Tweet
'AZERBAIJANI ELECTION TO NON-PERMANENT SEAT IN UNSC MIGHT HELP INDIRECTLY'
news.az
Nov 16 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews Carlo Frappi, a Researcher at the Milan-Based
Institute for International Political Studies Programme on Caucasus
and Central Asia.
What kind of changes towards the South Caucasus may we expect in the
Italian foreign policy with a new government after S.Berlusconi?
The fall of Berlusconi government won't have a remarkable impact on
Italian foreign policy toward the Southern Caucasus. In fact, Italian
interests and policies toward the area have traditionally been - and
will remain in the future - independent from governments political
affiliation.
In particular, due to the evident importance gained by Azerbaijan in
Italian energy supply system - in 2011, as a consequence of the Libyan
crisis, it became our first oil supplier with a share of 18% of
imports - and the potential to become a vital hub for European and
Italian gas supply, it is predictable that the relation between Rome
and Baku might further deepen in the near future, making Azerbaijan
the cornerstone of our regional policy.
As a matter of fact, Italy enjoys a unique position in the area and,
particularly, vis a vis Azerbaijan. Economically, Italy is by far the
first recipient of Azerbaijani export. Politically, it is the only EU
member state which is free from diaspora politics and which enjoys
very good relations not only with the Southern Caucasus republics, but
also with the pivotal actors in the wider region - namely Russia,
Turkey and, even thought to a different and lesser extent, Iran.
What are the main threats for security in the South Caucasus?
Of course the issue of Southern Caucasus' protracted conflicts still
represents the main regional threat both from a regional perspective
and from a wider Eurasian one. In fact, not only protracted conflicts
hinder the coherent and comprehensive development of all the Southern
Caucasus republics as well as regional cooperation, but they hamper
equally the possibilities of enhancing regional and inter-regional
cooperation - as in the August 2008 conflict between Georgia and
Russia perfectly highlighted.
Russia is a lonely active mediator in the Karabakh settlement. Can
this problem be resolved by Russia?
Russia has the upper hand in negotiations. Any solution to the
Karabakh issue will undoubtedly involve Russia. It is difficult,
however, to single out any kind of concrete Russian interest in the
resolution of the conflict, which still provides Russia with an
important tool for influence in the region. Only in the framework of a
wider understanding and engagement on security issues between Russia
and its Euro-Atlantic interlocutors it is possible to foresee a way
out to regional conflicts and, generally speaking, a way to avoid that
the Southern Caucasus - as well as eastern Europe - fall victim of
Eurasian power competition.
The EU expresses a wish to get involved in the Karabakh settlement.
What can the EU do to help to solve the problem?
The EU is, of course, the main actor interested in avoiding the
perpetuation of a 'grey zone' in between the enlarged Euro-Atlantic
space and the Russian influence area. I'm afraid, however, that as
long as EU member states won't develop a single view on how to deal
with Russia, it will be difficult - if not impossible - for the Union
to become an influential actor in the Southern Caucasus.
Having said that, I think EU might engage in the resolution of the
Karabakh issue at least in two different ways. First of all, and
generally speaking, the EU should work to fill the perception gap
evident in what Dov Lynch called the 'proximity-distance paradox' -
which sees the Caucasus region as close enough to be part of European
security space but, as the same time, distant enough that threats
emerging from the region are not perceived as immediate. On the other
hand, and in connection to the Karabakh settlement, the EU may
identify an eminent and unbiased personality credible enough to give
new impetus to and guide the negotiations on its behalf.
May Azerbaijan's membership to the UN Security Council assist somehow
move forward the Karabakh peace process?
Unfortunately, I do not think that there is a direct correlation
between the two. Having said that, I'm however sure that the
Azerbaijani election to a non-permanent seat in the UNSC - which
already stands as a proof of growing relevance in international arena
and as a success for its diplomacy - might help indirectly Azerbaijan
through enhancing both its international status and visibility.
From: Baghdasarian
news.az
Nov 16 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews Carlo Frappi, a Researcher at the Milan-Based
Institute for International Political Studies Programme on Caucasus
and Central Asia.
What kind of changes towards the South Caucasus may we expect in the
Italian foreign policy with a new government after S.Berlusconi?
The fall of Berlusconi government won't have a remarkable impact on
Italian foreign policy toward the Southern Caucasus. In fact, Italian
interests and policies toward the area have traditionally been - and
will remain in the future - independent from governments political
affiliation.
In particular, due to the evident importance gained by Azerbaijan in
Italian energy supply system - in 2011, as a consequence of the Libyan
crisis, it became our first oil supplier with a share of 18% of
imports - and the potential to become a vital hub for European and
Italian gas supply, it is predictable that the relation between Rome
and Baku might further deepen in the near future, making Azerbaijan
the cornerstone of our regional policy.
As a matter of fact, Italy enjoys a unique position in the area and,
particularly, vis a vis Azerbaijan. Economically, Italy is by far the
first recipient of Azerbaijani export. Politically, it is the only EU
member state which is free from diaspora politics and which enjoys
very good relations not only with the Southern Caucasus republics, but
also with the pivotal actors in the wider region - namely Russia,
Turkey and, even thought to a different and lesser extent, Iran.
What are the main threats for security in the South Caucasus?
Of course the issue of Southern Caucasus' protracted conflicts still
represents the main regional threat both from a regional perspective
and from a wider Eurasian one. In fact, not only protracted conflicts
hinder the coherent and comprehensive development of all the Southern
Caucasus republics as well as regional cooperation, but they hamper
equally the possibilities of enhancing regional and inter-regional
cooperation - as in the August 2008 conflict between Georgia and
Russia perfectly highlighted.
Russia is a lonely active mediator in the Karabakh settlement. Can
this problem be resolved by Russia?
Russia has the upper hand in negotiations. Any solution to the
Karabakh issue will undoubtedly involve Russia. It is difficult,
however, to single out any kind of concrete Russian interest in the
resolution of the conflict, which still provides Russia with an
important tool for influence in the region. Only in the framework of a
wider understanding and engagement on security issues between Russia
and its Euro-Atlantic interlocutors it is possible to foresee a way
out to regional conflicts and, generally speaking, a way to avoid that
the Southern Caucasus - as well as eastern Europe - fall victim of
Eurasian power competition.
The EU expresses a wish to get involved in the Karabakh settlement.
What can the EU do to help to solve the problem?
The EU is, of course, the main actor interested in avoiding the
perpetuation of a 'grey zone' in between the enlarged Euro-Atlantic
space and the Russian influence area. I'm afraid, however, that as
long as EU member states won't develop a single view on how to deal
with Russia, it will be difficult - if not impossible - for the Union
to become an influential actor in the Southern Caucasus.
Having said that, I think EU might engage in the resolution of the
Karabakh issue at least in two different ways. First of all, and
generally speaking, the EU should work to fill the perception gap
evident in what Dov Lynch called the 'proximity-distance paradox' -
which sees the Caucasus region as close enough to be part of European
security space but, as the same time, distant enough that threats
emerging from the region are not perceived as immediate. On the other
hand, and in connection to the Karabakh settlement, the EU may
identify an eminent and unbiased personality credible enough to give
new impetus to and guide the negotiations on its behalf.
May Azerbaijan's membership to the UN Security Council assist somehow
move forward the Karabakh peace process?
Unfortunately, I do not think that there is a direct correlation
between the two. Having said that, I'm however sure that the
Azerbaijani election to a non-permanent seat in the UNSC - which
already stands as a proof of growing relevance in international arena
and as a success for its diplomacy - might help indirectly Azerbaijan
through enhancing both its international status and visibility.
From: Baghdasarian