armenian
    rapprochement has also had a positive impact on Turkish-Azerbaijani
    relations; last year, the two countries signed not only a Strategic
    Partnership Agreement, but also more recently an agreement regarding
    selling gas to Turkey. Additionally, NGOs, media, and educational
    institutions intensified and expanded their relations.

    4.Azerbaijan is an observer and will react to the normalization
    process based on emotions

    The opening of the Turkey-Armenia border has been subject to criticism
    from both the opposition and ruling party in Azerbaijan. When Turkey
    and Armenia agreed to begin negotiations on diplomatic relations,
    this raised concerns in government and amongst the Azerbaijani
    public, across extreme nationalist groups and moderates, giving
    rise to discussions of Turkey's policy aims in Armenia. Generally,
    the public dismissed Turkish attitudes as "naive". The government
    was not emotional and did not voice its position until the official
    declaration of the "road map" for Turkish-Armenian relations in April
    2009, and the signing of the Protocols in October 2009.

    Then Azerbaijan appealed to Turkish public opinion, reaching out
    across Turkey's government, political parties, civil society, and
    population at large, calling upon them to take Azerbaijan's interests
    into account. Thus, this process prompted Azerbaijan to exercise its
    regional veto power, revealing the changing dynamics of international
    foreign policy, to act in time to protect national interest.

    The observer during the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process was
    Georgia, where public opinion saw the thaw between Turkey and Armenia
    as a U.S project whereby Georgia's position region was supposed
    to be taken over by Armenia. In general, Georgia believed that the
    Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would weaken its position as a major
    transit country in the region, and that Tbilisi would lose its place
    in energy projects. Secondly, Armenia's reduced dependency on Georgia
    would enable it to be more active in supporting Armenian nationalist
    groups active in the Georgian province of Samtskhe-Javakheti, thereby
    destabilizing the region.

    Meanwhile, Azerbaijani political circles remain unopposed to the
    normalization of Turkish-Armenians relations per se; however, they
    would like to see this process tied to the withdrawal of Armenian
    military forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. At present,
    there is relatively little pressure on Turkey but in anticipation
    of 2015, which will be the 100th anniversary of the events in 1915,
    it may increase, and could, as a result, be a crucial date for
    the protocols. This is the main issue that Turkish policy makers
    should be thinking about. Undoubtedly the 2012 elections in Georgia,
    Russia and Armenia - as well as in the France and U.S - will change
    the political face of the region and beyond, and these changes will
    resonate internationally. This could be an opportunity, but it is
    also true that there is less chance of peace being achieved close
    to elections.

    Conclusion

    In this context, it is of particular importance that the U.S. and
    the EU get more seriously involved in the resolution of the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict if they want to see tangible progress in
    the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. Turkish-Armenian
    negotiations brought about the signing of the protocols in 2009,
    in which the leaders of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs countries were
    involved; Azerbaijanis want to see same "picture" for the resolution
    of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    In short: the protocol-based normalization process will neither end
    campaigns for the recognition of the 1915 events as genocide nor
    necessarily advance the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
    as long as the process remains in limbo. Overcoming the traditional
    way of thinking is necessary in order to change the status quo in
    the Armenian-Azerbaijani-Turkish triangle. Armenia must foresee the
    implications of its policy decisions in the context of the broader
    geopolitical agenda of the Caucasus. Azerbaijan will accept the
    opening of the Armenian -Turkish border, but because the reason
    for closing it in 1993 was Armenia's occupation of the Azerbaijani
    district of Kelbajar, this move will not change the dynamics of
    conflict resolution; nor contribute to the foreseeable revitalization
    of Turkish-Armenian relations at the level of Track 1 diplomacy.

    Zaur Shiriyev is a Foreign Policy Analyst at the Center for Strategic
    Studies in Baku, Azerbaijan and the Executive Editor of Caucasus
    International journal.



    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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